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Major Professor: Daniel O. Dahlstrom, John R. Silber Professor of Philosophy 
ABSTRACT 
 After countering claims that truth cannot be a norm of belief, this dissertation 
argues that truth’s normativity is grounded in personhood. It does so by attending to the 
fact that truth is a norm for the human person, and to the relationships between the human 
person and the objective goodness and value of truth. The dissertation develops this 
argument by critically appropriating writings of Thomas Aquinas and representatives of 
twentieth-century personalism on the relationship between truth and the human person. 
            The dissertation’s initial chapters rebut objections (1) that the involuntariness of 
belief rules out any possibility of norms of belief, (2) that truth cannot be a norm of belief 
because truth is unable to provide guidance in determining what to believe, and (3) that it 
is incompatible with other norms of belief such as justification.  It rebuts the first 
objection by challenging its general account of belief and outlining an alternative 
account. It responds to the second argument by criticizing its understanding 
of guidance as overly narrow and sketching an alternative notion of guidance-by-
value.  It counters the third objection by arguing for the primacy of the truth-norm. 
            The dissertation then takes up the question of what grounds the truth-norm. 
Chapter Three surveys recent accounts, drawing from its survey a set of desiderata for 
 viii 
 
any satisfactory account. Chapter Four begins the dissertation’s account of the 
normativity of truth. Working from Dietrich von Hildebrand’s conception of objective 
goods, it argues that truth is an objective good for the person by showing how deeply 
interwoven truth is with friendship. Given that friendship is an objective good for the 
person, and that truth stands in certain intimate relationships to friendship, it follows that 
truth is an objective good for the person. Chapter Five rounds out the argument. The 
objective goodness of truth entails that truth is a value. Values are normative for persons. 
Therefore, truth is normative for the human person. This chapter defends the claim that 
values are normative for persons by elucidating the dependency of the realization of 
personhood—in several of its various dimensions—on value-grasping and value-realizing 
acts.  
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Introduction 
A joke is told about a philosophy professor who, upon declaring to his students 
that a certain conclusion was obvious, paused for a moment as though puzzled, and then 
immediately left the room.1 He returned, after some time had passed, having pondered 
that same conclusion during his absence. “Yes,” he said again, “it is obvious.” 
Whatever the verdict on the humor of philosophers in general, or this alleged joke 
in particular, it is a common feature of “doing” philosophy that some conclusions just 
seem obvious—until you start thinking about them. Suddenly, they no longer seem so 
obvious, and off the philosopher is to nail down again what seemed so clear but a 
moment before. After much toil, what seemed obvious before the philosopher started 
thinking about it is now obvious to him once again.  
Such is the case—famously—in Augustine’s Confessions, when he declares, 
“What then is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I want to explain it to a questioner, I do 
not know” (Confessions XI, XIV, 17). The subject of the present investigation is not time, 
but another one of those seemingly ubiquitous concepts—truth. Specifically, the subject 
is whether truth is a norm of belief.  
This thesis—that truth is a norm of belief—has been called a truism by at least 
one contemporary philosopher.2 But like the claim that some thesis is obvious, the claim 
                                                        
1 I was first told this joke by an undergraduate professor and advisor of mine, Professor Gary Hardegree of 
the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 
2 More specifically, Michael Lynch says that “truth is a good” and “truth is worth caring about for its own 
sake” are truisms (2004b, 12ff, 15ff). It is on the basis of these claims that he advances the normativity of 
truth. According to Lynch, something is normative if it is worth caring about for its own sake (ibid., 16). 
We can say, then, that according to Lynch, the thesis that truth is a norm of belief is either a truism or 
follows from a truism. 
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that some thesis is a truism is usually the prelude to someone coming along and asking, 
“but is it really?” Such is the case with the supposed truism that truth is a norm of belief.  
Another indication—at least in analytic philosophy—that stormy times are ahead 
for a supposedly obvious or truistic thesis is the vagueness or lack of specificity with 
which the thesis is formulated. To clarify my meaning, consider the following two basic 
norms of belief, from the work of Williams James ([1915] 1935, 113): 
(1) We must believe the truth. 
(2) We must shun error.   
These seem like commonsense norms of belief, don’t they? But by the early twenty-first 
century, increased scrutiny of the initial formulation of these norms as one truth-norm of 
belief left the precise articulation of these commonsense norms up in the air. To see why, 
consider the usual first pass at specifying the thesis that truth is a norm of belief.  
 (TN1): "S, p (S ought to believe that p if, and only if, it is true that p.) 
Consider what is, in the author’s experience, almost always the first objection that 
comes to the mind of a philosopher confronted with TN1. This is the objection that starts 
with the observation that there are so many utterly trivial true propositions (e.g., the 
proposition that the orange binder is 2.5 inches from the bookcase next to my desk). On 
the basis of this observation, it is argued that it cannot be the case, pace TN1, that S ought 
to believe all these (and every other) true proposition.3 This objection, as well as others, 
                                                        
3 For this objection, see Auf der Straße (2013, 7), David (2005), Engel (2002, 128), Grimm (2008) and 
(2009, 247-48), Horwich (2006, § III) and (2013, 18), Kvanvig (2008), Lynch (2004b, 55), Sosa (2001), 
and Whiting (2012, 283) and (2013b, § 3). An important early paper that raises this issue is Jane Heal’s 
([1988] 2013, § II). For commentary on her paper, see Dodd (2013). For an ingenious solution to the trivial 
truths objection, see Treanor (2012). 
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targets the sufficient condition of TN1.4 This condition says that the truth of p is sufficient 
for it to be the case that S ought to believe that p. 
The most common solution to the various problems that afflict the sufficient 
condition of TN1 is simply to drop TN1 in favor of the following: 
 (TN2) "S, p (S ought to believe that p only if it is true that p.) 
There are, however, at least two problems with TN2. One, observed by Bykvist and 
Hattiangadi in an influential paper on the difficulty of formulating the truth-norm, is that 
such a necessary-condition-only formulation does not actually have any positive content. 
It doesn’t tell S to do anything at all (Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007, 280). Since I take up 
this issue under the related heading of “guidance” in chapter II, I here refrain from saying 
any more about it.  
 The other problem, which I will discuss here, is related to this alleged lack of 
positive content. If TN2 doesn’t actually tell S to do anything, then S can satisfy TN2 
simply by not believing anything at all.5 Now, if you are a Pyrrhonian Skeptic, then 
perhaps you do not consider this to be a problem. But recall the first of the two 
                                                        
4 Another objection that targets the sufficient condition is the claim that TN1 violates the principle that 
“ought” implies “can.” 
5 Or so it has been alleged. Compare the norm that you ought to press the nuclear button only if the 
Russians have pushed theirs. If the Russians initiate a first strike, and Trump doesn’t push the button, he 
hasn’t technically violated the norm in question. All that TN2 and the Nuclear-Button Norm give us is a 
necessary condition on the existence of an objection, and not an obligation itself. At best, what we seem to 
get is a permission to push the nuclear button (compare Daniel Whiting’s permissivist account of the truth-
norm discussed in chapter III). Formally, “you ought to F only if C” seems to entail “if C, then you may 
F.” As I discuss in chapter III and its appendix, though, even this isn’t quite right, for there might be other 
conditions, C’, C’’, etc., that need also to obtain in order for the permission to exist. Alternately, one might 
inquire into reformulating TN2 as follows: “If it is not true that p, then it is not the case that you ought to 
believe that p.” But for this formulation to issue an obligation would require two assumptions which I 
cannot discuss here: (1) that “it is not true that p” entails “it is false that p”, and (2) “it is not the case that 
you ought to believe that p” entails “you ought to believe ~p” or “you ought to disbelieve p.” Assumption 
(1) seems plausible enough, at least in this context, but assumption (2) is more controversial. 
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commonsense Jamesian norms of belief presented above: we must believe the truth. It 
isn’t enough to strive to avoid error, if the result is that we never believe anything at all—
at least according to this broadly Jamesian picture of the “laws” of belief. What the 
sufficient condition of TN1 has been taken to make explicit—to adopt a phrase of 
Brandom (1994)—is the practice of pursuing, seeking out, or searching after the truth.6 
Without the sufficient condition, TN2 is unable to account for this “positive” side of the 
truth-norm, the side captured in the first of James’s commonsense norms of belief.  
 Since I want to endorse TN2 as a preliminary explication of the thesis that truth is 
a norm of belief, it is incumbent upon me to say a little more about this perceived 
shortcoming. One thing that I could say—following the work of Heal ([1988] 2013)—is 
that there simply is no such thing as the search for, or pursuit of, truth. If there is no 
phenomenon answering to this description, then it is a moot point whether TN2 is able to 
do it justice. If the “pursuit” doesn’t exist, then there is nothing to which TN2 fails to “do 
justice.” 
 As I make clear in chapter III, I do not find Heal’s arguments persuasive. I do 
think that there is something in the life of the human person that answers to the pursuit or 
search for truth. As such, I need to explain why it is that I am not concerned that TN2 is 
unable to make this aspect of the human person explicit. There are two reasons why I am 
                                                        
6 This is what Stout (2007, 18-22) calls our interest in getting things right or “objectivity,” which interest 
needs to be accounted for in any pragmatic account of inquiry as a social activity. Brandom (1994, 594-
595) likewise calls attention to the need to account for the emergence of the notion of objective correctness. 
This is the first indication (of several, in this introduction and elsewhere) that the normativity of truth does 
not require a metaphysically intense notion of truth but can be situated within the pragmatist tradition. This 
should not be surprising, given that we took William James as our point of departure. Nevertheless, it will 
also become clear that this investigation is not explicitly pragmatist in its orientation, though neither is it 
antithetical to a pragmatism that takes truth seriously (e.g., Brandom and Stout as opposed to Rorty).  
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not worried—or, in other words, two reasons why I think that the pursuit of truth should 
not be made explicit by the sufficient condition of TN1.  
 The first concerns the truth of propositions. The sufficient condition of TN1 
cheapens the pursuit of truth by leveling down all true propositions to the same level. In 
other words, if the pursuit of truth is captured by compliance with TN1, this means that 
the pursuit is indifferent to the contents of the true propositions in question. Any truths 
will do. The pursuit of truth would be equally exemplified by a sedentary individual 
spending her time conjoining the same proposition ad infinitum and by a philosopher 
engaging in some Herculean effort of thought.  
 This is not, to be clear, to deny the possible significance of all truths in principle, 
and the actual significance of many allegedly trivial truths to specific persons. In other 
words, to maintain that we must not level down the pursuit of truth is not equivalent to 
dismissing the lower ranks. G.K. Chesterton famously maintained that, “There is no such 
thing on earth as an uninteresting subject; the only thing that can exist is an uninterested 
person” ([1905] 1986, 54). But he also maintained that “the most practical and important 
thing about a man is still his view of the universe” (ibid., 41). Chesterton presents a 
pattern for someone who wishes to differentiate truths in terms of significance, without 
claiming that there are any utterly trivial truths. In declining to endorse the sufficient 
condition of TN1, then, I should not be read as necessarily endorsing the charge that there 
exist utterly trivial truths. In fact, I suspect that the premise of the objection is false. 
Rather, to bring this brief digression to an end, I think that TN1 itself trivializes the 
pursuit of truth, by interpreting it as something akin to the pursuit of trivia. Whether truth 
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is trivial or not, I will not here decide, but whether it is, or not, this much remains: the 
pursuit of truth is not a trivial pursuit.  
 In addition to the trivialization of the pursuit of truth, TN1 does another disservice 
to this feature of human personhood by restricting the pursuit of truth to the realm of 
propositional truth, and reducing the pursuit to the activity of acquisition and possession.7 
These are points that I will return to in more depth in chapter III. For now, let me just 
note that, if the pursuit of truth is merely an acquisitive pursuit of the human person—a 
sort of intellectual greed—then, together with the levelling down effect of TN1, it will 
turn out that someone who has acquired more truths (quantitatively speaking) will have 
more perfectly pursued the truth than someone who has “acquired fewer.” Yet it seems to 
me that the person who “has” and lives out one supreme truth has better pursued the truth 
than someone who has stuffed his head with trivia. The saint who contemplates the truth 
Deus caritas est, and lives her life accordingly, seems more perfectly to have sought the 
truth than someone who, spending all his free time in pubs, has acquired a larger number 
of “facts” by listening to the patrons playing at trivia.  
 It might be wondered what else I might have in mind by the pursuit of truth, if I 
am not restricting this pursuit to the domain of propositional truth, and the acquisition of 
as many beliefs in true propositions as possible. Here let me turn—not for the last time—
to the wisdom of St. Thomas Aquinas. In his discussion of truth as a special virtue falling 
under the cardinal virtue of justice, Aquinas distinguishes among the truth of life, the 
                                                        
7 Hibbs (1999, 589-90) notes, in another context, how contemporary epistemology is bound up with the 
notion of cognitive progress being a matter of the quantitative accumulation of true beliefs. 
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truth of justice, and the truth of doctrine (Summa theologiae (hereafter: ST) IIaIIae, q. 
109, a. 3, ad 3).8 
 The truth of life, which originally comes up in an earlier discussion of truth, 
obtains “insofar as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine 
intellect” (ST Ia, q. 16, a. 4, ad 3). Given the earlier discussion of truth and such “divine 
ordination,” it would seem that Aquinas is referring specifically to the essence of 
humanity. That is, a person exemplifies the truth of life when she lives in such a way that 
she fulfills her essence as a rational animal.  
 Since this is not an exercise in the exegesis of Aquinas, I am not going to delve 
into this question any further.9 It seems to me that we can take Aquinas’s insight here and 
extend it not only to the general “ordination” of the human person to his essence and end 
as a human person, but also to the particular “ordination” of individual human persons to 
particular ends (vocations) in this life.10 To pursue the truth in this sense is to be a true x, 
where x refers to the particular vocation in question: a good husband and father, a good 
wife and mother, a good priest, a good nun, a good sister, a good friar, a good monk. 
                                                        
8 Aquinas attributes this distinction, without a specific citation, to Jerome. 
9 It is, to my mind, related to the medieval dispute regarding the principle of individuation. If the principle 
of individuation is matter (as maintained by Aquinas), then it seems that all Aquinas can be referring to 
here is the essence of humanity, when he speaks of a man’s being ordained to something (where this 
essence includes the final end of man as well). For critical discussion of this view, see Stein (2002, chapter 
VIII, § 2). A related question (in terms of incommunicability as opposed to individuation) is whether the 
human person is not only existentially incommunicable, but also essentially incommunicable, or, in other 
words, whether one person is distinct from another not only in her act of existence, but also in her essence, 
similar to the angels. A discussion of this possibility can be found in Crosby (1996, 62-65), and is 
positively accepted by Scheler (1954, 123). A discussion of such high metaphysical speculation is beyond 
the present investigation, but is worth considering in a full exposition of the “truth of life” in order to 
determine whether the truth of life refers just to the essence of a being, or to something irreducibly 
individual about a being. 
10 This is a version of the distinction—drawn by Sciacca (1960, 115)—between the particular vocation of 
an individual person and the vocation of the same person insofar as he is a person. 
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Beyond these vocations which involve the profession of vows, we can also speak in a 
more everyday sense of being a true lover, a true friend, a true doctor, a true nurse, a true 
teacher, a true philosopher, a true artist, and so on. We can also speak—in what might be 
a reflexive sense accompanying these various vocations—of being true to oneself, or true 
to others. It is the truth of life extended in this way that I think answers to a large part of 
what is meant by the pursuit of truth. The pursuit of truth qua the truth of life, is the 
pursuit of being a true x, or being-true-to-x.11  
 What the attempt to capture the pursuit of truth by TN1 does is circumscribe the 
pursuit of truth to the domain of what Aquinas calls the truth of doctrine, or truths 
relating to some branch of knowledge. This is certainly a part of the pursuit of truth, one 
which is deeply intertwined with the pursuit of the truth of life. This deep 
interrelationship is exemplified in at least three ways: antecedently, concomitantly, and 
consequently.12 Antecedently, we need to “have” certain truths of doctrine ready-to-hand 
if we are to be a true x or be-true-to-x. You cannot be a true doctor without the possession 
of medical truths, nor a true priest without an acquaintance with the doctrines of the 
Church, nor a true spouse without some (admittedly basic) biological truths. Speaking 
more broadly of the truth of doctrine as any propositional truth, we can say that the truth 
of life is concomitant with the truth of doctrine, insofar as being a true-x or being-true-to-
                                                        
11 This discussion points to an ambiguity within the notion of the truth of life. In one sense, it refers to the 
truth as exemplar and measure of a life. In another, related sense, it refers to the person as measuring up to 
this measure/exemplar. It thus parallels the two fundamental “kinds” of truth in Aquinas’s theory: 
ontological and logical. According to the first sense, the truth of life is ontological. According to the 
second, the truth of life is logical, as residing in the person who measures up to the exemplar/measure of his 
life. 
12 The language of antecedent-concomitant-consequent is Aquinas’s, but the point here is my own. 
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x essentially involves coming to receive certain propositional truths. A true lover comes 
to receive the self-revelation of his beloved. A true-art-admirer comes to receive the 
artistic truth being communicated by the artwork. A true-physicist comes to learn more 
deeply the nature of the cosmos. Finally, the truth of doctrine is sometimes the 
consequence of the truth of life. This occurs in cases where, as a result of being a true-x, 
or being-true-to-x, the person comes to the discovery of some propositional truth (or else 
makes some proposition true). Hearing many confessions, say, the true priest comes to 
learn something about human nature.  
 This threefold structure (antecedent-concomitant-consequent) will be the 
centerpiece of chapter IV, as part of my attempt to elucidate the relationship between 
truth and friendship. My concern here, however, is merely to gesture toward a richer 
understanding of the pursuit of truth as involving both the truth of life and the truth of 
doctrine, both in themselves and as related to each other.13 
 For these two reasons (the leveling-down of (propositional) truths and the 
impoverished notion of the pursuit of truth), I am not worried about abandoning TN1. In 
fact, for these very reasons, I think that we should abandon TN1 as cheapening and 
trivializing the pursuit of truth. However we might wish to elucidate the need (or maybe 
even the obligation) to pursue the truth, we should not elucidate it by means of TN1. This 
leaves us with TN2 as providing what is (without further argument at this point) the 
strongest general principle regarding the truth-norm of belief. According to TN2, the truth 
of p is a necessary condition for the obligation to believe that p. In what follows, I 
                                                        
13 The truth of justice will come up later in this introduction.  
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proceed on the basis of this preliminary, and relatively weak, interpretation of the thesis 
that truth is a norm of belief.14 
 The relatively weak formulation of TN2 is already enough to get some interesting 
and substantial objections to the normativity of truth on the table. These objections are 
the preoccupation of the first two chapters of this dissertation. At its most fundamental 
level, the structure of this dissertation is tripartite. The first part (chapters I-II) consists in 
a critical evaluation of three substantial objections to the thesis that truth is a norm of 
belief. The second part (chapter III) constitutes a critical evaluation of accounts of the 
normativity of truth for belief and begins to pivot toward my own attempt at such an 
account. The third part (chapters IV-V) is the culmination of the dissertation: an 
attempted positive account of the normativity of truth for the human person. Let me now 
briefly introduce these parts further. 
 The first part consists of chapters I and II. In chapter I, I consider the thesis that 
truth is a norm of belief through the lens of belief. More specifically, I consider the 
objection that belief, if involuntary, is not an appropriate target of norms and normativity. 
I flesh out the objection in the following argument, which I call the argument from 
involuntariness: 
 (1) If truth is a norm of belief, then we, as believers, incur doxastic 
 obligations. 
                                                        
14 Though I shall, in chapter III and appendix II, offer some more remarks on a different way to solve the 
so-called “formulation problem.” 
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 (2) If we, as believers, incur doxastic obligations, then what we believe is under 
 our voluntary control. 
 (3) But what we believe is not under our voluntary control. 
 (4) Therefore, we incur no doxastic obligations. 
 (5) Therefore, truth is not a norm of belief. 
 After getting clearer on what each premise means, I respond to the challenge 
posed by the argument through a critical survey of objections to its premises in the 
contemporary literature. In objection to premise (1), I consider the possibility that norms 
of belief are not prescriptive in nature, and therefore the argument from involuntariness 
fails to get a grip. Under this heading, I look at proposals that norms of belief are rather 
norms of proper functioning, or else evaluative norms that may or may not imply further 
prescriptive norms.  
 At issue in premise (2) is the infamous principle that “ought” implies “can.” 
Accordingly, objections to premise (2) center on this principle as it interacts with the 
notion of voluntary control. The first objection argues that no “ought” implies voluntary 
control. The second argues no “ought” contained within the formulation of a doxastic 
obligation implies voluntary control. The third, and final, objection argues that no 
“ought” contained within the formulation of a doxastic obligation implies voluntary 
control specifically over what one believes.  
 Finally, in objection to premise (3), I consider the possibility that we do have 
voluntary control over what we believe. I look at three “strengths” or “varieties” of such 
control: weak (or compatibilist), moderate, and strong. The aim of the critical 
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examination of objections is not to convince the reader of any particular response to the 
argument. Rather, my aim is to demonstrate that, taken as a whole, the potential 
difficulties with the argument’s premises constitute a sufficient challenge to its 
trenchancy. This, taken in conjunction with the availability of prima facie plausible 
responses to the argument (the aforementioned objections to its premises), serves to 
undermine the force of the objection. Before ending chapter I, however, I also reflect 
upon the overall dialectic at issue in the argument from involuntariness. I am especially 
interested in bringing to the forefront a set of claims that have distorted the dialectic and 
prejudiced it in favor of the claim that what we believe is not under our voluntary control. 
I then offer a sketch of an alternative, “thick” account of belief. My sketch is heavily 
indebted to significant insights into belief and related attitudes that are contained in the 
work of Aquinas and the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel.  
 The inclusion of Aquinas and Marcel is neither accidental, nor merely 
impressionistic, as I discuss below. For now, let me merely note another structural feature 
of this dissertation. In addition to considering the normativity of truth first defensively 
(through responding to objections) and then offensively (through offering a positive 
account), I also consider it as an occasion for dialogue between contemporary analytic 
philosophy and other philosophical traditions—specifically European personalism and its 
influences, above all Thomism. In general, the dissertation takes its questions from 
contemporary analytic philosophy, but looks beyond that tradition for its answers. If 
analytic philosophy has issued the call, or challenge, that I take up in this work, the 
response that I develop constitutes a “creative retrieval” (in the words of Norris Clarke) 
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of the insights and work of other traditions. This dissertation is thus not only an attempt 
to answer a question, but also an attempt at a dialogue across philosophical traditions and 
the mutual enrichment that such dialogue can, if practiced well, enable.15 
 This structure of analytic challenge and “non-analytic” reply continues in chapter 
II. In chapter II, I consider two objections to the thesis that truth is a norm of belief that 
come from focusing, not on belief, but on truth. The first of these objections is the so-
called guidance problem. This problem, most associated with Glüer and Wikforss, though 
present in the work of others, argues that truth cannot be a norm of belief because truth is 
unable to provide “guidance” to believers regarding what they ought to believe. The 
guidance problem contends that the truth-norm is non-transparent with respect to 
compliance. In Glüer and Wikforss’s reckoning, the truth-norm tells persons to believe 
that p in the circumstance that p is true. However, in order to comply with the norm, the 
person must first determine whether it is true that p. But this, it seems, is eo ipso to have 
formed a belief that p. The truth-norm is thus too late to provide guidance. By the time it 
enters the scene, the person has already formed a belief, and, by his lights, the truth-norm 
will never tell him to believe otherwise than he already does. Some guidance! 
 Now it may have occurred to the reader that there exists an easy response, given 
that I reject the very formulation of the truth-norm that Glüer and Wikforss rely upon in 
crafting their objection. The guidance problem relies on the sufficient condition of TN1. I 
could, then, just sidestep the objection as inapplicable to my preliminary endorsement of 
TN2. Nevertheless, there are at least two reasons for considering the objection anyway. 
                                                        
15 Whether it is practiced well here is left to the judgment of the reader. 
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The first is that the issue of guidance itself represents a consideration in favor of TN1. If 
norms are supposed to be able to provide guidance, and if this would require that we 
endorse TN1, then we would have a further interesting argument against the truth-norm. If 
norms require guidance, but the only formulation of the truth-norm entails absurd results, 
then we would have a real puzzle on our hands.  
 The structure of my response to the guidance problem is similar to the structure of 
my response to the argument from involuntariness in chapter I. I begin by considering 
some contemporary objections to the guidance problem—specifically, from the work of 
Steglich-Petersen who has been engaged in a back-and-forth debate with Glüer and 
Wikforss. Next, I call into question certain presuppositions of the guidance problem. Just 
as I argued that certain claims have distorted the discussion of belief and voluntary 
control, I maintain that Glüer and Wikforss’s overly narrow conception of guidance has 
had a similar effect on discussions of the guidance problem. Finally, relying on insights 
of several personalist thinkers, I sketch the alternative notion of guidance-by-value.16 On 
this view, the truth-norm, and norms more generally, are able to provide guidance not 
only by furnishing persons with an explicitly-formulated rule,17 but also by indicating or 
otherwise objectifying certain values, as to-be-realized or to-be-incarnated by human 
persons. When the appreciation by persons—not merely individually, but interpersonally 
and in communion with each other—of such values is diminished, explicit norms play an 
increased role in the normative economy of the human person in community with 
                                                        
16 As I point out below, I am appealing to personalism in its “broad” sense. 
17 Brandom refers to this as “regulism” and criticizes it (1994, 18-20). 
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others.18 This implies that any complete solution to the guidance problem is going to 
involve stepping beyond the notion of rules, and seeking to recover the appreciation of 
the value of truth by human persons. By referring to the value of truth, the first half of 
chapter II foreshadows an important element of the positive account in chapters IV-V.  
 The second objection that I consider in chapter II is known as “Gibbons’s puzzle,” 
after John Gibbons who makes the problem the focal point of his (2013) monograph on 
the norms of belief. In a nutshell, the puzzle posed by Gibbons consists in the supposed 
incompatibility of the truth-norm with another candidate norm of belief: the justification-
norm. As Gibbons has it, his formulation of the truth-norm (equivalent with TN2) 
conflicts with his formulation of the justification-norm. According to Gibbons, the 
justification-norm is (to paraphrase into the style of my formulations of the truth-norm) 
as follows: 
 (JN) "S, p (S ought to believe that p if, and only if, S is justified in  believing that 
 p.) 
The problem stems from cases in which (1) JN together with S’s being justified in 
believing that p, entail that S ought to believe that p, and (2) p is false, so that (3) by TN2, 
it is not the case that S ought to believe that p. Gibbons’s central case involves the 
location of a person’s keys, but we can construct any number of cases.19 Suppose, for 
instance, that you are justified in believing that God exists, but that He doesn’t. JN tells 
you to believe that He exists, whereas TN2 says that it is not the case that you ought so to 
                                                        
18 This is my extension of an insight of Scheler (1973, 215-16). See chapter II, § 2.3.2.2 of the present 
work. 
19 See Gibbons (2013, 4). 
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believe. At its heart, then, the incompatibility between the truth-norm and the 
justification-norm consists not in contradictory ought-claims (as Gibbons sometimes 
seems to have it), but rather in the contradictory claims about the existence of certain 
doxastic obligations. 
 Gibbons considers several types of response to his puzzle before ultimately 
settling on what he calls a “subjectivist” response. According to this type of response, we 
maintain JN but dispense with TN2, save as a “particularized” norm.20 I do not discuss 
Gibbons’ solution in chapter II, save in passing. This is in keeping with the dialogical 
structure I have already described. Having taken up the challenge posed by Gibbons, I 
look elsewhere for a response. To answer the puzzle, I appropriate Aquinas’s account of 
conscience. I begin by showing how Aquinas faces (a version of) Gibbons’s puzzle, and 
thus why it is appropriate to look to Aquinas for a resolution. Next, I give an overview of 
Aquinas’s account of conscience as an act (the application of knowledge to action) that 
binds even when erroneous, but which does not necessarily excuse when erroneous. 
Grafting Aquinas’s distinctions onto the norms of truth and justification, I argue (pace 
Gibbons) that pride of place must be accorded to the truth-norm, and not the justification-
norm. At the crux of my argument is the contention that the primacy of the truth-norm is 
required to make intelligible our licit practices of interpersonal doxastic criticism and 
doxastic correction.21  
                                                        
20 That is, whereas he maintains that JN is fully general (as indicated by the universal quantifier), the truth-
norm only obtains for particular instances of belief. That is, in holding any particular belief that p, I am 
committed, on pain of irrationality, to p’s being true (Gibbons 2013, ch. 10). 
21 My argument here has something of a pragmatic flavor and indeed, as we shall see, Stout (2007) gives us 
a way of articulating the compossibility of JN with TN2 that will be mentioned in chapter II—a way that 
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 The attempt at a resolution of Gibbons’s puzzle closes chapter II, and, with it, the 
first part of the dissertation. In chapter III, I take up the last key element of the thesis that 
truth is a norm of belief, namely the normativity of truth. The central project of chapter 
III is a thorough review of the two dominant accounts of the normativity of truth in the 
contemporary literature. These are known, on the one hand, as the “teleological” or 
“instrumentalist” account and, on the other, as the “normativist” or “intrinsicalist” 
account. At the outset of chapter III, I frame these two accounts as responses to what I 
call the “doxastic normative question,” or the “question of the source of doxastic 
normativity.” This formulation is a deliberate adaptation of Korsgaard’s (1996) 
“normative question” to the question of doxastic normativity. In a quick-and-dirty way, 
we can say that this is the question, why ought I to believe in accordance with the truth-
norm? According to the teleological/instrumentalist account (TI), the answer consists in 
the claim that truth is the aim of belief. You ought to believe in accordance with the truth-
norm because truth is what you desire in your beliefs. The normativist/intrinsicalist 
account (NI) maintains instead that it is constitutive of the very concept, essence, or 
nature22 of belief that belief is governed by a truth-norm. In response to our imaginary 
interlocutor, NI says that you ought to believe in accordance with the truth-norm because 
otherwise you just do not count as believing at all.  
                                                        
seems to be informed both by pragmatism and the very claims of Aquinas that I appropriate in my own 
response. 
22 This is not to identify concept, essence, and nature, but just to point out the different ways in which the 
account has been expressed. One gets the impression, in reading literature on NI, that the distinction among 
these is not always scrupulously observed.  
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 After providing an exposition of the dominant accounts, and considering an array 
of objections levelled against them, I turn to consider what I call the “contenders.” These 
approaches—like my own—seek to break the dialectical logjam between TI and NI that 
seems to have paralyzed the prospect of resolving the doxastic normative question. In 
considering both the dominant accounts and the contenders, my aim is not to offer 
knockdown arguments and decisive criticisms. My desire in this investigation is 
ultimately to be more constructive than destructive. To that end, I utilize my critical 
review of TI, NI, and the contenders to obtain a preliminary list of desiderata or 
conditions of adequacy for a response to the doxastic normative question.  
 Looking ahead, the most important of these desiderata are (a) that the answer to 
the doxastic normative question must relate in a meaningful way to the subject of the 
truth-norm of belief, namely the human person, and (b) that it must get this relationship 
right.23 These chief desiderata also stem from the intuition that norms are always norms 
for some (kind of) being. Norms, by their very essence, have this “for”-structure. Hence, 
we cannot give an account of a particular norm without considering that being for whom 
the norm in question is a norm. In the case of the truth-norm, that being is the human 
person. As a result, an investigation of the normativity of truth must be an investigation 
of the normativity of truth for the human person.  
 It is for this reason that I have chosen personalism as the main partner in the 
dialogue carried out in this dissertation. Personalism offers, in my assessment, some of 
the richest philosophical literature on the nature and meaning of human personhood. As 
                                                        
23 Specifically, it must not reduce the relationship to a merely instrumental one. 
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such, it is perhaps the best place to look beyond the analytic tradition in seeking resources 
for an account of the normativity of truth for the person. The final section of chapter III 
begins the “personalist turn” of the dissertation, by putting one representative of 
contemporary analytic philosophy on the truth-norm (Lynch) in dialogue with a 
representative of personalism (Dietrich von Hildebrand) through the intermediate figure 
of Bernard Williams. One of the main aims of this dialogue is to clarify the method of 
chapters IV-V, as well as to introduce some key von Hildebrandian terminology and 
conceptual relationships that I rely upon in those chapters. The most important of these is 
the distinction between value and the objective good for the person. Objective goods for 
the person are values—whether directly (in-themselves) or indirectly (in virtue of the 
value of human personhood). This principle serves as a premise in a master argument that 
begins to emerge in chapter IV, and which runs as follows: 
 (1) Being endowed with truth is an objective good for the human person. 
 (2) If being endowed with x is an OGP, then either: (a) x is a value  directly, in 
 virtue of x’s participating some value(s) V0, V1, … Vn, or (b) x is a value indirectly, 
 in virtue of x’s pro-character for the human person and the value of human 
 personhood. 
 (3) Therefore, truth is either a value directly, in virtue of participating some 
 value(s) V0, V1, … Vn, or (b) x is a value indirectly, in virtue of x’s pro-character 
 for the human person and the value of human personhood. 
 (4) Values are normative for the human person. 
 (5) Therefore, truth is normative for the human person. 
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 Chapter IV presents a sustained argument for the first premise. I argue that truth is 
an objective good for the person by articulating its systematic relationship with another 
objective good for the person: friendship. Although I take it to be uncontroversial that 
friendship is such a good, I begin chapter IV by arguing for the objective goodness of 
friendship for the human person with the help of the personalist philosophers discussed 
below. After vindicating the objective goodness of friendship for the human person, I 
then proceed to describe a threefold relationship that obtains between friendship and 
truth. I argue that truth is antecedently, concomitantly, and consequently related to 
friendship.  
 Truth is antecedently related to friendship insofar as (1) it is necessary for 
freedom, and freedom is a prerequisite of friendship and (2) there must exist a certain 
structure of truth, communication, and reception to enable the inauguration of 
friendships. That is, there must exist a truth about the person (who is a would-be friend), 
this truth must be communicable, this truth must be communicated, this truth must be 
receivable, and this truth must be received by another person (who is the other would-be 
friend).  
 Concomitantly, truth is related to friendship insofar as it is one of the constitutive 
activities of a friendship—part of the art of friendship, if you will—that friends seek to 
reduce the “deficits of truth” that exist between them. That is, it is partially constitutive of 
what friendship is, that it involves the self-disclosure of yourself to your friends, as well 
your reception of the self-disclosure of your friends. But lest this aspect of friendship be 
taken out of context, I qualify and develop it along four dimensions: (1) whether this act 
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of friendship is necessarily explicit or may be implicit, (2) whether it is essential or 
accidental to friendship, (3) how it follows from friendship as a form of being-with-
another, and (4) how it is situated within the overall relationship that is friendship. 
 Finally, I argue that truth is a consequence of friendship, and this in two ways. 
The first is that friends serve as mediators of the truth about each other. That is, 
friendships bring to light certain truths about the friends that would not have been 
accessible except in and through the relationship. The second is that friendships create, in 
some sense, certain truths about the friends. This is especially the case insofar as 
friendship, as form of love, is a kind of commitment. In the last section of chapter IV, I 
develop this relationship between truth and friendship further, by considering a potent 
objection in the supposed incompatibility between being a good friend and believing in 
accordance with norms of belief such as the truth-norm. In response to this objection, I 
develop an account of a virtue of “friendly interpretation,” whereby, in forming beliefs 
about our friends, we strive to navigate the shoals of love and truth in such a way as to 
demonstrate in our friendships how it is that “between love and intelligence, there can be 
no real divorce” (Marcel [1952] 2008, 7).  
 Having argued that truth is an objective good for the person, I then assume that if 
truth is an objective good for the person, then it is either a value per se, or in virtue of the 
value of human personhood. Although I discuss the relationship between objective goods 
and values in chapters III and V, the assumption is unproblematic dialectically. If you 
accept premise (1) of the master argument, then you will likely accept premise (2)—
premise (2) is not the battlefield premise. 
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 What remains in chapter V is to defend the claim that values are normative for the 
human person. It is here that the creative retrieval of personalism becomes—in the words 
of Norris Clarke—a “creative completion.” According to Scheler, von Hildebrand, Stein, 
and others, to grasp a value is to grasp something that stands in norm-giving relations, 
something to which a proper response is due. The question is, what is the relationship 
between values and persons, such that values are norm-givers for persons and persons are 
norm-given by values. The answer to this question is what I call the “for”-structure 
between values and persons.  
 The idea of such a “for”-structure is due to two central contentions of this 
dissertation. The first is that normativity is always normativity-for a given (kind of) 
being, or that norms are always norms-for a given (kind of) being. The second is that 
understanding or explaining the normativity of x for a given (kind of) being e requires 
understanding the relationships that obtain between x and e, such that x is for e, in such a 
way that x is norm-giving for e.24  
                                                        
24 These principles have guided my investigation almost from the beginning. I have subsequently found 
similar principles articulated by Heidegger (thanks entirely to Professor Dahlstrom, whose translation of 
the quotation follows) and Wojtyla. Heidegger writes, in his first Marburg lectures, “In the foregoing 
considerations [by Husserl], there has never been any talk of what is supposed to be normatively 
determined; the entity subject to normative determination is never placed under scrutiny in the same 
primordial sense. It is even said that such phenomena as the “concrete I” and the “soul” are supposed to be 
out of play. Thus, what is supposed to be normatively determined does not enter into the realm of the actual 
theme…the claim is much more a matter of principle. The sense of the norm and normative lawfulness 
cannot be established as long as one does not envision what type of being is meant by a normatively 
determined and determinable being. The possibility of normativity cannot be explained without being 
investigated as normativity for something and, that means, without the “for-what” being investigated in 
terms of the structure of its being” (Heidegger [1994] 2005, 63). Heidegger’s critique here might easily be 
transposed into today’s discussion of the normativity of truth that occurs (by and large) in abstraction from 
the true subject of that normativity (the person) as opposed to the “technical” subject of that normativity 
(belief qua mental-state). Then there is Wojtyla who writes, “Ethics is always in some way about the 
human being; the human being is—in the broadest sense of the term—the material object of ethics. Norms, 
therefore, do not have full meaning apart from the human being, who, by living according to them, simply 
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 I articulate the “for”-structure between values and persons by considering the 
ways in which (1) the realization of personhood is dependent upon values, and (2) the 
ways in which values are dependent upon the realization of personhood. Under (1), I 
examine how the realization of personhood is dependent upon (a) acts in which persons 
grasp values, and (b) acts in which persons realize values. We shall see how these types 
of acts are uniquely suited to the realization of personhood, insofar as they contain 
aspects answering to the major structural features (intrinsic relationality, 
incommunicability and interiority) and dimensions (intellective, affective, and volitional) 
of personhood. Under (2), I consider three ways in which values depend upon persons for 
their existence in the actual world. Values depend upon the existence of persons 
“logically” as the “objects” of values as norm-giving entities. values depend upon 
persons metaphysically, as able to grasp the disparities between the actual world and the 
“world” of values, and to redress those disparities. Finally, values are dependent upon the 
free response and activity of persons for their coming-to-be in the actual world. 
 With the articulation of the “for”-structure in place, the defense of the master 
argument is complete. It remains then to assess the results of the theory against the 
desiderata articulated in chapter III, i.e., to see whether the proposed answer to the 
doxastic normative question satisfies the conditions we will have imposed. 
 
 
                                                        
lives in a good way and is perfected as a human being, or, in the opposite case, deteriorates and loses 
value” (Wojtyla [1955-57] 1993a, 46). 
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0.1 The Personalist Landscape 
 There are two final issues that need to be addressed in this introduction. The first 
is a situation of this dissertation’s creative retrieval of personalism within the landscape 
of personalist philosophy.25 Since personalism is so broad, I will here clarify just whose 
(or which) personalism is being retrieved, as well as how I understand the appropriation 
of personalism in this context.26 This is necessary, insofar as referring to a work as 
“personalist” is not as straightforward as it may seem. As Maritain ([1946] 1966, 12-13) 
observes: 
 Yet nothing can be more remote from the facts than the belief that “personalism” is one 
 school or one doctrine. It is rather a phenomenon of reaction against two opposite errors, 
 which inevitably contains elements of very unequal merits. Not a personalist doctrine, but 
 personalist aspirations confront us. There are, at least, a dozen personalist doctrines, 
 which, at times, have nothing more in common than the term “person.”27 
 
Others are more sanguine about being able to articulate certain central commitments that 
mark out a philosophy as personalist. Williams (2004, 178), e.g., lists five such 
commitments.28 They are (1) a radical difference between persons and non-persons, (2) a 
                                                        
25 The second issue is that of how the question of the nature of truth fits in with my investigation. Since my 
understanding of truth is primarily Thomistic, one might read these final sections of the introduction as 
situating my project within its joint influences of personalism and Thomism. 
26 Since this dissertation has no historical pretensions, let me begin by referring the reader to some excellent 
articles that provide basic historical and thematic overviews of personalism. These are Williams (2004), 
(2005a) and (2005b), Williams and Bengtsson (2013), Seifert (2011), and White (2011, 137-140). In what 
follows, I largely rely on the work of these authors, together with my own observations.  
27 Maritain thus shares with Williams (in the works referenced) and White (2011) the interpretation of 
personalism as a reaction, or corrective movement, in philosophy to certain ideas, institutions, and attitudes 
both in philosophy and the world at large. In the run-up to the passage just quoted, Maritain points to the 
twin errors of totalitarianism and the sovereignty of the individual. As the title of his work (The Person and 
the Common Good) indicates, his concern, which is the concern of personalists qua political philosophers, 
is with negotiating the right way to balance individual and community in the political domain. That the 
pitfalls of said negotiation afflict even personalist philosophies is acknowledged by Maritain, who 
advocates Thomistic personalism as the way to avoid political excesses of certain “personalisms” which 
tend to dictatorship or anarchy. 
28 Seifert (2011) gives a more extensive list that includes, besides the substance of the six tenets listed by 
Williams, (1) the transcendence of the person in knowledge of the truth, (2) an emphasis on the “heart” and 
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distinction between the individual and the person,29 (3) a concern for the person’s 
subjectivity and self-determination, (4) attention to the person as a possible object of 
action, and (5) attention to the relationality of the person. In later work, Williams 
maintains this core list, while adding to it the affirmation of the value or dignity of the 
person (2005a, 118).30 
 What is noteworthy about this list is that it is not so much a list of highly specific 
philosophical theses, as it is a manifesto for a philosophical research program. The 
strongest claim made is that persons are beings different in kind from non-persons. There 
is also a commitment to the person as subject, as self-determiner (dominus sui), and 
intrinsically relational. (I discuss this notion of intrinsic relationality at length in chapter 
IV.) These are what we might call the metaphysical commitments of personalism. It is the 
                                                        
affectivity, (3) the person’s relation to the world as the totality of finite things, (4) the person as essentially 
related to God, (5) the person as rational substance, (6) the absolute primacy of moral and religious values, 
(7) the drama of the moral choice between good and evil, (8) the existence of absolute moral imperatives, 
and (9) personhood as a pure perfection and an attribute of God. Of these nine additional elements, (1) and 
(3)-(5) seem to be indications of the influence of Thomism on personalism, though (4) is also a Schelerian 
point. (2) is definitely a contribution of Dietrich von Hildebrand, as, it seems, is (6). (7)-(8) are prominent 
themes in the work of Karol Wojtyla (Pope St. John Paul II). (9) is an element common to any Christian 
personalism. While Seifert’s list is more comprehensive, it risks ruling out certain personalist thinkers as 
“pseudo” personalists or “imperfect” personalists (as Seifert calls them). While I agree with Seifert’s 
contentions, I wonder whether their use as a litmus test of personalism is entirely helpful or even 
historically correct. Personalists have, e.g., denied that the person is a metaphysical substance (5). By 
Seifert’s lights such thinkers (whose ranks include Scheler) do not count as true personalists. 
29 Here is where one needs to bring in the “high metaphysical speculation” concerning the principle of 
individuation that I mentioned above. Although personalists like to distinguish the “individual” from the 
“person,” it is not necessary (and I do not accept) the strong interpretation of this distinction whereby we 
cannot speak of “individual persons.” Sokolowski, starting from the personalist claim that we cannot speak 
of persons merely as specimens of a species, argues that persons are not merely individuals in the sense of a 
specimen but also what he calls “singularities” (2006a, 165-66). In his words, “person” is not a sortal term, 
but a “radically individualized term” that expresses a “singularity” (ibid., 166). This is manifested 
linguistically in the inappropriateness of combining such terms with the indefinite article in English, i.e., 
Sokolowski maintains that it would not make sense to say things like “let me show you a this,” or “an 
individual,” or, “a person.” See also Sokolowski (2006b, 199-202). 
30 There are different opinions as to whether this claim is best served by the word “dignity” or by the word 
“value.” In the present investigation, I refer to the “value” of the person or the value of personhood, or of 
personhood as a value. For this point, see Williams (2005a, 118-119, fn 26) and Crosby (1996, 175, fn 1). 
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task of personalist philosophy to elucidate these aspects of personhood. On the other side, 
there are the ethical commitments of personalism, manifested by the attention it pays to 
the person as possible object of action. In this, personalism hearkens back to Kant’s 
second formulation of the categorical imperative, the formula of humanity. This is 
perhaps most explicit in the Personalistic Norm of Wojtyla, which states that the person 
is “a good toward which the only proper and adequate attitude is love” (Wojtyla 1981, 
41). Love is contrasted here with use, so that Wojtyla also goes on to say that, “a person’s 
rightful due is to be treated as an object of love, not as an object for use” (ibid., 42). The 
similarity to the Formula of Humanity is clear.31 
 The articles by Williams, and Williams and Bengtsson, above referenced do an 
admirable job of concisely describing the philosophical, as well as the broader 
socioeconomic and political trends that are “responsible” for certain philosophers turning 
back to the person. According to Williams, these include the philosophical positivism of 
Comte, the philosophies of Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche,32 philosophical Darwinism, 
Freudian psychology, and liberalism. These trends also seem to be behind the specifically 
metaphysical and ethical cast of personalism, focusing, as it does, on the uniqueness of 
the person. That is, these trends are, or are perceived as, depersonalizing both 
metaphysically and ethically: degrading the person’s ontological status, and the ethical 
                                                        
31 But, perhaps, ultimately superficial. If Scheler’s (1998, ch. IV) analysis of modern humanitarian love (the 
sort of “love” seemingly at issue in the Formula of Humanity) is correct (i.e., that such “love,” unlike 
Christian love, arose on the basis of ressentiment), then this “love” is not akin to the Christian love that is 
really owed to persons. 
32 Interestingly, Maritain ([1946] 1966, 13) speaks of a Nietzschean personalism, though he does not 
elaborate on what he means, referring to it merely as an extreme position. 
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requirements that govern our interactions with persons. Personalism is thus a response to 
these intellectual trends as applied to the human person.  
 As a response, personalism exhibits the characteristics of what White calls a 
“corrective” movement in the history of philosophy (2011, 141-42). Personalism as a 
corrective is related to the existentialist philosophies of thinkers such as Kierkegaard and 
his intellectual heirs (cf. Williams 2005a, 112). The problem with any such corrective 
movement, however, is that it risks distorting the truth in its zeal for reasserting certain 
“forgotten” truths.33 Such is the peril of personalism, as a tradition that has tended, in 
some of its representatives, to lean more toward an “anti-ideology” than a philosophy 
properly speaking (Williams 2004, 166).34 On this point, I shall have something more to 
say below. 
 The final historical note that is necessary here concerns certain divisions within 
personalism. The first division is a “geographical” distinction between American 
personalism and European personalism. The distinction between these “schools” is that, 
whereas European personalism is a reaction to idealism, American personalism—of the 
sort promoted by Parker Bowne and for which Boston University was known—is rather a 
form of idealism (Williams 2005a, 112-13, fn 11). The personalist thinkers appealed to in 
this dissertation all are European (in spirit, if not in location). 
                                                        
33 In White’s estimation, personalism is often guilty of neglecting the animality of the human person (2011, 
141-42). 
34 Not that this is merely a peril, for in its passionate assertion of certain truths, personalism has also at 
times been wed with a corresponding political movement (see Williams 2005a, 113-114). Personalism thus 
represents a philosophical tradition that has demonstrates the political relevance and efficacy of thought. 
Perhaps one of the high points in this regard is Maritain’s role in crafting the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
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 The second division is between “strict” and “broad” personalism. As Williams 
draws the distinction, “strict” personalism “places the person at the center of a 
philosophical system that originates from an ‘intuition’ of the person himself and then 
goes on to analyze the personal experience that is the object of this intuition” (2005a, 
109). This original intuition is that “by which one grasps values and essential meanings 
through unmediated experience” (ibid.). Its primary philosophical influences are 
phenomenology and existentialism.  
 Broad personalism, on the other hand, is described by Williams as follows: 
 In its broader sense, personalism inserts a particular anthropology into a global 
 philosophical perspective. Here the person is not considered as the object of an original 
 intuition, nor does philosophical research begin with an analysis of the personal context. 
 Rather, in the scope of a general metaphysics the person manifests his singular value and 
 essential role. Thus the person occupies the central place in philosophical discourse, but 
 this discourse is not reduced to a development of an original intuition of the person. 
 (ibid.). 
 
Instead of developing a system on the basis on some “original intuition” of 
the person, broad personalism instead offers “an anthropological-ontological shift in 
perspective within an existing metaphysics and draws out the ethical consequences of this 
shift” (ibid.). The influences here are not only phenomenology and existentialism, but 
also Thomism.35 The personalist thinkers appealed to in this dissertation are, for the most 
part, personalists in the broad sense.36  
                                                        
35 Note, in this regard, Maritain’s advocacy for a Thomistic personalism ([1946] 1966, 13) and Wojtyla’s 
programmatic overview of such a Thomistic personalism in his ([1961] 1993e). 
36 The major personalist thinkers whose works have served as sources of inspiration and reflection during 
my research include (but are not limited to) Max Scheler, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Edith Stein (St. Teresa 
Benedicta of the Cross), Jacques Maritain, Emmanuel Mounier, Gabriel Marcel, John Macmurray, Karol 
Wojtyla (Pope St. John Paul II), Norris Clarke, and John Crosby. It is worth noting that, with these 
thinkers, all three of the formative influences on broad European personalism are represented. 
Phenomenology: Scheler, as well as Husserl’s prized students von Hildebrand and Stein, Wojtyla whose 
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 Beyond the definition of broad personalism given by Williams, there is also 
another sense in which the philosophers I appeal to are “broad” personalists, namely, the 
fact that some of them did not explicitly identify themselves as personalists. In fact, 
Gabriel Marcel even denounces the very word “personalism” in one place.37 This 
notwithstanding, the concerns and philosophical commitments of Marcel and others make 
them personalists in spirit even if they never self-consciously arrogated the title to 
themselves and their work. For this reason, and also for the reason that “personalism,” as 
an “ism,” has an ideological ring to it,38 I will often refer to my approach in this 
dissertation not as a “personalist” approach, but (more generically) as a “person-
centered” or “person-centric” approach. This is meant to signal that my appropriation of 
personalism is intended to be broad and non-ideological. By a person-centric approach, I 
mean an approach that is not “forgetful” (to adapt a phrase of Heidegger’s) of 
personhood. At least within contemporary analytic philosophy, which prizes a certain 
method of breaking down philosophical problems, there is sometimes a forgetfulness of 
the human person. This occurs not only when philosophy fails to reflect upon the nature 
of human personhood but also, more commonly, when it fails to consider the nature of 
human personhood in conjunction with other philosophical problems, a complete 
resolution of which must involve a reference to the person. As I said at the beginning of 
this digression on personalism, the chief condition of adequacy on an account of the 
                                                        
doctoral dissertation was on Scheler, and Crosby who was a student of von Hildebrand. Existentialism: 
Gabriel Marcel and, by influence, Mounier. Thomism: Wojtyla, the later Stein, Maritain, and Clarke. 
37 See Marcel ([1952] 2008, 127). I discuss this passage in chapter II, fn 166. 
38 A ring which, as noted above, is not historically inaccurate. 
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normativity of x is a sensitivity to that kind of being for whom x is a norm. Truth is a 
norm for the human person. Philosophers ignore the nature of human personhood in their 
reflection upon the truth-norm (and doxastic norms more broadly) to the detriment of 
their very pursuit of the truth of these matters. 
0.2 Quid est veritas? 
 The final question that I should gesture at before proceeding with my 
investigation is the question of the nature of truth itself: in Pontius Pilate’s infamously 
skeptical words, quid est veritas (John 18:38).  
 I cannot hope—and so do not intend—to resolve the problem of the nature of 
truth. However, it is incumbent upon me, since I will frequently make reference to the 
notion of truth throughout this dissertation, to make clear in advance my own rough 
understanding of the nature of truth.  
 Before I do that, however, let me first acknowledge that it is an open question as 
to whether the normativity of truth for belief should be a matter of the nature of truth, or 
the nature of belief. As will become clear in chapter III, the dominant approaches within 
contemporary analytic philosophy to this question is to bypass the nature of truth 
altogether, and focus just upon the nature of belief.  
 There is less literature, therefore, that approaches the issue of the normativity of 
truth from considerations about the nature of truth itself. In fact, the main line of research 
in this respect is concerned not with the possibility of accounting for the normativity of 
truth by appealing to the nature of truth, but with asking whether the claim that truth is a 
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norm of belief is compatible with a deflationary theory of truth.39 Theories of truth come 
in two main varieties: substantial/inflationary and deflationary. The latter arguably do not 
support the contention that truth is a norm of belief since, by their lights, truth has no 
“nature.” If so, then either we must turn to a substantial theory of truth, or we must look 
not to the nature of truth, but belief, for an account of the truth-norm. Heal ([1988] 2013, 
131-32) is noteworthy for maintaining the view that even if we adopt a substantial theory 
of truth, such as correspondence, truth is still non-normative (see Dodd (2013, 139-40)).40 
 If Heal is correct, and it would seem that many think that she is, then we have no 
choice but to turn away from the nature of truth in our bid to ground the truth-norm. It 
                                                        
39 Often with a specific focus on Paul Horwich’s “minimalist” theory of truth. For works in this vein, see 
Auf der Straße (2013), Horwich (2006), Lynch (2004a), Moad (2008), and Mölder (2008). Auf der Straße 
(2013, 3) and Dodd (2013, 139) make the dialectic of this sub-debate clear. 
40 It is worth acknowledging that while Heal stands in the pragmatist tradition, her view is not entirely 
representative. Although she denies that “true” is evaluative, Rorty (surprisingly, perhaps) acknowledges 
that “true” does have “endorsing” and “cautionary” uses, in addition to its (non-evaluative) disquotational 
use (1991, 128), and wonders whether a normative story about truth could supplement a disquotationalist-
cum-behaviorist theory of truth (ibid., 141). Further on, he assimilates the first two uses to what he calls 
“normative uses,” and the latter, disquotational, use to what he calls a descriptive use. He diagnoses the 
problem with traditional (i.e., non-pragmatic) philosophy of truth as an “attempt to conflate these two kinds 
of use [normative and disquotational], and to view them both as explained by the use of ‘true’ to denote a 
non-causal relation called ‘correspondence’” (ibid., 136). The mistake, then, is twofold: (1) to run together 
the descriptive and normative uses of ‘true’, and (2) to seek an explanation of both uses of ‘true’ in the 
correspondence theory of truth. The Rortyan pragmatist need not deny, then, that truth is normative, but 
does need to deny that the normativity of truth is grounded in the nature of truth. It is an open question, 
though, whether the pragmatist might solve the problem of conflation (1) by including a “normative 
moment” (Aertsen) into the nature of truth itself. This may well (I suspect) require abandoning a 
correspondence theory of truth for something more akin to the Thomistic theory outlined below. It is clear, 
however, that Rorty, for one, wouldn’t take the bait, since he denies that truth is an explanatory notion at 
all (ibid., 141). Rather, what pragmatists like Rorty and Brandom advance is pragmatism about norms 
themselves, so that the answer to the normative question is to be found by investigating the implicit social 
practices at issue, e.g., inquiry (Brandom 2000, 159, 161). This approach is not entirely at odds with the 
proposal that I advance in chapters IV-V. Chapter IV considers the intimate relationships that exist between 
truth and friendship, and is especially concerned with articulating the role of truth in the “art” or “practice” 
of friendship. If read in isolation, this chapter might be interpreted as providing a pragmatic elucidation of 
the normativity of “true.” Even chapter V takes up the question of practice in the context of value-grasping 
and value-realizing acts, especially insofar as these are interpersonal acts. Nevertheless, the heart of the 
Thomistic-cum-personalist account given in chapters IV-V is metaphysical, in the sense of von Hildebrand 
(2017, 529-530): philosophizing about the person and her acts is not ipso facto to lapse into psychology.   
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would be a worthy task in its own right, to inquire into the several substantial theories of 
truth offered by contemporary philosophy to see whether this is so. This is not, however, 
the task of the present investigation. I am more interested in asking why it is that we 
ought to comply with the truth-norm, than establishing how it does, or does not, follow 
from any particular theory of truth. Furthermore, my sense that truth is a norm of belief is 
in the driver’s seat, if you will. I think that the normativity of truth is not necessarily 
something that we learn by considering the correct theory of truth, but rather a condition 
of adequacy on the correct theory of the nature of truth. Or, to put this point using a 
phrase of Jan Aertsen, a “normative moment” is “indispensable in every theory of truth” 
(1996, 255). My own argument for the normativity of truth for the human person is not an 
exercise in teasing this normativity from the nature of truth, so much as it is an attempt to 
construct an answer to (what I called above) the doxastic normative question. For this 
reason, I do not need to have a completely worked out theory of the nature of truth in 
advance. What is required, however, is a theory of the nature of truth that sits well with 
my affirmation of the normativity of truth. Since this is not, properly speaking, the task of 
this investigation, but does inform my thought (perhaps, at times, in an undetected 
manner), it is fitting for me to briefly close this introduction with a look at one theory of 
truth that does sit well with the conclusions of this dissertation. This is Aquinas’s theory 
of truth as a transcendental. In the remainder of this introduction, I outline this theory of 
truth and how it sits well (maybe even entails) the normativity of truth, as well as tease 
out a variety of relationships between truth and the human person that are latent in 
Aquinas’s thought. 
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0.2.1 Aquinas on the nature of truth: a very brief outline 
 The two elements of Aquinas’s theory of truth that are relevant for my purposes 
are his treatment of truth as a transcendental, and his endorsement of the formula veritas 
est adaequatio intellectus et rei as providing a formally complete definition of truth. The 
way to get both of these elements in our sights is by considering the distinction that 
commentators on Aquinas have drawn between “ontological truth” and “logical truth.”41 
But first, let me say a little bit more about what a “transcendental” is. (Note that the 
discussion of Aquinas in what follows refers to De Veritate (hereafter: De Ver.), q. 1, a. 
1, unless otherwise indicated.) 
 In general, a transcendental expresses a mode of being that is not expressed by the 
term “being” by itself. This can occur in one of two fundamental ways. According to the 
second way—which is operative in the case of truth as a transcendental—transcendentals 
“add” (in scare-quotes, since, according to Aquinas, nothing can be “added” to being 
since being is not a genus) a mode of being that is common and consequent upon every 
being. The transcendentals can be determined both (a) through a consideration of beings 
absolutely, or (b) through a consideration of beings in relation to other beings. The latter 
are what Aertsen calls—in his definitive (1996) study of Aquinas on the 
transcendentals—relational transcendentals. Among the relational transcendentals, we 
can distinguish further between those that consider beings as distinct from other beings, 
and beings as corresponding to other beings. This latter “class” of transcendentals is 
                                                        
41 In this terminology, I follow Stein (2002), and Wippel (2007, 65). Wippel (ibid., fn 1) gives additional 
locations of this locution. 
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possible only if there exists a being to whom all things might be said to correspond. 
Aquinas, taking up the words of Aristotle in the De Anima that the soul is, in a sense, all 
things, takes the rational soul to be that to which all beings can “correspond.”42  
 According to Aquinas, the rational soul has two powers: intellective and 
appetitive. All things thus correspond to the soul through one or the other.43 The good 
expresses the relation of all things to the appetitive power, where true expresses the 
relation of all things to the intellective power. It is with the true that we are here 
concerned. 
 Following the usage of other commentators and Thomist philosophers, I appeal to 
the distinction between ontological truth and logical truth in order to clarify Aquinas’s 
account of truth. Ontological truth is the intrinsic intelligibility of things. It is what serves 
as a foundation and basis for logical truth. Logical truth denotes the relationship between 
intellect and thing. It is the adaequatio intellectus et rei. But this adeaquatio differs 
depending on the intellect to which the thing in question is related. Accordingly, we need 
to distinguish, within logical truth, between essential logical truth and accidental logical 
truth.  
 In cases of essential logical truth, the intellect in question is the intellect upon 
which the thing in question depends for its essence—for the kind of thing that it is. With 
                                                        
42 This is the translator’s rendering of convenientiam and the related verb convenire. Readers are advised 
not to read (anachronistically) the meaning of “correspondence” as it features in the contemporary 
correspondence theory of truth back into Aquinas’s text. 
43 As we shall see in chapter V, personalists such as Scheler and von Hildebrand take exception to such a 
view, arguing that it ignores affectivity as a basic center of the human person alongside intellect and will. 
This does not mean, however, that personalism and Scholasticism (or Aristotelianism) are incompatible—
see Spencer (2015a) and (2017), Waldstein (2003) and (2005), and Feingold (2013). Indeed, as discussed 
below, Thomism (and, by extension, Aristotelianism) is one of the main sources of European personalism. 
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respect to the divine intellect, upon which everything depends for what it is, everything is 
related to it (i.e., the divine intellect) by essential logical truth. However, in a lesser 
sense, this relationship also obtains between a human artificer and his artifact. Aquinas 
gives the example of an architect, upon whom a given house depends for its (i.e., the 
house’s) being the kind of house that it is (ST Ia, q. 16, a 1, resp.). Essential logical truth 
is thus a relation between a thing and that upon which it depends for the measure of its 
intelligibility. 
 Accidental logical truth, on the other hand, refers to the potential intelligibility of 
some thing by some (non-divine) intellect—hence “accidental.” It is not necessary that 
everything be known by an intellect upon which it does not depend for its essence. But 
insofar as it is potentially knowable, it serves as a potential measure of the intellect in 
question.  
 In speaking of truth as a measure, I am following Aquinas, who describes the 
following structure that exists among things, ontological truth and logical truth, and 
divine and non-divine intellects. The divine intellect measures things (by essential logical 
truth) but is not measured by them. Things are both measured by intellects (essential 
logical truth) and measure (accidental logical truth) intellects. Non-divine intellects are 
measured by things (accidental logical truth) and do not measure things (save in the case 
of artifacts, described above) (De Ver. q. 1, a. 2, resp.). 
 The notion of measure at issue here is a normative one, and it is the notion of truth 
as a measure that constitutes Aertsen’s “normative moment” (1996, 255). The divine 
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intellect is the norm for things.44 The thing itself, insofar as it is true, is the norm for the 
intellect, or, to put the same point in the language of this dissertation, a norm for the 
human person insofar as he is endowed with intellect. 
 We can also frame the above distinction between logical and ontological truth in 
terms of different ways of defining truth. Aquinas distinguishes three such ways. The first 
defines truth in terms of its being the “foundation” or “basis” of truth. Here, the 
distinction between ontological and logical truth is crucial. For the human person, what 
makes logical truth possible is the ontological truth of things.45 (Recall that the truth of 
things measures the human intellect.) As an example of this sort of definition, Aquinas 
cites Augustine’s definition of truth as “that which is.” 
 The second type of definition regards truth as it is formally complete in its nature. 
For this sort of definition, it is necessary to include a reference to the intellect.46 Aquinas 
                                                        
44 Thing [res] is itself a transcendental according to Aquinas, one that refers to being through the concept of 
essence or quiddity (De Ver., q. 1, a. 1, resp.). It is thus related to truth as a transcendental. It is the 
thinghood of beings that allows them to be thought, as Aertsen observes (1996, 197).  
45 Ultimately, however, the ontological truth of things requires, as we have seen, the relationship of 
essential logical truth to the divine intellect. For this reason, Aquinas says that, per impossibile, if there 
were no intellects, then there would no truth. The relationship to an existing intellect is necessary. 
Accordingly, Aquinas argues that truth resides more properly in the intellect, than in things (De Ver. q. 1, a. 
2, resp.; ST Ia, q. 16, a. 1, resp.). The seeming radicalness of Aquinas’s claim (a claim with which Rorty 
would agree, though Brandom (2000, 161ff) does not) is mitigated by its conjunction (in Aquinas’s 
thought) with the necessary existence of God.  
46 It is here that Aquinas gives us the formally complete definition of truth as the adaequatio intellectus et 
rei. However, he also mentions Anselm’s definition of truth as a “rectitude perceptible only by the mind” 
(De Ver., q. 1, a. 1, resp.). Anselm’s account of truth, which can be found in his dialogue De Veritate, 
wears its normativity on its sleeve. In a pair of claims, the “teacher” of the dialogue, says both “it is the 
same thing for it to be correct and to be true” and “truth is no different from rectitude” (Anselm 1998, 154). 
The reference to truth as correctness and rectitude is especially reminiscent of the contemporary debate (or, 
better, the contemporary debate is especially reminiscent of Anselm!) with its discussion of truth as a 
“correctness condition,” and the normative interpretation of such correctness. It is a pity that no 
contemporary discussion in this area (to the best of my knowledge) discusses Anselm. Anselm’s account 
also has the advantage of discussing truth in a variety of contexts (signification, statements, opinions, the 
will, actions, the senses, and the essences of things). His account of truth in terms of rectitude has the 
advantage of showing how truth is a normative concept that underlies a diverse array of phenomena. This is 
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argues that truth resides primarily in the intellect (De Ver., q. 1, a. 2, resp., ST Ia, q. 16, a. 
1, resp.). For this reason, I think that we can conceive of truth (from the point of view of 
the human person) as beginning in the intrinsic intelligibility of things (as potentially 
intellected) and consummating itself in the intellect’s reduction of the potential 
intelligibility of things to actual intelligibility by the active intellect (ST Ia, q. 79, a. 3, 
resp.). It is in the “wedding” of intellect and thing in logical truth that the fullness of the 
nature of truth is disclosed.  
 Finally, the third type of definition considers truth “according to the effect 
following upon it.” Although he does not explicitly say whether he has in mind 
ontological truth or logical truth here, it would seem that he has in mind the former. In 
evidence of this are his citations of Hilary and Augustine’s definitions of truth: “the true 
is that which manifests and proclaims existence” (Hilary), “truth is that by which that 
which is, is shown” (Augustine), and “truth is that according to which we judge about 
inferior things” (Augustine). Hilary’s definition clearly indicates an intrinsic feature of 
being (and beings) as such, by which they are made manifest47 and so refers to 
ontological truth, as does Augustine’s first definition. Augustine’s second definition, by 
                                                        
particularly instructive in settling whether the normativity of truth for belief is a matter of the nature of 
belief, or the nature of truth. Anselm’s account suggests that we source the normativity of truth in the 
nature of truth, as belief is just one act (among many) which answers to the truth-norm.  
47 A word about “manifests” and “manifestation” here. These words should not be read as suggesting that 
things deliberately manifest themselves to other things. Aquinas is not advocating panpsychism. However, 
I should point out that for beings endowed with reason and will (e.g., human persons), the “manifestation” 
of the truth of their being is something which can they “make their own,” i.e., by acting in ways to manifest 
(or fail to manifest) who they are, to either reveal and disclose or else conceal who they are. The notion of 
manifestation at issue in the third type of definition of truth is therefore related to (if not equivalent with) 
communication, which can be participated more-or-less intensively. All things, according to Aquinas, 
naturally communicate the truth of themselves insofar as they are in act, but, we might hasten to add, only 
rational beings are able to communicate truthfully or untruthfully and thus perfect this natural 
communication by the cultivation of virtue. 
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invoking judgment, indicates ontological truth as the measure of our judgments about 
things. Indeed, it seems that this third type of definition of truth is the flip-side of the first 
type of definition of truth, and hence constitutive of ontological truth. For it is by its 
ontological truth that a thing “manifests” itself. Nevertheless, we might also argue that 
logical truth is at issue in this third type of definition, insofar as it is through the 
consummation of judgmental activity in communicating our judgments to others that the 
manifestation of that which is, is made complete for the community of human persons.  
 Another way to outline the relationships between truth, thing, and intellect, that is 
similar to Aquinas’s distinction among types of definitions, can be found in Edith Stein’s 
masterwork Finite and Eternal Being, in which she attempts, among other things, the 
synthesis of scholastic philosophy and the phenomenology of her teacher, Husserl. In her 
discussion of truth as a transcendental, she frames the question in terms of what makes 
logical truth possible. While she follows Aquinas, she also articulates a richer set of 
distinctions than he does. She distinguishes, e.g., between ontological truth and essential 
truth. Ontological truth is that on the basis of which a thing “is fit to be grasped by a 
knowing intellect” (2002, 296). Essential truth, which is presupposed by ontological truth 
in the case of things with actual being, expresses “the congruity of some actuality with 
the corresponding pure form” (ibid.). The need for such a distinction is due to the fact 
that Stein distinguishes between pure forms and essential forms. The pure form, 
congruity with which Stein calls essential truth, “does not come to be and does not pass 
away” (ibid., 226). “This pure form is above and beyond the realm of becoming. Its being 
stands above the contraries of actuality and potentiality and is eternally ‘perfected.’ And 
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this form prescribes both the end and the way to the end for the thing in which this form 
is ‘actualized’” (ibid.). The essential form, by contrast, refers to the nature or essence of 
the individual actual thing. The individual x’s nature is to be in this form, or to attain to 
this form (ibid.). The essential form of an individual x of kind k thus refers to the pure 
form of k-ness. Since we cannot speak of the congruity of something with itself, Stein 
distinguishes between ontological truth and essential truth because they come apart in the 
case of pure forms. Pure forms possess ontological truth, but not essential truth. 
 In addition to ontological truth and essential truth, Stein also distinguishes from 
both the notion of transcendental truth.48 Transcendental truth is the final element 
required to make logical truth possible. Transcendental truth refers to the intelligibility of 
things, or their “being-ordained” to intellect (ibid., 296-97). Stein concludes this section 
with an observation that I think is very prescient: “we therefore gain a full understanding 
of transcendental truth only if we succeed in clarifying (with respect to content) what 
“spirit,” “overtness,” of the spirit,” and “being revealed to the spirit” really mean” (ibid., 
298).  
 A Thomistic theory of truth therefore contains not only a “normative moment,” 
but also an essential reference to the intellect, and thence to the human person who is a 
being endowed with intellect. This in turn reinforces the normativity of truth. Normativity 
is, as I have said, always normativity-for some (kind of) being. Aquinas’s theory of truth 
identifies both the normative standard, or norm-giver (the ontological truth of things) and 
                                                        
48 Stein also distinguishes “artistic truth,” which appears to do the work of essential logical truth as applied 
to human artificers in Aquinas, from “divine truth” (ibid., 300-308). 
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the “target” of that normativity, that for which the standard of ontological truth is a norm, 
or norm-given (intellectual beings, or persons).  
 Both the relata of Aquinas’s theory of truth (intellects and things), and the 
intrinsically normative terms in which it defines the formally complete nature of truth, 
make clear that Aquinas’s theory is compatible with (and maybe even entails) the 
normativity of truth for the human person. Ontological truth is the norm for logical truth, 
and logical truth is logical truth only to the extent that it “measures up” to the standard of 
ontological truth. As a descriptive condition of the human intellect, logical truth just is 
“compliance” with the norm of ontological truth. The descriptive adaequatio of intellect 
to the thing is the satisfaction by the intellectual being of the truth-norm.  
0.3 Truth as an issue for the human person 
 At this point, it might be wondered why I do not just work out in detail how 
Aquinas’s theory of the nature of truth grounds the normativity of truth. This would 
indeed be a worthy project, but it misses the central desideratum of the present 
investigation. It may well be that truth is intrinsically normative, but the question is why 
comply with such a norm? Now, in a certain sense, the normativity of truth is inescapable 
by Aquinas’s lights. Ontological truth measures the human intellect, whether we want it 
to or not. But insofar as we are not merely passively intellectual, but actively intellectual 
beings, there always remains the question of whether we act so as to fulfill the truth-
norm, or act so as to subvert its authority over our intellects. In asking why we should 
comply with the truth-norm, I think that we want to see, in part, the deep relevance of 
truth to what it means to be a human person. 
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 Even here, I think that Aquinas is very helpful, and I will devote the remainder of 
this section to highlighting some relationships among truth, personhood, and other 
objective goods for the person, that are latent in Aquinas’s thought. A (slightly more) in-
depth discuss of these relationships is postponed to Appendix I. 
 It is worth noting that part of the inspiration to draw out these relationships is a 
challenge that Marcel throws down in The Mystery of Being. Where “quest” refers to 
making sense of truth as a value, Marcel writes: 
 In order to throw more light on the direction of our quest, I should like to insist strongly 
 that what matters for us is to elucidate our meaning when we say, for instance, that we 
 are guided by the love of truth, or that somebody has sacrificed himself for truth…It is 
 obvious at a first glance that a traditional formula, such as ‘truth is the adequation of the 
 thing and the intellect’, whatever its theoretic value may be, is by no means suited to 
 throw light on such assertions. There would be no meaning in saying that somebody had 
 died for the adequation of the thing and the intellect…Let us take it for the present that 
 we are applying ourselves to the consideration of truth in so far as truth is a value; it is 
 only under this aspect that truth can become ‘something at stake’. ([1950] 2001a, 58) 
 
I take up Marcel’s challenge, but reject, in part, his conclusions in this passage. I do not 
think, as he does, that we need to speak of truth as exhibiting a “fundamental ambiguity” 
(ibid.). Rather, as I discuss in Appendix I, we can get to the idea of truth as a value, of 
truth as something at stake, by considering the existential implications of Aquinas’s 
formula, as well as what it stands for. The connections that I mention in what follows will 
hopefully serve also to show that, beyond being intrinsically normative, Aquinas’s theory 
of truth is also able to capture how truth is an issue for the human person. It is arguable 
that nobody has ever died for the adaequatio formula per se, but, if anybody has indeed 
sacrificed himself for the truth, it is just as arguable that he sacrificed himself for what 
that formula—in however ponderous and Scholastic a way—stands for. 
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 What we are seeking, then, is a way to capture the existential pathos of truth 
without making the Kierkegaardian leap to truth as subjectivity. Reserving fuller 
discussion for Appendix I, let me briefly mention three such ways to capture this pathos 
by appealing to Aquinas. The first is the relationship between truth and communication, 
already alluded to above in footnote 47. All things, insofar as they are in act, 
communicate themselves to others, according to Aquinas. This is a natural consequence 
of their intrinsic intelligibility (ontological truth) and their being-in-act. It constitutes, as 
Norris Clarke (1994a) argues, the self-revelation of being. We might call this the natural 
communication of being. However, persons not only communicate themselves qua 
beings, but also engage in acts of self-communication qua persons. These acts of self-
communication can themselves be performed virtuously or viciously. The virtue in 
question is the virtue of truthfulness; the opposed vices are dissimulation, lying, boasting, 
hypocrisy, and irony. One way, then, in which we can discern the value of truth as 
captured in Aquinas’s definition is to attend to the relationship between truth and the 
possibilities for morally good human acts of truthfulness—or morally bad acts of the 
vices opposed to truthfulness.    
 A second “existential connection” can be detected in the relationship between 
truth and the passions. Aquinas illustrates three ways in which particular truths may be 
the objects of hatred, mapping these three ways onto the three types of definition of truth 
discussed above. We can hate a particular truth as being the way things are (first type of 
definition). We can hate a particular truth as known by ourselves (second type of 
definition). Finally, we can hate a particular truth as known by others (third type of 
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definition), i.e., we can hate some truth about ourselves as known by others insofar as it 
makes manifest who we “really are” (e.g., truths about one’s viciousness and sinfulness, 
which one seeks to conceal). In Appendix I, I suggest ways in which, building upon this 
foundation in Aquinas, truth itself (and not just particular truths) can be the object of 
hatred in three correlative ways.  
 A third, but by no means final, existential connection consists in the relationship 
between truth and justice. As discussed above, persons are those entities capable of self-
communication, and hence of either communicating truthfully or untruthfully. In addition 
to this fact about the powers of the human person, there is a corresponding normative 
point in Aquinas’s discussion of justice. Truthfulness, according to Aquinas, falls under 
the cardinal virtue of justice, since truth is something that we owe to each other in justice. 
Hence, the relationship between truth and communication also has normative 
implications for the perfection of our interpersonal relationships with others. The value of 
truth as adaequatio is here found in the values realized by living truthfully with others, in 
such a way that we not only communicate truthfully, but also can be counted upon by 
others as (in the words of Sokolowski) “agents of truth.”   
 Such are the indications of a Thomistic answer to the challenge thrown down by 
Marcel, to make sense of the existential significance of truth as a value, and as something 
that we can love and for which we can even sacrifice our lives. What I hope to have 
begun to show here (and what I develop further in Appendix I) is how Aquinas’s account 
of truth offers us more than an intrinsically normative notion of truth. He also offers us a 
notion of truth that exhibits systematic relationships to the human person, and to other 
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objective goods of the human person. His account thus sits well not only with the 
normativity of truth per se, but also with truth as normative for the human person. His 
thought contains not only an intrinsically “normative moment,” but also the seeds of an 
answer to what I have called the doxastic normative question. 
 In the first two parts of this dissertation, Aquinas’s theory of truth will not play a 
prominent role. But his articulation of a structure for interrelating truth with other 
objective goods of the human person will be central to the methodology of chapter IV. To 
remind the reader, I have here but barely sketched Aquinas’s theory of truth. I have not 
offered a defense of the theory, but merely an indication of its coherence with the thesis 
that truth is normative for the human person. If I do my job well in the chapters to come, 
it should be clear that I come by my acceptance of the normativity of truth not merely as 
a fringe benefit of endorsing the broad details of Aquinas’s theory, but rather that I 
endorse Aquinas’s theory precisely because it sits well with my proposed elucidation and 
defense of the normativity of truth. That, of course, is matter for the reader to decide. 
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Chapter I: The Normativity of Truth for Belief? 
1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I consider the first of three substantial challenges to the thesis that 
truth is a norm of belief. The first challenge is the objection from the putative 
involuntariness of belief, which is encapsulated in the following argument: 
 Argument from Involuntariness: 
(1) If truth is a norm of belief, then we, as believers, incur doxastic obligations. 
(2) If we, as believers, incur doxastic obligations, then what we believe is under 
our voluntary control. 
 (3) But what we believe is not under our voluntary control. 
 (4) Therefore, we incur no doxastic obligations. 
 (5) Therefore, truth is not a norm of belief. 
 In this first subsection, I will say a little more about each of the premises of the 
argument from involuntariness. But before that, let me first draw attention to an oft-noted 
ambiguity in our use of the word “belief.” “Belief” can refer either to the content of a 
belief, almost universally conceived of as a proposition49, or to the state of believing 
some proposition.50 In claiming that truth is a norm of belief, then, we might mean either 
that truth is a norm of belief-contents, or that truth is a norm of belief-states. I will say 
more about this below, as one of the possible responses to the argument from 
                                                        
49 Belief, that is, is almost universally taken as an attitude whose object is a proposition (belief de dicto) as 
opposed to things themselves (belief de re).    
50 Conceived, standardly, as a mental-state. For a refutation of the standard view of belief-states, see Baker 
(1995). As noted below, I am not here concerned with the ontology of belief-states. 
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involuntariness leverages precisely this point. Less often pointed out is that “belief” can 
also refer to the act of forming a belief-state. All this ambiguity might seem to doom the 
present project from the start. Just what is the target of the truth-norm of belief? Is it the 
act of belief, the state of belief, or the content of belief? Furthermore, what exactly is the 
act of belief, or the state of belief? I shall assume that we are entitled to the assumption 
that propositions are the contents of belief qua propositional attitude, but another 
question that might be raised here is that of the nature of propositions themselves. 
Furthermore, to take the content of belief solely to be propositions is itself a view of 
relatively recent vintage.51 It ignores not only the history of philosophy, but other 
twentieth-century philosophical schools and thinkers.52  
                                                        
51 This is displayed by those who would reduce belief de re to belief de dicto. However, in a broader sense, 
it seems that regardless of where one stands on this question, contemporary analytic philosophy is already 
restricted to propositions insofar as even de re belief is partially described in terms of propositions—i.e., S 
believes of x that x is F. For classic papers on this debate, see Quine (1956), Kaplan (1968), Sosa (1970), 
Chisholm (1976), and Burge (1977).  
52 To take but two examples, chosen because they represent thinkers whose influence will resonate 
throughout this dissertation, consider St. Thomas Aquinas and Gabriel Marcel. Aquinas speaks of 
“believing God” (credere Deo), “believing in a God” (credere Deum) and “believing in God” (credere in 
Deum) (ST IIaIIae, q. 2, a. 2). “Believing in a God” is the material object of faith according to Aquinas 
(ibid.). What Aquinas’s distinction calls into question here is precisely the assumption that the content of a 
belief is the same as its object, i.e., a proposition. Something similar holds for the thought of Gabriel 
Marcel, who distinguishes between belief-in and belief-that, with the object of belief-in being either a 
person or some “suprapersonal” reality (1964, ch. 6; [1950] 2001b, ch. 5). Pieper (1963, 17) reminds us that 
belief involves both belief-in and belief-that, citing Aquinas’s claim that to believe always means to believe 
someone and to believe something, i.e., to believe something on the testimony of someone. For critical 
discussion of belief-in and belief-that, see Price (1969, series 2, lecture 9). Price argues that there are two 
kinds of belief-in: evaluative belief-in and factual belief-in. The latter are unproblematically reducible to 
factual beliefs-that. For example, “I believe in unicorns” is reducible in meaning to, “I believe that there are 
unicorns.” Evaluative belief-in is also reducible to beliefs-that, provided that the propositional beliefs to 
which you reduce an evaluative belief-in contain valuational concepts. Despite the promise of this analysis, 
Price concedes that it does not capture the whole of belief and all cases of belief, struggling particularly 
with beliefs in one’s friends, belief in God, and the affective/non-cognitive element of belief-in (namely, 
the pro-attitude and trust in that which one believes in). 
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 The point of raising these question is not to show the hopelessness of the task I 
have undertaken, but to make a critical observation at the outset, namely, that whether 
truth is a norm of belief is going to be sensitive, in part, to the nature of belief, even if—
as I contend—the normativity of truth for belief is not grounded in the nature of belief. 
But since this is not a dissertation on the nature of belief, I will attempt to avoid making 
any heavy commitments about the nature of belief up front. To this end, I will assume, 
given the context of the present objection, that the content of belief is a proposition, and 
that belief is accordingly a specific type of propositional attitude, roughly, the attitude we 
have toward a proposition when we take that proposition to be true.53  
 Recast in these terms, the general question is whether there are norms that govern 
belief in a proposition, and the claim is that truth is one of these norms—if not, in some 
sense, the norm.54 The source of the normativity of truth is the subject of later chapters. 
What concerns us here is whether belief is even an appropriate object of norms, given the 
objection that our beliefs are not under our voluntary control. Put in these terms, we can 
see how the problem of the nature of belief need not be settled before we begin. Whether 
we conceive of belief in terms of act, state, or content, the problem of involuntariness 
remains with us. The advocate of involuntariness (the doxastic involuntarist who 
espouses doxastic involuntarism) will claim that the involuntariness applies to all three, 
or at least to two of the three, and offer a reinterpretation of the third. That is, the doxastic 
                                                        
53 Cf. Schwitzgebel (2015). 
54 In chapter II, I will take up the question of conflict between the norm of truth and other candidate norms 
of belief (specifically: the norm of justification). Though I am not committed to truth being the only norm 
of belief, I argue that it is more fundamental than the norm of justification. 
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involuntarist will claim that (a) the content of our beliefs is not under our voluntary 
control (i.e., we cannot just select propositions to believe), (b) the state of believing that p 
is not under our voluntary control (i.e., we cannot just put ourselves into the state of 
believing that p), and (c) the act of forming a belief that p, or of believing that p is not 
under our voluntary control (i.e., we cannot just decide to form a belief that p). My 
terminology here is admittedly slippery, sliding from “not under our voluntary control” to 
talk of “selecting,” “putting ourselves in,” and “deciding.” Just what is, one might rightly 
ask, the nature of voluntary control? As we shall see, the literature that mounts this 
objection to the normativity of truth for belief is specific on this point. Whereas the 
literature largely avoids engaging with the issue of the nature of belief (an issue for the 
philosophy of mind) it does engage with the issue of what would be required for 
voluntary control. Below, I will outline the objection’s conception of what is required for 
voluntary control over our beliefs, and we will see how some responses to the present 
objection consist in arguing that this conception of voluntary control is false.  
 Having discussed these two initial ambiguities, let us return to the argument from 
involuntariness. The first premise, to remind the reader, is: 
(1) If truth is a norm of belief, then we, as believers, incur doxastic obligations.55 
The general principle instantiated here is that norms of x entail x-obligations. Norms of 
belief therefore entail belief (doxastic) obligations. So, if x is a state or act that has a 
                                                        
55 Note that this formulation is condensed. If truth is a norm of belief, then believers incur doxastic 
obligations. We are believers. Therefore, we, as believers, have such obligations. Also, the locution “we, as 
believers” is not meant to imply that doxastic obligations somehow only apply to the human person qua 
believer. They apply to the human person simpliciter, which entity happens also (perhaps essentially) to be 
a believer. 
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subject (in this case, the believer), and n is a norm of x, then the subject (the believer) 
incurs x-obligations. As understood in the argument from involuntariness, these 
obligations are obligations to believe certain propositions. Thus, this general principle 
commits you to the further assumption that norms are prescriptive, i.e., that norms entail 
obligations. But, as will be discussed below, some norms are not prescriptive, but are 
rather evaluative in nature. This first premise is therefore not entirely innocent of 
significant assumptions. Furthermore, I should note that this premise is rarely made 
explicit in formulations of the argument from involuntariness. But it is crucial that it be 
included, for if the truth-norm is not a prescriptive norm, then the argument is unsound.  
 Moving on, the second premise states: 
(2) If we, as believers, incur doxastic obligations, then what we believe is under 
our voluntary control.  
Here, one of the ambiguities discussed above crops up. What is meant by “what we 
believe?” I have deliberately phrased the premise in this way in order to keep open the 
three distinct possibilities mentioned above. That “what we believe” is “under our 
voluntary control” might attach, in the first instance, to belief-contents (selecting 
propositions to believe), belief-states (putting ourselves into a state of believing some 
proposition), or acts of belief-formation (deciding to believe some proposition). I say, “in 
the first instance,” because, in what amounts to another response to the issue of 
ambiguity, it seems as though these three will turn out, upon closer examination, to be 
intimately linked. That is, if belief is voluntary in one of the three senses, then it is likely 
to be voluntary in one, or both, of the other senses as well. If we can select propositional 
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contents to believe, for example, then it seems as though we are able to put ourselves into 
belief-states and decide upon acts of belief-formation. For example, it seems that if I can 
decide to believe either that Oswald acted alone in killing Kennedy or that he acted with 
an accomplice, then I can also decide to believe (to perform the act of believing) one of 
these alternatives, thereby putting myself in the state of having that belief. So, prima 
facie, the ambiguity here does not present a problem for premise (2). If there are doxastic 
obligations, then it is the case that what we believe is under our voluntary control, 
however we interpret “what we believe.” 
 A second observation to be made about premise (2) is its rationale. The rationale 
behind premise (2) is a version of the principle that “ought” implies “can” (OC). Of 
course, premise (2) might just be seen as an instantiation of an interpretation of OC in 
terms of voluntary control, that is, where “can” is interpreted in terms of voluntary 
control. Since more is said about this below, I refrain from further examining OC here. 
Suffice it to say, however, that the soundness of the argument from involuntariness does 
depend, in part, on the interpretation of OC and its relationship to belief via premise (2). 
 Next is premise (3): 
(3) But what we believe is not under our voluntary control. 
Here, the rubber really hits the road. You cannot advocate the truth of (3), or the truth of 
its negation, that what we believe is under our voluntary control (doxastic voluntarism), 
without saying more about either (i) how you understand belief, or (ii) how you 
understand voluntary control. Below, I will begin by discussing the two works that have, 
by and large, fixed the terms of the debate over whether belief is voluntary or not, namely 
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Williams (1973) and Alston (1988). From these works emerge a basic thesis about belief 
(Williams’s thesis that belief aims at truth), and some basic requirements on voluntary 
control, that drive the initial plausibility of the truth of premise (3). A critical look at 
these texts is thus called for, before examining more recent views regarding the truth or 
falsity of premise (3).  
 Rounding things off, premises (4) and (5) follow logically from (1)-(3). These 
three premises will therefore structure the remainder of the discussion of this chapter. I 
will begin, in section 2, with a look at Williams (1973) and Alston (1988), the 
aforementioned seminal texts that have shaped the debate in which this chapter is 
steeped. After looking at these texts, their arguments and presuppositions, and raising 
some questions for them, I will turn to possible responses to the argument from 
involuntariness (sections 3-5). These possible responses will take the form of rebuttals to 
premises (1)-(3). My discussion will follow actual instantiations of these response types 
in the literature and will thus consist largely of a critical survey of available philosophical 
positions. Finally, in section 6, I will offer my own thoughts regarding the debate over the 
voluntariness of belief and close by sketching an alternative account of belief. 
 I should be clear about the ambitions of this chapter. Since this is not primarily a 
dissertation on the nature of belief per se, nor on the nature of voluntariness, I do not 
claim to demonstrate the truth of doxastic voluntarism or any other thesis. Rather, I am 
calling attention to (primarily three) ways of undermining the argument from 
involuntariness. Since it takes only one false premise to make an argument unsound, all 
that is required for us to proceed past this obstacle, is that you accept at least one iteration 
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of at least one possible type of response to premise (1), (2), or (3). I am not claiming to 
establish the truth of any particular response (though I will indicate where my sympathies 
lie in section 6). Of course, if nothing can gainsay your acceptance of the soundness of 
the argument from involuntariness, then either your journey with me has ended here, or 
else you can choose (or can you?) to believe that doxastic voluntarism is true, or at least 
to suspend judgment. 
2 The Headwaters of the Debate: Williams and Alston 
 In this section, I introduce two seminal papers—Williams (1973) and Alston 
(1988)—which are the starting-off points for the contemporary debate regarding the 
argument from involuntariness. Taking each paper in turn, I lay out the main arguments 
and tentatively raise some critical questions, which point either to responses surveyed in 
sections 3-5, or to my own reflections in section 6.  
2.1 Bernard Williams’s “Deciding to Believe” (1973) 
 In this subsection, I want to focus on three aspects of Williams’s paper, one of 
which I think has been woefully neglected. The first concerns some initial 
methodological claims. The second concerns Williams’s five features of belief. The third 
concerns the argument that, necessarily, belief is involuntary. 
2.1.1 Methodological Assumptions in Williams 
 Williams begins his paper by stating that he will not be considering moral or 
religious beliefs, “but cases of more straightforward factual belief” (1973, 136). He then 
goes on to say that the scope of his discussion is belief qua psychological state or, put 
more simply, “people believing things” (ibid.). It is clear, then, that Williams holds two 
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methodological commitments in this paper. The first concerns the scope of his discussion, 
which is no less than the state of belief itself. The second concerns his choice of 
examples of belief. Although the target of his discussion is the state of belief, his 
examples are limited to straightforward factual beliefs, e.g., that it is raining, or that the 
substance on the table is salt (ibid.).  
 There is, however, a tension—between the scope of the discussion and the choice 
of the examples—that has been overlooked. The insight, pithy though it may be, that 
stands behind the view that there is a tension here is the claim that there are beliefs, and 
then there are beliefs. Considered third-personally, or impersonally, a belief that it is 
raining may seem just as good as any other belief when it comes to understanding 
“people believing things.” But considered first-personally, there is a world of difference 
between believing that it is raining and, say, believing that the universe is governed by a 
providential personal God. Without saying anything else, it should, I hope, be obvious 
that if you want to discuss belief in general, and you restrict your attention to beliefs like 
“It is raining,” then, it is at least possible that you are going to leave out certain features 
of belief, or else misinterpret them. When the conclusion to be established is modally 
qualified—in the present case, Williams’s conclusion is cast as a necessary truth—then it 
seems as though you are required to examine as wide a range of examples of the target 
phenomenon as is possible, given one’s restraints. But it is surely not asking too much, 
that in the course of arguing that it is impossible that belief is voluntary, that we examine 
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not only the belief that it is raining, or that the shaker contains salt, but also beliefs that 
there is a God, the universe is absurd and meaningless, and that murder is wrong.56 
 An inspiration for this observation is a related insight of Linda Zagzebski. 
Zagzebski argues that beliefs lie along a continuum, or scale, of voluntariness, with some 
beliefs more voluntary than others (1996, 66). This insight does not make sense, 
however, if it is intended as an abstract point about certain belief-contents being such that 
they can be believed “more voluntarily” than others. Rather, I interpret it as a point about 
individual believing persons (or groups thereof). Relative to a particular believer, Jane, 
say, some contents will be such that forming a belief in them will be more under her 
voluntary control than will others. (Of course, given the similarities that exist among 
human persons, the abstract interpretation in terms of contents will more or less align 
with an interpretation from the point of view of the person. So I will not insist, in this 
subsection at least, on making too fine a distinction.) Zagzebski’s point is that the reason 
why the thesis of doxastic involuntarism has seemed so plausible is that the doxastic 
                                                        
56 Perhaps someone will object at this point, and say, but if non-cognitivism is true about such beliefs, 
perhaps we need not include them in the discussion. But, I reply, regardless of whether non-cognitivism is 
true, and regardless of its scope, whatever beliefs it targets for analysis as not truth-evaluable, are either 
still beliefs, or else they aren’t. If they still are beliefs, then they must be included in the discussion of 
voluntariness. If they aren’t, then we need an explanation for why what seem to be paradigm instances of 
belief actually aren’t beliefs at all, and why things that ordinary people affirm as beliefs only under highly 
artificial circumstances—being interrogated by epistemologists, say—turn out to be the real beliefs. I 
should also note that my procedure here seems to be the reverse of that of Price (1969, 37). In his lectures, 
Price contends that we must eschew a focus upon first-personal beliefs as inevitably distorting the analysis. 
The force of the disagreement may be mitigated by the fact that Price is concerned with the linguistic 
analysis of belief-statements, and hence thinks that he needs to consider not only present-tense first-person 
belief-statements, but other forms of belief-statements as well. However, I would argue that if, like 
Williams, we wish to restrict our examples of belief, it is at least incumbent upon us to focus on the true 
exemplars of belief. 
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involuntarist has taken, as her paradigms of belief, beliefs (such as perceptual beliefs) 
that intuitively strike us as involuntarily formed (ibid., 69).57  
 I wish to go a step further, however, and advance the following claim, which will 
be discussed further in section 6. The claim is that if we are going to maintain Williams’s 
scope, and must, for whatever reasons, restrict the class of examples that we examine, 
then we must look precisely at those beliefs that Williams, in the first paragraph of his 
paper, dismisses. For I think that if we are to do justice to the ordinary concept of belief, 
belief as it actually features in the lives of human persons, then we must look at what are 
the central cases of belief, and these will be beliefs like religious, moral, philosophical 
(broadly construed, to include one’s “personal philosophy”), and political beliefs. When 
we ask someone, “what do you believe?” the answer we are inviting is one that lays out 
for us the other’s big picture beliefs about, to use Douglas Adams’s phrase from 
Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, “Life, the Universe, and Everything.” If we asked Jane 
what she believed, and she responded with a litany of perceptual beliefs, then we would 
stop her. She would have missed the point. It is my suspicion that we only think of 
perceptual beliefs as beliefs because, under highly artificial conditions, ordinary subjects 
will affirm that they have the “beliefs” in question. That is, if an epistemologist asks Jane 
whether she believes that it is raining, or that the sky is blue, or some such, Jane will not 
deny that she believes these propositions, but the fact that, under such conditions, there is 
no denial (typically, though not in the case of a skeptic), should not be taken to entail that 
                                                        
57 Zagzebski’s broader insight is that such beliefs are paradigm instances of rationality, and, as such, have 
distorted our analyses of concepts like “rational belief,” “justified belief,” and “knowledge” (ibid.). 
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these sorts of beliefs are paradigmatic of belief. Rather, as I will say more about below, 
this fact should be taken to imply that we possess something like an “analogical” concept 
of belief that we are able to extent, under such artificial circumstances, to meet the 
demands of the questioner.58 I think, therefore, that, at the outset of Williams’s discussion 
lies a problem for any attempt to establish a necessary truth about the involuntariness of 
belief. If I have (and will) belabor this point, it is because I think that an appreciation of it 
is necessary to move beyond the argument from involuntariness, and because any true 
understanding of belief and its norms is going to require that we think about all sorts of 
beliefs, and not the sort that dominate epistemology papers, and especially think about 
those sorts of beliefs that seem to be the real exemplars of belief, and the sorts of beliefs 
that we really care the most about.59 
2.1.2 Belief aims at truth 
 Williams goes on to discuss five features of belief. I will only discuss one here, 
because it is by appeal to this feature this Williams make his argument for the necessary 
truth of doxastic involuntarism, and because debate over this thesis has dominated much 
                                                        
58 This is crucial, as it promises both to account for the range of our usage of the word “belief,” but also 
what I argue (in section 6, anticipated here) is the central usage and meaning of “belief” for the human 
person. 
59 Another example of the way in which the distortion occurs can be found in Adler (2002, 4). Adler takes it 
that his conceptual evidentialist view has the virtue of accounting for “a huge range of undisputed data,” in 
that, even if it has a hard time with certain kinds of beliefs (e.g., religious beliefs, beliefs about the 
goodness of others, axioms and principles like induction, basic beliefs), we should not give it up because 
these represent only a small portion of all beliefs. My point here is just that the pool of “beliefs” may have 
been artificially extended by predicating “believes that p” where p includes propositions like “it is raining” 
or “the sky is blue” or “there is a book”. It may seem that a theory like conceptual evidentialism accounts 
for the huge bulk of data, but it is hardly undisputed data, whereas if it cannot account for those beliefs that 
I would say are undeniably beliefs proper (e.g., that God exists, that people are basically good, that nature 
is uniform in its laws) this is a problem. In short, certain theories seem to acquire strength just in virtue of 
extending the class of beliefs, and then focusing on cases that fall at the lower end of the spectrum. 
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of the literature considered in this dissertation. It is the claim that “beliefs aim at truth” 
(Williams 1973, 136). Williams goes on to articulate his meaning in three sub-theses: 
 (1) “truth and falsehood are a dimension of assessment of belief” (ibid., 137).60 
 (2) “to believe that p is to believe that p is true” (ibid.) 
 (3) “to say “I believe that p” itself carries, in general, a claim that p is true.” 
 (ibid.) 
 Let me make some observations about (1)-(3). First, note than (1) seems to imply 
that truth is an evaluative norm of belief. A dimension of assessment just seems to be an 
evaluative norm, which in the case of belief would amount to the claim that a true belief 
is a good belief and a false belief is a bad belief. Second, (2) is uncontroversially true. 
(3), however, requires some reflection. Williams himself concedes that in ordinary 
language there is another sense in which saying “I believe that p” does not univocally 
carry the claim that p is true. For example, we might be asked how to get to the Fenway 
Green Line stop from the intersection of Beacon and St. Mary’s. Saying, “I believe that 
you take such-and-such a route” flags, in ordinary discourse, that you are not entirely 
confident in your beliefs about the route. Williams treats these uses of “I believe that p” 
in connection with his second feature of belief, namely that the “most simple, 
straightforward, basic, elementary expression of a belief is an assertion” that p (ibid., 
137-38). But the sort of locution that we use in giving directions in the above example is 
not an aberrant phenomenon. It is part of the way in which our ordinary language 
                                                        
60 The notion of truth as a dimension of assessment predates Williams and can be found in the work of J.L. 
Austin ([1979] 2007d, 130). 
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manages to embody the distinction between belief and knowledge. Again, by appealing 
only to a limited class of lower-end beliefs like “it is raining,” we can easily succumb to 
the temptation to write off the significance of this locution. We do not often say “I 
believe that it is raining,” because we usually know that it is raining, and it is only 
because mainstream epistemology takes knowledge to entail belief that we even think of 
such examples as paradigm examples of belief in the first place. So the “claim to truth” of 
condition (3) needs to be understood not to entail a claim to know that p, or else condition 
(3) collapses the distinction between knowledge and belief. 
 One final note before moving onto Williams’s argument. That beliefs aim at truth 
has been interpreted in the subsequent literature on the norms of belief in a teleological 
way, such that truth is the telos of belief, whether in virtue of a purpose on the part of the 
believer, or in virtue of the functional (or function-like) behavior of subpersonal belief-
formation mechanisms.61 Such an interpretation does not seem supported by Williams’s 
articulation of the aim thesis. So it might seem that one can affirm the aim thesis, but not 
the teleological conception of belief. But, as I shall point out, it does seem to be required 
by the subsequent argumentation of Williams’s paper. It is to that argumentation that I 
now turn. 
2.1.3 Williams’s Argument 
 Williams offers two arguments for the conclusion that, necessarily, belief is 
involuntary (1973, 148-49). The first can be found in the following paragraph: 
                                                        
61 This view will be discussed in more detail in chapter III. For now, one example of such a view is 
Velleman (2000). 
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It is not a contingent fact that I cannot bring it about, just like that, that I believe 
something…Why is this? One reason is connected with the characteristic of beliefs that 
they aim at truth. If I could acquire a belief at will, I could acquire it whether it was true 
or not; moreover, I would know that I could acquire it whether it was true or not. If in full 
consciousness I could will to acquire a ‘belief’ irrespective of its truth, it is unclear that 
before the event, I could seriously think of it as a belief, i.e., as something purporting to 
represent reality. At the very least, there must be a restriction on what is the case after the 
event; since I could not then, in full consciousness, regard this as a belief of mine, i.e., 
something I take to be true, and also know that I acquired it at will. With regard to no 
belief could I know—or, if all this is to be done in full consciousness, even suspect—that 
I had acquired it at will. But if I can acquire beliefs at will, I must know that I am able to 
do this; and could I know that I was capable of this feat, if with regard to every feat of 
this kind which I had performed, I necessarily had to believe that it had not taken place?62 
 
It is not my intention here to provide a formulation of the argument. But what I wish to 
do is call attention to a conditional premise that any formulation of the argument will 
require, and which is relevant to the argument from involuntariness, namely: 
(At-Will) If S can believe that p at will, then S can believe that p even if S does 
not take p to be true.63 
 This is a very strong constraint on believing at will (believing voluntarily). Since 
Williams takes it that doxastic involuntarism follows from the thesis that beliefs aim at 
truth, Williams understands the involuntariness of belief as following from this aim. To 
believe at will is to believe irrespective of what you take to be the truth, but to believe is 
to aim at the truth. Therefore, you cannot actually believe at will.  
                                                        
62 For detailed formulations and examinations of this argument, see Winters (1979, 252-56) and Walker 
(2001, 76-81). Winters thinks that the strongest principle in the neighbor of the necessary involuntariness 
thesis is that we cannot (simultaneously and in full consciousness) believe that: we believe that p and that 
our belief that p is sustained at will (Winters 1979, 253). Frankish (2007) takes issue with Winters’s 
formulation, and offers his own revised version of Williams’s thesis: for any proposition p, it is impossible 
to believe in full consciousness both that one consciously believes that p, and that one’s belief that p is both 
unsupported and deviant (532). Peels (2014b) offers counterexamples to Williams’s conclusion. 
63 This just restates the relevant text from the block quote (above). 
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 Although more along these lines will be said below, it is important to point out 
now that this principle is not just strong, but too strong. As Walker (2001, 68-69) notes, 
voluntariness cannot require such “arbitrary plumping.” Rather, he says, voluntariness 
should be construed more narrowly, to embrace responsiveness to reasons (a key 
rejoinder, as we shall see). We typically count an action undertaken for reasons as 
voluntary, so why should we not typically count a belief that is held for reasons as 
voluntary? Nishi Shah (2002, 437-440) likewise weighs in against (At-Will). Shah argues 
that aimedness is not a sufficient condition for involuntariness: if actions of type T have 
aim A, then we cannot count as T-ing unless we take A into account. But this does not 
entail that our T-ing is involuntary. In fact, notes Shah (ibid., 439), if it were the case that 
aimedness suffices for involuntariness then, on a classical account of action, all action 
would turn out to be involuntary. For on classical accounts of action, all actions aim at 
the Good. But then if having an aim were to suffice for involuntariness, it would follow 
that all actions, being aimed at the Good, are involuntary. But this is no part of a classical 
theory—for example, that of Aquinas, on which the only thing that is involuntary about 
human action is that it has the final end (aim) that it has (see ST IaIIae, q. 13, a. 6).64  
 More down-to-earth examples typically come by reference to games. You do not 
count as playing darts unless you are aiming at the board. But, for all that, you can play 
darts voluntarily. If to count as voluntarily playing darts, you had to be able to play darts 
                                                        
64 The final end, according to Aquinas, is happiness (beatitudo). This is due not to some external constraint 
on the will of man, but rather due to the fact that the will of man has, for its object, the Good, and due to the 
fact that happiness, as the perfect good, cannot be apprehended by reason as evil, and so the will 
necessarily wills happiness as the final end (IaIIae, q. 1, aa. 5,7; q. 8, a. 1; q. 13, a. 6). 
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while not aiming at the board at all (say by just throwing the darts at the other players), 
then playing darts voluntarily would be impossible. The general point is that constitutive 
aims do not entail involuntariness. Now, I am neither affirming nor denying Williams’s 
aim thesis at this point65; I am simply arguing that the truth of the aim thesis in no way 
impugns the voluntariness of belief. Since (At-Will) must be part of any formulation of 
the argument implicit in the passage cited above, any such argument is unsound.66 
 But Williams’s is just one argument67, however influential, and despite the 
reasons advanced against it here, it is a further step to go from the unsoundness of one 
argument for a conclusion to the falsity of that conclusion. But insofar as Williams’s 
argument is taken as strong reason to believe that belief is involuntary, its unsoundness at 
least gives us reason to look at premise (3) of the argument from involuntariness again. 
Such efforts will be the subject of section 5, below. For now, I will turn to the other 
formative work for the question under consideration, William Alston’s “The 
Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification” (1988). 
2.2 William Alston’s “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification” 
 In a way, Alston’s paper is the more influential. It is from Alston’s paper that we 
get the essence of the argument from involuntariness. Alston’s goal is to argue against 
                                                        
65 For an argument against the aim thesis, see Owens (2003). Owens argues that since believers cannot, in 
forming a belief, balance the “aim” of belief against other aims, belief is not genuinely aim-directed. This 
has come to be known as the exclusivity problem in the literature. For a response to Owens, see Steglich-
Petersen (2009). For a response to the exclusivity problem that takes issue with Steglich-Petersen, see 
McHugh (2012a) and (2013b), who argues against the phenomenon of exclusivity. 
66 For Williams’s second argument, see (1973, 149). Since this argument appeals specifically to perceptual 
beliefs, and their connection to the environment, I do not spend time discussing it here. Bennett (1990) 
responds to Williams’s second argument. 
67 Scott-Kakures (1993) also defends the conceptual impossibility of believing at will, though he does so 
from considerations about willing per se, as opposed to believing. 
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deontological conceptions of epistemic justification, i.e., accounts of justification 
according to which S is justified in believing that p if, and only if, S is not blameworthy 
in believing that p, where blameworthiness is understood in terms of not having violated 
any epistemic rules or principles (1988, 257-58). It is in this context that he argues from 
the involuntariness of belief to the falsity of the deontological conception. Now, as has 
been noted by Chuard and Southwood (2009, 600), Alston’s argument, if sound, does not 
merely demonstrate the falsity of the deontological conception, but also the non-existence 
of norms of belief more generally. The argument, as usually formulated68, consists of two 
central premises:  
(1) If there are norms of belief, then belief is under our voluntary control (Alston 
1988, 259) 
(2) Belief is not under our voluntary control (Alston 1988, sections III-V) 
 These premises correspond roughly to premises (2) and (3) of the argument from 
voluntariness outlined at the outset of this chapter. Since we are going to go through these 
premises in sections 4 and 5, below, I will not say much in response to this argument 
here. But I will say a little more about the premises themselves, as Alston understands 
them. 
 First, Alston understands the conditional premise as following from the principle 
that “ought” implies “can” (OC). He says, “by the time-honored principle that “ought 
implies can”, one can be obliged to do A only if one has an effective choice as to whether 
                                                        
68 See, e.g., Feldman (2000, 669), Engel (2002, 133), Shah (2002, 436), Ryan (2003, 48) and Chuard and 
Southwood (2009, 600). 
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to do A” (ibid., 259). It is not immediately clear if he envisions this as following from 
OC, or as an interpretation of OC in terms of voluntary control. According to the latter 
view, the “can” of OC just is the “can” of voluntary control—that is, OC just is a 
principle that states that if you ought to do something, then doing it is under your 
voluntary control. Responses that we will survey in section 4 take aim at OC, either going 
for a full rejection of OC, a rejection of OC as applied to belief, or a rejection of OC as 
underwriting Alston’s conditional premise. 
 Alston argues by dilemma to establish the involuntariness of belief. Alston 
proposes that belief is either under our basic voluntary control, our non-basic immediate 
voluntary control, or our long-range voluntary control (he discusses each in turn in 
sections III, IV, and V of his paper). Basic control is the sort of control that we exercise 
“just like that” when, e.g., we just raise our arms. Non-basic voluntary control is the kind 
of control that we exercise over something by performing one uninterrupted intentional 
act. For example, we have non-basic voluntary control over the lighting in a room 
through our basic voluntary control over flipping the light switch to the “on” position. 
Finally, there is long-range voluntary control, which is the sort of control we exercise 
through repeated, non-consecutive acts. For example, we might get someone to like us by 
engaging in a long-term program of doing nice things for her from time to time. Alston 
denies that we have either basic or non-basic immediate control over our beliefs and, 
while he concedes that we have some degree of long-range control over some of our 
beliefs, he thinks neither that we are reliably successful in our efforts to form beliefs in 
this way, nor that such control would be sufficient to underwrite norms of belief. 
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 His argument against our having basic immediate control comes in the following 
passage: 
My argument for this, if it can be called that, simply consists in asking you to consider 
whether you have any such powers. Can you, at this moment, start to believe that the U.S. 
is still a colony of Great Britain, just by deciding to do so. If you find it too incredible 
that you should be sufficiently motivated to try to believe this, suppose that someone 
offers you $500,000,000 to believe it, and you are much more interested in the money 
than in believing the truth. Could you do what it takes to get that reward? Remember that 
we are speaking about believing at will. No doubt, there are things you could do that 
would increase the probability of your coming to believe this, but that will be discussed 
later. Can you switch propositional attitudes toward that proposition just by deciding to 
do so? It seems clear to me that I have no such power. Volitions, decisions, or choosings 
don’t hook up with anything in the way of propositional attitude inauguration, just as they 
don’t hook up with the secretion of gastric juices or cell metabolism (Alston 1988, 
263).69  
 
A few observations: first, this problem inherits the same sort of problem (albeit 
differently stated) faced by Williams’s argument, namely, that its conception of believing 
at will might easily be taken to be too strong. Should we concede that our inability to 
believe obvious falsehoods just by deciding to, regardless of whether there is a strong 
incentive to do so in the form of a reward, tells against our ability to form beliefs at will?  
 Second, Alston’s argument is more specific than Williams’s, and argues for a 
different conclusion. Whereas Williams argues that belief is necessarily involuntarily and 
makes the issue one of conceptual impossibility, Alston argues merely that it is a 
contingent psychological fact about human believers that we do not have the ability to 
form beliefs at will. He also focuses on the kind of causation that would have to be in 
                                                        
69 Steup (forthcoming, 8) objects to Alston’s explanation. It isn’t the case that our wills are causally 
inefficacious with respect to forming the belief that the US is still a colony of Great Britain. Rather, we just 
cannot get ourselves to decide to believe such an obviously false proposition in the first place. So it’s not 
the case that we form a volition (volitional control) but that we fail to execute that volition (executional 
control). Rather, our will is effectively constrained in its volitional control by our appreciation of what 
reason obviously dictates—in this case, that the US is obviously not still a British colony. 
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place in order for us to count as believing at will, namely that the “inauguration” of our 
propositional attitudes would have to be caused in the right way by our intending to 
believe that p. As we will see below, at least one thinker, Matthias Steup, does think that 
our intentions to believe cause our beliefs in the right way.  
 Finally, it is important to note the comparison of belief-formation to processes 
like gastric juice secretion. Williams make a similar implicit comparison when he 
discusses blushing (1973, 148). But blushing, like the secretion of gastric juices, is not so 
much involuntary as non-voluntary. If the fact that we cannot form beliefs in the same 
way that we raise our arms suggests that belief-formation is more akin to non-voluntary 
physiological processes, then we have some reason, I think, to question whether we have 
the right notion of voluntary control in our sights. For while it seems that some persons 
can live their doxastic lives as if the formation and maintenance of beliefs were a non-
voluntary process, this is surely not necessary. We can be involved in the formation and 
maintenance of beliefs more or less intensively and, while we cannot form a belief in the 
same way that we can raise an arm, we should not, for all that, conclude that we lack 
voluntary control over our beliefs. 
 Against non-basic voluntary control, Alston starts by noting that such control, if 
applicable, could only apply to beliefs whose contents are neither clearly true nor clearly 
false. It might be thought that, in such cases, by deciding to gather evidence and 
undertake an inquiry, we have non-basic immediate control over our beliefs. But, says 
Alston, this is not sufficient for non-basic voluntary control, for by initiating an inquiry, 
all that we do is determine that we will have some belief within a more or less definite 
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range of beliefs. Using the example of the proposition that Al Kaline’s lifetime batting 
average is .320, he argues that by initiating the process of inquiry (say, by deciding to 
look up Kaline’s average in an almanac) we do not form a belief at will with the content 
that Kaline’s average is .320, but just ensure that we will form some belief or other, 
whatever corresponds to the entry in the almanac. As we will see below, at least one pair 
of thinkers (Salmieri and Bayer (2014)) will question Alston’s description of the case and 
its support for doxastic involuntarism.  
 Finally, with respect to long-range voluntary control, Alston just doesn’t think 
that such control reliably works. As such, it is insufficient to underwrite norms of belief 
(1988, 275-77). Hence, according to Alston, for any form of voluntary control, either we 
do not possess such control with respect to belief, or else such control is insufficient to 
underwrite norms of belief.  
 This completes my exposition and preliminary critical evaluation of the seminal 
works that inaugurated the contemporary debate over the voluntariness of belief, and the 
implications this debate has for norms of belief. In addition to introducing formative and 
highly-influential arguments for involuntarism (to the point that involuntarism is a de 
facto orthodoxy among contemporary analytic philosophers, or at least a default 
assumption), this review has introduced us to the claim that belief aims at truth, to which 
we will return in section 6 of this chapter, as well as in the discussion of the teleological 
account of the normativity of truth in chapter III. It has also served to acclimate the 
reader to the terms in which “voluntary control” has been cast for purposes of answering 
whether belief is under our voluntary control. With the “historical” starting points in 
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place, we can now return to the argument from involuntariness and begin the survey of 
critical rebuttals to premises (1)-(3). 
3 Premise 1: If truth is a norm of belief, then we, as believers, incur doxastic 
obligations. 
 As I noted in section 1, this premise is often not made explicit in formulations of 
the argument from involuntariness.70 But, if it is not made explicit, the argument begs the 
question against alternatives to the claim that the truth-norm is prescriptive. Premise (1) 
supposes that truth is a prescriptive norm of belief, i.e., a norm that entails certain 
obligations on the part of the believer. If truth is a prescriptive norm, then premise (1) 
seems to follow without a problem. But what if the truth-norm is not a prescriptive norm? 
In this section, I look briefly at two alternatives.  
 The first is due to Engel (2002). Engel argues that truth is an “epistemic norm” 
which he contrasts with practical norms (2002, 135). In addition to not entailing any 
practical obligations, he argues that the truth-norm also does not entail any epistemic 
obligations either (ibid.).71 It is rather, he says, a kind of “role-ought.” Engel cites 
Feldman (2000) here, and rightly so, as the concept of a role-ought is originally due to 
Feldman. But I think that Engel is wrong to claim that role-oughts “do not describe any 
obligation…on the part of the subject” (ibid.). This misconstrues Feldman’s 
                                                        
70 An exception is Chuard and Southwood (2009, 600) who, while formulating what they take to be 
Alston’s argument, include as the first premise the conditional that if the deontological conception of 
epistemic justification is true (analogous here to the antecedent of (1) (If truth is a norm of belief…), “then 
there are true deontic claims about the beliefs of normal subjects” (roughly analogous to the consequent of 
(1) (then there are doxastic obligations). 
71 These, I take it, are obligations to believe that stem from one’s evidence, e.g. the Humean dictum to 
proportion one’s beliefs to one’s evidence. 
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understanding of role-oughts as applied to norms of belief. As we will see below, 
Feldman’s role-oughts are actually a response to premise (2) of the argument from 
involuntariness. It is not the case that role-oughts do not entail obligations—they do. 
Feldman’s main example is that of the incompetent teacher who, while she cannot teach 
the curriculum, nevertheless has an obligation to teach the curriculum to her students 
(2000, 676). Now it is the case that such role-oughts apply in virtue of the person they 
bind having elected to take on a certain role (ibid.). But this does not entail that norms 
containing role-oughts do not describe obligations. They do: the norm that tells a teacher 
that she must teach her students the curriculum may be a role-ought, but it still describes 
an obligation of the teacher, namely, to teach the curriculum.  
 Engel seems to have something else in mind, even though he cites Feldman.72 
Consider his example, “Politicians ought to be honest.” Engel says that this norm “does 
not necessarily refer to any subjective obligation on their part, but to the normal 
performance of a certain role” (2002, 135). Now, I think that there is ample room to 
dispute his example, but nevertheless I do agree that there is a sense of “norm” that he 
has his finger on. We do speak of norms of proper function. We say things like, “The 
thermostat should click on when the house gets below 68 degrees,” “the terminal ileum 
should absorb vitamin B-12,” “the subject should be able to make out the letters in the 
third row.” We also use this sense of norm to cover various (more or less) elaborate 
social practices and rituals. The Roman Catholic Church, e.g., has hundreds or more 
                                                        
72 Oddly, while Engel calls the examples he borrows from Feldman examples of role-oughts, the examples 
in question come the section of Feldman’s paper that precedes the section on role-oughts. 
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norms regarding, among other things, the celebration of the Mass and the administration 
of the Sacraments.73 
 So I do think that there is a natural sense of “norm” on which Engel’s 
considerations lean. If truth were a norm in this sense, then it might mean something like 
the following: our belief-forming mechanisms are functioning as they ought to function 
to the extent that they produce true beliefs over false beliefs.74 If this were the case, then 
premise (1) would not be true. For it could be the case that truth is such a norm of proper 
function without believers thereby incurring any doxastic obligations. That is, if truth is a 
norm in this sense, then the connection between norms and obligations is broken and 
premise (1) is false. 
 A related, though distinct, proposal is that truth is an evaluative norm of belief. 
This proposal is to be found in McHugh (2012b).75 Evaluative norms, unlike prescriptive 
norms, are not prescriptions that “bind or guide one’s conduct, but [are] rather 
evaluations of (e.g.) properties, objects, events, or states of affairs” (McHugh 2012b, 10). 
While they may have implications for what we ought or ought not to do, the implication 
is not straightforward. The idea is that something might be evaluated as good relative to 
some evaluative norm and (assuming the evaluation is correct) be good even in the 
absence of someone having done something good, and likewise for an evaluation that 
                                                        
73 Contained in official liturgical books like the Roman Missal, the General Instruction of the Roman 
Missal, the Roman Breviary (and its General Instruction), and the Roman Ritual. 
74 This gloss suggests a certain affinity with externalist (specifically, reliabilist) interpretations of epistemic 
justification. 
75 To be clear, McHugh does not propose the evaluative reading of the truth-norm as a solution to the 
problem I am addressing, but rather as an alternative to the prescriptive reading which, he argues, requires a 
formulation of the truth-norm so complex as to undermine the truth-norm’s ability to provide guidance to 
believers (2012b, 14-15). 
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something is bad (ibid.). These last points are crucial, for the truth or falsity of premise 
(1) will turn on how one understands the connection between evaluative norms and the 
prescriptions that McHugh says they often imply. If the connection is such that premise 
(1) is true, then this proposal doesn’t rebut the premise.76 But if the connection is such 
that premise (1) turns out false, then it does.77  
 McHugh formulates his evaluative account of the truth-norm as follows: “for any 
S, p: if S believes p, then that belief is a good doxastic attitude to have to p if p is true, 
and that belief is a bad doxastic attitude to have to p if p is false” (2012b, 22). 
Briefly put, whereas a prescriptive truth-norm prescribes particular acts of belief-
formation, an evaluative truth-norm evaluates beliefs in terms of their contents. A belief 
whose content is true is evaluated as a good belief, and a belief whose content is false is 
evaluated as a bad belief. Furthermore, the goodness in question is not goodness 
simpliciter, but rather goodness qua belief—“good” in what Geach (1956) calls its 
attributive sense: that sense of goodness by which it makes sense to talk of good thieves 
who aren’t good (that is, thieves who are good at thievery, but who aren’t good 
simpliciter).78 
                                                        
76 McHugh gives some reason for thinking that premise (1) of the argument from involuntariness is true by 
claiming that his evaluative account explains prescriptive norms of belief. In a nutshell, his suggestion is 
that (1) if there is a principle stating that if A is a good and consideration R makes likely that f-ing will 
bring about or constitute A, then R gives you a pro tanto reason to engage in f-ing, and (2) if there is a 
principle stating that what you ought to do is determined by what you have most reason to do, then (3) the 
evaluative truth-norm explains prescriptive norms of belief (McHugh 2012b, 21).  
77 How might it turn out to be false? One possibility is that the evaluative truth-norm does not imply any 
doxastic obligations. It might be a necessary condition on the existence of such obligations, but require 
other conditions to obtain before entailing any doxastic obligations. Furthermore, it is possible that 
whatever other condition we threw in would just be an instance of a doxastic obligation, so that the 
conditional would effectively have the form: (p & q) ® q.   
78 The distinction goes back to Aristotle. Cf. Metaphysics 1021b14-20. 
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 Finally, I think that McHugh’s response to the objection that his account is not 
genuinely normative is worth mentioning. One might object that, on his account, belief is 
akin to thievery or the good performance of any other function. In that case, the objection 
presses, truth would be normative in what McHugh calls a deflationary sense (2012b, 23). 
Armed with our discussion of Engel, we could cast this as saying that an evaluative norm 
of belief in McHugh’s sense just collapses into a norm describing proper performance 
according to Engel. But what distinguishes belief from any other mere function is its role 
in our lives. It is essential, says McHugh, to the sort of entity that we are, that we regulate 
our beliefs. Beliefs, qua representations of the world, are necessary for our navigating the 
world. They are also necessary for the exercise of our abilities to be rational and moral. 
He writes, “the doxastic function is...essential to some of the most fundamental aspects of 
our nature, without which we would not be dealers in rational or moral norms at all” 
(ibid.). It is thus in virtue of the special role that properly regulated beliefs play in the 
unfolding of our nature that an evaluative truth-norm stands above, and apart from, and 
does reduce not to, norms in Engel’s sense.79  
 Let us review the results of this section. The first response undermines premise 
(1) by interpreting truth as a norm of proper performance. The second response interprets 
truth as an evaluative norm of belief in terms of the truth-value of the contents of beliefs, 
                                                        
79 This thought is significant for the present dissertation because it points to the sort of consideration that I 
will argue is what grounds the normativity of truth. As mentioned in the introduction, my method will be to 
consider the normativity of truth insofar as truth is a norm for the human person. A proper understanding of 
the truth-norm, and its source, will thus appeal to an understanding of the nature of the human person and 
the goodness of truth for the person. In fact, as we shall see in the appendix to chapter III, my own tentative 
stab at a formulation of the truth-norm is evaluative in the sense that its antecedent refers to the goodness of 
a given belief, where one element of the goodness of a given belief is that it is true. However, the 
consequent of my formulation contains an “ought” and so is prescriptive in a way that McHugh’s is not. 
 72 
 
and may or may not undermine premise (1), depending on whether one understands such 
evaluative norms to imply prescriptive norms. I now turn to consideration of possible 
rebuttals of premise (2), centering on the connection between the existence of doxastic 
obligations and requirement of voluntary control. 
4 Premise 2: If we, as believers, incur doxastic obligations, then what we 
believe is under our voluntary control. 
 In response to premise (2), there are two kinds of possible response. One is to 
attack the rationale for this principle, which is OC. Taking this route has several 
branches. One might attack OC simpliciter. One might attack OC as applied to “oughts” 
of doxastic norms. Or, one might attack OC as providing support for premise (2). We will 
look at examples of all three sorts of views.  
 A second possibility consists in maintaining the “spirit” of premise (2), while 
altering its content. What I mean is this. Premise (2) encodes a plausible assumption 
about obligations, namely, that we have to be responsible for the matter of our 
obligations. (What I mean by “matter” is that with which the obligations are concerned, 
so that the matter of our doxastic obligations are our beliefs.) But one might deny that 
responsibility for x requires voluntary control over x. In other words, one might think that 
while premise (2) is in the neighborhood of what must be the case if there are doxastic 
norms, it is not quite right. Rather, this approach would substitute something like the 
following: 
(2*) If we, as believers, incur doxastic obligations, then we are responsible for our 
beliefs. 
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Then, assuming that the class of things for which we are responsible is wider than the 
class of things over which we have voluntary control, it would not necessarily be the case 
that, if belief is not under our voluntary control, then there are no doxastic norms. I will 
not here consider the relationship between responsibility and voluntary control in itself, 
as that would take us too far afield. Rather, I just flag at the outset that this assumption is 
required in order for this sort of response to constitute a full reply to the argument from 
involuntariness. If voluntary control is necessary for responsibility, on the other hand, 
then this response is a non-starter.  
 With these preliminary taxonomic comments in place, we can now move to 
consider the first kind of response, regarding principle OC and its relation to premise (2). 
4.1 Questioning “Ought” implies “Can” 
 Under the heading of “questioning OC” is a variety of strategies of varying 
strength. We will look at some representatives of this strategy, in order of descending 
strength. The strongest possible response here is to deny the truth of OC simpliciter, not 
just as applied to doxastic “oughts,” but as applied to any “ought” at all. A strong 
proponent of this strategy is Ryan (2003, section 3). Ryan quite boldly states at the 
beginning of her discussion that “regardless of the popularity and initial plausibility of 
the idea that “ought” implies “can”, it is not true” (2003, 50).80  
                                                        
80 It is important to note, in light of the work of Chuard and Southwood (2009) (see below) that Ryan 
formulates OC in terms of voluntary control directly, rather than formulating OC in a way that is voluntary-
control-neutral and then arguing that OC, thus formulated, neither entails nor otherwise supports something 
like premise (2) of the argument from involuntariness. 
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 Ryan’s strategy is to go through several versions of OC, arguing against each. In 
response to the strongest version of OC (her OC1: If a person S has an obligation to do A 
at time t, then S is able to do A voluntarily at t), she presses cases in which it seems that 
we excuse people for not doing what they ought to do, even if they were unable to do so 
voluntarily. But Ryan, flipping the tables on this line of reasoning (if excused, then not 
obliged), argues that the presence of excuses rather indicates that an obligation exists and 
has retained its obligatory force despite the fact that the person obliged was unable to 
comply.  
 Ryan’s suggestion is that we excuse the conduct of someone who cannot comply 
with an obligation because she has failed to do what she ought to have done (2003, 53). 
Ryan goes on to suggest weaker versions of OC (her OC2, OC3, and OC4) presenting 
what she takes to be counterexamples to each (ibid., 53-59). Since I am not trying to 
demonstrate the falsity of OC here, I refer the reader to Ryan’s particular cases to 
determine whether they hold water as counterexamples to OC. What I will suggest here is 
that if OC needs to be weakened to avoid counterexamples, then there will come a point 
when it has been weakened so much that it no longer captures what we find to be so 
intuitively plausible about OC in the first place. This in itself might give us reason to 
adopt a formulation of OC that does not interpret “can” in terms of voluntary control. 
What we “can” do, in the sense relevant to OC, might be broader than what is under our 
voluntary control. This sort of move should put one in mind of the second category of 
rebuttal mentioned above. Perhaps OC needs to underwrite something like premise (2*) 
instead. If this is so, then, given the assumption that voluntary control is not necessary for 
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responsibility, perhaps OC, interpreted not in terms of voluntary control, can instead 
underwrite that claim that if there are obligations, then we must be responsible for the 
matter of those obligations.  
 Rejecting OC tout courte is, however, a strategy that not many are ready to 
embrace, so let us move on to a weaker strategy. The next weakest strategy consists in 
denying the applicability of OC to obligations that are doxastic, or epistemic, in kind. So-
called “doxastic oughts” or “epistemic oughts” are not such that they entail “can.”81  
 Here, the role-oughts introduced by Feldman (2000) are one possibility. As noted 
above, and pace Engel (2002), role-ought do constitute obligations, but they are 
obligations that follow in virtue of the person whom they bind having taken on a 
particular role (Feldman 2000, 676). Feldman’s three examples include teachers who 
ought to explain things clearly, parents who ought to take care of their children, and 
cyclists who ought to move in certain ways. Some teachers, parents, and cyclists may be 
unable to meet these obligations, but, nevertheless, it remains the case that they ought to 
do so (ibid.). Feldman’s strategy is to construe “believer” as just such a role. We cannot 
help, he says, but to be believers. We form beliefs in response to our experiences in the 
world. It is our “plight,” he says, to be believers, and so “we ought to do it right. It 
doesn’t matter that in some cases we are unable to do so” (ibid.). 
 Feldman’s approach is not without its problems.82 But, again, my aim in this 
chapter is not to demonstrate the truth of any one particular response, but rather to act as 
                                                        
81 Mizrahi (2012) offers a counterexample to the claim that epistemic oughts imply can. 
82 See, for example, Ryan (2003, section 5), Altschul (2014, section 2), and Peels (2014a, 686-87). 
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a sort of philosophical salesman, laying out the wares of various thinkers as they apply to 
premise (2) of the argument from involuntariness. For now, as we leave Feldman, let us 
just note the general strategy. The strategy is to identify a kind of obligation to which OC 
does not apply. Instead of rejecting OC wholesale, as Ryan (2003) does, this strategy 
attempts to leave OC intact for so-called ethical oughts. 
 A strategy related to the role-ought strategy is the ideal ought, or the ought-to-be 
strategy. While Feldman assimilates doxastic obligations to what he calls role-oughts, 
another way you might interpret the “ought” of doxastic obligations is in terms of some 
norms specifying an ideal condition of being. Consider the following distinction drawn 
by David (2005). David is considering Lynch’s (2004a, 2004b) claim that believing what 
is true is always prima facie good. David formulates this as principle T, suppressing for 
the moment Lynch’s qualification about its being prima facie good: 
 T: It is good to believe what is true. 
Now as David points out, this is ambiguous between the following:  
 T1: For any particular proposition that is true, it is good to believe that 
proposition. 
 T2: It is good to be such that you believe true propositions. 
David calls T1 the “right” use of good, and T2 the “good” or “value” use of good (2005, 
293-94). David describes formulations like T2 as, “a whole condition a person can be in” 
(ibid.). If doxastic obligations are like this, then we might call them “ought-to-be’s.”83 
                                                        
83 Since the thought of Max Scheler will be discussed in later chapters, let me here clarify that “ought-to-
be” as used in the analytic literature is not equivalent with “ought-to-be” in Scheler’s work. The same goes 
for this concept as it appears in the work of Nicolai Hartmann. In the present context, ought-to-be is just a 
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The idea would then be that an ought-to-be does not require voluntary control over our 
beliefs. That we ought to be such that we are the sort of persons who believe true 
propositions does not entail that we have voluntary control over our beliefs, at least not if 
voluntary control is understood in the strong sense of Williams and Alston, discussed 
above in section 2. Rather, it would just require that we are able to shape ourselves in 
such a way that we come to be more and more in a condition of being such that we 
believe the truth.  
 In the analytic tradition, the formation of oneself in this way is typically glossed 
in terms of performing activities such as evidence-gathering. Such a gloss is inspired by 
the inquiry-based model that has become dominant in modern epistemology as a result of 
the rise of empirical science. But T2 can also be given a gloss in terms of an older, 
classical contemplation-model, such that what you ought to do if you would be such that 
you believe the truth is to cultivate certain virtues or dispositions relative to being open to 
the truth. One thinker that discusses precisely this is the Thomist Josef Pieper (1989a, 
135-37). Although Pieper couches his discussion in terms of knowledge,84 I think that his 
point can be assimilated to the present discussion. Pieper says that insofar as knowledge 
is knowledge, it must not, indeed cannot, be the case that the will plays any role in 
determining its content. In other words, we cannot know that p, if we have somehow 
determined the content of our “knowledge” through the exercise of our will. A classic 
                                                        
way of saying that what is at issue here is the person’s condition, and not any particular action. Of course, 
one might argue that this distinction is without real teeth, insofar as it is classically held (e.g., by Aristotle 
and those who follow him) that it is by acting that one forms one’s character. 
84 Which is typical given that he is working in the Thomist tradition, which distinguishes knowledge and 
belief in such a way that knowledge does not entail belief. 
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example of such an occurrence, which Pieper cites, is that of wishful thinking. We do not 
count as knowing that p if the content of this “knowledge” has somehow been determined 
on the part of the subject through his wishful thinking, rather than on the part of the 
object.  
 But, as Pieper argues, this does not entail that the acquisition of knowledge is 
itself something purely passive.85 Rather, the will is involved in two ways. First as to 
determining that the person knows. Again, this is a classic Thomist point: the will must 
move, as its efficient cause, the intellect to its operation, but it does not determine the 
result of the intellect’s operation, i.e., what is known.86 But more than this, Pieper adds, 
the will plays a threefold role in knowledge: 
(1) It is responsible for maintaining the “proper attitude in regard to knowledge” 
(1989a, 135). Pieper understands this “attitude” in terms of maintaining a certain 
contemplative “silence” before being, an “asceticism of knowledge” (ibid.). 
Maintaining this attitude of silence is necessary for one to get out of the way of 
the object’s revelation of itself and for one not to distort that revelation in advance 
through one’s willfulness.87 
(2) The will is responsible for undertaking the activity that we designate as 
“knowing.” (I discussed this above: for the Thomist, the will moves the intellect 
to its act, as efficient cause.)  
                                                        
85 And coming out of the Thomist tradition, this makes sense, given the tradition’s arguments that there 
must be both a passive and an active intellect in order than man might know (cf. ST Ia, q. 79, aa. 2-3). 
86 See, e.g., ST Ia, q. 82, a. 4, resp., ad 1. 
87 A similar point is raised by Eugene Kelly (2011, 155). 
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(3) The will is responsible for the direction and intensity of our attention and 
awareness. What we know, that is, will be partially determined by what we decide 
to focus on, and how intently we focus on it (ibid., 136). 
 Applied to the present proposal that doxastic obligations command the person to 
be a certain way, Pieper’s approach suggests that such an ought-to-be does not entail that 
we have voluntary control over our beliefs directly—that is, as Williams and Alston have 
it, over the content of our beliefs, just by deciding to believe that p—but rather that we 
have voluntary control over cultivating the prescribed condition. The ought-to-be of 
doxastic norms prescribes maintaining a certain orientation to the truth in keeping with 
the attitudes described by Pieper. Of course, this is little more than a sketch of the idea, 
but it should suffice to show how it is meant to work.88 
 Such, then, are the two strategies for distinguishing among different kinds of 
“ought” and assimilating the “oughts” contained in our doxastic obligations to one of 
these. According to the first such strategy (role oughts), the strategy was to assimilate 
them to oughts for which voluntary control over what we believe is not necessary. 
According to the second strategy (ought-to-be), it is specifically voluntary control over 
what we believe that is not necessary. Such oughts do not require voluntary control 
                                                        
88 Alston anticipates this sort of strategy in his discussion of the indirect influence that we have over our 
beliefs, through certain actions that we can perform or dispositions that we can cultivate (1988, section VI) 
and critiques it in section VII of his paper. Discussion of this critique will find a place in a later chapter. 
Despite his critique, this strategy has been endorsed by others. On Montmarquet’s (1992) view, for 
example, we are not directly responsible for our beliefs per se, but rather for our intellectual character 
traits, in virtue of which we believe as we do. Altschul (2014) argues similarly that we are responsible for 
our beliefs via responsibility for the various bodily and mental activities that causally influence the beliefs 
that we have. Finally, Nottelmann (forthcoming), arguing from a different angle, concludes that our 
practice of blaming agents for their beliefs (thus implying some form of control) does not require the 
background assumption of voluntary control, but that indirect control would suffice. 
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directly over the matter of our doxastic obligations, but rather over the enabling 
conditions that dispose us well with respect to that matter.  
 There is, finally, the response of Chuard and Southwood (2009). The general 
thrust of their response is to show that premise (2) is under-motivated. Their argument, in 
a nutshell, is to show that no version of OC entails premise (2) (ibid., section 5). Unlike 
Ryan (2003), who formulates OC in terms of voluntary control, Chuard and Southwood 
question whether we have any reason to think that claims about what we can do should 
entail claims about what is under our voluntary control (2009, 614). They give four 
possible interpretations of “can” (possibility, ability, feasibility, and availability) and 
argue that none of these are such that the corresponding interpretation of OC entails 
premise (2). The obvious alternative strategy, they claim, is for Alston to appeal 
specifically to a version of OC like those advanced by Ryan, and which is essentially how 
I have formulated premise (2). Doing so concedes that conventional interpretations of OC 
do not underwrite premise (2), but rather that we must take premise (2) as a sui generis 
principle about obligation. But, like Ryan, they argue that such a principle suffers from 
counterexamples (ibid., 620-21).89  
 Chuard and Southwood actually bring us back full circle to Ryan’s original 
arguments against OC formulated in terms of voluntary control. In a nutshell, the broader 
argument that can gleaned from both the first and third approaches surveyed is as 
follows. If we interpret the “can” of OC in any number of the usual ways, then premise 
(2) of the argument from involuntariness does not follow from OC. If we just force the 
                                                        
89 For a response to Chuard and Southwood, see Peels (2014a, 690). 
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matter and interpret the “can” of OC as meaning “has voluntary control over,” then the 
principle suffers from counterexamples. A lot hangs, then, on what you think of the 
proffered counterexamples.  
 By contrast, the second approach appeals to a different strategy, one that 
recognizes the truth of premise (2) but that shows how the oughts in question are such 
that premise (2) does not apply to them. In the first example of this view (role-oughts) 
this was because such oughts obtain regardless of whether the subject can meet them. In 
the second example (ought-to-be), this was because such oughts do not require voluntary 
control over our beliefs, but rather a certain condition of the person with respect to her 
beliefs. That is, our doxastic obligations are primarily obligations about our condition, 
and, as such, do not prescribe anything that is not under our voluntary control. 
 In short, since premise (2) is a conditional, falsifying it is a matter of giving an 
interpretation whereon the antecedent is true, and the consequent is false. Ultimately, this 
will either be a matter of interpreting the oughts such that they apply regardless of 
whether we have the relevant voluntary control, or interpreting them such that the 
relevant voluntary control is not required. That is, in order to rebut premise (2), we must 
either argue that doxastic obligations obtain whether we have voluntary control over our 
beliefs or not, or, that such obligations do not require voluntary control over our beliefs 
per se in the first place.  
4.2 Questioning Voluntary Control as Necessary for Responsibility 
 As mentioned in the last paragraph, the second strategy for rebutting premise (2) 
is to deny that doxastic obligations require that we have voluntary control over our 
 82 
 
beliefs. The ought-to-be interpretation anticipated this kind of reply, but in an 
insufficiently general way. Whereas that strategy advanced the possibility that we need 
not have voluntary control over what we believe per se, it still maintained that doxastic 
norms apply to something (our condition) over which we do need (and have) voluntary 
control. The suggestion of this subsection is that doxastic obligations do not, more 
generally, require voluntary control, since what is really at stake is that we be responsible 
for our beliefs, and responsibility does not require voluntary control.  
 One notable representative of this sort of view is Hieronymi (2008). According to 
Hieronymi, we are responsible for (in the sense of being-answerable-for) our beliefs in 
virtue of the fact that we are legitimate targets of the question, “why do you believe that 
p?” where the invited answer to this question is constituted by (epistemic, truth-
conducive) reasons to believe that p (2008, 365-66). On the other hand, “an activity is 
voluntary just in case you decide to do it for reasons you take to settle the question of 
whether to do it, therein intend to do it, and, providing all goes well, do it by executing 
that intention” (ibid., 366). Applied to the case of belief, this implies that to count as 
voluntary, believing that p would have to be the sort of thing that one could “settle the 
question on” by considering reasons that would make believing that p good.  
 But believing is not voluntary on this account precisely because you cannot settle 
the question of whether to believe that p by considering whether it would be good to 
believe that p, but only by considering whether p is true.90 That is, settling the question of 
                                                        
90 One possible response at this point would be to claim that when it comes to whether one ought to believe 
that p, reasons that make such a belief good or not just are reasons that make it true or not. This is 
suggested, e.g., by McHugh’s (2012b) evaluative reading of the truth-norm, on which a belief that p is good 
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whether to believe that p, in the sense required by voluntary control, requires appeal to 
non-epistemic reasons to believe that p (e.g., that believing p would be pleasant) whereas 
we can only settle the question of whether to believe that p by appeal to epistemic reasons 
that support the truth of p. Now, if we did have voluntary control over our beliefs, then it 
would not be the case that we were responsible for our beliefs since, as we just saw, 
Hieronymi thinks that doxastic responsibility is answerability in terms of epistemic 
reasons to believe. Therefore, it is essential that belief not be voluntary if we are to be 
responsible for our beliefs (ibid.). Thus, responsibility does not require voluntary control. 
Thus, this view entails the falsity of premise (2), and suggests, as alluded to above, its 
replacement with premise (2*). The real issue is doxastic responsibility, not doxastic 
voluntarism (which is a red herring). Obligations require responsibility, not voluntary 
control, and we have here an argument that this is essentially the case.91 
 Another pair of possibilities in this connection is discussed by McHugh (2014a 
and forthcoming). McHugh accepts the thesis of doxastic involuntarism but tries to find a 
way in which we are free with respect to our beliefs nevertheless. In this way, he also 
seems to advocate the falsity of premise (2) and its replacement by (2*).92 But if sense 
                                                        
just in case it is true that p. Cf. also Lynch (2004b, 13), who, following Williams James (albeit, it would 
seem, with a different notion of “truth”), says that truth is the good of belief. Alternately, looking forward 
to remarks made in chapter III, we might conceive the truth of a proposition as one element of the goodness 
of a person’s believing said proposition. 
91 To be clear, Hieronymi does seem to think that responsibility requires some form of control (not 
necessarily voluntary control) which is appropriate for action, but not belief (2008, 372). Instead, we 
control our beliefs by thinking about the world. The “stretch of our minds” that is constituted by our take 
on what is true, and what is worth doing, is under our control because it is constituted by the conclusions 
that we come to (ibid., 372).  
92 In fact, this sort of concern seems to the reason that McHugh undertakes his (2014a) project. As he says, 
epistemic responsibility requires doxastic responsibility, and this requires doxastic freedom (2014a, 1). 
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can be made of doxastic freedom without voluntary control, then we might use this 
insight to argue that, armed with such freedom with respect to our beliefs, we are indeed 
responsible for our beliefs in the way required by the existence of doxastic obligations.  
 McHugh (2014a) suggests modelling freedom of belief on freedom of intention. 
McHugh thinks that epistemic responsibility requires doxastic responsibility and that 
doxastic responsibility requires doxastic freedom. But he also thinks that doxastic 
freedom cannot be modeled on freedom of action, since that would imply voluntary 
control (something at odds with his endorsement of doxastic involuntarism). Hence, he is 
forced to find a different model for doxastic freedom (2014a, 1). He decides to model 
doxastic freedom on freedom of intention, since, like intentions, beliefs are not under our 
voluntary control (i.e., we do not control our intentions by forming intentions to intend). 
Following the suggestion of Fischer and Ravizza (1998), he thinks of intentional freedom 
in terms of being responsive to reasons, where this involves a receptivity-condition and a 
reactivity-condition. That is, in regulating your intentions, you exhibit a regular pattern of 
recognizing reasons for action, as well as the capacity to implement that recognition in 
your intentions, by forming and retaining intentions to act as those reasons recommend, 
and not as they do not recommend (McHugh 2014a, 16). 
 Furthermore, the reasons in question will be object-directed reasons, and not 
state-directed reasons. Object-directed reasons are reasons that “make the world’s being 
that way something to be enacted, considerations that make it likely that the world is that 
way, or considerations that make the world’s being that way desirable” (ibid., 17). State-
directed reasons, on the other hand, are considerations that “merely pertain to the 
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subject’s being in that state—considerations in the light of which the subject’s being in 
the state would be a good or bad thing” (ibid.). Thus, there will be two cases in which we 
would say of an agent that she is not free with respect to her intentions: either she is not 
receptive to object-directed reasons for or against performing a certain action, or else she 
is unable to react to those reasons for or against performing a given action, by forming an 
intention to perform or not to perform the action in question (ibid., 18).  
 Likewise, doxastic freedom requires that the agent be regularly receptive to 
object-directed reasons for doxastic states (belief, disbelief, suspension of judgment) and 
regularly reactive to those reasons in forming the appropriate doxastic state, but not 
reactive to state-directed reasons for doxastic states (ibid., 26). In this way, McHugh 
makes a point similar to Hieronymi (2008) who, recall, makes settling the question of 
what to believe (what doxastic state to be in with respect to p) a matter of reasons that 
support the truth of p, and not reasons that it would be good to believe that p. Such 
reasons, in Hieronymi’s terminology, thus seem to be what McHugh, following a 
different, but established, terminology, calls state-directed reasons. An agent will thus not 
count as doxastically free if she is either not regularly receptive to object-directed reasons 
to believe, or she is not regularly reactive to those reasons in forming the appropriate 
doxastic state (ibid.).93 
 In fact, there is a further similarity between McHugh and Hieronymi. Recall that 
Hieronymi argues that responsibility for belief is such that belief is essentially non-
                                                        
93 Kruse (forthcoming) argues against the grounding of doxastic responsibility in what he calls “evaluative 
direct doxastic control,” which is essentially control of the sort promoted by McHugh here, in terms of 
responsiveness to one’s (epistemic) reasons. 
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voluntary. McHugh (2014a, 33-34) argues to the somewhat similar conclusion that if 
belief were under our voluntary control, we would actually be less, not more, free. The 
former view is stronger of course, arguing for the claim: necessarily, if responsible, then 
non-voluntary. McHugh argues rather for the conditional: if voluntary, then less free (and 
therefore less responsible, given that, by his lights, freedom is a necessary condition on 
responsibility). Simplifying somewhat, we can say that Hieronymi argues that if belief 
were voluntary, then we would not be responsible for belief, and McHugh argues that if 
belief were voluntary, then freedom, and thus responsibility, would be undermined 
(2014a, 33). Like Williams and Alston, McHugh understands voluntary control of belief 
to imply that we could form beliefs irrespective of truth and evidence. If this were so, he 
continues, then given that such beliefs formed irrespective of truth and evidence would 
guide our intentions and actions just like any other beliefs, the regular receptivity of one’s 
intentions to reasons would be compromised (ibid., 34). The upshot is that, “the role of 
doxastic states in the regulation of intention is such that our lack of voluntary control 
over our doxastic states enriches our freedom, rather than taking away from it” (ibid.; 
McHugh forthcoming 16).94 Thus, on this proposed rebuttal of premise (2), what is called 
into question is not only the claim that doxastic obligations require voluntary control, but 
also the assumption that such control really would make us “more free” when it came to 
what we believe. 
                                                        
94 [Page numbers in references to this work are those of the online publication of this article.] Adler (2002, 
57) likewise notes that this is not the kind of voluntary control that we would want, as it would make belief 
a poorer guide to the world. 
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 McHugh (forthcoming) identifies the sort of control we have over our beliefs as 
“attitudinal control.” Such control is the kind of control we exhibit when we revise our 
attitudes directly for reasons.95 Doxastic freedom, as discussed above, is thus exercised 
through our capacity for attitudinal control. Here McHugh more explicitly connects his 
discussion of responsibility to a discussion of norms. Responsibility to norms, he says, 
requires the capacity to respond to reasons associated with those norms (ibid., 1). 
Attitudinal control just is this capacity, and so is necessary for responsibility to norms, 
including norms of belief. So, responsibility does require control, but not voluntary 
control (cf. Hieronymi’s identical claim, above). 
 One final note. McHugh (forthcoming, 15) also notes that the voluntary control of 
action is actually the exception, rather than the rule, of reasons-responsive conduct. Far 
more common is the case of attitudinal control. If he is right, then it is unfortunate that 
voluntary action is taken as the paradigm. I find this point to be similar to that of 
Zagzebski, discussed above, regarding epistemology’s taking perceptual beliefs as 
paradigm cases of belief. Taken together, these two biases have distorted the discussion 
of the control we have over our beliefs, by forcing us to consider, as the exemplar of such 
control, whether we can voluntarily choose to believe (e.g.) that it is raining when we 
know that it is not. Such constraints risk distracting us from the sort of control that we 
                                                        
95 “Directly” in the sense that revisions in our beliefs, say, do not require passing through an intention to 
revise our beliefs (McHugh 2014a, 8). In this way, McHugh is a proper doxastic involuntarist, setting 
himself apart from the view of Matthias Steup, discussed below, which, while it also appeals to the notion 
of reasons-responsiveness, it a form of doxastic voluntarism. 
 88 
 
care about, over the sorts of beliefs that we care about, and the real targets of our notions 
of doxastic responsibility, freedom, control, and obligation.  
 The foregoing completes the review of the second category of response to premise 
(2) of the argument from involuntariness. Whereas the first category of response falsifies 
premise (2) by arguing that OC does not apply to doxastic obligations, the second 
category of response argues that doxastic obligations just do not, as a matter of fact, 
require voluntary control over what we believe per se. The advocates of such responses 
thus maintain something like premise (2*) instead, where doxastic responsibility, rather 
than doxastic voluntarism, is a necessary condition on our incurring doxastic obligations. 
Such responsibility may either be such that it requires belief to be non-voluntary of 
necessity (Hieronymi) or else that its involuntariness enriches, rather than diminishes, 
such responsibility (McHugh). In closing we were reminded yet again how the terms of 
the debate have been distorted not only by the sorts of beliefs we are forced to take as 
paradigmatic (Zagzebski) but also by the sort of control (voluntary) that we are forced to 
take as the paradigm of control (McHugh). We will return to these reflections in section 
6. But for now, let us turn to objections to the third premise of the argument from 
involuntariness. 
5 Premise 3: But what we believe is not under our voluntary control. 
 As we have seen, choosing to attack the argument from involuntariness by 
attacking premise (2) allows you to maintain the thesis that belief is not under our 
voluntary control. As this has become something of a latter-day philosophical orthodoxy, 
it might be thought to be the more successful line of attack. However, as Ryan (2003, 49) 
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notes, the argument from involuntariness (as she formulates it) has, for its premises, two 
intuitively plausible theses: (1) that “ought” implies voluntary control; and (2) that belief 
is not under our voluntary control. So it might seem that if you are one for latter-day 
orthodoxies, then you are going to have a hard time rejecting either premise (2) or 
premise (3) of the argument from involuntariness as I have formulated it, since rejecting 
one of these premises means giving up at least one highly plausible claim. Assuming, 
however, that you wish to maintain that there are norms of belief, it seems that one of 
these premises has to go. In this section, I consider what might be seen as the 
considerably stronger tack of rejecting doxastic involuntarism and affirming the thesis 
that what we believe is indeed under our voluntary control. As with the approaches 
canvassed in section 4, these responses come in a variety of strengths. I will start with 
what I take to be “weaker” replies and move up accordingly. 
5.1 The Williams-Alston Concept of Voluntary Control is too Narrow 
 The first way that you might respond to premise (3) is to press back against what 
we saw was its guiding notion of voluntary control, inherited from Williams and Alston. 
According to this notion of voluntary control, to have such control over our beliefs, it 
must be the case (i) that we can form a belief that p irrespective of what we take the truth-
value of p to be (Williams); and (ii) that we can form the belief that p basically, in a way 
akin to just raising our arms, or non-basically, by doing something to bring it about that 
we do form a belief, in a way akin to flipping a switch to turn on the lights (Alston).  
 Shah (2002) presses back against this conception of voluntary control. As noted 
above, Shah argues that if Williams’s account of what is required for voluntary control is 
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correct, then it turns out that any activity that is constitutively directed at some aim is 
necessarily involuntarily. Since, according to Williams, belief is so aimed at the truth, 
belief is necessarily involuntarily (Shah 2002, 439). This, of course, is Williams’s 
conclusion, as we saw above in subsection 2.1. Furthermore (and briefly since the point 
has already been mentioned) if, as classical theories of action have it, all action has some 
constitutive aim, usually considered to be “the Good,” then on Williams’s conception of 
voluntary control, all action is necessarily involuntarily. This seems to go far beyond 
anything Williams hoped to establish, and so his view is too strong, if conjoined with a 
highly plausible (minimally classical) view on which action is aim-directed.96  
 More to the point, Shah argues, as does Peels (2014a, 16), that we should not 
identify believing at will with believing irrespective of truth-conditions. As Walker 
(2001, 68-69) notes, in responding to Williams in particular, we do not typically take it 
that an agent who acts because she thinks that she has decisive practical reasons for 
acting is doing so involuntarily, so why think that someone who believes because he 
takes it that his epistemic reasons are sufficient is doing so involuntarily? To use 
Walker’s phrase, why is it that “arbitrary plumping” is required for doxastic voluntarism, 
but not for voluntary control over our actions? It seems that the bar for doxastic 
                                                        
96 A further point. Consider the distinction made by Aquinas, between human acts (actiones humanae) that 
is, acts proper to man qua man, and by which man is the master of himself (suorum actuum dominus) 
through reason and will, and mere acts of a man (actiones hominis), which are just any old actions 
performed by someone who happens to be a man, e.g., kicking a can down the road absentmindedly (ST 
IaIIae, q. 1, a. 1). Even though you might want to deny that all actions, of either variety, have some aim, it 
would surely not be right to claim that human-actions qua human-actions are aimless. (For Aquinas, all 
properly human acts are for some end (ST IaIIae, q. 1, a. 2).) Thus, even the more limited claim that such 
acts are aim-directed would still, when conjoined with Williams’s conception of voluntariness, result in the 
conclusion that even human actions are involuntary, even though they are, by definition, voluntary. 
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voluntarism is set artificially higher than the bar for ordinary action.97 Finally, Ryan 
(2003, section 6), also questions the orthodox conception, arguing (1) that forming a 
belief need not be like raising a hand in order to be voluntary; (2) that in both cases of 
belief-formation and raising a hand, there is much more going on than a simple desire to 
do so being executed; and (3) that some beliefs actually are formed just like raising your 
hand in ordinary circumstances. In short, the idea that unites all these thinkers is that the 
mere fact that we find ourselves unable to form beliefs “willy-nilly” (as Ryan has it) does 
not suffice for showing that belief is involuntary. 
 Another argument, this one directed more specifically to Alston, comes from 
Salmieri and Bayer (2014). Salmieri and Bayer question Alston’s commitment (though it 
is also present in Williams) to the notion that to count as having voluntarily chosen to 
believe that p, we must have chosen that belief under a description that specifics its 
propositional content. Recall that Alston calls into question strategies of maintaining non-
basic voluntary control over our beliefs that point to examples in which we choose to 
undertake some inquiry and to form beliefs in accordance with the results of our inquiry. 
His example—deciding to look up the lifetime batting average of Al Kaline in a baseball 
almanac—is interpreted by him not as a case of voluntary control over having a belief 
that p, where p will specify the average, but rather choosing to some have some belief or 
other within some more or less definite range (0 to 1, in the case of batting averages). 
                                                        
97 Unless, of course, you think that what is required for voluntary control is the ability to do otherwise (in 
other words, that libertarian free will is necessary for voluntary control), but this option is not open to 
someone like Alston who explicitly denies that the issue about doxastic voluntarism has anything to do 
with the metaphysics of free will (1988, 262).  
 92 
 
The assumption that underwrites this interpretation of the case is that voluntary control 
requires deciding to believe some specific proposition p, by an act of choice that specifies 
the content of p in its description. Responding to this example, Salmieri and Bayer write: 
But surely there is a significant sense in which the person intends to believe the specific 
proposition about the batting average that is attested to by the almanac, whatever it turns 
out to be. Far from intending merely to form any old belief about the average and coming 
to the one he does by chance, the inquirer opens the almanac on the premise that one and 
only one figure will be written next to Kaline’s name and with an intention to believe of 
that figure that it is Kaline’s lifetime batting average. (2014, 45) 
 
This strikes me as a much more plausible interpretation of the Alston’s own example.  
 Here is another example, similar to Salmieri and Bayer’s. Consider Otto, the 
orthodox Roman Catholic. Otto is a good Catholic, but, like many, he does not know 
every last proposition that the Church teaches to be true. He wonders what the Church’s 
take is on the relationship between marriage and fertility. He consults his trusty copy of 
the Catechism of the Catholic Church, intending to form a belief in whatever he sees 
printed on the page. He turns to paragraphs 1652-54 under the subheading “The 
opennesss to fertility” and forms, among other beliefs, the following: that parents are the 
principal and first educators of their children (CCC 1653). Now, you might object to 
this, saying that as we have described Otto—namely as orthodox—he already believed 
whatever was in the Catechism. But this is too fast. First, why think that he had the belief 
if he didn’t know what his church taught? The commitment to believe whatever the 
church teaches does not entail that one already has all of the propositional beliefs in 
question, from the beginning. Secondly, Otto might already have a belief about the topic 
in question, but it might not accord with the Catechism. For example, perhaps he had a 
bad religious education in his parish and was taught that there was no connection between 
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marriage and the openness to new life. In this case, we would surely not want to say that 
he already had the belief in question, as he actually had another belief (which we will 
assume he took to be true on the basis of his teacher’s credibility) which is (practically) 
the negation of what the Catechism says. So, whether the source in question is a baseball 
almanac or the collected doctrines of a religion, it is not the case that deciding to form a 
belief in accordance with the deliverances of the source is just the intention to form some 
belief or other, but the intention to form a specific belief.  
 Salmieri and Bayer glean from their analysis of Alston’s case a general insight, 
namely that beliefs are partially constituted by the acts by which they are formed and 
maintained, and that the choice to perform such acts is a choice to have certain beliefs 
(ibid., 43). Moreover, it is in respect of these acts that epistemic praise and blame attach 
to believers, and not in respect of the content as such (ibid., 47-48). What matters when it 
comes to epistemic appraisal is not so much what we believe, as how we believe, e.g., 
what our policy is toward new evidence that comes to light regarding some proposition 
we believe (ibid., 49). Now, this last step might be going too far, and I am not endorsing 
it, but what I do think both Shah and Salmieri and Bayer have done is to successfully call 
into question—either by considerations about the relationship between aims and 
voluntariness (Shah), or by considerations about the nature of the choices by which 
beliefs are chosen and specified (Salmieri and Bayer)—the excessive narrowness of the 
concept of voluntary control at issue in premise (3). 
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5.2 Doxastic Voluntarists 
 Beyond questioning the assumptions behind the conception of doxastic 
voluntarism at issue in premise (3), one can go further and actively affirm that we do 
have voluntary control over our beliefs. In so doing, one can either accept the Williams-
Alston understanding of voluntary control and argue that we do have such control over 
what we believe, or else one can offer a different understanding of doxastic voluntary 
control (in response to arguments that the Williams-Alston understanding is too stringent) 
and argue that we do have that kind of doxastic voluntary control. As we will see, even 
the strongest of doxastic voluntarist views seem to leave behind the Williams-Alston 
understanding of doxastic voluntary control. I start, however, with the weakest versions 
of doxastic voluntarism and work up to the strongest. 
5.2.1 Weak Versions of Doxastic Voluntarism—Doxastic Compatibilism 
 The weak version of doxastic voluntarism goes by the name, for better or worse, 
of doxastic compatibilism. Compatibilism, of course, is the view that free will is 
compatible with causal determinism. Doxastic compatibilism, then, is the view that 
doxastic voluntarism is compatible with causal determinism. On this sorts of view, beliefs 
are under our voluntary control just in case, to appeal to one prominent advocate of the 
view, they have “good causal histories” (Steup 2012, 153). I will discuss Steup’s view, 
below. For now, I turn to what might be thought of as the weakest of the compatibilist 
litter, Mark Heller’s “Hobartian voluntarism.”  
 According to Heller (2000), the issue in question is indeed the question of free 
will. Unlike Alston, then, the issue at stake in belief is but one aspect of a more general 
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concern. Whatever we end up saying about belief, for instance, we should say about other 
things like our desires and emotions (Heller 2000, 133). Heller’s view is that we have 
what he calls an “epistemic nature,” which is constituted by our desire to form beliefs in 
accordance with certain dispositions rather than others (ibid., 135). On his account, our 
beliefs are free and voluntary, to the extent that they reflect our epistemic natures (ibid., 
135-36). Furthermore, Heller endorses a view on which what we are really judging when 
we deem some act of S’s bad, is S’s character (ibid., 134). Thus, holding someone 
responsible for her beliefs, on this picture, is not primarily a matter of holding her 
responsible for having chosen to have a false or unjustified, but rather for having a bad 
epistemic nature, i.e., in virtue of the belief reflecting poorly on S as an epistemic agent, 
as someone who identifies with bad dispositions of belief-formation (ibid., 136).  
 What makes this account the weakest we will consider is that it concedes that a 
psychology of willing does not seem appropriate for the production of beliefs. We do not, 
to use a Jamesian slogan, will to believe. But this is okay, as Heller also says that 
voluntary control does not directly appeal to the will, but rather to one’s nature. In the 
case of typical actions, this will be the agent’s moral nature, where the agent’s moral 
nature is (in a way reminiscent of Frankfurt (1971)), the will with which she identifies, 
whereas in the case of belief, it will be her epistemic nature, i.e. those belief-forming 
dispositions with which the agent identifies (Heller 2000, 137).98  
 Next up the scale of strength of doxastic compatibilism are views like those of 
Ryan (2003, section 8), and Steup (2012 and forthcoming). As Ryan (2003, 70) has it, 
                                                        
98 For a rebuttal of Heller’s position, see Peels (2014a, 693). 
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forming a belief voluntarily is compatible with “the claim that our doxastic attitudes are 
determined by our appreciation of our evidence” (ibid.). For Ryan, our doxastic states are 
“typically freely held because…[they] are typically held intentionally” (ibid.). This does 
not require that the believer form any explicit intention to believe that p; while that would 
be sufficient for intentionality, it is not, on her view, necessary.99 Rather, what is 
necessary for intentionality is that something be done purposively, and this is compatible 
with something being done automatically and unconsciously (ibid., 70-71). So her view, 
as distinct from that of Steup, does not advance the case for explicitly intentional belief-
formation. Although she does not aim to offer an analysis of compatibilist freedom, she 
argues, by way of cases, that there is no relevant difference between our doxastic 
attitudes and other actions considered voluntary by the compatibilist (ibid., 71). She also 
argues, from cases that both compatibilists and incompatibilists agree are cases of unfree 
action, that belief is not in the “uncontroversially unfree category” and that, in ordinary 
cases, belief is very much like other actions that a compatibilist (though not an 
incompatibilist) would count as free (ibid.).  
 At the heart of Ryan’s compatibilist account is the claim, set in opposition to 
Williams’s (1973) implicit comparison of belief-formation to blushing, that “when you 
believe a proposition, you are doing something, not just having something done to you” 
(2003, 73).100 When we believe in accordance with our appreciation of the evidence, we 
are believing as we intend to (ibid., 73-74). The suggestion seems to be that the active 
                                                        
99 To be clear, “intentionality” as Ryan uses it should not be mistaken with that word as used by Medieval 
philosophy, Brentano, or phenomenology.  
100 In fact, her examples of how this is so line up nicely with those of Pieper (1989a), discussed above.  
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component of belief makes it purposive in a way that underwrites its counting as 
intentional. One’s appreciation of the evidence is the active component in question. So 
long as one is believing in accordance with one’s appreciation of the evidence, then one’s 
belief is purposive and so counts as intentional. You are doing, Ryan says, “just what you 
intended, given your appreciation of the evidence” (ibid. 74).101 
 Finally, there is the even stronger doxastic compatibilist view of Matthias Steup 
(2012 and forthcoming). Steup, like Ryan, agrees that voluntariness does not require a 
conscious prior intention to believe that p (2012, 154). But where he diverges from Ryan 
is that, in addition to maintaining the implicit intentionality of belief-formation, which we 
experience via our beliefs being responsive to reasons, he also maintains that we form 
beliefs as the result of an explicit intention to do so (ibid., 155-57). His argument is 
centered on his (now oft-cited) case of Car Theft (ibid., 157):  
 Suppose that, having returned from a trip and taken a shuttle to the airport parking 
 garage, I am now where I thought I left my car. To my surprise, it is no longer there. I 
 wonder whether it has been stolen. There is of course the possibility that I don’t 
 accurately remember where I parked it. So I retrieve the paper slip which states the exact 
 location of my parking spot. According to the slip, I am at the right spot. Considering my 
 evidence—the parking slip and the absence of my car—I conclude that it was stolen. 
 
                                                        
101 Before moving on, let me make the following observation to throw some light on the significance of the 
present discussion. Ryan’s distinction between doing something and having something done to you is 
reminiscent of the distinction, drawn by the personalist philosopher Karol Wojtyla (1979a, 61-62) between 
action and something merely happening in or to someone. It is in and through action proper that the person 
integrates and transcends herself, according to Wojtyla. In drawing attention to the active component of 
coming to believe certain things, Ryan’s point can be used to remind us that beliefs, no less than more 
obvious cases of action, serve as that in and through which a person is able to transcend herself—from the 
humdrum transcendence of living in a world to the sublime transcendence of a life consecrated to the God 
she believes in. The present discussion thus anticipates—however obliquely—the turn to the believing 
human person in the latter half of this dissertation. By conceptualizing how it is that the person is involved 
in the formation of her beliefs, we make sense of the fact that belief is a creative act of the person, i.e., one 
that actualizes and realizes one’s personhood. The present section can thus be read, in light of the 
dissertation as a whole, as reviewing a range of analytic philosophical views on how to make sense of this.  
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Steup interprets this case as involving the following features. I wonder whether my car 
has been stolen and suspend judgment regarding the proposition that it has been stolen. I 
then consider my reasons for and against believing that my car has been stolen. 
Concluding that I have good reason to believe that it has been stolen, I decide to believe 
that it has been stolen. My attitude of suspended judgment is replaced by an attitude of 
belief that my car has been stolen because I decided so to believe, and the “causal 
relation between my decision and my belief is non-deviant.”102 Steup then compares this 
case with the case of deciding to take a walk, concluding that they are similar, and thus 
that the doxastic involuntarist has not shown that there is a sufficient, relevant difference 
for deeming deciding to take a walk, and taking a walk because of that decision, to be 
voluntary, but believing that my car has been stolen because I have decided so to believe 
to be involuntary (ibid., 158). 
 In Steup (forthcoming, 3) Steup gives a more elaborate defense of the thesis of 
“doxastic intentionality,” which if true, he says, would go a long way toward vindicating 
doxastic voluntarism.103 The truth of doxastic intentionality would partially vindicate 
voluntarism insofar as doxastic intentionality is a necessary condition for doxastic 
voluntarism. As in his (2012), Steup argues both for the implicit and explicit 
intentionality of belief. Focusing on explicit intentionality as the decisive feature of his 
account, we should first note that, methodologically, Steup thinks that involuntarists like 
                                                        
102 I will not here discuss non-deviancy. Suffice it to say that this sort of condition is often placed on 
intentional action, so that one’s intention to A causes one’s A-ing in the “right sort of way.” Specifying the 
“right sort of way” is a fraught issue in the philosophy of action.  
103 Again, “intentionality” is used here in the sense employed by Ryan (see above). 
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Alston not only explain their cases wrongly, but also that they examine the wrong sorts of 
cases (ibid., 8). There is an affinity here with a common refrain of this chapter, namely, 
that we risk getting skewed results on questions about belief and voluntariness if we take 
our examples from the lower-end of the spectrum (“it is raining”) or from cases of the 
obviously false (“the US is a British colony”). The reason, as Steup points out, that we 
cannot believe such propositions is not that we lack executional control over our beliefs 
(i.e., the power to execute intentions to believe certain propositions), but that we just 
don’t form such crazy intentions in the first place, given the obvious falsity of the 
propositions in question. Looking in the right places—of which the case of Car Theft is 
one example—bears out doxastic intentionality, and thus supports voluntarism, or so 
Steup argues. These cases include (ibid., 8-10): 
 (1) Cases in which our reasons pull us in different directions 
 (2) Cases in which our beliefs are inconsistent  
(3) Cases in which our evidence conflicts with our prudential reasons regarding 
whether to believe that p 
(4) Cases in which our evidence conflicts with our moral reasons regarding 
whether to believe that p 
(5) Cases in which our evidence conflicts with our emotions regarding p. 
 Such are the sorts of cases in which Steup thinks that explicit intentionality plays 
a role in the formation of one’s beliefs. Summing up the general thrust of the account, 
Steup’s doxastic compatibilism counts beliefs as voluntary just in case they have a good 
causal history—e.g., the result of memory, perception, introspection, testimony, and 
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reasoning (2012, 153). To be determined to believe what in the light of your evidence is 
clearly true and to disbelieve what is clearly false is to be in control of your beliefs, 
according to the compatibilist picture. Since voluntary control is typically taken to 
require intentionality, the account also defends doxastic intentionality (2012, 
forthcoming), claiming not only that all, or almost all, of our beliefs are at least implicitly 
intentional—a claim it shares with Ryan—but also that some are explicitly intentionally 
formed, and that we are familiar with such cases in our daily lives.  
 In general, what unites the doxastic compatibilist strategies just canvassed is a 
commitment to the compatibility of our belief’s being determined in some way, with their 
also being under our voluntary control. For Heller, this was a matter of our beliefs issuing 
from our epistemic natures, that is, issuing from belief-forming dispositions that we 
desire to have, and with which we identify. For Ryan, this was a matter of issuing from 
our active appreciation of the evidence and being exactly what we meant (implicitly 
intended) to believe, given that active appreciation. Finally, and most strongly, for Steup, 
this was a matter not only of such implicit intentionality, but also, in certain cases, of 
being explicitly intentional. Where beliefs are formed in accordance with intentions that 
are determined in a “good way”—e.g., through perception or good patterns of 
reasoning—such beliefs count, on Steup’s compatibilist picture, as voluntarily formed.104 
5.2.2 Moderate Versions of Doxastic Voluntarism 
 Moving up the line, we come to views like that of Nickel (2010), on which there 
is a role for the will in the formation of beliefs, but only under certain evidential 
                                                        
104 For challenges to doxastic compatiblism, see Peels (2014a) and Tebben (2014). 
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circumstances. Nickel argues that a moderate form of doxastic voluntarism like his does 
not entail the truth of pragmatism, i.e., the view on which we can choose to believe for 
pragmatic (or, more broadly, non-epistemic) reasons. Nickel’s view, then, is not so strong 
as to suggest that we can choose to believe that p because having a belief that p would be 
pleasant or allow us to fit in with a certain social group. Instead, Nickel focuses on cases 
in which our evidence is adequate enough to permit a belief that p, but not sufficient to 
require such a belief. Where our level of evidence is merely adequate, it would be 
equally rational to form a belief that p, or else suspend judgment with respect to p. It is 
important to note, as he does, that these are not cases of equipollence, or case in which 
the evidence seems to be equally strong both for and against the truth of p. He does not 
have an epistemic version of Buridan’s Ass in mind. Rather, the cases that he has in mind 
are those in which it is questionable whether normal background conditions obtain 
(Nickel 2010, 315-16). Nickel gives the example of a birdwatcher who sees what he takes 
to be a goldfinch. But the birdwatcher also has some reason to believe that another, 
similar, bird may have flown into the area, against its normal habits. The question as to 
whether the normal background conditions obtain is thus open. In such a case, the 
birdwatcher has adequate, though not sufficient, evidence to believe that the bird is a 
goldfinch. In such a case, he may either believe so, or withhold judgment—and 
whichever choice he makes, he would be forming his doxastic attitude rationally.  
 In such cases, Nickels argues that there is a role for the “doxastic will” by 
showing how three conditions on voluntariness are met: (1) self-expression; (2) reasons-
responsiveness; and (3) alternative possibilities (2010, section III). In short, the first 
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condition is that the decision to believe or to suspend judgment in the goldfinch case are 
expressive of the birdwatcher’s self by manifesting what the birdwatcher takes to be more 
important when it comes to his beliefs. Here, William James is a helpful interlocutor. As 
James says in his lecture, “The Will to Believe,” we can adopt one of two basic doxastic 
strategies. We can either take a more liberal strategy, and risk taking on erroneous beliefs 
for the sake of believing more truths, or we can take a more conservative strategy, and 
risk not believing as many truths for the sake of shielding ourselves from error (James 
[1915] 1935, 113-114). In Nickel’s terms, we can say that the birdwatcher’s belief that 
the bird is a goldfinch satisfies the self-expression condition on voluntariness by 
manifesting his liberal policy toward belief. Or, we can gloss this condition with the help 
of Heller (2000), discussed above, and say that the birdwatcher’s belief meets this 
condition by expressing his epistemic nature, which, coming to the same thing, is 
constituted by his desire to form beliefs according to James’s liberal doxastic policy.  
 Secondly, the condition of reasons-responsiveness obtains in this case because the 
birdwatcher is responsive to his evidence. It’s just that such responsiveness does not 
determine what he believes. In this respect, Nickel differs from McHugh (2014a) who 
maintains both the reasons-responsiveness of belief and doxastic involuntarism, but is 
similar to Steup (2012), who would argue that such reasons-responsiveness constitutes a 
good causal history, making the belief voluntary.105  
                                                        
105 Notice here how crucial reasons-responsiveness is to this debate, and how it is appealed to both by self-
declared involuntarists and by self-declared voluntarists. The lesson, as I take it, is that the disagreement 
lies less in issues about belief, as in issues about what counts as voluntary control, since belief as a reasons-
responsive attitude is taken to be voluntary by some and involuntary by others. 
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 Finally, the condition of alternative possibilities is met, in virtue of the fact that, 
given that the evidence is adequate though not sufficient, the birdwatcher may either 
believe that the bird is a goldfinch, or else suspend judgment. Thus, there are cases in 
which belief is not determined, and in which there is room for the will to be efficacious in 
the formation of a belief. This is merely a moderate voluntarism because the possibility 
of believing for non-epistemic reasons is not on the table. The strongest versions of 
voluntarism are thus those that either make room for non-epistemic reasons to believe, or, 
stronger still, require, in certain cases, that one must believe that p for non-epistemic 
reasons.  
5.2.3 Strong Versions of Doxastic Voluntarism 
 One account of the voluntariness of belief that is compatible with believing for 
non-epistemic reasons is that of Ginet (2001). Ginet’s account proceeds from 
considerations about what it means to believe something. According to Ginet, to believe 
that p is to count on p, and to count on p entails that one stakes something on p’s being 
true.106 It is also entails not preparing oneself for the possibility that not-p, rather than p, 
is the case. Such deliberate non-preparation involves one neither thinking about not-p, 
nor considering what to do if not-p turns out to be the case. This is so much the case that 
                                                        
106 One possible objection to Ginet’s account is that it fails to make Moore’s Paradox out to be paradoxical. 
It is not paradoxical to say, “I don’t count on p, but p.” In light of the discussion of section 6, however, this 
objection loses some of its force. When belief is rigorously distinguished from knowledge, Moore’s 
Paradox no longer seems paradoxical. To use Moore’s favorite example, it just doesn’t seem all that 
paradoxical to say, “It is raining, but I don’t believe it.” After all, according to a more traditional account of 
belief, you don’t believe it—you know that it is raining, or else you see that it is raining. Thanks to 
Professor Walter Hopp for raising the issue of Moore’s Paradox in this context. 
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when one comes to learn that in fact not-p is the case, one reacts with surprise (Ginet 
2001, 65-66).  
 It is important to observe, however, that, by Ginet’s lights, we are sometimes 
compelled to count on p, rather than not-p, in light of our evidence. Sometimes the 
evidence is so compelling for p—e.g., perhaps p is the proposition “it is raining” and we 
are currently observing the rainfall—that we cannot but count on p. But, as with other 
thinkers we have already discussed, Ginet steers us toward consideration of beliefs whose 
propositional contents are not obviously true or false. The fact that we cannot count on 
any old proposition, regardless of the evidence that we possess—“willy-nilly” as Ryan 
puts it—does not mean that we cannot exercise voluntary control over our beliefs. For 
while in many cases, what we count on is compelled by the force of our evidence, there 
are also cases in which there is no such compelling force, in which there is an opening for 
belief, as an act of counting on the truth of p, to be the result of a decision (ibid., 66). The 
general idea, then, is that, in deciding to A, we have decided to form a belief that p, if, 
and only if, in deciding to A, we have decided to count on the truth of p (ibid., 67).   
 Let me make a few observations before moving on from Ginet’s account. First, 
Ginet’s account is unique among those we have looked at thus far, insofar as it seems to 
get at the truth of voluntarism by giving an account of what it means to believe that p. It 
should be clear from the introduction to this dissertation, and from remarks at the 
beginning of this chapter, that such a methodology here meets with approval. Ginet’s 
dispositional understanding of what it means to believe, in terms of counting on 
 105 
 
something, gets at voluntariness not through some generic, thin understanding of belief, 
but through a thick understanding of what it means to count on something’s being true.107  
 The second observation I wish to make regards Ginet’s concession that, in a raw 
numbers sense, the number of beliefs that are voluntarily chosen in the way he describes 
is probably quite low (2001, 70). This concession relates to a similar claim made by 
Alston (1988, 265-66) and Adler (2002, 4). Alston and Adler, in advancing this point 
about the numbers of beliefs involved, do so with an eye to arguing as follows: 
 (1) Theory T accounts for the overwhelming number of our beliefs. 
(2) Therefore, either theory T is correct, or, at least, we have reason to maintain 
theory T, and insufficient reason (from the cases of problematic sorts of beliefs 
like political, philosophical, religious, and moral beliefs) to abandon theory T. 
 (3) Therefore, either theory T is correct, or else we have no reason 
to give it up.  
The argument, as formulated, is invalid, but I assume that it could be made valid. The 
problem that I wish to raise for it is just another instance of a general methodological 
point I have been advancing through this chapter. Looking at this argument, however, 
makes my point crystal clear. The number of beliefs that a theory explains (whether that 
                                                        
107 Another account of belief that is amenable to voluntariness, though the philosopher in question does not 
consider it in relation to the question of voluntariness, is that of Lynne Rudder Baker’s (1995) Explaining 
Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind. Baker’s view, which she calls practical realism, is that belief 
is an irreducible state of the whole person (unlike, as on the standard view, physically-realized states of the 
brain) whose nature is revealed by the counterfactuals which it supports (Baker 1995, 21). In other words, 
to believe that p is to be disposed to act in certain ways, say certain things, or think certain thoughts, in a 
variety of actual or possible circumstances. If, as on a classical Aristotelian-Thomist view, the acquisition 
of dispositions supervenes on the performance of acts, then Baker’s view might be amenable to doxastic 
voluntarism. (For what it is worth, in personal conversation, Baker has identified herself as being in the 
Aristotelian tradition, broadly understood.) 
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theory is doxastic involuntarism or, in Adler’s case, the conjunction of conceptual 
evidentialism and doxastic involuntarism) is no support, all on its own, for that theory, if 
the number of beliefs the theory explains are driven up simply by extending the domain 
of belief.  
 Without a substantial understanding of the nature of belief on the table, the thin 
understanding with which we have been working lets a lot into the domain of belief. We 
therefore risk writing off voluntarism simply because it seems incompatible with the vast 
number of such beliefs. But if voluntarism is compatible with those beliefs (1) that seem 
to be most truly beliefs and (2) the sorts of beliefs that we most care about vis-à-vis 
norms, then the mere fact that, on a weaker or broader understanding of belief, the 
overwhelming number of beliefs are involuntarily formed does not, by itself, tell against 
doxastic voluntarism. Rather, it may turn out that exemplary beliefs are voluntary to the 
highest degree, and that beliefs becomes less and less voluntary the further we move from 
the exemplars of belief.108  
 For his part, Ginet presses back that despite the fact that the proportion of beliefs 
formed voluntarily is low compared to the raw number of our beliefs, nevertheless such 
beliefs are a regular feature of our lives, even, for some, a part of their everyday lives 
(2001, 70). We should thus not write off such an account as Ginet’s (or Steup’s, which 
makes a similar point about the ubiquity of voluntarily formed beliefs) on account of a 
perceived deficiency of scope. Even if only a small number of our beliefs are under our 
voluntary control, then it will still turn out that with respect to these, the argument from 
                                                        
108 Recall from earlier that Zagzebski thinks of belief as falling on a spectrum of voluntariness (1996, 66). 
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involuntariness fails, and that these beliefs will be subject to doxastic norms. Since these 
are the beliefs that we care the most about, this strikes me as not at all a bad result.109 
 Finally, to close this subsection, and the discussion of premise (3) of the argument 
from involuntariness, let us consider a classic and oft-cited version of doxastic 
voluntarism due to William James in his aforementioned lecture, “The Will to Believe.” 
The first thing to understand about James’s account is that it presupposes, rather than 
argues for, the metaphysical and psychological possibility of believing at will. His 
concern is rather with the ethics of believing at will, whether it is morally licit to do so. 
His primary interlocutor, as is well known, is William Clifford, who advanced the famous 
evidentialist dictum that, “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for everyone, to believing 
anything upon insufficient evidence.”  
 But despite the fact that James presupposes the possibility of believing at will, he 
does not presuppose, as do Williams and Alston, that believing at will requires the 
possibility of believing that p regardless of the proposition and regardless of one’s take 
on the truth or falsity of that proposition. James speaks of hypotheses and of options, 
where an option is a decision made to believe one or another hypothesis. Deciding an 
option, then, is deciding to accord to one proposition, but not another (p over not-p), the 
status of belief (James [1915] 1935, 101).  
                                                        
109 One way in which this might be considered a bad result is if it restricted the normativity of truth only to 
the beliefs in question. In response to this potential problem, let me anticipate two claims made below. The 
first is that belief is plausibly the sort of act or state which can be participated more or less intensively by 
persons, so that we can explain how the sorts of beliefs that Adler focuses on can be accounted for by Ginet 
(or any other, similar account) as beliefs in an analogous sense. The second is that, pressing Zagzebski’s 
idea of a continuum of voluntariness, it might be that truth is a norm for all beliefs but, for those beliefs at 
the lower-end of the continuum is merely an evaluative norm. 
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 To decide an option, then, is to believe at will. But we can decide an option only 
when certain conditions obtain. These conditions follow three distinctions that James 
makes with respect to options. Options can be (1) living or dead; (2) forced or avoidable; 
and (3) momentous or trivial (ibid.). A living option is one in which both hypotheses are 
live for the believer in question. If the choice is between two hypotheses which you, the 
believer, do not take to be live (by which I think James can be interpreted as meaning: 
take to be possibly or probably true), then you cannot decide between them, as you 
cannot believe that either of them is true. James’s example is that of being a theosophist 
or a Muslim. If you are a Christian and committed to the truth of your religion, then 
neither hypothesis is live for you, and you cannot decide an option between them (ibid.). 
A forced option is one in which you are forced to decide in favor of one hypothesis or the 
other. This will be the case in which the hypotheses are a proposition and its negation. 
Either God exists, or He does not exist. You cannot avoid deciding an option here. Not to 
decide is effectively to decide in favor of the negation (cf. ibid., 108). Lastly, a 
momentous option is one for which there is some stake in deciding. Although James does 
not cite Pascal in this context, we can think of Pascal’s wager. There is something 
significant at stake when the question of belief is applied to the existence or non-
existence of God. Whether or not to believe that God exists is no trivial matter.  
 The next important point to bear in mind is that James does not think that we can 
believe just anything we want to believe. He writes: 
 Can we, by just willing it, believe that Abraham Lincoln’s existence is a myth, and that 
 the portraits of him in McClure’s Magazine are all of someone else? Can we, by any 
 effort of our will, or by any strength of wish that it were true, believe ourselves well and 
 about when we are roaring with rheumatism in bed, or feel certain that the sum of the two 
 109 
 
 one-dollar bills in our pocket must be a hundred dollars? We can say any of these things, 
 but we are absolutely impotent to believe them. (ibid., 103) 
 
Together with the threefold distinction drawn in the last paragraph, this leads us to 
James’s injunction that our “passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an 
option between propositions whenever it is genuine option that cannot by its nature be 
decided on intellectual grounds” (ibid., 108, italics in the original). A genuine option is 
one that is live, forced, and momentous. According to James, we are not only permitted, 
but also obligated, to decide an option between hypotheses when both are live (when it 
isn’t the case that we take one to be false), mutually exclusive (p or not-p), and 
momentous (does God exist? Is the world absurd? Is classical liberalism the best political 
philosophy? Are my friends good people?).  
 How we go about deciding our options is fundamentally settled for us by how we 
choose to weigh the two fundamental laws of our nature as would-be knowers: Believe 
truth! and Shun error! (ibid., 113). Whether we adopt a riskier strategy for the sake of 
gaining truth—a certain lightheartedness and liberality in the formation of our beliefs—or 
whether we adopt a cautious, conservative attitude—a fearfulness of being duped—we 
determine for ourselves the sorts of believers that we will be. In a nutshell, James claims 
that we can decide upon what to believe when the matter is not settled by our evidence, 
and that we must decide upon what to believe when the matter is not settled by our 
evidence and the choice is between contradictory propositions about something of 
significance.110 
                                                        
110 For a supportive, contemporaneous discussion of James, see Drake (1916). For a contemporary 
discussion of Drake, see Sharadin (2015). For some empirical arguments in favor of the possibility of 
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 Thus, even the strongest version of doxastic voluntarism does not take it that such 
control over our beliefs requires that we can fly in the face of what we take to be 
obviously true or false. But it does require that we be able to consciously settle the 
question of whether to believe that p in a way that outstrips what we would take to be 
sufficient evidence to decide the matter intellectually. It is on this battlefield that 
someone like James stands his ground.  
 With James, we have completed our survey of strong voluntarist positions, and 
thus of voluntarist responses to premise (3) of the argument from involuntariness.111 We 
have thus also completed our survey of critical responses to the argument from 
                                                        
willing, see Funkhouser (2003). Funkhouser points to psychological studies that show that subjects 
maintain their beliefs even when they come to be in a situation in which all of their evidence has been 
discredited and they know this. Thus, he argues, if we can maintain our beliefs in these circumstances, then 
we can also voluntarily choose to believe. 
111 I make no claims to completeness in this survey. Some positions left out include that of Frankish (2007) 
who advances what he calls “doxastic activism” and which may (or may not) entail weak voluntarism, Rott 
(forthcoming) who argues that while we do not have voluntary control over forming beliefs, we do have 
voluntary control over the withdrawal of belief in a proposition, and Flowerree (forthcoming) who argues 
that the problem of belief and epistemic agency is no more puzzling than agency and intentions broadly. 
(Note that Rott’s empirically-informed theory of negative doxastic control has interesting parallels with 
Descartes’s thesis, in the Fourth Meditation, that we have the ability to suspend judgment even when the 
proposition in question is seemingly obviously true. See Price (1969, 222-225) for discussion of Descartes 
on doxastic voluntarism.) A more interesting case, given the Thomistic inspiration of this investigation, is 
that of Aquinas himself. Pieper (1963, ch. III) gives a clear statement of the role Aquinas assigns to the will 
in the act of believing. His solution, which I cannot discuss in detail here, is very different from the 
foregoing. Working, as we saw at the outset of this chapter, from the contention that to believe is to believe 
something on the basis of someone’s testimony, Aquinas says that what the will wills in cases of belief is 
not the proposition believed (that would be mere wishful thinking), but rather the person providing the 
testimony. Pieper sums up thus, “Toward what does the believer direct his will when he believes?...Toward 
the warrantor and witness whom he affirms, loves, “wills”—insofar as he accepts the truthfulness of what 
that witness says, accepts it on his mere word. This wholly free, entirely uncoercible act of affirmation, 
which is enforced neither by the power of self-evident truth nor by the weight of argumentation; this 
confiding, acknowledging, communion-seeking submission of the believer to the witness whom he 
believes—this, precisely, is the "element of volition" in belief itself” (ibid., 30). Although I must leave the 
details for a future work, I think that we can discern in Aquinas’s philosophy of belief the contours of an 
argument that belief has a special role vis-à-vis the formation and sustenance of interpersonal relationships. 
For further discussion of belief as assent and the role that this claim plays in classical and Christian 
conceptions of doxastic voluntarism, see Barnes (2006). 
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involuntariness as a whole. Summing up, such responses can take a variety of forms, 
which I summarize in the following table: 
Premise 1:  If truth is a norm of belief, then we, as believers, incur doxastic 
obligations. 
Basic Option: Doxastic norms are not prescriptive in nature. 
  Sub-option 1: Doxastic norms are norms of proper performance. 
Sub-option 2: Doxastic norms are evaluative norms that may or may not 
imply prescriptions.  
Premise 2:  If we, as believers, incur doxastic obligations, then what we believe is 
under our voluntary control. 
Basic Option 1: No “ought” implies voluntary control. 
Basic Option 2: No “ought” contained within the formulation of a doxastic 
obligation implies voluntary control. 
Basic Option 3: No “ought” contained within the formulation of a doxastic 
obligation implies, specifically, voluntary control over what we believe. 
Premise 3: But what we believe is not under our voluntary control. 
Basic Option: What we believe is under our voluntary control. Sub-option 
1: We have weak (compatibilist) voluntary control over (some or all of) 
what we believe. 
Sub-option 2: We have moderate voluntary control over (some or all of) 
what we believe. 
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Sub-option 3: We have strong voluntary control over (some or all of) what 
we believe. 
 The upshot of this critical survey, as mentioned at the outset, is to defuse the 
argument from involuntariness. I do not claim to have established the truth of any of 
these responses, and thus the falsity of either premise (2) or (3), although my criticisms 
may have shown where my sympathies lie. All that is required in order to proceed is that 
you find at least one of these responses plausible enough to suspend judgment at this 
point and continue this investigation with me. But if you find that you are unable to 
suspend judgment, because that it not a live option for you, because none of the 
possibilities canvassed here is anything but dead to you, then we can go no further 
together than the close of this chapter. For now, however, I turn to the final section of this 
chapter, in which I attempt to draw out some important insights from the critical survey 
of the past three sections in an attempt to offer some kind of unified (and, I hope, 
somewhat original) response by supplementing the analytic literature with considerations 
from the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and Gabriel Marcel, two thinkers whose 
influence will be felt more and more as this dissertation progresses.  
6 And now for something completely different.  
 In this penultimate section, I set out to do two things. First, I pull together the 
strands of a claim that can be found peppered throughout the preceding review, namely, 
that the debate over the voluntariness of belief has been distorted in serious ways. 
Second, I sketch an alternative understanding of belief which appeals to some of the 
results of the discussion of these distortions. In order to defeat the argument from 
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involuntariness, it is not required that you accept this alternative conception (you might 
instead accept one of the contemporary positions discussed above in sections 3-5). I offer 
this conception to those who find my analysis of the distortions compelling and want an 
outline of an account that takes them seriously. 
6.1 Two Distorting Assumptions 
 The first item of business for this last section is to draw together and reaffirm 
some key insights that have been gathered along the way, specifically regarding 
methodology, scope, and presuppositions. It is my contention that that the following 
presuppositions have greatly distorted the debate over the voluntariness of belief: 
(1) taking beliefs like perceptual beliefs to be paradigmatic, or the central 
instances, of belief; 
(2) taking the lifting of one’s arm “just like that” as the model of voluntary 
control. 
6.1.1 Misidentifying the central cases of belief 
 The first distortion regards what would count as an answer to the question, “What 
do you believe?” It is my contention, and I think that this is borne out by an ordinary 
language understanding of the concept of belief, that “belief” applies, in the first 
instance,112 to a person’s answers to the “big questions,” to matters of (again using the 
Douglas Adams phrase) “Life, the Universe, and Everything.”113 Consider the question, 
                                                        
112 I say, “in the first instance,” because I ultimately want to press the case for an analogical understanding 
of “belief,” which is borne out by the history of the word. There are, quite naturally, intermediate cases of 
belief that fall between the obviously thin (I believe that grass is green) and the central cases (I believe that 
the world is essential a broken world). 
113 For some philological evidence, we can look to the Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd Edition, which 
arranges its definitions chronologically. Under “belief,” the first definition is “the trust that the believer 
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posed by one person to another, “What do you believe?” Assuming for the moment, as 
we have been, that the content of belief is a proposition, this question does not invite a 
reply like, “I believe that it is raining, that it is cold outside, that there is a stand of three 
pines over there, that this is a cup of coffee in front of me, a glass of scotch in front of 
you…” and so on.114 If someone proceeded to answer us in this way, we would stop him 
at once. We are not inviting a litany of propositions about the immediate environment. 
We are inviting, rather, an answer that, to use a popular phrase, requires some soul-
searching on the part of the person to whom the question is addressed. We are suggesting, 
through our question, the popular imperative that you must believe in something, that 
                                                        
places in God” (df 1a). Next comes “the mental action, condition, or habit of trusting to or having 
confidence in a person or thing; trust, dependence, confidence, reliance, faith” (df 2). This definition is 
qualified with the claim that “belief” is usually followed by “in”. Notice the active and dispositional 
character of belief. The next two definitions make reference, respectively, to a set of doctrines believed (as 
in the formal statement of a creed), and to a set of propositions held to be true, in early usage with special 
reference to religious propositions (df 3 and df 4a). Finally, we get a “philosophical” usage, where belief 
refers to a “basic or ultimate principle or presupposition of knowledge; something innately believed” (df 
4b). Definitions 5a and 5b refer to the usage of belief together with with (obsolete) and in, where again this 
is an “acceptance or conviction.” Finally, we get, in definitions 6 and 7, the locution of belief together with 
a that-clause. But even here it is not so simple. Definition 6 makes reference to “religious, philosophical, or 
personal convictions” and definition 7 qualifies, “esp. on the grounds of testimony or authority, or in the 
absence of proof or conclusive evidence.” So even when we do (finally) arrive at a very generic sense of 
belief-that-p, we have qualifications regarding the sort of contents chiefly at issue (personal, philosophical, 
religious) and the grounds of the belief (testimony, authority, a lack of conclusive evidence or proof). Even 
in latter-day belief-that contexts, then, there is still a sense that belief principally takes a certain sort of 
content and has a certain sort of ground. Furthermore, the word seems to be used in a way that suggests 
voluntary control over our beliefs—as opposed to a strict form of evidentialism. The history of “belief” 
therefore provides some evidence that belief is an analogical concept. For there appears to be a core sense 
that is preserved throughout (such that, for instance, we are still dealing primarily with a religious concept) 
that has been gradually attenuated and made able to take more varied contents. A similar history is to be 
observed in the case of the verb “believe,” where it is only by definition 4 that we get “believe that,” none 
of the examples of which involve such locutions as “I believe that it is raining.” (It is interesting to note that 
belief in the deliverances of the sense is mentioned at definition 3b, but “chiefly in negative contexts,” e.g., 
“I cannot believe my ears (eyes)” and its variants. (Ten out of twelve examples involve just this locution—
the other two refer generically to “believing in one’s senses.”) Both these entries (together with the entry on 
“believer”) testify to the original core theological or religious sense. Interestingly, this philological 
evidence also comports well with Pieper’s presentation of Aquinas’s account of belief. 
114 Pieper (1963, 6-7) takes a similar approach to establishing the meaning of “belief,” considering what 
would constitute a fitting or appropriate response to the question, “do you believe that?”  
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everyone needs to believe in something or other. (Sometimes, it might be said, even if 
this something is only yourself.115) Do you believe in God, your country, your family, the 
basic goodness or basic rottenness of humanity, the ideals of classical liberalism, laissez-
faire economics, hard-core Marxism, the unfettered pursuit of power?116  
 In other words, in asking the question “what do you believe,” I am supposing that 
you must believe in something, and I am asking you what it is that you believe. I am not 
asking you to give me a statement of your “representation” or “map” of the world.117 I 
can see that it’s raining just fine, just as well as I can see the trees over yonder and the 
beverage in my glass. If I needed that kind of information, I would surely not have asked 
you what you believed. I would have just asked you directly: is this scotch in my glass? Is 
that coffee in yours? Are those trees over there what they call “pines?” And so on. If we 
want to preserve, and I think that we should, a distinction between asking people about 
their beliefs, and asking them for straightforward factual information about the immediate 
environment, then I think that we need to realize that, in the first instance, to believe is 
usually not merely to take something as true.  
                                                        
115 Interestingly, G.K. Chesterton identifies this kind of belief-in-oneself as at the heart of madness ([1908] 
1986b, 216-17).  
116 I invite the reader to make the necessary translations to propositional replies to keep with our 
simplification—though I maintain that such propositional responses are not likely to be what comes out of 
the mouth of our hypothetical ordinary interlocutor. 
117 It has been suggested that a competing explanation for why these responses are ill-fitting is that they 
provide no new information to the questioner, thereby violating certain Gricean conversational maxims or 
other pragmatic norms. In response, I think that we can modify the examples so that they do provide new 
information (suppose the questioner is blind). Furthermore, we can consider the parallel case of desire, and 
the question, “what do you want.” Someone responding to this question might provide new information to 
the questioner (e.g., by reciting a Christmas wish list), while missing the question. Asking someone what 
they want (in the context described above) is akin to asking someone what they believe. It is request not 
merely for new information, but for a very particular kind of information. 
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 Now, I will grant that we can be led, like the slave boy in the Meno, to the answer 
that the contemporary epistemologist wants. But we do not get there merely by being 
asked, “what do you believe?” Rather, we have to be asked, very specifically, “do you 
believe that there is a stand of pine trees over there?” Now, I think that our ordinary 
believer would initially look askance at the question. Surely, he does more than believe 
that the trees are over there. He knows that the trees are over there. Given (what 
Williams, as we saw above, dismisses all-too-quickly) the usage of reserving “belief” for 
cases that we take to be “less” in some sense than knowledge, I think that the ordinary 
believer would at first not be inclined to simply agree that he believed it. “No,” he might 
reply, “I do not just believe that there are pine trees over there. I am quite sure of it. There 
are three pines over there.”  
 At this point, the epistemological interrogator might take one of two tacks. First, 
he might press his “test-subject” by way of negation. “Surely, though, you would not say 
that you do not believe that are trees over there?”118 In the face of this question, the test-
subject might concede that he does believe, because he has been made to feel as though it 
would be extremely odd for him to disavow such a belief. The second tack that the 
epistemologist might try in order to get a concession is to press the claim that, surely, if 
you know something, then you believe it. Knowledge, that is, entails belief. Now, our 
ordinary man is unlikely just to go along with a thesis about entailment, but he is likely to 
be led along by the notion that since knowledge is stronger than belief, if you are so 
strong as to be in a position of knowledge, then you are also in a position of belief. If you 
                                                        
118 This route seems to consist in exploiting Moore’s (apparent) Paradox. 
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can lift a 100 lb. weight, then you can also lift a 50 lb. one. This metaphor of strength is 
very deceptive because it implies that you can easily compare what it is to know that p 
with what it is to believe that p, such that if the former is “harder” to do than the latter, 
then, if you can claim knowledge, then you can also claim belief. At least, this is how it 
looks pretheoretically. From the epistemological interrogator’s point of view, this is just 
the “traditional” JTB theory of knowledge, on which S’s knowing that p entails S’s 
believing that p.  
 But such a view is not without its challengers. For example, on Aquinas’s view of 
belief (discussed below) knowing that p does not entail believing that p. I will leave it to 
the reader to sift through the alternatives. But for now, the point is just that our ordinary 
concept of belief is not as thin as the focus on perceptual beliefs would have us think. 
While it seems a simplification to admit such a thin conception of belief, we are already 
making a heavy philosophical decision to talk and theorize about belief as if it were 
already pretheoretically understood in this thin way. As we have seen, taking belief in 
this thin way greatly increases the number of beliefs. As such, it skews the debate 
regarding doxastic voluntarism. Since it appears that the vast number of our (thin) beliefs 
are involuntarily formed, and since the beliefs that pose a problem for the involuntarist 
amount to an extremely low share of the total number of our beliefs, the involuntarist 
claims the high ground, declaring that he has no reason to concede simply because there 
are a few holdout beliefs that cannot entirely be accounted for on his [the involuntarist’s] 
terms. Such is one dialectical result of assumption (1). 
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 Another way in which to put the distortion is in terms of what we care about when 
it comes to belief. Why do we have certain normative practices (of blame, for instance) 
regarding what people believe? Typically, we do not care about someone’s perceptual 
beliefs unless they are false. But then our interest is not so much in the beliefs, as in 
diagnosing what went wrong with the person. By taking perceptual beliefs as 
paradigmatic, we prejudice the discussion against the idea that there are norms of belief 
in anything but a deflationary “proper function” sort of way, as we saw above in the 
discussion of Engel. That is, an important way in which assumption (1) skews the 
discussion is by casting aspersions on thinking that there are prescriptive norms of belief 
at all. If the vast majority of beliefs are automatically and involuntarily formed, then why 
not think that the rest are involuntary too?  
 A second doxastic phenomenon that the focus on perceptual beliefs misses that is 
also related to the care that we take in our beliefs and the beliefs of others is that of 
conversion. Someone is a communist. We can try to convert him to capitalism—an 
atheist to Catholicism, a right-winger to the left-wing, a moral realist to moral nihilism, a 
militarist to pacifism, and so on. Because we take other persons as equally capable of 
coming to know the truth (whether on their own or not), we take it that people’s minds 
can be changed—and, indeed, people’s minds can be changed when it comes to the belief 
that God exists in a way that is missed (because highly improbable) when we consider the 
belief that snow is white. While we have very little hope, and no real reason, to try to 
convince someone to abandon his belief that snow is white, we have hope (and reason) to 
convince him to embrace the Gospel.  
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 Finally, assumption (1) ignores the care that we take in our beliefs by distorting 
the relationship between belief and the personal identity of the believer. The starting 
point here is to consider how you would answer the question, “what do you believe?” The 
question, put in this pointed way, seems to reach down and to ask, in effect, “Who are 
you?” Marcel, for instance, says that we are our beliefs (1964, 171-2). Now, this is not 
the (false) claim that we are numerically identical with our beliefs, but rather—as Marcel 
says of the claim, “I am my body”—the claim that the union between me and my beliefs 
is stronger than any mere juxtaposition. I do not merely “have” beliefs, but I am my 
beliefs.119  
 This seems right. Consider the act of questioning what someone believes. Above, 
the point of such a reflection was to reveal to us what we take to be appropriate responses 
to such a question. Now, reflect on how asking someone what she believes is a very 
intimate affair. Reflect, if you will, not only on what sort of answers we expect, but also 
on how these answers are especially revelatory of the person whom we are asking. 
Asking someone what she believes is a fundamental way of getting to know her. We 
cannot truly know someone unless we know what she believes. At least, certain 
relationships seem to be impossible without an intimate knowledge of the other’s beliefs. 
Can we really be best friends with someone if all we know about her is her taste in film, 
television, food, and drink, where she works and goes to school, what sort of clothes she 
wears, and other sundry facts about her? It would seem not. It is important to ourselves 
                                                        
119 This is to put the point in terms of Marcel’s distinction between être (to be) and avoir (to have).  
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that we know what we believe, and it is important to others who would bear us certain 
relationships (e.g., friendship) that they know what we believe.  
 We identify ourselves in ways that pick out whole sets of beliefs. I am a Catholic. 
I am a political centrist. I am an optimist, and so on. Many of the practical and social 
identities that we embrace are an embrace of certain beliefs as part of how we look out 
onto the world. If someone does not know these things about me, do they really know 
me? Can they really relate to me in certain ways? If Sue knows everything about Sam 
except what Sam believes, does Sue really know Sam? Can Sue really be friends with, or 
otherwise truly love, someone about whose beliefs she has no clue? More to the point, 
imagine that Sue knows every belief Sam has about his perceptual environment. Let us 
stipulate further that such “beliefs” are the clear majority of Sam’s beliefs. Would we say 
that Sue knows what Sam believes? Throw in Brad’s beliefs about gradually more and 
more subjects, his belief that trains are the best way to travel, that Nixon was 
misunderstood, that compact cars are better on mileage than SUVs. Even so, I still think 
that the common verdict would be that she does not know what Brad believes. In general, 
I think that what we will find is that, if the thin sense of belief is correct, then we should 
be willing to say of Sue that she knows what Brad believes much sooner than we in fact 
do. We are not willing to say that someone knows what someone else believes until the 
beliefs in question reveal something about the person’s identity to the other person. What 
one believes is bound up with who one is. But again, if the belief that the cat is on the mat 
is the paradigm, how are we to make sense of this relationship? The long and short of the 
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matter is that assumption (1) makes us forget why ordinary human persons care so much 
about belief in the first place (beyond in a merely instrumentalist way). 
 The upshot of assumption (1) is that it inflates the raw numbers of beliefs in such 
a way as to prejudice the dialectic in favor of doxastic involuntarism and put the onus on 
the voluntarist to show why he is not just engaging in “special pleading” on behalf of a 
rag-tag army of hold-out beliefs. But it is hardly special pleading if it turns out that the 
hold-outs are themselves the exemplars of belief.  
 Note that this is not necessarily to claim that perceptual beliefs aren’t beliefs. We 
need to distinguish two possible upshots of my criticism of assumption (1). The first is 
the modest claim that contemporary epistemology has misidentified the exemplars, 
central cases, or paradigms, of belief. As a result of this misidentification, contemporary 
epistemology fails to make intelligible the care that we take in our beliefs and skews the 
debate in favor of doxastic involuntarism. It is this modest claim that I have defended 
here. The second possible upshot is the radical conclusion that non-paradigmatic beliefs, 
such as perceptual beliefs, aren’t beliefs at all. As we shall see below (in section 6.2), this 
is not upshot that I draw from the foregoing criticisms. 
6.1.2 Distortions regarding voluntary control 
 The next distorting assumption regards how we understand voluntary control. As 
we have seen, voluntary control is typically understood (in the various critiques of 
doxastic voluntarism) as being the sort of control that we have when we raise our arms 
“just like that.” Call this fiat control. Notice, furthermore, that as extended to the case of 
forming beliefs, this is interpreted as the ability to form a belief regardless of what one 
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takes to be its truth-value and regardless of what one’s take on the reasons for and against 
the proposition are. But as many have pointed out,120 there is no reason to think that 
believing voluntarily should require the exercise of such a power. It has even been 
suggested that possessing such a power would diminish our freedom (McHugh 2014a, 
33-34). And as Ryan (2003) notes, such a description of a typical case of arm-raising 
ignores a whole host of necessary conditions on voluntary activity. It isn’t the case that 
we can raise our arms “just like that.” Plenty of other conditions need to obtain as well—
at a minimum, our brains must be functioning tolerably well.  
 Just as arm-raising requires certain other conditions, so too does belief-formation. 
We cannot just form beliefs by fiat. At a minimum, if we are to consciously form a belief, 
we at least need to have reasons that we take to be truth-conducive even though they may 
in fact not be (cf. Funkhouser 2003, 183). Having reasons plays a central role in this 
debate, as we have seen. Fisher and Ravizza’s account of moral responsibility in terms of 
reasons-responsiveness is appealed to both by voluntarists and involuntarists. This itself 
is a curious fact. Some take reasons-responsiveness to be such that it makes belief-
formation voluntary (Steup), but others take it to make belief-formation involuntary 
(McHugh). Which is it?  
 The reason that philosophers obtain different results is that they are thinking about 
different cases. Cases, such as Steup’s Car Theft, involving a conscious process of 
reasoning and deliberating about whether some proposition is true, are different from 
cases involving perceptual beliefs. Fisher and Ravizza’s use of the word “mechanism” in 
                                                        
120 As we saw about, this includes Walker (2001), Shah (2002), and Peel (2014a). 
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their formulation of reasons-responsiveness is instructive here. It might be that where 
reasons-responsiveness is understood in mechanistic terms, it does not support 
voluntariness. If the mechanism is such that it will just issue in whatever belief is “best 
supported” by received reasons, then belief is involuntary. It is a determinate matter what, 
given the reasons you have, you will believe. At the subpersonal level, such talk of 
mechanism and determination seems to fit well.121  
 When, however, beliefs are formed in a way that engages the whole person, at the 
personal level, exercising one’s reason is how one acts voluntarily. It is through the 
exercise of reason, as Aquinas writes, that man is free and not determined to fixed 
actions. The extent to which we are actively engaged in our beliefs though the exercise of 
reason (responding to reasons at the personal level) is the extent to which we have some 
degree of voluntary control over our beliefs. Correlatively, the extent to which we are 
disengaged (our belief being the mere end-products of certain subpersonal processes) is 
the extent to which we relinquish voluntary control over our beliefs.  
 The point, at this stage, is simply that the question of voluntariness, closely 
connected with the question of the role of reason in the formation of beliefs on both sides 
of debate, suffers from how we choose our examples. If, however, we bear in mind the 
insight of Zagzebski (1996, 66) that belief lies along a spectrum of degrees of 
voluntariness, we need not be surprised that the way in which we talk about the exercise 
                                                        
121 This is not to say that, at the subpersonal level, our beliefs are formed merely as a function of our 
evidence, for presumably beliefs are formed at this level also as the result of non-truth-conducive 
influences, e.g., wishful thinking, deeply ingrained biases and prejudices, the conditions of various 
illnesses, and so on. 
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of reason—as a “mechanism” versus a personal deliberative process—influences the 
question of voluntariness. The other point to take away from this discussion is that the 
fiat conception of voluntary control prevents us from seeing that “voluntary control” 
comes in degrees and that by starting from an overly strong conception of voluntary 
control, we are apt to beg the question against doxastic voluntarism, and, even more 
severely, beg the question against voluntary control over any action whatsoever. With 
these distortions in mind, the question is whether we can come up with an account that 
neither relies upon, nor embraces, these distortions. I aim in the next subsection to sketch 
the contours of just such an attempt.122 
6.2 Belief as an ambiguous, “analogous” commitment to the truth 
 In this subsection, I outline a substantive account of what it means to believe. I 
use the phrase “what it means to believe” advisedly, to indicate that my interests are not 
with the ontology of beliefs (e.g., are they brain-states or not?), but with what might be 
called the personalist-existentialist meaning of believing for the human person. The 
account is highly influenced by two thinkers: Thomas Aquinas and Gabriel Marcel. 
Discussion of their accounts of belief will thus appear in what follows. The upshot, I 
hope, is an account of the meaning of believing drawn from the true paradigms or 
exemplars of belief—one that makes room for, rather than peremptorily closing off the 
possibility of, a form of voluntary control over what we believe. 
                                                        
122 Although this may not be the most felicitous place to discuss this, it bears mentioning, before moving 
on, that the dominant assumptions of a thin understanding of belief, as well as of the involuntariness of 
belief, in contemporary analytic philosophy, seems to be an instance of that tradition’s empiricist heritage. 
Consider, e.g., Hume’s definition of belief, as “a lively idea related to or associated with a present 
impression” (Treatise I, III, 7). What could be thinner and more involuntary than that?  
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6.2.1 Belief as commitment 
 The first element of this account is a re-conception of belief away from the 
Williams-inspired teleological claim that belief aims at truth. What I propose in its place 
is that the relationship between belief and truth is best described in terms of 
commitment.123 But first let us consider the inaptness of the aim thesis. In order for the 
aim thesis to work, the aim of belief needs to be sufficiently distinct from belief itself. 
But what would it mean for someone to aim at the truth in forming a belief? The picture 
that comes to mind is that of beliefs as darts, with truth being the dartboard. It is as if, in 
aiming at the truth, we form beliefs in the hopes that we will thereby have acquired some 
                                                        
123 Before proceeding, let me point out that other authors have articulated a connection between belief and 
commitment. My own view has been influenced by reflections upon Aquinas and Marcel. My account 
should not, therefore, be read with these other authors primarily in mind, though there is some overlap. Let 
me briefly run through them for the benefit of the reader. Brandom speaks of “doxastic commitments,” 
where these are social-normative deontic statuses instituted by the practice of giving and asking for reasons 
(1994, 142). These commitments are “inferentially articulated” (ibid., 157). Given his pairing of 
commitment with entitlement, doxastic commitments are commitments to advancing the contents of one’s 
beliefs as-true and as-reasons, and to responding to someone asking us for our reasons for so believing. 
Ultimately, however, Brandom does not analyze belief in terms of commitment, but seeks to replace belief-
talk with commitment-talk. The benefit of this, he thinks, is that it avoids the ambiguity between belief as a 
commitment to what we avow and belief as a commitment to what is implied by what we avow (ibid., 195). 
Then there is Millar (2004, 73, 75) who says that when we believe p, we are committed to believing all that 
is actually (and not merely thought to be) implied by p. This commitment is grounded in ideals of reason 
which are constitutive of being a rational agent (ibid., 76). (Thus, he effectively resolves Brandom’s 
ambiguity by understanding the commitment of belief as a commitment to what is implied by what one 
avowedly believes.) Vahid (2006, 303) writes that, “adopting an attitude of believing towards a proposition 
seems to carry with it some sort of commitment towards the truth of that proposition.” Coates (2009, 109-
12) writes that, “beliefs may be construed as a particular way of making a commitment…placing oneself 
under a norm, where the content of the commitment specifies the conditions under which the norm is 
satisfied.” Qua theoretical commitments, his understanding of belief-as-commitment gets you the view that 
all beliefs are correct just in case they are true. Lynch (2012, 83) thinks of the relationship between belief 
and commitment the other way round: while beliefs follow from commitments, beliefs are not themselves 
commitments, nor need they involve commitments. (Cohen (1995, 31) would agree with this claim.) 
Gibbons (2013, 196-97) claims that believing that p commits you not only to the truth of p, but to knowing 
that p. For him, this is a matter of the requirements of rationality. The overarching theme of these positions 
is an understanding of the commitment in terms of the requirements of theoretical rationality, logical 
implication, or the practice of giving and asking for reasons. As we will see below, I think that this is only 
part of the story of belief-as-commitment.  
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truth. But this is just to say, in the context of belief, that we hope that we will thereby 
have acquired a true belief. This does not seem to be sufficiently distinct from belief 
simpliciter, especially since there is no guarantee that every belief we form will turn out 
true. Furthermore, it does not seem to make sense of the fact that in believing that p we 
are not taking aim at the truth of p, but already claim to have the truth of p. My belief 
does not aim at the truth; it embodies a commitment to some proposition that I already 
claim is true. When I ask you, “what do you believe in,” I am asking about that to the 
truth of which you are committed.  
 The basic claim, then, is that to believe that p is to be committed to the truth of p. 
There is, however, an ambiguity in the phrase “committed to the truth of p,” which I 
discuss in the next subsection. For now, it is enough to note that the ambiguity concerns 
the actual locus of the commitment. Is my commitment to the truth of p a commitment 
primarily to the truth (whatever it may happen to be) regarding p, or is my commitment 
to the truth of p a commitment primarily to my preexisting belief that p (regardless of the 
truth)? Given the ambiguity of “committed to the truth of p,” it seems that we must speak 
of different senses of belief.  
 What about different kinds of belief? Here, my view is less settled. Matthews 
(1972) argues convincingly against the pervasive philosophical error of speaking 
interchangeably of senses and kinds, as if there were a kind of x for every sense of “x,” 
and vice-versa. Accordingly, from the fact that there are multiple senses of “belief,” it 
does not follow that there are multiple kinds of belief (one for each interpretation of 
“committed to the truth of p”). If we wish to speak of different “kinds” at all, we can only 
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do so by invoking the distinction between genus and species. That is, we can assign a 
“kind” of belief to each sense of “belief” only if these kinds are understood as species of 
some generic notion of belief. Though I am not firmly wedded to this structure, I follow it 
for the remainder of this chapter. I will understand belief qua commitment to the truth of 
p to constitute the genus of belief. The genus of belief contains at least two species, each 
of which corresponds to a sense of “belief” that we get by fixing an interpretation of 
“committed to the truth of p.” It is for this reason that I speak of belief as an “ambiguous” 
commitment to the truth of p. I discuss this ambiguity further in the next subsection.  
 Before we discuss this ambiguity, however, more needs to be said about belief, by 
way of distinguishing it from other, related attitudes such as knowledge and opinion. For 
example, Aquinas (ST IIaIIae, q. 2, a. 1 and De Ver. q. 14, a. 1) and Marcel (1964, ch. 6; 
[1950] 2001b, ch. 5) both draw distinctions between belief and opinion.124 I will situate 
my own account of belief by reference to their distinctions, ultimately drawing on their 
accounts of belief and opinion to fill in what I have called the two “species” of belief, or 
the two senses of “believe”/“belief.”  
 I begin with Aquinas. I want to suggest, following Aquinas, that belief is distinct 
from knowledge, such that knowing that p does not entail believing that p. Knowledge 
and belief are two different phenomena, each with a distinctive phenomenology.125 To 
                                                        
124 Marcel also distinguishes, within belief, between belief-that and belief-in (ibid.). Although he does not 
discuss belief-that explicitly, I think that we can make sense of belief-that as commitment from what he 
says about belief-in and contrast it appropriately with mere opinion in what follows. 
125 Besides Aquinas and Marcel, my primary inspirations here, another philosopher who nicely 
distinguishes between phenomenologically different ways of relating to propositions is Newman. Newman 
([1874] 2010, 34ff) distinguishes five types of what he calls “notional assent”: profession, credence, 
opinion, presumption, and speculation. I hope to explore the relationships among Aquinas, Newman, and 
Marcel in future work. 
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know that p is not to believe that p, plus having a justification and meeting some anti-
Gettier condition(s). I think that this is an important step, because it allows us to preserve 
the distinction between knowledge and belief that is encoded in our ordinary ways of 
talking and thinking about our beliefs, as was discussed in section 6.1. While we might be 
able to induce others to say that they believe that there are trees over there, by making 
them feel ridiculous for denying that they believe that there are trees over there, or by 
pushing them into thinking of belief as lesser knowledge (properly speaking: entailed by 
knowledge), to believe and to know are really two distinct ways of relating to something 
as true. I know that there is a tree over there, but I believe that classical liberalism is the 
best political philosophy. I regard both contents as true, but what differs are my lived 
relationships to these contents.126 
 To see how this distinction works, let us look at how Aquinas defines belief in the 
Summa theologiae. To believe, he says, is to think with assent (ST IIaIIae, q. 2, a. 1). The 
truth of this definition, however, depends upon the meaning of “to think,” which Aquinas 
says is ambiguous. On the other hand, “to think” refers to any actual consideration of the 
intellect. On the other hand, it stands for “that consideration of the intellect, which is 
accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which precedes the intellect’s arrival at the 
stage of perfection that comes with the certitude of sight” (ibid.).127 
                                                        
126 To be clear, according to Aquinas, human (though not divine) knowledge properly speaking concerns 
universals, whereas particulars are the object of perception. In this sense, the Thomist would never concede 
that we know (or believe) that there are trees over there. Rather, we see that there are trees over there. But I 
will persist in speaking of knowing particulars in what follows for ease of discussion. 
127 He also distinguishes, within this second sense, between “to think” as applied to universal notions and as 
applied to particular matters, and hence as a power either of the intellective or of the cogitative power (ST 
IIaIIae, q. 2, a. 1).  
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 It is in this second sense that “to think with assent” completely expresses the act 
of belief (actus qui est credere). For if “to think” were taken in its first sense, then we 
might be said to believe that which we know (by science (scientia)). Since Aquinas 
distinguishes belief from knowledge, an account of belief in terms of the first sense of “to 
think with assent” is too broad. Thus, to believe is to think with assent in the second 
sense of “to think with assent.” According to this sense, to believe that p is to assent to p, 
where the assent is accompanied by inquiry or investigation of p. To see this better, let us 
now look at how Aquinas contrasts belief with some other (to use modern parlance) 
propositional attitudes128: knowledge, opinion, and doubt.129  
 When someone knows that p is true rather than ~p, his intellect is “so determined 
that it adheres to one member without reservation” (De Ver. q. 14, a. 1, resp.). 
Furthermore, the determination in question is a purely intellectual operation (except in 
the sense that the will moves the intellect as its efficient cause). What this means is that 
the intellect, once considering p either just understands it to be true (when the truth of p is 
immediately clear to the intellect, e.g., in the case of self-evidently true propositions like 
“the whole is greater than its parts”) or else knows it to be true in virtue of principles that 
it knows immediately (when the truth of p is immediately known through first principles) 
(ibid.). 
                                                        
128 This approach aligns with what Aquinas writes about belief. In De Ver. q. 14, a. 1, Aquinas says that 
belief, concerning as it does the true and false, occurs in the second operation of the mind, that of affirming 
and denying through composing and dividing concepts, where the sign of such affirmation and denials are 
propositions.  
129 In the article of the ST (IIaIIae, q. 2, a. 1) at issue here, Aquinas also mentions the attitude of suspecting, 
but as he does not mention this in the more detailed account of these attitudes in the article of the De 
Veritate we are discussing (q. 14, a. 1), I have omitted suspicion from my discussion. 
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 When someone believes that p is true rather than ~p, his belief is not determined 
by the intellect, as in cases of knowledge. Rather, the will must play a role in determining 
the content of the belief (p rather than ~p) because the intellect, in these cases, is not 
determined by its object, i.e., it is not determined with respect to its assent-to-p either by 
seeing the self-evidence of p, or else by seeing how p follows from other principles. 
Aquinas also says that, because of this, other considerations can move the will to its 
assent, such as the goodness or fittingness of p. But this point is not necessary to draw the 
distinction between belief and knowledge (ibid.).130 
 Next there is opinion. When one opines that p, it is the case that, whereas it seems 
to one that the reasons for and against p are equally weak, or equally strong, there is 
nevertheless an inclination toward p as opposed to ~p. Lastly, when one doubts that p, 
one does not even have an inclination toward either p or ~p. In such a case, we waver 
between the two, but do not incline to one or the other (ibid.). These last two are related. 
When we hold an opinion that p, we hold that p but with fear (cum formidine) that ~p is 
the truth (ibid.). Opinion and doubt are thus of a pair. They come together with respect to 
contradictory propositions. Of opinion-doubt, we can say that here there is thinking 
without assent.131 
                                                        
130 A consideration weighing in favor of the “goodness” of believing would be any rewards that accrue to 
the believer, e.g., eternal life. (The example is Aquinas’s.) An example of a medieval case of fitting belief 
would be belief in the doctrine of the Incarnation. Such a doctrine, according to Aquinas, could not be 
deduced from first principles, but could be shown to be “fitting” i.e., it cannot be deduced that it is 
necessary that God redeems man by means of the Incarnation, but only that it was fitting that He redeem 
man by means of the Incarnation (see ST IIIa, q. 1, aa. 2-3; Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. 4, ch. 54).  
131 As we shall below, however, opinion does tend to develop into an attitude that manifests itself in a kind 
of frenzied pseudo-assent or degenerate assent.  
 131 
 
 To believe, however, does involve assent; it “cleaves firmly to one side” just as 
knowledge does (ST IIaIIae, q. 2, a. 1). In this, it shares something with knowledge 
against opinion-doubt. The mode of this assent, however, is not the same in both 
knowledge and belief. In the case of knowledge, where what is known is some self-
evident proposition, the assent is more or less spontaneous upon consideration of the 
proposition. In the case of something known through principles (scientia), the assent is 
caused by discursive thought.132 In the case of belief, however, the “assent and the 
thought are “more or less parallel”” (quasi ex aequo) and the assent is not caused by 
discursive thinking, but by the will (De Ver. q. 14, a. 1). Thus, the differing relationships 
between thought and assent are what fundamentally distinguish knowing from believing. 
In a case of knowledge, our state of knowing that p is the outcome of some intellectual 
operation (whether understanding or science), whereas our state of believing that p is 
concomitant with our thinking about p, and thus concomitant with an inquiry into p. 
Whereas it is not the case that we inquire into what we know, we do inquire into what we 
believe.133 We might say that we “wrestle with our beliefs” but not with our knowledge. 
                                                        
132 For example, one’s knowledge that q is caused by one’s having discursively reasoned from principles p 
and p ® q. To be clear, though, there is no need to assume that all scientia relies upon a formalistic 
understanding of discursive reasoning. The reasoning might be material. 
133 In both the ST and De Ver., Aquinas uses a form of inquisitio, which the translators have rendered as 
“inquiry.” “Investigation” would have done just as well. Newman, in Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, 
distinguishes the two, saying that inquiry implies doubt and, as such, is incompatible with the assent of 
belief. While one may “investigate” the “credibility” of a proposition that one beliefs, one “cannot literally 
inquire about its truth” (Newman [1874] 2010, 146-47). Inquisitio may be rendered as a “searching for” or 
a “searching into.” Making Aquinas’s point compatible with Newman’s is a matter of translating inquisitio 
in this latter way. We are not searching-for the truth when we believe that p (we already claim to have it 
and we are already committed to it). This would be a step back to the view that beliefs aim at truth. Rather, 
the inquisitio is a matter of searching more deeply into what one believes. In this way, the inquisitio of 
belief disposes one well with respect to understanding (credo ut intellgam, as Anselm says). Pieper (1963, 
44-49) provides a nice discussion of this aspect of belief according to Aquinas, arguing that this “mental 
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But in belief, this active wrestling with what we believe is wed to a voluntary assent to 
the content of the belief, so that we hold ourselves “captive” by the imposition of the will, 
rather than being determined by the intellect (ibid.). That is, in holding the attitude of 
belief with regard to p, we are not determined, but determine ourselves, to hold the 
belief.134 Because of this, when we believe that p, we can still entertain ~p, and be moved 
to take ~p seriously, and maybe even abandon the belief that p for the belief that ~p. But 
this is not possible in cases of knowledge. If we know that p, then while we might be able 
to entertain its negation, we cannot be moved to take it so seriously that we might 
withdraw our assent from p and instead bestow it upon ~p.  
 On this account, then, we can think of knowledge as involuntary—we cannot 
choose what we know and our assent is “caused” by our intellectual operation (though, in 
another sense, it is voluntary insofar as the will moves the intellect to its act), whereas 
belief is voluntary, and opinion-doubt is involuntary. When Aquinas speaks of opinion, 
he describes it as an “inclination” and he specifically denies that assent is given in the 
case of opinion (ibid.). Such inclinations are easily acquired. We pick up opinions from 
others uncritically and unreflectively. Marcel’s example of this is of the person who takes 
his opinions from his newspaper ([1950] 2001b, 70-71). Updating the example, we might 
say that one’s inclination to p over ~p is picked up from what others say on social media 
or cable news. There is a connotation of passivity to inclination that is not present in how 
Aquinas (and, as we shall see, Marcel) depicts belief. Belief engages the whole person in 
                                                        
unrest” that exists alongside the unconditional assent of belief is not a case of doubt, thereby resolving 
Newman’s worry.  
134 Again, note the relationship between believing and self-determination. 
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a particular way, depending upon both intellect and will. Belief relies on intellect, insofar 
as (i) what we believe is conditioned by the intellect (by what we know or understand) 
and (ii) insofar as the inquisitio that is partially constitutive of belief requires the intellect. 
Belief relies on the will as that by which it cleaves firmly to the proposition in question. 
Belief is thus voluntary both in the more remote sense of the will moving the intellect to 
its act, and in the more proximal sense of depending on the will for its partially 
constitutive act of assent.  
 It is at this point that some of the insights of Marcel on belief and opinion can be 
grafted onto the Thomistic vine. For Marcel, our beliefs constitute an openness and a 
commitment to their object. How exactly should we understand an openness to 
propositional truth? Marcel, who does not explicitly discuss belief-that, does not say. But 
his discussion of personhood and opinion, the latter of which I will discuss below, sheds 
some light (see Marcel 1964, 110-13). According to Marcel, personhood is the “active 
negation” of the impersonal. Transposed into the realm of belief and opinion, this striving 
for the personal consists in the movement from opinion to belief. Opinions are, by and 
large, impersonal. Opinions are what “one maintains” or what “they maintain.” They are 
picked up and taken over uncritically from others. The movement toward belief consists 
in a series of acts by which one moves from being a mere spectator with regard to what 
one “believes” (opinion) to being a participant in what one believes, thereby becoming a 
true believer. Although Marcel uses a variety of words here, the basic triad of acts that 
constitutes this movement is that of evaluation-appraisal-assumption. The person 
evaluates the truth-claims he receives from others and appraises them. This involves not 
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only scrutinizing the claim’s justification by reasons or evidence, but also, as Marcel 
observes, the system of “values” that is latent in the claim itself. Consider the following 
opinion that might be picked up by a reader of Breitbart News: immigrants are more 
likely to commit crimes than non-immigrants. This is suggested, for example, by the 
selective and constant coverage of crimes committed by immigrants. Plenty of people just 
pick up this opinion. For readers of Breitbart News, this is just “what one believes.” But 
for the person determined not to be a mere spectator with regard to what she believes, 
determined not to abdicate her personhood when it comes to what she believes, this will 
not do. What evidence do we have for believing this (in reality, false) claim about 
immigrants? What values are implicit in this content? What is my appraisal of the reasons 
and values at issue?135 The result of all this is an inner revision of one’s attitudes, either 
by rejecting one’s opinions, or by a transformation of one’s opinions into beliefs. The 
natural result and crowning act of this is the communication of the fruits of this interior 
participation with others, which, beyond constituting participation in the social dimension 
of inquiry, is also an act whereby we assume responsibility before others for the truth to 
which we are committed. 
 This Marcelian analysis of belief-that sits well with an analysis of openness in 
Aquinas’s terms. To believe that p, rather than to opine that p, is to remain open to p in 
                                                        
135 I think that, insofar as we cannot fact-check all of our sources all of the time, the latter is perhaps more 
important. While we may, in many cases, just have to assume that someone claiming that p is true has 
reasons backing the claim up, we do not have to assume that a particular source has the value of 
truthfulness at heart. Are the values (or disvalues) of the source rather those of anger, bitterness, 
resentment, xenophobia…? Does the exemplification of these values give us reason to think that the 
presentation of content is done, not with an eye to communicating truth, but rather to inducing particular 
opinions, the spread of which the editor of the content finds desirable?  
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the sense that we exist in an ongoing, concomitant relationship of investigation with 
respect to p. That is, we do not treat p as something that we know. Rather, we remain 
open by continuing to wrestle with p, to investigate p, to actively think about it, turn it 
over in our minds, reflect on it, etc. In this way, belief has an active component that is 
utterly absent from opinion according to Aquinas and Marcel.  
 But while this sort of openness brings with it an active recognition that our 
intellect is not, nor should be, “at rest” in cases of belief as opposed to knowledge (cf. De 
Ver. q. 14, a. 1), there is another sort of openness that comes from firmly assenting to p as 
true. This is an openness to the fruits of considering the truth in question. In the basic 
case, these fruits are logical, in that we can gather further beliefs by reasoning from our 
already-held beliefs. But the fruits are also existential, in that by entering more deeply 
into certain of our beliefs, we come to draw implications for how we should see the world 
and others, and how we should act in the world and toward others.  
 It is in both of these respects that belief differs from opinion in Marcel’s sense. 
According to Marcel, opinion is “a seeming which tends to become a claiming” ([1950] 
2001b, 70). What starts out as something that we receive from others, something that 
seems to us to be the case, tends to develop into precisely the opposite, i.e., into 
something that we claim, illicitly, to be obviously true. According to Marcel, opinion 
tends to end up making an even stronger claim for its content: it claims not only that its 
content is true, but also that everybody knows it to be true (ibid., 71).  
 Here I think that Marcel and Aquinas are especially complementary: both are 
describing the same attitude (opinion) albeit at different points in its development. 
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Aquinas’s description of opinion as an inclinatio cum formidine explains why it is that 
opinion has a tendency to develop from an attitude that manifests itself in claims about 
what seems to be the case, to claims about what is the case, to claims about what 
everybody knows to be the case. The explanation of this development is that it is the 
result of the fear that is concomitant with the holding of an opinion, a fear that may be 
more or less submerged, but which is ever-present.136  
 Let us now sum up the results of the foregoing discussion, incorporating the claim 
that to believe that p is to be committed to the truth of p. To simplify matters, consider 
just knowledge, belief, and opinion. What distinguishes belief from opinion is that belief 
involves assent. What distinguishes belief from knowledge, which also involves assent, is 
that the assent of belief is concomitant with ongoing thought (cogitatio) and searching-
into the truth of what is believed (inquisitio), as well as requiring the will to hold it firm.  
 In appropriating Aquinas’s way of distinguishing these three, I am effectively 
taking assent as an act expressive of a commitment to the truth of some proposition. We 
are committed to what we know and what we believe (albeit in different ways), but we 
are not committed to our mere opinions.  
 I say “mere opinions” pointedly, for there appears to be space in Aquinas’s 
structure for another attitude, one that involves assent, and therefore a commitment, to 
                                                        
136 Aquinas, as we have seen, glosses this as a fear of error, whereas Marcel glosses it, more complexly, in 
terms of a fear of not being taken seriously by others. That is, opinions develop in the way they do (in part) 
because of a fear of not being taken seriously by others in the social group defined by those opinions (cf. 
Marcel [1952] 2010, 124). The fear of not being taken seriously in my opinions by society—not to have 
carved out a niche for myself in some opinion-constituted-group, e.g., a political party—prevents me from 
truly participating in my beliefs in such a way that an inner revision is possible. Instead I become locked 
into my opinions, closed off to them in such a way that I just maintain their truth, and their universal 
acceptance as truth, by “everybody.” 
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some proposition p, but without the concomitant inquisitio characteristic of belief. It is 
the presence and possibility of this attitude that leads to the aforementioned ambiguity in 
the phrase “committed to the truth of p.” For lack of a better phrase, I will refer to this as 
the “opinion-mode” of belief, or as “opinionated belief.” It is this way of believing that 
supplies the second species of believing that exists alongside the species of belief 
identified by Aquinas. It is to these two species of belief, and the accompanying 
ambiguity of belief as a commitment to the truth of p that we must now turn. 
6.2.2 Belief as ambiguous 
 The claim that to believe that p is to be committed to the truth of p is ambiguous 
insofar as the phrase “committed to the truth of p” is ambiguous. The two senses of 
“committed to the truth of p” correspond to two species of belief that fall under the 
belief-genus. The first of these species is essentially belief as elucidated by Aquinas and 
Marcel. The second of these species, which was briefly introduced at the end of the last 
subsection, is that of the opinion-mode of belief, or opinionated belief. In this subsection, 
I fill in these two species of belief further, by spelling out the two ways in which one may 
be committed to the truth of p. Here is an initial formulation of the distinction:   
 C1 (belief-mode): I am committed to the truth of my beliefs. 
 C2 (opinion-mode): I am committed to the truth of my beliefs.137 
                                                        
137 David makes this distinction in his (2005), in the context of pointing to an ambiguity in the goal that 
Lynch (2004a) claims that believers have, namely the goal of believing propositions if, and only if, they are 
true. David points out that this goal can either be the goal of desiring that our beliefs actually be true, or 
that of desiring that our beliefs, whatever they happen to be, be true. 
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 Let us take each in turn. If a commitment to p is lived according to C1, then it is 
constitutive of a belief as articulated in the last section. They are, in the (somewhat 
clumsy) parlance of this section, beliefs according to belief-mode. In this sense of 
“commitment,” commitment to the truth of your beliefs is an openness to the truth, i.e., 
an ongoing parallel engagement with the belief through thought and reflection with an 
eye to harvesting more intensively the fruits of what you take to be true. But this 
commitment can become perverted and degenerate into a commitment, not to the actual 
truth of your beliefs, but to maintaining, at all costs, the truth of your actual beliefs, 
whatever they may be. Consider the following cases by way of illustration.  
 Otto believes that God exists and that He providentially governs the world. As 
such, he acknowledges that he does not know this. He wrestles with this belief. He 
wonders about it, entertains the possibility that it is not true (though is not seriously 
moved to reject it, at least not most of the time). He reflects on it, reads philosophical and 
theological literature on the topic, talks to others about it. He prays about it (Lord, I 
believe; help Thou my unbelief). But he is also open to more and more intently delving 
into this proposition that he takes to be true. He sees the world as moving toward God as 
its ultimate end, as well as God working in people’s lives by grace.  
 Now consider Lotho. Lotho also believes that God exists and that He 
providentially governs the world. Lotho rarely thinks about his belief.138 He doesn’t 
wrestle with it, doesn’t reflect on it, doesn’t read or talk about it with others. But he is 
                                                        
138 To be clear, we might think that if beliefs are dispositions, then these dispositions need not always be 
exercised. Yet it also seems to be the case that, unless we manifest our dispositions to think about what we 
believe frequently enough, the belief will waste away. 
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still committed to the truth of his belief. He thinks about it just once a week, almost 
accidentally, while the subject is forced upon him at a weekly church service. He doesn’t 
really think about or reflect on it at all during the week. But if challenged on his belief, he 
will maintain it up to the hilt.139 The claim here is that this way of living the commitment 
of truth (C2) consists in a bewitchment by the fact that my beliefs are mine, and a more or 
less developed tendency toward what Marcel calls fanaticism, i.e., a refusal to argue, 
consider, reflect, think, and be open, which is ultimately the enemy of truth.140  
 Thus, to make my point in terms of assent, we still have assent, but the assent is 
more to the truth of my beliefs, than to the truth of my beliefs. Another way to put this, in 
the terms of Piller (2009, 198) is that wanting to be right is not the same thing as being 
interested in the truth. Alternately, I might appeal to what Haack (1996, ¶ 5) calls 
“pseudoinquiry” and “fake” or “sham” reasoning to make my point.141 She writes: 
 Peirce identifies one kind of pseudoinquiry when he writes of “sham reasoning”: 
 attempts, not to get to the truth of some question, but to make a case for the truth of some 
 proposition one’s commitment to which is already evidence- and argument-proof (ibid.). 
 
 In addition to citing Pierce, Haack identifies her own species of fake 
                                                        
139 Lotho seems to present a case of what Price (1969, series 2, lecture 4) refers to as “half-belief.” 
According to Price, such beliefs are necessary for conversions to transpire (ibid.). It seems, then, that 
Lotho’s belief is better than no belief at all, insofar as it is necessary for him to come to believe in the way 
Otto does. 
140 See Marcel ([1952] 2008, ch. 2) for a discussion of this theme. 
141 It seems, then, that even in cases of beliefs in the opinion-mode (opinionated beliefs), there is some 
accompanying “inquiry.” But it is sufficiently different from the inquiry that accompanies belief in the 
belief-mode not to collapse my distinction between the two. The only issue raised by the presence of such 
pseudo-inquiry in cases of opinionated beliefs is that of where precisely to draw the line between 
opinionated beliefs and non-opinionated beliefs. Above, I cash this out as a distinction in terms of the lack 
of inquiry in cases of opinionated belief. Perhaps, in light of the present observations, it would be better to 
concede that both species of belief involve inquiry, but that non-opinionated beliefs involve real inquiry 
and opinionated beliefs involve the pseudo-inquiry described by Haack. Either way, such opinionated 
beliefs are still qualitatively distinct from both belief (which involves commitment in the sense of C1) and 
mere opinion, which doesn’t involve any commitment (and hardly any thought) at all.  
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reasoning as “attempts not to get to the truth of some question, but to make a case for the 
truth of some proposition to which one’s only commitment is a conviction that 
advocating it will advance oneself” (ibid.). Such fake reasoning is exemplified by 
academics who make a name for themselves by offering clever arguments for “startlingly 
false or impressively obscure” ideas (ibid.). Summing up, she writes, “sham and fake 
inquiries aim, not to find the truth, but to make a case for some proposition identified in 
advance of inquiry” (ibid., ¶ 6). I would add, to return to my account, that a prominent 
class of such propositions “identified in advance” are the propositions to which one is 
committed in the way identified by C2.  
 Of course, given that I am discussing belief, and not the act of inquiry which 
precedes some of our beliefs, Hacck’s language is not perfectly translatable to the present 
discussion. In the language of this section, when we believe according to the belief-mode, 
we always assent to propositions as true, and not as contents of my beliefs. In the 
opinion-mode, by contrast, we assent to propositions as contents of our beliefs. Of 
course, we always also assent to them as true, but this is entirely derivative upon the fact 
that we never believe that p without always also believing that p is true. It is a matter of 
emphasis, as well as what is uppermost. When we believe according to the belief-mode, 
truth is uppermost, and the assent is fundamentally to the truth. When we believe 
according to the opinion-mode, possession is uppermost, and the assent always cleaves to 
what is mine, whatever it may be. Anticipating the discussion of the value of truth in later 
chapters, we might also say that to believe according to the belief-mode is to incarnate 
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the value of truth, to be a certain way as persons. To believe according to the opinion-
mode, however, is to merely, and egoistically, have opinions.   
 This perversion of the commitment to the truth of p manifests itself in at least two 
ways. The first concerns how the thought that accompanies belief is manifested. In cases 
of opinionated belief, there is both a striking minimization of thought, and, more than 
this, a reorientation of thought itself. Investigation becomes rationalization, in a way akin 
to what Haack called “fake reasoning.” It becomes, at best, defensive. We think about 
what we believe only when we are forced to by challenges from others. Instead of 
investigation and reflection being part of the lived experience of believing, they become 
mere instruments by which we buttress, reinforce, and defend our beliefs against the 
challenges posed by others. In the opinion-mode, one doesn’t bother to actually engage 
with one’s beliefs unless some “crisis” requires it. At the extremes, this ambiguity may 
even manifest itself in the chasm which separates philosophy from sophistry.  
 Secondly, there is the relationship that each species of belief bears toward other 
ways in which a person may come to relate to the same truth. In the next chapter, I allude 
to the Anselmian motto credo ut intellegam: I believe, so that I might understand. Belief 
according to the belief-mode (C1) is such that is amenable to leading to knowledge and 
understanding. Belief according to the opinion-mode (opinionated belief) (C2) is not. In 
fact, it might even make such an advancement impossible. Recall what Marcel says about 
the pretension of opinion—that my opinion is what “everybody knows.” If, then, I take 
what I believe to be already a matter of universal knowledge, how can I possibly dispose 
myself toward coming to know or understand the truth? There is of course the possibility 
 142 
 
that I have good luck and my opinionated beliefs are true. Nevertheless, many 
philosophers have thought that “knowledge” acquired by luck is no knowledge at all. 
Whatever one says to that claim, it seems clear to me that opinionated believing is 
inimical to genuine understanding. The difference between C1 and C2 is thus seen both 
in terms of the aforementioned ambiguity of “commitment to the truth of p,” and in terms 
of how the different species of belief to which they correspond are related to the 
prospects of knowledge and understanding.  
6.2.3 Belief as “analogous” 
 The next step of the account has already been anticipated. As noted above, the 
upshot of the earlier criticism of contemporary epistemology’s fixation on perceptual 
beliefs comes in two varieties: modest and radical. A radical interpretation of the critique 
would eliminate all but “pure” beliefs from the domain of belief. A modest interpretation 
distinguishes between beliefs that are exemplary, paradigmatic, or central cases, of belief, 
from those that are not, without also claiming that the latter are no longer beliefs. 
 Another way to put this point is in terms of the Scholastic distinction among 
univocal, analogical, and equivocal predication. The radical interpretation of my critique 
might be read as the claim that we equivocate when we claim both to believe that Christ 
is the Son of God and to believe that some roses are red. The modest interpretation, by 
contrast, might be read as claiming that “belief” is analogously predicated of both of 
these commitments (to the truth of Christ’s being the Son of God and to the truth that 
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some roses are red).142 What is probably not up for dispute, according to this linguistic 
reading of my critique, is that “belief” is not univocally predicated in both cases.  
 Cashing the upshots of my critique in terms of the distinction between analogical 
and equivocal predication is merely heuristic in the present work. This investigation has 
neither the space nor resources to determine whether “belief” is, properly speaking, an 
analogical predicate. This must be left to future work. Instead, I will speak of belief (not 
“belief”) being “analogous” (in scare-quotes) as a convenient way of expressing the fact 
that belief, as a commitment to the truth of p, has certain exemplary, paradigmatic, or 
central cases (the “prime analogates,” if we want to press the linguistic heuristic) which 
represent, as it were, what it means to fully participate the nature of belief. Other beliefs 
are belief by more-or-less intensively participating the exemplary form of belief.143  
 Our description of one such “prime analogate,” the belief that God exists and 
providentially governs the world, is quite rich and substantial.144 It involves a lot on our 
part, and is very intimately related to how we go about our lives: what we do, say, and 
                                                        
142 Just as Aquinas says that while we cannot predicate qualities of God and man univocally, it is not the 
case that all such predication is equivocal, so too (perhaps), we are not merely equivocating in calling both 
beliefs “beliefs.”  
143 My reader should not interpret the use of “exemplary form” here as indicating any heavy-handed 
metaphysical commitments. I use “exemplary form” more or less interchangeably with “nature” in the 
present context, merely to flag that the nature of belief is, properly speaking, revealed by considering 
exemplars of belief, and that it is by more or less approximating these exemplars that a belief is a belief. 
This is what is also intended by the loose use of “analogous” (in scare-quotes). Exemplary beliefs are 
beliefs properly speaking, and other beliefs count as beliefs in virtue of their standing in some participation 
relation to the exemplary form (which is participated fully by the exemplars of belief). It is worth pointing 
out that my use of scare-quotes around “analogy” (as I use it here) may not be necessary, if those Thomists 
who advocate a metaphysical interpretation of analogy are correct. 
144 Although our brief examination of the history of the English word “belief” reveals the primacy of 
religious convictions, there are other candidates for the prime analogate, e.g., moral, political, and 
philosophical beliefs, beliefs about yourself and those you love, and certain scientific beliefs. 
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think, with whom we converse and how we converse with them, how we act toward the 
world and interact with other persons.  
 By contrast, perceptual beliefs are very far removed from the belief that God 
exists. How might such beliefs participate the exemplary form of belief? Consider the 
belief that it is raining. We are committed to the truth of this in that we take such a belief 
as a premise in our practical reasoning, e.g., about whether to work in the garden, what to 
wear when taking a walk, etc. We give our assent to this belief and so we are committed 
to its being true. But our commitment is not so much consciously given as presupposed by 
how we use the belief in question, and our thinking about the belief in question is mostly 
limited to how the content of the belief bears on practical matters of daily life. 
Nevertheless, we see here attenuated versions of assent, commitment, and accompanying 
thought.  
 Before concluding this section, let me acknowledge the point (made above) that 
we should not think of this element of my sketch in terms of a hard separation of beliefs 
into two piles: the central cases and the marginal cases. Between the credo in unum Deum 
and the belief that the box wine is on the counter there is room for a whole slew of 
beliefs, participating to different degrees in the meaning of believing as discerned in the 
central cases. Consider the following. Box wine is underappreciated. Box wine is better at 
preserving wine for longer periods of time. Those who disparage box wine are snobs. 
Those who drink box wine are unrefined. And, finally, in vino veritas. For each of these 
possible belief-contents, a person can participate more or less in the exemplary form of 
belief (though we are enough alike that certain patterns emerge). In short, I think that we 
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can understand the degrees of participation in keeping with the criteria that emerged from 
considering a marginal case. The dimensions of participation involve the degree to which 
the commitment is conscious and conscientious, the degree to which the commitment in 
question is (or is not) “swallowed up” in practical matters, the degree to which one avows 
the belief before others, and the extent to which it manifests who one is.  
6.3 Belief and the Question of Voluntariness 
 Finally, let us ask how this sketch might serve as a response to the question of 
voluntariness. Here, I rely on much of the preceding discussion. The basic idea is this. 
We wanted to be able to vindicate the insight of Zagzebski that belief lies on a spectrum 
of degrees of voluntariness. The application of the preceding account to the question of 
voluntariness consists of the following stages. First, we claim that the nature of belief is 
such that we can more or less intensively participate in the formation and maintenance of 
our beliefs. To borrow an earlier-discussed insight of Marcel, we can, with respect to our 
beliefs, move away from passively receiving what “one believes” or what “they believe.” 
That is, instead of just unquestioningly taking on the beliefs of our society, class, family, 
or whatever other group you want to pick, we become such that we actively evaluate and 
appraise what we receive before according it the status of a belief. The degree to which 
our beliefs intensively participate in the nature of belief as described above is thus the 
degree of our lived participation in the formation and maintenance of our beliefs.  
 In turn, as the descriptions of this lived participation hopefully make clear, the 
extent to which we live out and enact this participation in what we believe is the extent to 
which we exercise voluntary control over our beliefs, as well as assume responsibility for 
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them before others. We act as the gatekeepers of what we “receive” from others. We 
actively appraise and evaluate what is handed on to us. We wrestle with our beliefs and 
actively think about, reflect, consider, and inquire into them, and we give our assent and 
come down firmly on side of a matter for which the intellect’s operation is not sufficient 
to determine us. The scale of voluntariness is thus not some abstract construct, but is 
indexed to the way we live our lives. For those who are engaged to the nth degree with a 
wide range of their beliefs, some of those beliefs will be higher up the scale of 
voluntariness. But as a rule of thumb, we are such that certain sorts of beliefs are reliably 
higher up on the scale of voluntariness. In a short, if pithy, formula: we exercise 
voluntary control with respect to what we believe to the extent that we live as believing 
human persons. 
 Finally, to tie these remarks about voluntary control back to the discussion of 
evaluative versus prescriptive norms, we might say that the spectrum of voluntariness is 
aligned with a spectrum that runs from merely evaluative normativity, to both evaluative 
and prescriptive normativity. That is, once we breach a certain point on the spectrum of 
voluntariness, prescriptive norms come into force. Whether this suggestion is more than a 
mere metaphor depends on working out the notion of such a “scale of normativity.” But 
even so, the point is sound. If we countenance a degree of voluntariness, and wish to 
maintain, as have some of the authors canvassed in this chapter, that prescriptive norms 
require voluntary control, then, with respect to some beliefs, there are such norms, and, 
with respect to others, there are not.145 
                                                        
145 These other would then be subject only to an evaluative norm of truth. 
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 Allow me now to briefly sum up section (6). This section began with identifying 
two assumptions of the contemporary literature on whether belief is voluntary that, I 
argued, severely distort the debate. The upshot of this discussion is that the concepts of 
belief and voluntary control presupposed by many parties to the debate have heavily 
skewed the debate in favor of doxastic involuntarism. In response to this, I have sketched 
an alternative understanding of belief that attempts to make sense of the claim that belief 
lies along a scale of voluntariness, rather than simply being all involuntary, all voluntary, 
or all fully-involuntary or fully-voluntary. Belief, according to this understanding, was 
given a thicker phenomenological profile with the help of Aquinas and Marcel. Belief, 
thus understood, answers to the arguments made against the thin concept of belief: they 
constitute the right sort of answers to questions about one’s beliefs, they make sense of 
the care that we take in our beliefs (as expressed in doxastic normative practices, the 
phenomenon of conversion, and the relationship between belief and personal identity), 
and they make sense of the importance of coming to know another’s beliefs for the sake 
of forming interpersonal relationships. 
7 Conclusion 
 The goal of this chapter has been to declaw the lion that is the argument from 
involuntariness. I have gone for a philosophical shotgun effect, showing ways we can 
argue for the falsity of any one of premises (1)-(3). My other goal has been to offer some 
“meta-level” observations on the debate that explain the dominance of doxastic 
involuntarism. Finally, I aimed to present a sketch of an alternative account of what it 
means for a human person to believe. In another dissertation, this would take center 
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stage, where much more could be said. For now, I present it as a work in progress, as an 
alternative conception that makes sense of (1) the central and important role of belief in 
the life of the human person, and for the person’s identity as a person; (2) how the 
voluntariness of belief can be conceived of along a spectrum of voluntariness; and (3) 
why we care, or at least ought to care, about the norms of belief, getting them right, and 
understanding their source and scope. 
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Chapter II: The Normativity of Truth for Belief? 
1 Introduction 
 We have cleared the first of three major objections to the claim that truth is a 
norm of belief. In the last chapter, I addressed the objection that belief is involuntary, and 
so not an apt subject of norms. I laid out the argument from involuntariness in detail, and 
proceeded to show how, in the contemporary literature, there exist responses to each of 
the argument’s three premises. I then offered some observations on the debate regarding 
the voluntariness of belief, arguing that the way in which that debate has been framed has 
skewed the discussion in favor of doxastic involuntarism. I concluded by sketching an 
alternative account of belief rooted in the philosophy of Aquinas and Marcel.  
 Having reminded ourselves of where we have been, let us now turn to the second 
and third general problems concerning the normativity of truth for belief. These are 
organized under the heading of truth-centric problems for the thesis. That is, whereas the 
problem of the last chapter was the result of reflection on belief, the problems raised here 
are the result of reflection on truth. The first goes by the name of the “Guidance 
Problem” and is due primarily to Glüer and Wikforss (2009, 2010, 2013), although I shall 
also discuss related problems implicit in David (2005), Gibbons (2013) and McHugh 
(2012b). According to the Guidance Problem, norms must be able to provide guidance. 
But, it is maintained, truth cannot provide guidance. Therefore, truth cannot be a norm. 
My response to the guidance problem will consist of a critique of Glüer and Wikforss’s 
concept of guidance, as well as an outline of an alternative kind of guidance. 
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 The second problem to be considered in this chapter comes from Gibbons, 
namely, the central puzzle around which his (2013) monograph is organized. Truth is not 
the only candidate norm of belief. There are other candidate norms, the most commonly 
invoked of which is a norm of justification. Gibbons’s puzzle concerns the existence of 
cases in which it seems that these norms deliver mutually-incompatible results, telling the 
person both to believe, and not to believe, some proposition p. Here, my task will be to 
give some account of how the truth-norm is related to the justification-norm, in order to 
avoid the problem of contradictory ought-claims.146  
2 The Guidance Problem 
 The Guidance Problem is mainly attributed to Glüer and Wikforss, who introduce 
it in their (2009) and reiterate it in their (2010) and (2013). In this section, I will 
principally discuss Glüer and Wikforss’s version of the problem, although I also mention 
variants of the problem in the work of David (2005), McHugh (2012b), and Gibbons 
(2013). Further variants or intimations of the problem can be found in the work of 
Papineau (1999, 29), Sosa (2001, 50, 54), and Engel (2013a, 308). 
2.1 Glüer and Wikforss’s Guidance Problem 
 Truth, it is often said, is an “objective norm” (following Boghossian (2003, 38-
39) and (2005, 211). Objective norms, as Boghossian understands them, are non-
transparent with regard to how one goes about complying with them. What this means is 
that we must comply with such norms by following certain other norms, with regard to 
                                                        
146 As in the discussion of doxastic involuntarism, my response to these objections are necessarily limited in 
their definitiveness. Just as this is not a dissertation on doxastic voluntarism, so also is it not primarily a 
dissertation on epistemic justification or normative guidance. 
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which compliance is a transparent matter. Boghossian’s oft-mentioned example is the 
“rule” “Buy low, sell high” (ibid.). It is not transparent to stock traders when the price of 
a stock “is low relative to the price for which one will be able to sell it” (ibid., 211). So 
stock traders follow other rules which are directly followable. But, as Boghossian notes, 
it would be misleading to leave out the fact that the traders in his example follow the 
rules that they follow not for the sake of those rules, but as a means to complying with 
the rule that tells them to buy low and sell high.  
 Glüer and Wikforss have no problem with objective norms as such, but identify a 
special problem for the notion of an objective norm of truth. To show this, they first 
subsume the truth-norm under the following general form: Do X when in C.147 That is, to 
count as a norm that guides agents, the truth-norm must tell agents what to do when 
certain circumstances obtain (Glüer and Wikforss 2009, 44). “X” in the case of the truth-
norm is “believe that p” and “C” is “p is true.” As is the case with any objective norm in 
Boghossian’s sense, it is not clear when the circumstance C obtains. So as in the case of 
other objective norms, what is required is that the agent form a belief that C obtains 
which, in conjunction with the norm, tells the agent to X. In the case of the truth-norm, 
then, the agent must first determine whether p is true in order to figure out whether to 
form a belief that p.  
 But, as Glüer and Wikforss point out, to determine whether p is true is eo ipso, to 
form a belief that p, or to form a belief that ~p, depending on the results of one’s inquiry. 
                                                        
147 For a reminder as to why I consider the guidance problem, even though I have already argued against a 
formulation of the truth-norm similar to the one used by Glüer and Wikforss, see the discussion of chapter 
II in the introduction. 
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In their first discussion of the guidance problem, Glüer and Wikforss utilize this insight 
to advance the claim that the truth-norm never actually provides any guidance to agents 
because the truth-norm never tells an agent to believe otherwise than she already does 
(2009, 44). Consider the following proposition: God created the universe. As Glüer and 
Wikforss understand the truth-norm’s form, the truth-norm tells me to believe that God 
created the universe just in case it is true that God created the universe. So, I must go 
about determining whether God created the universe. Say I read a lot of Aquinas and 
come to the conclusion that God did create the universe. As a result of my inquiry, I have 
formed the belief that God created the universe. What now, does the truth-norm tell me to 
believe? Well, it seems just to tell me to believe that which I already believe—namely 
that God created the universe. Conversely, if I had formed the belief that God did not 
create the universe, it seems that the truth-norm would have told me to believe precisely 
that instead. The problem, then, is that the truth-norm never tells you to believe what you 
do not already believe, and thus can hardly be providing guidance. 
 In an early response to the 2009 version of the argument, Steglich-Petersen (2010) 
pushes back against Glüer and Wikforss in two ways. First, he faults Glüer and Wikforss 
for (wrongly) thinking of the antecedent and consequent of the truth-norm as referring to 
the same thing. That is, he thinks that Glüer and Wikforss’s elucidation of the truth-norm 
ultimately amounts to: believe that p only if you believe that p, which is plainly not what 
the truth-norm tells you to do (ibid., 752). Following a distinction drawn by Jonathan 
Dancy, he claims that Glüer and Wikforss confuse a reason for believing that p with an 
enabling condition on believing that p. Just like the stock-trader attempting to comply 
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with the rule, “Buy low, sell high,” the believer must form a belief in order to comply 
with the truth-norm. In the former case, these will be beliefs about stock prices, and in the 
latter case beliefs about what is the truth. But the presence of this belief among the 
person’s mental states is not a reason for believing that p. It is a merely a condition on 
following the norm. You cannot follow the truth-norm unless you have already formed a 
belief about where the truth lies on some given matter, but the presence of this belief is 
not a reason, or the reason, for which you form a belief, nor is it the reason for which the 
truth-norm tells you that you ought to believe it.148 Furthermore, we can, according to 
Steligch-Petersen, determine whether p is true without determining whether we believe 
that p.149 If he is right, then Glüer and Wikforss (2009) have just made a mistake in 
identifying the antecedent and consequent of their formulation of the truth-norm 
(Steglich-Petersen 2010, 752-3). 
 In the same paper, Steglich-Petersen offers, to my mind, a more substantial 
rebuttal to the objection that truth cannot provide guidance to believers. According to 
Steglich-Petersen, a sufficient condition on a norm’s providing guidance is that the 
deliverances of the norm in question can conflict with the deliverances of other possible 
norms (ibid., 754). For example, you might imagine another possible norm (which he 
                                                        
148 The latter point is Steglich-Petersen’s, but the first point is my own and, I hope, uncontroversial. How 
could the presence of a belief be the cause of my forming a belief, when the beliefs have the same 
propositional content? This would involve either an equivocation of some kind, or else a commitment to the 
self-causation of beliefs qua mental-states. 
149 In this respect Steglich-Petersen maintains that the transparency of doxastic deliberation, identified by 
Shah (2003, 447) is asymmetrical. (The transparency of doxastic deliberation is such that we always 
determine whether to believe that p by determining whether it is true that p.) In maintaining that 
transparency is asymmetrical, Steglich-Petersen maintains that we determine whether p is true without 
determining whether we believe that p. 
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calls “Pleasant”) which commands believers to believe that p only if it is the case that 
doing so would be pleasant for the believer in question. Since we can imagine 
propositions relative to persons, that it would be pleasant for those persons to believe, 
albeit known by them to be false, we can imagine a case in which the truth-norm would 
tell the believer not to believe that p, and the pleasant-norm would tell the believer to 
believe that p. Say, e.g., that I have done a lot of research in moral philosophy and 
theology and have come to the conclusion that simony is a sin.150 It would be pleasant for 
me to believe that it is not a sin, as then I could go about my business without worrying 
about the fate of my soul. In short, this response, which I think more successful, is to 
point out a case in which the truth-norm provides guidance by making a difference to 
how the believer goes about forming beliefs.151 
 Moreover, although this is not discussed by Steglich-Petersen, the truth-norm 
makes a demand on the believer, as we often expect to be the case from considerations of 
what the “right thing to do” is. If there is a certain moral imperative concerning actions 
(we often hear, with a certain rhetorical flourish, of the choice between the “right” and 
the “easy”), why not a certain imperative from the ethics of belief?152 There is the right 
thing to believe—that which is true, or reasonably believed to be true—and the easy thing 
to believe—whatever would put us at ease, whatever is pleasant, whatever confirms other 
                                                        
150 That is, the selling of ecclesiastical goods, such as church offices, sacraments, and indulgences. 
Simonists are condemned in Dante’s Inferno (Canto XIX) to the Eighth Circle of Hell, where their heads 
are set into holes in the rock, and their exposed feet are tormented by flames. 
151 In this respect, Steglich-Petersen’s response seems to have a certain pragmatist flavor. 
152 I put “morality” in scare-quotes here in order not to make the contentious assumption that the morality, 
or ethics, or what have you, of belief is “the same as” (in all respects) the morality of action.  
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beliefs of ours, whatever reinforces the coherent story that we tell ourselves about the 
world, ourselves, and others in it.153 
 Glüer and Wikforss respond to Steglich-Petersen in their (2010), taking Steglich-
Petersen’s critique as an opportunity to sharpen their argument. They do so by 
emphasizing the temporal dimension of the believer’s attempt to comply with the truth-
norm. If determining whether p is true is necessary in order to determine whether to 
believe that p in accordance with the truth-norm, and if, as even Steglich-Petersen 
concedes (2010, 752), determining whether p is true will inevitably eventuate in a belief 
that p (or ~p), then it seems that by the time the truth-norm re-enters the scene, it is too 
late to provide any guidance to the believer in question (Glüer and Wikforss 2010, 759). 
The point is not, as Steglich-Petersen interprets it, that one must consult one’s 
psychology and determine whether one believes that p in order to determine whether, by 
the truth-norm, one ought to believe that p. The point is rather that in determining 
                                                        
153 To make the point in terms of empirical psychology with the aid of Kahneman (2011, ch. 3): the human 
mind is predisposed to cognitive ease, that is, “believing” that which seems intuitively right and easy, and 
that which easily fits into the coherent stories that we tell ourselves to describe and explain the world. In his 
book, Kahneman distinguishes between what he calls “System 1” and “System 2” (though these are 
admittedly useful fictions that he uses to present facts about human psychology). System 1 is automatic, 
intuitive, impressionistic, operating quickly and without any experience of voluntary control, whereas 
System 2 allocates attention and effort, works through the problems presented to it, and is associated with 
the experience of agency, choice, and control (ibid., 20-21). It requires the intervention of System 2—
which is often “lazy” (ibid., ch. 3)—to serve as the gate-keeper with regard to our conscious acts of 
endorsement of what System 1 delivers us. One might almost say that System 2, when it is “deployed,” 
answers to the truth-norm, whereas System 1 answers to a norm not far off from Steglich-Petersen’s 
“Pleasant”—at least insofar as cognitive ease is experienced, or else describable, as a certain sort of 
pleasure—a kind of slackness that is experienced as having things taken care of, and having nothing further 
to busy oneself about. Doxastic norms, then, might be seen as a plea for seriousness when it comes to what 
we give our full-throated doxastic endorsement to. [Indeed, while he is inconsistent in his usage on this 
score, Kahneman sometimes talks (e.g. ibid., 24) as if “belief” itself is limited to the endorsements of 
System 2, whereas System 1 delivers mere impressions as to what is true. If this is so, then we have at least 
one prominent psychologist who sees the need to restrict the sense of “belief” (in its proper sense, anyway) 
along the lines I proposed in section 6 of chapter I.] For a philosophical application of Kahneman’s 
research to the matter of regulative epistemology, see Roberts and West (2015).  
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whether p is true in the first place, one already believes that p (~p), and so there is no 
room for the supposed truth-norm to guide the believer with regard to what she ought to 
believe (Glüer and Wikforss 2010, 759-60).  
 Glüer and Wikforss (2013) continue to hold this view. Steglich-Petersen (2013a) 
has, however, made another attempt to refute it. In his latest work dedicated to the 
guidance problem, he largely appeals to his earlier discussion of the possibility of norms 
that are, or would be, incompatible with the truth-norm. He writes: 
 If one were in doubt as to whether the correctness of belief depended on truth or 
 pleasantness, it would clearly be guiding to become convinced of the truth norm’s 
 validity, since one would then direct one’s attention towards whether p is true, rather than 
 towards whether believing p would be pleasant, when trying to find out whether to 
 believe that p. It is easy to miss this point, because we almost cannot help but take for 
 granted that when considering whether to believe that p, we are interested in the truth of 
 p. But the conceivability of other possible norms, which are in conflict with the truth 
 norm, and would give rise to different beliefs if followed, shows that the truth norm can 
 provide guidance in the relevant sense. (2013, 281) 
 
 The conceivability of other norms of belief shows how the truth-norm can guide 
believers with regard to what they ought to believe. It is worth dwelling for a moment on 
this passage, as it will be similar to one of my own responses to the guidance problem. It 
is often assumed that the question of whether to believe that p can only be consciously 
settled by appeal to “epistemic reasons” or, to use the language of Hieronymi (2008) 
reasons that are truth-conducive. I take it that Steglich-Petersen has this sort of prejudice 
in mind when it speaks of how we “almost cannot help but take for granted” that we are 
interested in truth when the question is that of whether to believe that p. Now, one thing 
that must be pointed out is that if one understands the relationship between belief and the 
answerability of belief to the truth-norm as flowing from the nature, essence, or concept 
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of belief—a generic cluster of views that will be discussed under the heading of 
“normativism” in the next chapter—then the conceivability of these other norms of belief 
is either (a) called into question, (b) not sufficient to undergird the guidance of the truth-
norm, or both (a) and (b).  
 That is, if, as, for example, Shah (2003) and Shah and Velleman (2005) put it, to 
possess and deploy the concept of belief is to possess and deploy the concept of a state 
for which truth is the standard of correctness, where “standard of correctness” is 
understood normatively, then the conceivability of other norms of belief would just seem 
to be incoherent. You would not be imagining norms of belief, but norms of something 
else. The fact that you claim to be able to conceive of other such norms just betrays that 
you do not have the “concept” of belief, or the “essence” of belief, properly in your 
sights. Now, it is a virtue of Steglich-Petersen’s insistence on this point, that it shows up 
the woodenness of this sort of reply. It is only, as we saw in the last chapter, a latter-day 
orthodoxy that belief cannot answer to considerations about the good of the believer, say. 
But be that as it may, there is a stronger response to Glüer and Wikforss in this regard, 
and that is to recall that their overarching project in the three papers under examination is 
an argument against belief normativism, as that doctrine shows up in thinkers such as 
Wedgwood ((2002), (2013a), (2013b)), Boghossian ((2003) and (2005)), and others. So 
they cannot appeal to a doctrine of belief normativism to reply to the conceivability 
argument offered by Steglich-Petersen.  
 Finally, let me briefly mention the second point of Steglich-Petersen’s most recent 
response. His second point is that the concept of guidance by a norm that is presupposed 
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by Glüer and Wikforss is too narrow. Glüer and Wikforss, he says, presuppose that “a 
norm N of the form “Do X when in C” can influence S’s behaviour with respect to X 
only if following N can make a difference to S’s X-ing compared to S’s X-ing after 
having determined whether C obtains” (2013, 282). Now truth, as he concedes, cannot 
guide believers in this way, as Glüer and Wikforss show. That is, he is conceding the 
point made earlier, that if you accept how Glüer and Wikforss understand guidance, then 
it is the case that the truth-norm (as they formulate it) does not tell you to believe 
otherwise than you already believe. But if his earlier point about other conceivable norms 
is correct, then it is nevertheless the case that truth can guide believers, and thus that 
Glüer and Wikforss’s presupposition regarding such guidance is indeed too narrow. 
Rather, truth can guide believers in virtue of the fact that acceptance of the truth-norm by 
the believer makes a difference to what the believer who accepts the norm comes to 
believe (ibid., 281).  
2.2 Two Other “Guidance Problems” 
2.2.1 David’s Truth-Goal Guidance Problem 
 Guidance problems also show up in other texts (some of which were mentioned 
above), albeit not labelled as such. While credit for the guidance problem goes to Glüer 
and Wikforss, I think that we can especially discern similar problems in the work of 
David (2005) and Gibbons (2013). What unites both approaches to the guidance problem 
is that the problem, as presented in these works, does not target the normativity of truth 
tout courte, but rather one particular account of that normativity, namely the teleological 
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account. Since discussion of the teleological account will be a part of chapter III, I shall 
here say only what is necessary to understand these versions of guidance problem.  
 Let us start with David. David (2005) criticizes Lynch’s (2004a, 2004b) claim that 
“truth is good” is a truism. David focuses his critique on the notion that truth is a goal of 
believers, calling into question whether truth can be a goal in the first place. He 
distinguishes between a global non-conditional truth-goal and a particular conditional 
truth-goal. The global non-conditional truth-goal is that S wants to believe all truths.154 
The particular conditional truth-goal is that, for some p, S wants to believe that p if it is 
true that p (David 2005, 299-300). As David describes the process of acting according to 
such a global goal, you break down the global goal into a particular goal. If you want to 
purchase all the books written by Thomas Hardy, then you go into a used-book shop and 
form particular, conditional goals of the form: if x (this book I am looking at) was written 
by Hardy, then buy x. That is, in order to comply with the global Hardy-goal, I need first 
to determine whether a particular x (in this case, a particular book) meets the conditions 
of the particular Hardy-goal, and then, as a result of my determination, form the desire to 
buy the book, and then buy the book.  
 The problem though is that this process breaks down when “the relevant condition 
is being true” (ibid., 300). For in determining whether a particular proposition meets the 
condition of being true, we come therewith to form a belief in that proposition. There is 
                                                        
154 I leave aside discussion for the moment as to whether this is the best interpretation (of Lynch or 
otherwise) of the global truth-goal. For instance, it seems to imply that the truth-goal of human persons 
should be understood as the desire for omniscience. But that is an extreme interpretation, and risks straw-
manning what has been considered a typically human trait at least as far back as the opening line of 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics. David (2005, 298) seems to entertain this uncharitable interpretation. 
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thus no room for one to come to “want” to believe the proposition in question, and then to 
actually believe the proposition in question because that is what one wants to do (ibid., 
301). This is the Guidance Problem of Glüer and Wikforss translated into the language of 
goal-directed behavior. Goals, it is plausible to assume, guide the persons whose goals 
they are. But truth cannot guide us because in determining whether the conditions of the 
goal are met, we come to believe that we have already met them. To then want, or intend, 
to form the belief in question sounds odd and misleading (ibid.). Here is the argument 
that I think we can glean from David’s discussion: 
 (1) If truth is a goal, then truth can guide.  
 (2) Truth cannot guide. 
 (3) Therefore, truth is not a goal. 
 While the word “norm” does not appear in the argument, we can insert it by 
adding an addition premise above premise (1). Call it premise (0): 
 (0): If truth is a norm, then truth is a goal.155  
What David’s argument, as I have formulated it, draws our attention to is the question of 
whether the guidance problem presupposes that guidance by norms necessarily implies 
the kind of guidance at issue in goal-directed behavior. Are all norms goals? I hope that it 
is uncontroversial that not all norms are goals, given the wide range of norms that suffuse 
our daily lives. Must all norms provide guidance in the sense presupposed by Glüer and 
Wikforss and David (but rejected by Steglich-Petersen)? In effect, this is to ask whether 
                                                        
155 This points to the special applicability of David’s argument to the teleological account of the normativity 
of truth. 
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“guide” as it appears in my formulation of David’s argument is univocal. When we say 
that goals guide, we have a particular notion of guidance in mind—but is it the only 
notion of guidance, and, if not, is it the kind of guidance that truth can and (let us say) 
does provide? By explicitly discussing the guidance problem within the context of 
explicit goals and goal-directed and goal-guided behavior, David’s text enables us to 
begin questioning what is taken for granted by Glüer and Wikforss. 
2.2.2 Gibbons’s Guidance Problem 
 As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the second major problem that I 
will consider in this chapter is also due to Gibbons (2013). It is, in fact, the problem that 
motivates Gibbons’s entire work, and the one which he attempts to solve. But I think that 
in Gibbons’s text there is also a version of the problem that we are now considering. That 
is, Gibbons also thinks that the truth-norm suffers from a guidance problem. 
 There are two primary strands of thought in Gibbons that together constitute his 
version of the guidance problem. The first comes out of his critique of what he calls 
“objectivist” solutions to his main problem. In a nutshell, since more will be said on this 
below, objectivist solutions to his puzzle involve an endorsement of the truth-norm, and 
an explanation (or explanation-away) of the justification-norm. That is, an objectivist 
solution accepts that (for all p) you ought to believe that p only if p and tries to explain, 
on the basis of this norm, why it is also the case (for all p) that you ought to believe that p 
if, and only if, you are justified in believing that p. One possible objectivist solution that 
he considers—what he calls the “Bad Attempt”—attempts to explain the justification-
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norm (J) by deriving it from the truth-norm (T). Here is how this derivation is supposed 
to work (Gibbons 2013, 77): 
 (T) For all p, you ought to believe that p only if p is true. 
 (R) You ought to be reasonable. 
 (JLR) For all p, you ought to believe that p only if you are justified in 
 believing that p.156 
 There are two problems with the bad attempt, according to Gibbons (ibid., 77-78). 
The first is that the premises are inconsistent, since they deliver contradictory verdicts 
about what you ought to believe in certain cases (for more on this, see my exposition of 
Gibbons’s Puzzle in section 3 of this chapter). This prevents the derivation from being 
interesting, he says, since you can prove anything you want from a contradiction. The 
other problem with the bad attempt is that the conclusion (JLR) is just a special instance 
of (R) and so (T) does not do any work in the derivation. In other words, you could “get” 
the justification-norm straightaway from (R) all by itself.157 (T) does not do any work 
here: it is not necessary to explain (JLR).  
                                                        
156 One initial problem which I will not make much of here is that, as this argument is formulated, JLR is an 
“only-if” conditional, i.e., we ought to believe that p only if we are justified in doing so. But as Bykvist and 
Hattiangadi (2007, 280) point out, such a “norm” does not tell us to do anything at all. As such, if this is 
how Gibbons understands norm J, then his own puzzle never arises. That both truth and justification are 
necessary conditions on what we ought to believe is not contradictory. It is only when one or the other 
norms is formulated as a biconditional that the puzzle arises. As it turns out, Gibbons does formulate J as a 
biconditional elsewhere in his work; he is simply inconsistent in his formulation here. 
157 (R) as Gibbons understands embodies the categorical imperative that applies to all persons regardless of 
their desires, to “Be reasonable!” (2013, 5). Norm J (the norm of justification) is “suggested” by the 
categorical imperative to be reasonable (ibid.). Just what this means is not made clear by Gibbons at the 
outset, but his diagnosis of the Bad Attempt suggests that J just follows from R. You ought to believe that p 
if, and only if, you are justified in believing that p because that just is the reasonable thing to do, and you 
ought (categorically) to be reasonable.  
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 Gibbons goes on to consider two more attempted derivations of the justification-
norm from the truth-norm, following up suggestions in the work of Timothy Williamson 
on assertion and Ralph Wedgwood on belief. Since it is not my intention to rebut each of 
Gibbons’s critiques here, I will come straight to the point that suggests a version of the 
guidance problem. With regard to each of the derivations in question (the Bad Attempt, 
and the ones inspired by Williamson and Wedgwood), Gibbons argues that you need to 
add something to T to make the derivation work, but that whatever you add to T is (a) 
incompatible with T and (b) capable of getting us J all on its own (ibid., 88, 91, 93, 95).  
 How is this the case? Well, in all three cases, we need a premise that mediates 
between the truth-norm and the justification-norm. In the Bad Attempt, this is just 
explicitly R, which is incompatible with T according to Gibbons. But here’s the rub: in 
the Williamson- and Wedgwood-inspired derivations, while R does not feature explicitly, 
it is nevertheless implied and presupposed as the explanation of the mediating premises 
of those derivations. In the case of the Williamson-inspired derivation, the mediating 
premise is: 
 (W) If one must (F only if p is true), then one should (F only if one has 
 evidence that p is true). (ibid., 81) 
In the case of the Wedgwood-inspired derivation, the mediating premise is the principle 
of instrumental reason. Now, this principle has both an objective version, and a subjective 
version, according to Gibbons (ibid., 92). If we take the objective version, however, then 
we are bound sometimes to believe unjustifiably and thus irrationally, so it cannot be that 
we have the objective version in mind for the Wedgwood-inspired derivation. That is, if 
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we have in mind the objective principle of instrumental reason, we are just reaffirming T. 
The objective version of the principle of instrumental reason thus follows from the 
requirement to obtain the end of truth, but cannot serve as a bridge to norm J, whereas the 
subjective version of the principle of instrumental reason does not follow from the 
requirement to believe the truth (T), but does get us norm J. This is because what lies 
behind the subjective version of the principle of instrumental reason is just R itself, 
which, as we saw in the Bad Attempt, suffices to get us norm J all on its own (ibid., 
93).158  
 Gibbons goes on to consider other objectivist solutions, specifically one which we 
will come under the heading of “teleology” in chapter III of this dissertation. It is this 
context that supplies a more pressing version of the guidance problem. Already in the 
first strand of Gibbons that we just finished discussing, there is a guidance problem 
implicit in the thought that we cannot derive J from T. But, of course, the guidance 
problem only arises here if we assume that in order for T to guide us, we would have to 
be able to derive J from T using nothing that, by itself, entails J. But whatever we think 
about the narrowness of Glüer and Wikforss’s concept of guidance, surely guidance-by-
derivation is too narrow. 
 A more serious version of the guidance problem in Gibbons comes from his 
consideration of the idea that it is having a desire for truth that gets us J. In a word, 
Gibbons thinks that the desire for truth is powerless in principle and thus, I would add, 
                                                        
158 Gibbons (ibid., 88) makes the same point about premise (W): the only thing that gets us to accept (W) is 
(R) which is incompatible with T and suffices, without T, to get us norm J. 
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that truth qua desire for truth is unable to provide guidance to believers. Having a desire 
for a true belief, says Gibbons (ibid., 106), does not by itself make sense of believing that 
p. Rather, what is required is some further belief of the following form: 
 (B) Believing that p will amount to or result in believing the truth about p (ibid.). 
But here is where Gibbons most explicitly channels Glüer and Wikforss (although he 
does not cite them). He writes, “anyone with a modicum of sense who believes (B) 
already believes that p is true…” (ibid.). (B) presupposes a belief that p, so it is 
“extremely difficult” to maintain that inferring p from B is how things go in the ordinary 
case of determining what it is that you ought to believe. In general, the truth-goal/truth-
desire is impotent in a way structurally similar to the problems besetting the attempted 
derivations of J from T. The desire for truth alone does not give you a reason to believe a 
certain proposition. What is also required is that you believe that a given belief in some 
proposition p is a means to satisfying your desire for truth. But in such cases, you already 
have the belief that p without the desire. Once again, we have a case in which the truth-
norm (understood instrumentally) all by itself cannot tell the believer what she ought to 
believe, but what we add to the truth-norm (again, in this case, being interpreted 
instrumentally)—namely a means-end belief about where the truth is to be “found”—is 
sufficient. T is impotent in derivations of J, and the truth-desire is impotent in 
explanations of why you believe that p. What is required, in both cases, for successfully 
“explaining” J in terms of T bypasses T.  
 In general, though, what lies behind Gibbons’s version of the problem is the issue 
of guidance. Without getting into the weeds on certain subjects beyond the remit of this 
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dissertation, what motivates Gibbons’s thought is a distinction between two types of 
reasons, and how they seem, respectively, to provide guidance and not to provide 
guidance. On the one hand, there are objective (or so-called “normative”) reasons which, 
as Gibbons portrays them, seem just to be identical with “facts.”159 On the other hand, 
there are subjective, or motivating, reasons that Gibbons seems to identify with mental-
states of agents. Objective reasons guide believers only indirectly, via believers’ 
knowledge of them, whereas subjective reasons are capable of directly rationally causing 
the agent to believe that p (ibid., 140). Although Gibbons’s argument against objective 
reasons and indirect guidance ultimately goes down a different road, I think that we can 
align Gibbons’s rejection of objective reasons with the guidance problem.160 If guidance 
by truth with respect to what we ought to believe is a matter of guidance by objective 
reasons, then such guidance is indirect, mediated by our knowledge of said reasons (or 
facts). Consider wondering about whether you ought to believe that p. In order for the 
truth of p to guide, you must know the truth of p on this picture. But since, at least for 
Gibbons, to know that p entails already believing that p, we arrive at a version of the 
guidance problem similar to the temporalized version of the problem provided by Glüer 
and Wikforss. By the time we come know that p, the question of whether to believe that p 
is moot, as is the possibility of guidance. 
                                                        
159 See, e.g., his initial presentation of them (2013, 15). 
160 His ultimate concern, or one of his concerns anyway, is to argue that indirect guidance and the 
corresponding conception of reasons as objective gets the wrong results when it comes to drawing the 
distinction (which he thinks is not merely verbal) between the normative and the evaluative (2013, ch. 6). 
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 To review, I claim that there are three varieties of guidance problem in Gibbons, 
which we might think of as varieties of the general guidance-problem-type originally 
identified by Glüer and Wikforss. Using “impotence” to mean “unable to provide 
guidance”, we have (1) impotence by failure to entail the norm that itself would provide 
guidance (namely J), (2) impotence by failure of the desire-for-truth or the truth-goal to 
rationalize a given belief (akin to David’s guidance problem), and (3) impotence by 
already entailing the belief that p—we might also call this “impotence by tardiness.” Of 
these three varieties, my concern is with the third, with respect to which Gibbons 
coincides with Glüer and Wikforss. Of the other two, the first is, as I indicated above, 
easily set aside. Guidance by derivation is far too narrow. The second relates to the entire 
attempt to ground the truth-norm teleologically—I therefore fold discussion of it into the 
discussion of the teleological account in chapter III.  
 In general, and to anticipate the discussion in the second half of this chapter, 
Gibbons thinks that truth by itself suffers a guidance problem through its detachment 
from rationality. Satisfying the truth-norm will sometimes be a matter of acting 
irrationally, and we do not know when, in order to satisfy T, we should act rationally, and 
when we should irrationally. This is the supreme lack of guidance.161 If reason is our 
ultimate guide of last resort, or our most basic guide, then how can truth, which would 
sometimes (according to Gibbons’s interpretation of T) have us eschew reason for some 
other true-belief promoting mechanisms (e.g., lucky tea leaves), provide guidance? While 
he does not say so explicitly, I think that we can sum up the concern here with the claim 
                                                        
161 See, e.g., discussion at (Gibbons 2013, 93-4).  
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that any norm that would direct us to eschew reason is thereby no “guide” at all. If our 
ultimate and most basic guide to navigating the universe were Super GPS (my invention) 
and there was a “norm” of navigation that sometimes advised (under circumstances that 
we could not determine) not to follow Super GPS but to consult your magic eight-ball 
instead, then such a “norm” would hardly count as providing “guidance.”  
2.3 Solving the Guidance Problem 
 In my response to the guidance problem in this section, I will focus attention upon 
the more generic and explicit version of the problem as it features in the debate between 
Glüer and Wikforss and Steglich-Petersen. As I have construed it, the guidance problem 
in Gibbons is ultimately bound up with the central puzzle of Gibbons (2013), which will 
be discussed in section 3, below. That is, the guidance problem in Gibbons is derivative 
upon the more general conflict between the norms of truth and justification. Responding 
to this version of the guidance problem is therefore the job of a more general response to 
Gibbons’s puzzle regarding truth and justification. It was, however, helpful to discuss 
Gibbons’s guidance problems insofar as it showed how the two problems with which this 
chapter is concerned form a unity. For now, though, I will concentrate attention upon 
Glüer and Wikforss’s guidance problem which in its most recent iteration boils down to 
what I have called “impotence by tardiness.”162 
 
 
                                                        
162 Though, as indicated above, this also coincides with one of the species of guidance problem that I claim 
can be found in Gibbons. 
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2.3.1 The First Response to Impotence by Tardiness 
 In responding to impotence by tardiness, we should first explicate the temporal 
dimension of the type of situation at issue in the guidance problem. Glüer and Wikforss 
seem to imagine situations of the following type. A believer—call her Jane—accepts the 
truth-norm. She accepts that there is a norm that tells her to believe that p if it should turn 
out that p is true. Since Glüer and Wikforss seem to grant Wedgwood’s restriction of the 
truth-norm to propositions that the believer is actually considering, I will do so also. Jane 
encounters the proposition, say, that God created the universe. She turns to the truth-norm 
for guidance. What, by the lights of this norm, she asks herself, ought I to believe? Ought 
I to believe that God created the universe? Or ought I to believe that God did not create 
the universe? To which the truth-norm replies: you ought to believe the truth, whatever it 
is. If God created the universe, then you ought to believe that He did. If He didn’t, then 
you ought to believe that He didn’t.  
 The truth-norm thus fixes the circumstance C under which Jane ought to believe 
either p (that God created) or ~p (that God did not create). Now let us assume that p is 
true: God did create the universe. Jane does not know this. As Glüer and Wikforss seem 
to imagine things, at this point Jane has to form a belief as to whether circumstance C 
obtains. She has to determine whether it is true that God created the universe. Let us say 
that she determines that God did create the universe. Now, she turns to the truth-norm, 
armed with her belief that circumstance C obtains. But, as Glüer and Wikforss point out, 
by the time Jane has turned back to the truth-norm, it is too late for that norm to be of any 
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help whatsoever. Jane has already formed her belief, and the truth-norm will tell her to 
believe whatever it is that she has already determined to be true.  
 My preliminary response to the guidance problem, then, is to call into question 
this description of the temporal dimension of the situation at issue. It is not as if Jane 
considers whether to believe that p, then moves to determining whether it is true that p, 
and then asks herself what the truth-norm tells her to believe. The truth-norm is rather 
such that it guides Jane throughout the entire situation. When she is asking herself what 
to believe, the truth-norm tells us her to believe the truth, and she answers her question of 
whether to believe that p by determining whether it is true that p.  
 This preliminary response is meant to go after Glüer and Wikforss’s latest 
statement of the problem (which is also akin to David’s and one of Gibbons’s version of 
the problem). The upshot is that we need not think of the truth-norm as providing 
guidance only at some specific, usually terminal, phase of the belief-formation process. 
That the truth-norm is “too late” to provide guidance at the terminal stage of belief-
formation does not mean that it cannot provide guidance at any other stage of. As 
Steglich-Petersen (2013, 281) points out, accepting the truth-norm does have an impact 
on one’s body of beliefs, even if it does not make a difference after the time at which the 
person has determined whether Glüer and Wikforss’s circumstance C obtains.   
 The mistake, therefore, lies in assuming that the truth-norm only counts as 
providing guidance if it could possibly direct a person to give up her belief that p, after 
the time at which she determined whether circumstance C (the truth of p) obtains. But 
this is doubly mistaken: (a) because the truth-norm is what determines what the relevant 
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circumstance is (truth as opposed to some other “property” of p) and thus determines the 
sort of investigation into p that transpires (an investigation into whether p has the relevant 
property described by circumstance C); and (b) because this notion of guidance would 
require the possibility of the norm telling someone to give up what they thought was the 
truth. That is, if the truth-norm’s guidance is not restricted to the terminal stage, then 
there is no reason to worry about the fact that the truth-norm never tells you to believe 
otherwise than you do when you reach the terminal stage. If you have been guided by the 
truth all along, then your determination whether p satisfies C not only will, but should, be 
the same as at the terminal stage envisioned by Glüer and Wikforss. Or, to put it more 
simply, believing that p because you have determined that p is true is sufficient for the 
truth-norm having provided guidance to you, even if this belief follows eo ipso from your 
determination of the truth-value of the proposition in question. Wondering whether to 
believe that p, the truth-norm advises you to consider whether p is true. This is, if you 
will, one-step guidance. The truth-norm tells you to consider the truth-value of p and, in 
so doing, you come to believe that p.163  
2.3.2 Other Kinds of Guidance 
 Although I think that the argument against impotence by tardiness presented in 
the last section suffices to counter the latest version of Glüer and Wikforss’s guidance 
                                                        
163 Another way to push back against impotence by tardiness is to call into question the very notion of such 
a “terminal stage.” Insofar as belief is not typically, or not purely, a synchronic matter, the notion of truth 
only providing guidance at a particular time index is questionable. I take it as a virtue of the sort of 
guidance I have advanced in this section that it sits well with the fact that belief is diachronic in an 
important sense. See, for instance, the discussion of belief as concomitant with investigation in chapter I, 
section 6.  
 172 
 
problem, I also think that more can, and should, be said about the concept of guidance at 
issue here. I begin by looking more closely at a suggestion of Steglich-Petersen. 
2.3.2.1 Other Possible Norms—Steglich-Petersen 
 Like Steglich-Petersen, I think that Glüer and Wikforss’s notion of guidance is far 
too narrow. As I have interpreted Glüer and Wikforss and Steglich-Petersen, the problem 
is that Glüer and Wikforss presuppose that there can only be guidance by a norm N, if N 
can provide guidance after the determination of whether circumstance C obtains. Norms 
that guide in this way are any norms that are amenable to being cast in terms of Glüer and 
Wikforss’s generic formula: Do X when in C. Such norms will be such that one can tidily 
separate the doing of the action X, from the determination of the circumstance C. Their 
original example, borrowed from Boghossian, of the stock-trader considering whether to 
sell some stocks clearly fits the bill. The determination of whether a given sell-off would 
yield a certain payoff is clearly separate from the actual act of making the sale. Another 
example might be that of a military commander in the field who, relying on his training, 
makes certain determinations of his enemy’s disposition before performing certain 
actions, e.g., deploying an extra battalion on his left flank. 
 Steglich-Petersen, on the other hand, points to a more liberal notion of guidance, 
whereon N guides S’s act of Xing only if S’s following N can make a difference to S’s 
Xing (2013, 281). Here, the norms are those that are not, I think, amenable to being cast 
into Glüer and Wikforss’s generic formula. These will be cases of norms where the 
determination of C and the performance of X are not separable. They might be distinct, 
but not separable. An interesting case here is that of the verdicts handed down by a judge 
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or a jury. A judge determines whether a certain circumstance applies—the guilt of the 
defendant—and performs the act of finding him guilty or not-guilty. Of course, these are 
separate in a sense—the speech-act is distinct from his deliberation in his chambers. But 
insofar as the judge is guided by a norm to hand down a verdict of guilty only if guilty 
(or: only if proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt), the separation is not so tidy. 
Accepting the norms of being a good judge (or the norms of justice more generally) 
makes a difference, as Steglich-Petersen would say, to how the judge acts. 
 So while truth cannot provide guidance in Glüer and Wikforss’s overly strict 
sense of guidance, it can, Steglich-Petersen claims, provide guidance in his more liberal 
sense of guidance (ibid., 282). His argument for such guidance, both in his (2013) and in 
his (2010), takes the following form: 
 (1) If there are other possible norms of belief that would conflict with the truth 
 norm, then the truth-norm can provide guidance. 
 (2) Pleasant—the norm that tells you to believe that p if doing so would be 
 pleasant for you—is such a possible norm. 
 (3) Therefore, the truth-norm can provide guidance. 
 While Steglich-Petersen is on the right track in pointing to a mistaken notion of 
guidance that is presupposed by the guidance problem, I do not think that his 
counterargument is entirely successful. While the existence of other possible, conflicting 
norms of belief may be a necessary condition on a norm’s being able to provide 
guidance, I do not think that it is a sufficient condition. I therefore think that premise (1) 
is probably false.  
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 There are two reasons for the rejection of premise (1). The first is that conflict 
between norms indicates guidance only on the assumption that both norms can provide 
guidance individually—otherwise, the argument just begs the question. Consider: if you 
are given two sets of rules to follow, or two maps to follow, one of which you do not 
have access to, then, even if accepting the rules or map that you do have access to would 
make a difference to how you act, is that really sufficient for saying that the other set of 
rules or map, to which you do not have access, is equally able to provide guidance?  
 The second reason for rejecting premise (1) is thus more general: I think that even 
though he loosens up Glüer and Wikforss’s notion of guidance, Steglich-Petersen is still 
beholden to a notion of guidance that is understood solely in terms of the following of 
explicit rules.164 (His example of the norm Pleasant is such a rule.) He just recognizes, as 
I have argued in the previous section, that the temporal restriction imposed by Glüer and 
Wikforss is too strict. If adoption of the truth-norm would make a difference to the agent 
at any time, then that is enough for it to provide guidance. But he still thinks in terms of 
rules. His claim that there are other possible norms of belief that conflict with the truth-
norm is underwritten by his sense that truth is the aim of belief, and that there can be 
other aims of belief against which the aim of truth can be weighed (2009). Given this 
underlying commitment to the teleological account of the truth-norm, it seems that his 
claim that there are other possible norms is really to be understood to mean that there are 
                                                        
164 In this, I am partly influenced by the argument against regulism (the view that norms are just explicit 
rules or principles) in Brandom (1994, 19-26). Additionally, I am concerned that the notion of guidance 
shared by Glüer and Wikforss and Steglich-Petersen is syllogistic in a way that doesn’t ring true to our 
everyday experience of being-guided. Not all guidance (though perhaps some) is a matter of subsuming 
particular cases under general principles. I am indebted to Ryan Sosna for seeing this potential line of 
criticism—though I take responsibility for its formulation. 
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other (possible) “aims” of belief, other than the aim of truth. Since I do not wish to 
endorse the teleological account (see chapter III), and since I can see no other way to 
make sense of the idea of conflicting norms of belief that we might imagine someone 
adopting, I conclude that even Steglich-Petersen’s looser understanding of guidance is 
not quite right. Again, it may very well be necessary for guidance that we be able to 
identify alternatives. But then again, all that might be necessary is just that the possibility 
of violating the truth-norm exists, in a way that indicates that the person has “spurned” 
the counsels of the truth-norm. But leaving that aside, it does seem right to say that for a 
norm to provide guidance, adoption of the norm must make a difference to how persons 
acts (or in this case, believe). The question is how the norm makes a difference, and 
whether there is a way to understand this that does not end up taking us back to a view 
where the relationship between believing and truth is that beliefs “aim at” the truth.165 
2.3.2.2 Guidance by Value 
 One way in which truth can guide persons beyond the narrow sense of guidance 
presupposed by the guidance problem is by way of the value of truth. Since many of the 
                                                        
165 Support for the idea of other possible norms of belief that would deliver guidance at odds with the truth-
norm can be found in the work of C.S. Lewis, an author whose contributions to philosophy are sadly 
neglected. In the first of the Screwtape Letters, we read the following, “Your man has been accustomed…to 
have a dozen incompatible philosophies dancing about together inside his head. He doesn’t think of 
doctrines as primarily ‘true’ or ‘false’, but as ‘academic’ or ‘practical’, ‘outworn’ or ‘contemporary’, 
‘conventional’ or ‘ruthless’…Don’t waste time trying to make him think that material is true! Make him 
think that it is strong, or stark, or courageous—that it is the philosophy of the future. That’s the sort of thing 
he cares about” (2002, 185). The lesson for the guidance problem is that what a person thinks is the salient 
condition C, or, in other words, what the norm of belief is, will make a difference to what a person believes. 
A person who thinks that the salient condition is truth will believe differently from someone who thinks 
that the salient condition is practicality, novelty, or any of the other alternatives floated by Lewis in the 
passage quoted. There is an affinity here with how a pragmatist might understand guidance: in order for 
truth to provide guidance, it needs to make some kind of difference to the person in practice. It is precisely 
this difference in practice that Lewis so colorfully illustrates. 
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claims and themes that appear in this subsection will be of central concern, and therefore 
discussed more thoroughly, in later chapters, I will here limit my presentation of them. 
This discussion also anticipates the appropriation of a variety of thinkers broadly 
identifiable as “personalists” in later chapters. These thinkers have influenced the 
following discussion and, in particular the idea of guidance-by-value” (GV).  
 The first aspect of GV pertains to the relationship between “oughts” and values. 
Scheler, von Hildebrand, and Stein (to take three examples) all have some understanding 
of norms that relates them to values. For Stein, “the good-if-so (insofar as you’re dealing 
with a value yet to be realized) is equivalent with a do-so of obligation” or, more simply, 
obligation is “a value as what ought to be realized” ([1922] 2000, 254). For Scheler, 
“anything of positive value ought to be, and anything of negative value ought not to be” 
and “every ought has its foundation in values” (1973, 206).166 Lastly, for von Hildebrand, 
there are two further considerations.  There is the matter of the appropriate response that 
is due to values ([1953] 1972, 38-39, 240), and there is the matter of the appropriate kind 
of norm.  The appropriate kind of norm is grounded not in the “immanent logic” of things 
(i.e., instrumental or hypothetical normativity) but depends instead on values that take the 
form of a challenge or call issued to the person’s conscience (ibid., 182-83). 
 Now, this preliminary survey glosses over many subtle differences among these 
philosophers. But the basic idea that unites them is clear enough: what you ought to do is 
related in some way to values, which ought to be realized. The upshot for guidance here 
is that norms guide us not always in themselves, but insofar as they point beyond, or 
                                                        
166 Similar to Scheler’s is the view expressed by Hartmann ([1932] 2007, ch. 18). 
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deeper, than themselves to the values to which they are related.167 Norms, on this 
understanding, are (to put it crudely) like signposts. They point the way to the deeper 
phenomenon of values. As Wojtyla puts it, while the semantics of norms highlight the 
notion of duty, their importance for us lies with the goods that they objectify (1979a, 
164).168 That is, norms are not just expressions of duties, but are also, if genuine, 
judgments of values to be realized.  
 Although these philosophers disagree on how exactly to package this collection of 
insights, the unifying thread is that of indicating values. In fact, in a profound insight that 
bears much reflection, Scheler even suggests that the preponderance of norms in a 
community seems to be inversely related to the community’s appreciation of values 
(1973, 215-16).169 In other words, we have more and more recourse to explicitly 
                                                        
167 I say “related” to avoid taking a stand on the nature of this relationship. All that I need commit to here is 
that the relationship is asymmetric. The spirit of the ethics of values that unites these philosophers is a 
rejection of grounding values in norms. (This is in turn seems related, at least in Scheler and Hartmann, to 
their shared critique of Kantian formalism in ethics, with which both preface their ethical works.  
168 As in the last section, there is a similarity here with the pragmatist’s take on guidance. Norms make a 
difference in practice by calling attention to certain values as to-be-realized. Although the pragmatist would 
be leery of embracing a metaphysically inflationary account of values, she could simply say that norms 
provide guidance as signaling to ourselves and others what we in fact value. Thus understood, norms could 
take their place in Brandom’s (1994) game of “giving and asking for reasons.” Norms serve as reasons for 
acting (or believing) through encoding what we value; we can thus introduce them into discourse for the 
purpose of giving these reasons to others. They also serve as our response to another’s request for reasons. 
That is, one way in which we can explain our beliefs and actions to others is to cite norms that explain the 
beliefs or actions in question by clarifying what we took to be valuable about a given belief or action. 
169 Perhaps Scheler had in mind the line from Tacitus, “et corruptissima re publica plurimae leges” (Annals 
III, 27). Marcel, in later work ([1952] 2008, 127), seems to arrive at a similar insight. The following bears 
lengthy quotation: “As often happens, the idea and the word together make their appearance as the marks of 
a kind of internal collapse, and what the word really seeks to indicate is the place where the collapse has 
taken place. This becomes particularly clear when truth itself, as in Nietzsche, is treated as a value. But I 
should like to cite another kind of example of this very general phenomenon. It seems to me that the 
development in philosophy of what is called ‘personalism’—the very word becomes unsupportable—would 
only have been possible in an increasingly dehumanized word, in which the reality of what one means by 
‘the person’ is every day trampled underfoot. It would be permissible, I think, to suppose that we are here 
in the presence of some process of compensation: an almost entirely illusory process, to be sure, since it 
seeks to reconstitute at the level of the idea—or fundamentally at the level of the imaginary—what at the 
level of the real is tending on the contrary to be destroyed.” Now, this does not mean that Marcel does not 
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formulated norms when values gradually fade from the scene. In an interesting way, this 
speculation suggests a rebuttal to the fixation on norms-as-rules that lies behind the 
guidance problem. Perhaps the reason why we want the truth-norm to guide us in the 
manner of a rule is because we have lost touch of the value of truth. 
 To sum up, the first point is that norms can provide guidance that does not need to 
run through rules. Values need not provide guidance by furnishing us with specific 
explicit rules, even if the norms that indicate those values do take the form of a “rule.” If 
this sounds mysterious, perhaps the following example will make my meaning clearer. 
Part III, Section 2 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church goes through each of the Ten 
Commandments, drawing from them a wealth of moral norms. Consider, e.g., the 
commandment to honor thy father and thy mother. This is a norm which is given to us 
(superficially speaking) in the form of an explicit rule: Honor thy father and thy mother! 
Yet, the guidance provided by this norm is at once both empty and overflowing. It is 
empty insofar as it does not seem to give us any concrete guidance at all. How do we 
honor our parents? It is full to overflowing insofar as it furnishes us with the indication of 
a whole plenitude of values: the values of honor, of paternity and maternity, of filial 
                                                        
think that truth, and persons, are valuable. He argues that truth is a value ([1950] 2001a, ch. IV) and it 
should be clear from this passage that he thinks that persons are valuable. What he takes issue with, I think, 
is that strand of “personalism” (present in varying degrees in thinkers like Scheler, Hartmann, and von 
Hildebrand) that insist on the ideal (quasi-Platonic) character of the values, whereas Marcel always 
emphasized the real and the concrete being of the values, and their need for “incarnation” in the concrete 
situations of personal life. Although there seems to be fundamental agreement on the ought-to-be of value, 
Marcel was always wary of abstraction and straying from the concrete. So we have here an even stronger 
version of Scheler’s insight: not only does the preponderance of norms suggest a crisis of value, but the 
explicit treatment of value “on the level of the idea” might even suggest a collapse of the internal and 
internalized sense of value: a retreat of the sense and incarnation of values in real life, and their substitution 
in philosophical life with certain ideal entities.  
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devotion, of gratitude, and so on. My point is that norms need not guide us simply 
through a formula of the form, “Do X when in C.” They can guide us by enabling us to 
appreciate a whole domain of values that can be wonderfully, if tersely, summed up in 
such an admirable command as “honor thy father and thy mother.” 
 But lest one think that, even in case of the fourth commandment, what we get 
from it is still just the elaboration of further, explicit rules of the form “Do X when in C,” 
let me add the following observation. Consider the case of equity courts as they 
developed in the English judicial system, especially as it existed in Medieval and early 
modern Britain.170 Laws, when promulgated, cannot legislate in advance for all 
contingencies or every possible eventuality. Nor were the courts of (common) law 
particularly well suited to dealing with difficult cases since they were bound up with 
strict procedures. Without a lengthy digression into some fascinating legal history, the 
upshot for the present point is that explicit rules, just like laws, cannot cover all instances. 
Norms must therefore be able to provide guidance in a way that transcends merely 
explicit rules. They must be able to provide guidance in cases where a certain degree of 
moral creativity, if you will, is called for. Returning to the example of honoring one’s 
father and mother, consider the advent of nursing homes or, more specifically, the issue 
of increased longevity, together with a whole range of debilitating diseases that comes 
with it. Honoring one’s parents means negotiating these eventualities of the contemporary 
world. Does one honor his parents by putting them into a nursing home? Must he take 
                                                        
170 I am indebted to Professor Daniel Dahlstrom for calling my attention to this example. For the 
information that follows, see Jones (2009). 
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one’s ailing parents into his own home? How much does honor demand, and what is 
excessive? How is the demand to honor to be balanced against the duties to one’s own 
spouse and children? Presumably, amidst changing circumstances, we can still honor our 
parents. Creativity preserves compliance (with the norm). But it also points to the 
hollowness of the contention that norms can only provide guidance through explicit rules.  
 Corresponding to this first point is the insistence of the aforementioned thinkers 
that persons can in fact grasp the values implicit or explicit in norms and, in so doing, see 
the relationship articulated above between norms and values. To grasp a value is to grasp 
that it ought-to-be, and truly to respond to values is to respond in a variety of ways 
issuing from the various dimensions (intellect, will, and heart) of one’s personhood.  
 The capacity to respond in this manner, it bears adding, does not mean that we are 
infallible graspers of values. For example, both von Hildebrand ([1953] 1972, 46-47, 83, 
229-32) and Stein ([1922] 2000, 159-164) speak of “value-blindness” in their discussions 
of “value-perception.” But the possibility (and actual) occurrence of such blindness, no 
more than visual blindness, should not lead us to assert that there is no veridical value-
perception. Just because some cannot see something, does not mean that nothing is there.  
 Of course, we must be wary lest we overstate the analogy between object-
perception and “value-perception.” A significant difference is that while we can just point 
out an object that someone (who is not literally blind) has missed in his visual field, there 
is no exact analogue in the case of values. That is, if someone does not see Waldo, we 
can always point Waldo out, or else describe him, and then, viola, our interlocutor sees 
Waldo. Not so with values. As Stein observes: 
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 You can have a thing in front of you and know, on the basis of a message, that it 
 possesses a value, without catching sight of this value yourself. In both cases, you as 
 subject are value-blind. That the thing is standing in front of your intuitively is of no  
 consequence for your relationship to the value; this relationship would not change if the 
 thing were only emptily represented. ([1922] 2000, 162).  
 
Set within her discussion of affective acts, we can interpret Stein as calling attention to 
the fact that we cannot “perceive” a value independently of an affective response on our 
part to the value in question. We can be told about the value (receive a message) and yet 
still be blind to a value so long as we do not affectively respond to the thing in question. 
 Gabriel Marcel makes a similar point in his typically concrete manner of thinking 
and writing, speaking of the “connoisseur” and the “non-connoisseur” ([1950] 2001a, 61-
62). The non-connoisseur is in no position to draw relativistic or subjectivist conclusions 
from his situation. Rather should he conclude that his condition is one of being cut from 
certain aspects of reality. The image of the connoisseur is particularly apropos here, 
insofar as to be a connoisseur is not merely to be able to identify certain things qua 
objects in an entirely neutral, or non-affective way. An oenophile is not someone who can 
just analyze samples of wine in the same way that a chemist can. A chemist can analyze 
samples of wine all day long and never advance one iota in the appreciation of the value 
of a good vintage. It is the connoisseur who, more than perceiving the wine as a particular 
substance, also responds affectively to it, grasping it as a value. If you think that the 
example is trivial, similar points can be made concerning the value of human personhood. 
It is one thing to acknowledge—in a merely intellectual way—the value and dignity of 
the human person. It is another thing to truly grasp it, where this requires, more than mere 
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notional assent, an affective act of love for others qua persons. This is the stuff of great 
moral conversions and awakenings.171    
 The third step in this reflection brings us back to the point made in the first 
paragraph. The perception of values always somehow involves grasping an obligation to 
make some sort of response. Depending on the value and what aspect of the person it 
appeals to, this response will vary. Stein, for instance, speaks of the value-response as 
being affective (see, for instance, (1922) 2000, 159ff). Von Hildebrand distinguishes 
more finely between theoretical, volitional, and affective responses ([1953, 1972, 199-
203), each appealing to a “center” of the human person. Again, despite the metaphysical 
subtleties that divide them, the basic insight is this: to count as having grasped a value, 
you must have grasped the normativity that is implicit in the value, and which is made 
explicit in the semantic formulation of norms. Claiming to grasp the value of X, while 
denying that X ought to be, and denying that norms that mention X get their grip 
ultimately through the value of X is to betray one’s blindness.  
 Up to now, the points made have been generic, applying to GV as such. Now I 
need to say something specifically about how I understand truth against the background 
of this form of guidance. Since I will be speaking more about the value of truth in 
chapters IV-V, my remarks here are not intended to be decisive. At this point, I just want 
to call attention to some features of truth as a value that relate to the possibility of GV.  
                                                        
171 This is especially true in a world where a merely intellectual assent to the value of personhood is all-too-
readily given, but in such a way that betrays a failure to truly grasp the value in question. 
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 One feature of truth serves as a particularly apt starting point here. Aquinas argues 
that if, per impossibile, there were no intellects, then truth would not exist (De Ver. q. 1, 
a. 3, resp.). Without going into a lengthy digression, what underwrites this claim 
according to Aquinas is that truth resides primarily (though not exclusively) in the 
intellect, whether divine or human (ST Ia, q. 16, a. 2, resp.; De Ver. q. 1, a. 2, resp.).  
 Simplifying and condensing the details, truth proceeds ultimately from the divine 
intellect, which, being supremely actual, is supremely intelligible in itself. In creating 
things, the divine intellect “measures” the truth of things. This “ontological” or 
“transcendental” truth of things—their intelligibility qua being—in turn measures the 
truth of the human intellect (ST Ia, q. 16, a. 1, resp.; De Ver. q. 1, a. 2, resp.). Truth is 
thus a relationship of dynamic adequation of the intellect to being. Of the different 
operations of the mind, truth resides most fully in the second act of the mind—the act of 
composing and dividing (forming judgments) (ST Ia, q. 16, a. 2, resp.; De Ver. q. 1, a. 3, 
resp.).172  
 In the human world173 then, truth comes to be most fully in the act of intellectual 
beings (persons) forming judgments by which they apprehend the adaequatio of their 
intellect to being. What this mean is that, if truth is a value, then it is a value that we 
cannot merely behold as “external” to us. While in a certain sense this is true of all values 
(that to realize them is also to go beyond mere spectating), it is especially so of truth 
                                                        
172 I discuss Aquinas’s account of truth in greater detail in the introduction and appendix I. 
173 What I mean by human world, in the context of Aquinas, is what the medieval would have called the 
“sublunary world”—the world of man and all that is below man in the order of being, what today we might 
just call the “natural world” or the “natural order” to distinguish it from the supernatural.  
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insofar as truth is ontologically dependent, in the human world, on the characteristic act 
of the human person to raise to actual intelligibility the potential intelligibility that is the 
preserve of all being qua being.  
 Another way to put this point is with the aid of Marcel’s critique of the notion of a 
“fact.” As he writes, “we must not hesitate to affirm that the coherence of a fact, of any 
fact, is conferred on it by the mind that grasps it, by the understanding self” ([1950] 
2001a, 64-65). What this leads us to is an understanding of how the person is responsible 
for the flourishing of truth, or the flourishing of falsity, in the human world. Truth, as I 
interpret Marcel, is not so much a relationship between the internal (my mind) and the 
external (the world) as it is a way of relating different aspects of the self. For example, 
what he calls incarnating the “spirit” of truth is a matter of the “self” that “is desire” 
yielding to the “understanding self” (ibid., 65, 69).174 Marcel understands this act of 
yielding in terms of the resolution of an inner struggle and ambiguity within the self 
(ibid.), overcoming the temptation to conceive reality as we would like it to be (rather 
than as it is), as well as the cessation of a certain game that we play with ourselves, 
whereby we maintain a sense of (what I would qualify as “partially doxastic”) self-
complacency ([1952] 2010, 133-34).  
 In any event, the foregoing gloss hopefully suffices as a sketch of the contours of 
the dependency on the human persons of the realization of the value of truth. Truth is 
brought to its full stature in the human world in, and by the operation of, the human 
                                                        
174 Talk of “selves” is just a heuristic for Marcel, who maintains that we are not really talking about more 
than one self (ibid., 65). 
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intellect. But for human persons whose incarnation of the spirit of truth is not a mere 
mechanism and whose freedom involves the ever-present possibility of succumbing to 
the temptation of untruth, the value of truth must be incarnated in a special way by the 
human person.  
 Finally, I need to say something about what I think the value of truth calls us to 
do. How does it make a difference? As I argued briefly in chapter I, section 6, there is a 
distinction to be made between the rational and the existential fruits of belief. I think that 
this distinction can be given further application here. In the first instance, in grasping the 
value of truth we grasp that we must not neglect the operation of our intellects. We must 
exercise our intellects. 
 At this point, though, we run up against the second problem to be discussed in this 
chapter, which concerns the putative conflict between truth and reason (or justification) 
as normative for belief. In fact, we already find this problem raised in Glüer and Wikforss 
(2009, 44). Supposedly, truth cannot guide reason, because the standards of correctness 
of truth differ from those of reason. To arrive at what is true is just a matter of “getting it 
right” with respect to the truth-value, supposedly no matter how irrational the mechanism 
by which you “get it right” is, whereas to be reasonable is be just that—reasonable, 
although you may in the process forgo arriving at the truth. This is to anticipate Gibbons 
(2013), who thinks that the truth-norm cannot be a general norm of belief, because 
sometimes it tells us to be irrational. 
 I cannot here argue against Gibbons’s contention completely, and my remarks in 
section 3 will constitute a further advance on what I do say here. I think that it is 
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mistaken to think of truth and reason as wholly extrinsic to one another, such that they 
have distinct and separate standards of correctness. Truth is the standard of correctness of 
reason or, to use Aquinas’s frequent citation of Aristotle, truth is the good of the intellect 
(e.g., Summa contra Gentiles, book 1, ch. 59, ¶ 5). This is not to claim that the human 
intellect is infallible (certainly, Aquinas did not think so), but rather to refuse to concede 
a view of reason whereon it is a pure instrument in the “hands” of the person. Rather, 
reason is ultimately rooted in the truth, and the intellect understands its own correctness 
in terms of the truthfulness of the judgments that it forms.175  
 Furthermore, it need not be that reason is a mere means to truth. This would 
imply, after all, that reason is but one of many possible means to the truth, which is what 
drives the intuition that reason and truth have (or are) different standards of correctness 
for the intellect. But this is to place reason on a par with any other so-called “reliable 
truth-promoting” mechanisms, such as fortunate clairvoyants and crystal balls. But reason 
is not a mere means in this sense. Adapting an argument of Marcel, I would argue that 
reason is not an instrument at all.176 An instrument implies someone or something, 
                                                        
175 This rootedness of reason in truth can be understood if we bear in mind that for Aquinas and other 
scholastics, reason (ratio) is not the only act of the mind. There is also intellect (intellectus), whose 
etymology indicates the intellect’s proper act: namely, to read the interior of things (intus legere) (De Ver. 
q. 1, a. 12, resp.). The proper object that corresponds to this act is the essence of the thing. When it comes 
to this first act, by which the intellect abstracts the what-it-is of a thing, there is no falsity, save per 
accidens insofar as an error occurs in the intellect’s second act (composing and dividing/forming 
judgments), e.g., saying of an F that it is G, when it is not, or when F-ness and G-ness are incompatible, or 
when G-ness does not follow from the essence of F-ness grasped by the first act of the intellect. See ST Ia, 
q. 17, a. 3, resp.; De Ver. q. 1, a. 12, resp. Ratio is rooted in the truth, therefore, insofar as it works from an 
original apprehension of the truth that is essentially, if not accidentally, free from error. This, and other 
operations of the intellect have falsity only insofar as a correct reduction to principles is not made (De Ver. 
q. 1, a. 12, resp.). 
176 I am here adapting Marcel’s argument against an instrumental view of the relation of persons to their 
bodies ([1950] 2001a, 99-102).  
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separate from the instrument, whose instrument it is. But reason is not like that for us. 
Reason is not something that we find lying around our minds, as we find a tool lying on 
our workbench. Rather, reason just is one of the basic ways in which our being is that of 
being-in-the-world. Marcel does not explicitly use the term being-in-the-world here 
(though he does elsewhere), but I think that this is the best interpretation of his argument. 
His argument, which concerns the person-body relationship, concludes that we are 
“identical” (though not numerically so) with our bodies. Our bodies are neither our 
instruments, nor exhaustive of our personal identity, but rather our embodiedness is our 
way of being. So too, I think, with reason. We are not identical with our intellects, nor are 
our intellects mere tools—rather, our intellectuality is a fundamental way in which we 
have our being. Further investigation reveals the ways in which these two interpenetrate: 
our reasoning is embodied, and we can reason about our bodies.177 
 As to the possibility of falsity in the intellect, and the normative conflicts that 
arise therefrom, this is the subject of section 3 of this chapter. All that I hope to have 
mitigated here is the sense that truth cannot guide us via the intellect because of differing 
standards of correctness. This is to conceive the relationship between truth and reason 
erroneously in a way that wrongly instrumentalizes reason and divorces it from its 
relation to personal being.  
 Such, then, is the rational guidance of truth. Intermediate between rational and 
existential guidance, we might insert the way in which grasping the value of truth guides 
                                                        
177 The upshot for the debate over personal identity is that our identity is exhausted neither by our bodies, 
nor by our intellects and that personal being is (non-dualistically) both embodied and intellectual. 
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us, not only to the intellectual act, but also to excellence of the intellect act, by 
commending to us the cultivation not only of the classic Aristotelian-Thomistic 
intellectual virtues, but also the moral virtues that thinkers like Roberts and Wood (2007) 
have convincingly argued have intellectual components as well—virtues like courage, 
humility, firmness, and the love of knowledge.178 Additionally, though more difficult to 
categorize, would be the thought of Pieper (1989a) and ([1963] 2009b) who argues for an 
“asceticism of knowledge,” and for the necessity of contemplative silence before being in 
order to make oneself receptive to the truth.179  
 Finally, it is to Marcel that we can look for the existential guidance of truth. For 
this, we have only to look to what was cited above. Grasping the value of truth involves 
recognizing the obligation to give way before the truth, even those truths that are 
mortifying (and maybe especially these), of unifying oneself in the act of courageously 
facing the truth, and of abandoning a manipulation of one’s understanding in order to 
maintain a steady-state of doxastic self-complacency. It is also to grasp the value of 
communication over agreement, which I understand as the need for recognizing the 
primacy of truth over the mere securing of conformity of opinions in interpersonal 
settings (Marcel [1950] 2001a, 74). In this way, incarnating the spirit of truth moves from 
the individual person to the community.180 Truth is to be incarnated not only in how we 
                                                        
178 The connection between value and virtue vis-à-vis guidance would also tell against a rules-based 
understanding of the guidance of truth, insofar as virtues are not typically thought of along the lines of 
rules. Being virtuous is not a matter of merely following rules. 
179 The theme of receptivity is found in several of the thinkers here surveyed and is a helpful organizing 
principle of the concrete ways in which we seek to incarnate the value of truth. 
180 I also detect this insight in his discussion of the need, in assuming responsibility for what we believe, to 
communicate to others what we embrace as the truth (1964, 113). 
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approach being intellectually, but also in how we, at the personal level, or the level of the 
“whole person” respond to the truth, and live out the spirit of truthfulness in our 
interpersonal relationships.    
 Summing up, then, the response to the guidance problem that has been presented 
in this section begins with an exposition of the guidance problem’s presupposition that 
the truth-norm can guide only if it is an explicit rule that one can “follow,” and, 
furthermore, that the “truth” that guides is the truth-value of propositions. Against this, I 
have attempted to call attention to the sense in which there is guidance by values. With 
the aid of several thinkers, we have portrayed this in the following terms. Norms like the 
truth-norm are related to, dependent on, and point to, certain values. They thus guide by 
virtue of pointing to the values that ground them. The value of truth is special in its 
double dependence on the human person for its full realization in the human world. But 
this double dependence also points out the ambiguity in the human relationship to the 
truth, as well as to how truth calls us to an honest and open receptivity to being, a refusal 
to give into the temptation to re-veil the truth that we encounter, and truthful 
interpersonal relationships.  
 To conclude, let us also recall the insight of Scheler, that the preponderance of 
norms indicates the retreat of values from the human world. We might do well then, not 
to insist so strongly on how norms can guide us, as on trying to rehabilitate the 
appreciation of values in the human community (a rehabilitation begun by Scheler, 
Hartmann, von Hildebrand, and Marcel), with faith that an authentic grasp of such values 
will provide its own guidance that bypasses the overweening need for explicit rules. In a 
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world where “post-truth” is a watchword and “alternative facts” considered a coherent 
notion in some quarters, our norms are only as secure and efficacious in their guidance of 
persons as the underlying grasp of the value of truth is. If we really want to solve the 
guidance problem, the turn (or re-turn) to values is the best way forward.181 
2.3.2.3 Guidance by Light 
 Finally, before leaving the guidance problem behind, I would like briefly to 
mention one other possible kind of guidance that is overlooked by the parties to the 
problem. Under the terms of the problem, truth is taken as a “non-transparent” norm. The 
suggestion of non-transparency seems to be backed up by an assumption that truth is not 
itself transparent. Putting aside cases of self-evidently true propositions (whose truth-
value, I assume, is not opaque to us), I think that we can nevertheless speak of truth as 
being a “light” that guides, an image not only in work of Marcel, but present in the 
doctrine of truth as a transcendental in Aquinas. The cases I have in mind are those in 
which the intellect has put down some roots, if you will, in a particular truth that it 
knows. I am assuming an anti-skeptical attitude here: there are things that we know, and 
that we know that we know. We can then speak of truth as a guide insofar as the human 
intellect can proceed from the belief or knowledge of one truth, to the belief or 
knowledge of another truth. This is not to say (in the case of belief, anyway) that such 
moves are always truth-preserving. The human intellect is not infallible. The point is just 
                                                        
181 Related to these concluding remarks is a distinction drawn by Eugene Kelly, in passing, between 
guidance and determination (2011, 11-12). Normativity requires the ability to provide guidance, but 
guidance is not determination. The normativity of values works in this way—guiding persons without 
determining them. Indeed, it is distinctive of values that the appeal to the person in such a way (see chapter 
V of this dissertation). Kelly’s distinction might be leveraged as a critique of Glüer and Wikforss’s concept 
of guidance, which seems to conflate guidance with determination. 
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that one truth can cast light on other truths. Furthermore, it can even disclose to the 
person entire domains of truth that might have otherwise been inaccessible to the person, 
even if those domains were intelligible in themselves and therefore potentially knowable 
to the person all along.182  
 I say belief and knowledge here advisedly. My point is more easily and less 
controversially made in the case of knowledge. If we know that p, then it seems that this 
knowledge of the truth can guide us to still further truths. But belief, insofar it involves 
the will holding itself “captive” as we saw above, might be thought ill-suited to be a light 
shining on further truths. This, however, ignores the possibility that if we make an 
“advance of ourselves” with respect to the truth, then we can come to be in a position of 
knowledge and understanding of some truth, to which we previously had to bind 
ourselves by the will. As we saw in chapter I, this is a further way of characterizing one 
of the species of belief as commitment to the truth of some proposition. The act by which 
we bind ourselves in belief to a certain truth is not a sterile captivity, but one which, 
through the openness of the believer, can become understanding. In the work of 
Kierkegaard and James, we find the insight that an advance of oneself in believing can be 
efficacious in bringing about certain states of affairs.183 So too, in the thought of Anselm, 
we find the insight that an advance of oneself in believing can bring about (and maybe is 
                                                        
182 An example of this can be found in Pope St. John Paul II’s encyclical letter Fides et Ratio. Belief in the 
Crucifixion of Christ—an absurdity to human reason unenlightened by faith—not only guides the believer 
into seeing other truths, but also discloses an entire realm of truth (see § 33). 
183 In the case of Kierkegaard, I have in mind his discussion in The Works of Love on the power of belief to 
build up love in the beloved. We believe in the loveableness of the beloved and, through the advance of 
ourselves in such beliefs enable and help to bring about the deepest realization and exemplification of 
values in the beloved’s life (see 2009, 206-207). In the case of James, I am thinking of his case of the 
mountaineer who must believe that he can leap a chasm in order to save his life ([1896] 1919, 59).  
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even necessary to bring about) a state of understanding. The insight that I am referring to 
here is encapsulated by the Anselmian motto, “credo ut intelligam,” the original title of 
his Proslogion.184 I believe, so that I might understand. Such belief, which is the preserve 
of faith, guides by acting as a light for the human intellect, readying it to participate more 
deeply in the truth that it believes (so that it understands what it believes), and opening 
the way to new fields of truth (so that it can advance in knowledge of other truths).  
 Since this is not a dissertation on religious faith, I will not say much more about 
this possibility. It is enough that it is a significant possibility of guidance in the history of 
philosophy. But one further thought is in order. Insofar as belief is historical for the 
person (that is, our beliefs have a “history” for us in terms of their acquisition, how 
strongly we hold them at various times, how we depend upon them at different junctures 
and in considering different possibilities, and so on) and insofar as beliefs are not (save as 
an epistemologist’s abstraction) purely isolatable from each other, we must not get hung 
up on the notion that it is only through the truth-values of as-yet-unbelieved propositions 
that truth is able to provide guidance. This would be to fall back into a narrow 
understanding of guidance. Truth guides not only insofar as if the truth-value of an as-
yet-unbelieved proposition is “T,” then we ought to believe that proposition. It also 
guides, if the suggestion of this subsection is correct, through the truths that we already 
know and believe.185 
                                                        
184 Earlier occurrences of this principle occur in Augustine’s Tractates on the Gospel of John (29.6): crede 
ut intelligas (believe so that you may understand) and nisi credideritis non intelligetis (unless you believe, 
you will not understand). The latter formula Augustine attributed to Isaias 7:9: nisi credideritis, non 
permanebitis.  
185 A third possibility about is the prospect of guidance by exemplars. Perhaps just as there are moral 
exemplars, there are also doxastic exemplars, i.e., persons who are really good at believing the truth. This is 
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3 The Puzzle from Incompatible Norms of Belief 
 In the last section, we looked at the objection that the truth-norm cannot provide 
guidance. In this section, we will look at a related objection, namely, that the truth-norm 
seems to be incompatible with other, equally promising, candidate norms of belief. 
3.1 Gibbons’s Puzzle—Possible Responses—Gibbons’s Solution 
 This puzzle is the focal point of Gibbons (2013), and it is from his exposition of 
the puzzle that I will take my starting point. As Gibbons puts it, this puzzle for the truth-
norm stems from the fact that there seem to be at least two norms of belief that are non-
optional and incompatible. That is, it seems as though, by the believer’s own lights, truth 
is not an “optional extra” when it comes to belief. If p is false, then a belief that p seems 
to be automatically wrong. However, there will be cases in which a belief that p is 
reasonable for some person to hold, even though it is false that p. In such a case, it seems 
as though the truth-norm tells the person not to believe that p, whereas the norm of reason 
(which Gibbons (2013, 5) cashes out in terms of justification) tells the person to believe 
that p. To make things more concrete let us consider the specific version of the puzzle 
that Gibbons introduces at the beginning of his discussion—the case of the missing keys. 
Thus Gibbons (2013, 4): 
 Suppose you come home from work, put your keys on the dining room table where you  
 always do, and while you’re upstairs, someone sneaks in and steals them. While upstairs, 
                                                        
a possibility suggested by the work of Zagzebski (2012) and (2017). A related possibility—one I think is 
worth exploring—is the prospect of taking moral exemplars to be doxastic exemplars. That is, considering 
the possibility that someone’s deep moral goodness should be taken as a reason to believe what she 
believes. Such a possibility is suggested by the way in which, e.g., people convert to Catholicism on the 
basis of hearing or reading about the lives of the saints. It is not, in such cases, that the convert takes it that 
the saint has good evidence for her belief, but rather that the convert takes the holiness of the saint as 
somehow itself pointing to the truth of the saint’s beliefs. A parallel point can be made in the case of doubt. 
When in doubt, the Catholic can “lean on,” as it were, the faith of the saints.  
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 you believe your keys are in the dining room. This is a perfectly reasonable thing to 
 believe. It’s fairly clear from the description of the story that all the evidence available to 
 you suggests that the keys are on the table. In fact, I think it’s fairly clear that this belief, 
 if formed, would meet the following fairly low standard of justification: it’s more 
 reasonable for you to believe that p than it is for you to either withhold judgment or deny 
 that p. Given that the question has come up and that it matters to you, you have to do one 
 of these three. What should you do?186 
 
As Gibbons (2013, 5) formulates it, the norm of reason, or justification is as follows: 
 (J) Necessarily, for all p, you ought to believe that p if, and only if, you are 
 justified in believing that p. 
Thus formulated, and by the terms of the case of the missing keys as presented, J tells 
you to believe that the keys are on the dining room table. But what does the truth-norm 
tell you? As formulated by Gibbons (2013, 2), the truth-norm is as follows: 
 (T) Necessarily, for all p, you ought to believe that p only if p. 
Thus, if T is also a norm of belief, then it is not the case that you ought to believe that p. 
Thus, J tells you to believe that p, but T tells you that a necessary condition on the 
existence of such an obligation—the truth of p—is not met. Thus, it is both the case that 
ought to believe that p, and it is not the case that you ought to believe that p, in the case 
of the missing keys. 
 In his initial discussion of the puzzle, Gibbons claims that it is not the existence of 
inconsistent norms that is the problem, but rather the act of accepting norms that you 
                                                        
186 Although this sort of situation sounds plausible, it has been suggested that perhaps it is not so plausible 
on closer inspection. It is certainly a very highly contrived situation. Considered from the first-person point 
of view, we can pose the following dilemma (thanks to Professor Dahlstrom for suggesting this): either I 
know where my keys are, or I do not. If I do, then, at least on the received account, I have satisfied both the 
demands of truth and justification. If I do not know where my keys are, but merely have a belief about 
where they are, there is still no inconsistency in jointly accepting the demands of truth and justification. 
Furthermore, it is worth asking whether in scenarios such as this, it is really a question of belief. You have a 
memory of where you last placed your keys which, if asked where your keys are, you would consult in 
giving an answer—but is it really the case that you have a belief about the location of your keys? 
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know to be inconsistent. As he puts it, this is a genuine puzzle because our intuitions pull 
us in opposite directions. On the one hand, there is the intuition that you ought to be 
reasonable in the case of the missing keys, and believe what you have most reason to 
believe, which is that your keys are on the table. On the other hand, however, we have the 
intuition that there is something automatically wrong with believing a false proposition 
(ibid., 6). Another way of putting the point is that there are two dimensions of assessing 
your belief that p. One is objective, and by its lights, there is something wrong with your 
belief. The other is subjective, and by its lights, there is nothing wrong with your belief—
your belief is reasonable, and therefore the right one for you to have. These assessments 
come into conflict (ibid., 8).  
 Gibbons goes on to consider three broad categories of response to the puzzle.187 
The first is linguistic in nature, and it attempts to make sense of the truth of both T and J 
as applied to a particular proposition p, by appealing to ambiguities, or else to context-
dependent features, of the “ought” in T and the “ought” in J. Without going into 
unnecessary detail, I will just note that Gibbons rejects this family of responses as 
inadequate to the task of resolving the puzzle. All that these responses do, ultimately, is 
restate the puzzle in more sophisticated terms. To take a simplified version of this 
response that has shown up again and again: we might claim that the “ought” in T is an 
“objective ought” and that the “ought” in J is a “subjective ought.” This would not 
resolve the question, however, because the question is not about T and J themselves but 
                                                        
187 Gibbons (2013, 22-23) also considered what he calls “nihilism” as a response to the puzzle, according to 
which we let the incoherence between T and J “just slide.”  
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about two competing sets of reasons, requirements, and standards for belief. The puzzle 
remains: what ought you to believe? The problem with ambiguity theory, according to 
Gibbons, is that either it abrogates an all-things-considered sense of “ought” and thus 
leaves you in a position unable to answer the question of what you ought to believe, or 
else it is forced to identify this so-called “regular” or “all-things-considered” “ought” 
with either the sort of ought present in T, or else the sort of ought present in J (ibid., 21, 
chs. 2-3). Either you make the puzzle unanswerable, or else your “answer” to the puzzle 
still leaves the puzzle unresolved.188 
 Serious contenders for resolutions of the puzzle are thus going to come from 
either the objectivist or the subjectivist camp. As Gibbons presents the dialectic, the 
challenge that is laid down is that of explaining, or explaining away, the intuitions of the 
other side. So, if you are an objectivist, and wish to hold to T, then it is incumbent on you 
to explain the subjectivist intuitions in favor of J, or else to explain them away. If you are 
a subjectivist, and wish to hold to J, then it is incumbent on you to explain, or else 
explain away, the objectivist’s intuition in holding T.189 The objectivist needs to explain, 
in terms of his acceptance of T, why it is that we ought (at least when not erroneous to do 
so) to be reasonable and believe those propositions that we have most reason to believe, 
or else to explain why it is not the case that we need to be reasonable in this way. The 
                                                        
188 This means that Gibbons presupposes that there is such an all-things-considered, or regular, ought when 
it comes to the question of belief. For articles that discuss this question, see Booth (2011) and (2012), and 
Stapleford (2015b). 
189 Gibbard (2005) can be read as a subjectivist. 
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subjectivist needs to explain, in terms of his acceptance of J, the intuition that there is 
something wrong with holding a belief that is false.  
 We have already seen some of Gibbons’s discussion of objectivism, above, as a 
special case of the guidance problem originally furnished by Glüer and Wikforss. Here, 
my concern is not with a detailed exposition, followed either by critique or endorsement, 
of Gibbons’s solution to the puzzle he raises. I wish rather to sketch my own attempt at a 
resolution to the puzzle. For the record, however, Gibbons’s solution to his puzzle is 
subjectivist in nature, albeit with a twist (2013, Part IV). The twist is that Gibbons 
dissociates subjectivism from its usual alliance with internalism about justification. 
Again, the details are not crucial at this juncture. Omitting much of interest, we can 
summarize Gibbons’s solution by saying that he endorses J as a generalized norm of 
belief, but not T. However, he does endorse particularized instances of T.190 He thinks 
that this is required by rationality (in whatever sense of rationality is illustrated by 
Moore’s paradox). That is, since belief commits the believer, according to Gibbons, not 
only to p’s being true, but also to the believer’s being in a “position to know” that p, in 
believing that p the believer is rationally committed to believing that p only p is true.191  
 
 
                                                        
190 A particularized version of the truth norm is also embraced by Horwich (2006). 
191 Another possible response that bears investigating is suggested by Zagzebski’s (2012, 2014) work on the 
basic role of trust for rationality. That is, pace Gibbons, there is no fundamental irrationality in the 
commitment to both T and J insofar as basic self-trust is necessary for us to get on what our lives, 
intellectually speaking. What this suggests is that it is foundational for the exercise of rationality at all that 
we trust that following J enables compliance with T. Gibbons starts from a position of distrust and so even 
with his subjectivist solution to the puzzle, the problem remains that of how to assure ourselves that 
following J gets us truth and knowledge.  
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3.2 A Thomistic Response to Gibbons’s Puzzle 
 It should be clear from my comments above that I suspect that a problematic 
separation of truth and reason is, in no small way, responsible for the puzzle as Gibbons 
presents it. However, I do not wish to rest my case on a restatement of those arguments, 
for I think that even given what I take to be the correct understanding of the relation of 
truth and reason, there is still a version of Gibbons’s puzzle to contend with. In response 
to this puzzle, I will therefore undertake a “creative retrieval” of Aquinas in order to 
furnish the beginnings of a reply to Gibbons’s puzzle. The choice of Aquinas is not 
merely the result of the structure of this dissertation, which is to look to Aquinas and the 
personalists for a fresh approach to stagnant problems in analytic epistemology, but also 
suggested by the present dialectic. Absent the presupposition of the divorce of truth and 
reason, Gibbons’s puzzle becomes, if anything, harder to solve. In this section, I will first 
argue that Aquinas does indeed face a version of the puzzle, before turning to the creative 
retrieval proper. The creative retrieval will be an appropriation and application of 
Aquinas’s discussion of conscience. Although the discussion is couched in Thomistic 
terms, my intention is not to lean too much on technical Thomistic claims, since I think 
that the insights presented below are able to stand on their own two feet. These 
reflections on Aquinas are helpful because they provide a generally overlooked and 
robust way of understanding the relationship between T and J. This Thomistically-
inspired understanding of the relationships accords pride of place to T and outlines 
answers to a set of questions that Gibbons’s reliance on J seems ill-suited to address.  
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3.2.1 Aquinas faces Gibbons’s Puzzle 
 Let us begin by looking at some passages that show how Aquinas faces Gibbons’s 
puzzle. Here is the first, from the Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG): 
 The investigation of the human reason for the most part has falsity within it, and this is 
 due partly to the weakness of our intellect in judgment, and partly to the admixture of 
 images. (SCG Book 1, ch. 4, ¶ 5) 
 
Aquinas goes on to articulate the two sorts of errors that he has in mind in this paragraph. 
On the one hand, there is the case where someone is “ignorant of the power of 
demonstration” and doubts those things that have been demonstrated (ibid.). This is to 
doubt whether p when one is in a position to know whether p (to use the language of De 
Ver., q. 14, a. 1 and ST IIaIIae, q. 2, a. 1). On the other hand, there are cases in which 
someone is not ignorant of the power of demonstration, but in whom we find “mingled 
something that is false, which is not demonstrated, but rather asserted on the basis of 
some probable or sophistical argument, which yet has the credit of being a 
demonstration” (SCG Book 1, ch. 4, ¶ 5). This is the error of allowing falsehood to creep 
in and be taken as knowledge.  
 In the first case, we allow ourselves to become skeptical of knowledge, insofar as 
we see the several “wise men” each teaching his own brand of doctrine. (Consider, e.g., 
the case of undergraduate students being introduced to philosophy—bombarded with an 
array of mutually-contradictory “philosophies,” they can quickly become inured to the 
knowledge-claims of philosophy and slip into a kind of unreflective skepticism.) In the 
second case, we allow ourselves to become gullible, insofar as we “credit” propositions 
as known, when in fact the argumentation for those propositions is insufficient. Situating 
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this in terms of Gibbons’s norm J, we might say that the first error consists in failing to 
obey the sufficient condition of reason, i.e., that we ought to believe that p if we are 
justified in doing so. The second error consists in failing to obey the necessary condition 
of reason, i.e., that we ought to believe that p only if we are justified in doing so. The first 
error means not believing when we should, and the second error means believing when we 
should not. Human reason has falsity in it in a twofold, and curiously opposed way: both 
by letting too much in, as well as not keeping enough out. Human reason is a poor 
gatekeeper. Too often it shuts out the truth and lets in error.192  
 Other relevant passages for our purposes are those wherein Aquinas discusses 
falsity (De Ver. q. 1, aa. 10-12; ST, Ia, q. 17). In these articles, he considers whether there 
is falsity in things, sense, and intellect. Since we are interested here in reason, we can 
focus on the intellect. According to Aquinas, there is falsity in the intellect only if we 
understand the referent of “intellect” in a certain way. It is here, incidentally, that we also 
see how, for Aquinas, it is impossible to conceive truth and reason as essentially divorced 
from each other. Consider the following distinction. Intellect can refer, in one sense, to 
what Aquinas calls its proper act, that from which it derives its name (intellectus).193 This 
                                                        
192 Notice the relation of this discussion to James’s twofold goal of would-be knowers. The twofold goal is 
a way of negotiating the twofold sources of error discussed by Aquinas. Taking a more “liberal” doxastic 
policy lets in more truth, but also more falsehood. Taking a more “conservative” doxastic policy lets in less 
falsehood, but also less truth. Our doxastic policy thus has an effect on the “error mixture” of our bodies of 
belief. Of course, by the believer’s own lights, all of his beliefs are true, and so while a believer whose 
doxastic policy is more liberal will know, of his beliefs, that the likelihood of there being falsehoods among 
them is higher, this does not entail that any particular belief is false, and so demands no particular revisions 
to one’s body of beliefs. We just have to live with the prospect that we have gotten a lot wrong and be 
consoled by the prospect that we have gotten more right. By contrast, the conservative believer probably 
has less in the way of truth and consoles himself with the thought that at least he has not been duped.  
193 See fn 175 for my initial discussion and citations regarding this point and what follows in the remainder 
of this paragraph.  
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is the act of apprehending the quiddities (the what-it-is) of things. With respect to this act, 
called by some commentators on Aquinas the “first act of the mind,” there is no falsity in 
the intellect, save per accidens (accidently). Properly speaking, in its first act, the mind 
always makes contact with its object. The per accidens falsity is imputed to the first act 
as the result of errors that creep in with what is called the “second act of the mind,” the 
act whereby we form judgments, e.g., that all Fs are Gs. Errors of judgment occur in 
cases when we judge that x, which is an F, is also a G, where being-G does not follow 
consequently upon the essence of F-ness. It also happens in cases where there is an 
outright inconsistency between F-ness and G-ness. For example, the claim that all men 
are white is essentially an error of the intellect in its second act, and per accidens an error 
in its first act.194  
 If this is so, then there is error in the intellect even more so in the case of what is 
called the “third act of the mind,” namely, discursive reasoning from premises to 
conclusions. Aquinas explicitly (and tersely) admits as much when he writes: 
 Intellect can also be taken in a second sense—in general, that is, as extending to all its 
 operations, including reasoning and opinion. In that case, there is falsity in the intellect. 
 But it never occurs if a reduction to first principles is made correctly (De Ver., q. 1, a. 12, 
 reply). 
 
Error creeps in more and more the further along the intellect goes. In its proper, or first, 
act, the intellect is essentially always true (semper verus est). In the second act, the 
intellect may be either true or false, and so also in the third act.195 The picture that 
emerges is as follows. With respect to the first act of the mind, the intellect is rooted in 
                                                        
194 Disclaimer: Aquinas does not think that someone is a human only if he is white. 
195 Or we would say, in a modern key, sound. 
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the truth (the root of reason is the truth) but can be accidentally false insofar as the 
intellect in its second act can be false non-accidentally. In the second act of the mind, 
wherein truth primarily dwells (see ST Ia, q. 16, a. 2; De Ver. q. 1, a. 3), there is falsity in 
the ways indicated. Finally, there is the third act of the mind, by which the intellect 
moves from “truth” to “truth,” but where there may be error either accidentally, insofar as 
the premises are false, or non-accidentally, insofar as the form of the reasoning is invalid.  
 It is worth dwelling for a moment on this picture, for it seems that a tension exists 
within it. How can the person both always correctly apprehend the quiddity of the thing 
in question, and yet make all sorts of erroneous judgments concerning it? How could 
someone who thought that humans are white count as having apprehended the quiddity of 
human? This is an important question and although I cannot completely and definitively 
resolve it here, it is important to acknowledge it and say something about it, because 
otherwise there will be a problem for the idea that reasoning is rooted in the truth.  
 To see how we might go about declawing the problem, consider another claim of 
Aquinas: that our intellect is so weak that we cannot even know perfectly the nature of a 
little fly (Expositio in Symbolum Apostolorum, Prologue). Yet, we are able to apprehend 
the quiddity of the fly in the first act of the intellect. Which is it? A response to this 
question is a project in itself, but I think the outline of a Thomistic reply would go as 
follows. By the act of the passive and active intellect, we manage to abstract the quiddity 
from the thing that we are considering, which has actualized our intellect in a particular 
way. Before abstracting the quiddity, we were in a state of “first potentiality” with respect 
to that quiddity. That is, before we first abstract the quiddity of the little fly, all that we 
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are intellectually with respect to flyhood is in a state of potentiality, ready and able to 
receive that quiddity from the fly and through the operation of the active intellect, which 
makes actually intelligible the quiddity of the fly. After abstracting the quiddity, we have 
actualized our intellect in a certain way by acquiring the quiddity in question, but we 
need not actually consider the essence of the little fly. When we are not actually 
considering it, we are said to have a habitual knowledge of the little fly, to be in a state of 
first actuality/second potentiality: that is, we have actualized our intellect insofar as we 
have the form in our habitual knowledge, but our intellect is also in potentiality with 
respect to the actual consideration of the essence.196  
 Through this act of actual consideration, which actualizes our intellect in a second 
and deeper way, we delve into flyhood, if you will, and are able to do so because of the 
original rootedness of our intellect in the truth. In a sense, we only really come to know 
more and more the essence of a thing by forming judgments about it and coming to see 
the adequacy of those judgments.197 It is, I think, in the dynamic movement toward, or 
away from, the truth of things, that we come to participate more or less intensively in the 
essence of the thing in question. As we judge more and more truthfully of a thing, what it 
is and what it is not, and what follows from what it is, and what does not, and what is 
compatible with a thing, and what is not, we may be said to enter more “intensively,” as it 
were, into the essence of thing.  
                                                        
196 For these points, see ST Ia, q. 79, a. 6, resp. and ad 3, q. 84, a. 3, resp., and q. 85, a. 3, resp. 
197 This is a point that Aquinas makes by saying that truth and falsity resides most properly in the intellect 
composing and dividing (forming judgments) for the perfection of the intellect as known (ST Ia, q. 16, a. 2, 
resp.; De Ver. q. 1, a. 3, resp.).  
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 But the point remains that there is always an original rootedness of the intellect in 
the truth of the thing, without which subsequent intellectual operation is impossible. 
Without an original grasp of the human qua human, we cannot come to see the falsity of 
the judgment that all humans are white. It is because of the possibility of “second-
actualizing” our original acquaintance with essences—through acts of considering and 
reflecting upon them, teasing out their implications, considering them in conjunction with 
other things that we know—that we are able, e.g., to come to know and understand what 
it means to be human, and how this transcends restrictions of racial categories. It is this 
overall structure of human knowledge, if you will, that makes intelligible both the 
orientation of the intellect to truth, and the possibility of error, without which we would 
have to indulge either an undue skepticism or an undue infallibilism. 
 My aim here is not to give a full-blown exegesis of Aquinas’s texts or to propose 
a comprehensive interpretation of his work on these topics. It suffices if the textual 
evidence I have presented at least furnishes us with a defeasible case for the claims I am 
making about the relevance of his views to the issue at hand. That evidence shows that 
Aquinas is, indeed, saddled with Gibbons’s puzzle, but not only insofar as human reason 
is a poor gatekeeper in terms of its compliance with Gibbons’s norm J. (That is, it 
sometimes fails to obey the sufficient and necessary conditions that constitute J.) It is also 
poor when it comes to compliance with T. Humans makes false judgments, and reason 
invalidly. However, Aquinas also makes clear that reason, however erroneous and 
fallacious it may be in a given case, remains wed to the truth as to its ultimate source, and 
as to making its activity possible in the first place.  
 205 
 
 Aquinas therefore faces what we might consider to be a version of the puzzle that 
is arguably stronger than the one Gibbons himself constructs. For if the puzzle is 
constructed on the basis of a false account of reason, then the puzzle is a mere pseudo-
puzzle, and can be dispatched simply by refuting the errors in question. Here, however, 
this low-hanging fruit is not available to us. Posing the problem in Thomistic terms gives 
it more teeth, since it does not rely on endorsing a problematic instrumental conception of 
reason. In fact, I think that it is in general true to say that any philosopher who does not 
think that the human intellect is infallible is saddled with some form of the puzzle.  
3.2.2 Aquinas on Conscience 
 In this subsection, I outline Aquinas’s views on conscience before applying his 
insights to craft a solution to Gibbons’s puzzle. 
3.2.2.1 Conscience is an act 
 According to Aquinas, conscience is the act whereby a person applies knowledge 
to action. It is important to bear this in mind, for the history of the term “conscience” 
reveals quite a change from its meaning in Aquinas to its popular meaning today. 
Although Aquinas’s doctrine of conscience is, in its own way, quite radical, it still makes 
room for the fallibility of conscience, a prospect that the popular meaning of the word 
today seems to have lost. Today, for instance, we speak not so much of an erring 
conscience, or an improperly formed conscience, but as of the rights and interests of 
others, and of the extent to which the paradigm of rights allows for balancing the 
consciences of persons against the rights of others. Think, in this regard, of the debate 
over protecting the consciences of those who claim religious exemptions to certain laws, 
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e.g., the Little Sisters of the Poor with respect to the contraceptive mandate of the 
Affordable Care Act.  
 The application of knowledge to action comes about in one of two ways. In the 
first instance, it is the application of knowledge with respect to whether an action has, or 
has not, occurred, i.e., whether some action is an accomplished fact (De Ver. q. 17, a. 1, 
reply). It is in this sense, according to Aquinas, that the conscience of man is said to said 
to serve as witness to a man’s deeds (ibid., see also ST Ia, q. 79, a. 13, resp.). Aquinas’s 
example is that of conscience witnessing to a man that he has often spoken evil of others. 
In another way, the application of knowledge to action is made with respect to 
determining whether some action is right or not. In this latter respect, there is a further 
distinction between the conscience commanding someone to perform some action not yet 
performed, and the conscience passing judgment on some action that the person has 
already performed (ibid.).198  
 In the parallel, but condensed, discussion of the act of conscience in the ST, 
Aquinas takes a similar stand. He again contends that conscience is an act, but his 
division of the acts of conscience, while not departing substantially from that of the De 
Veritate, appears to make phenomenological considerations primary. Instead of a twofold 
distinction (conscience applied to whether something happened and applied to whether 
something is right), Aquinas makes a threefold distinction among (1) witnessing, (2) 
binding, inciting, urging,199 and (3) accusing, tormenting, rebuking. Conscience is the act 
                                                        
198 It is the wedding of this act of conscience together with the witnessing act of conscience that constitutes 
the examen conscientiae of the Catholic. 
199 The Latin in the ST refers to “instigare” and “ligare,” while the De Ver. adds “inducere.” 
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by which, through the application of knowledge, we witness the fact of some action 
(performed by the person whose act of conscience is doing the witnessing), bind 
ourselves to do something, or rebuke ourselves for doing something. Finally, with respect 
to (3), Aquinas also speaks of conscience as passing positive judgment on some action 
that the person has performed. That is, the application of knowledge to some prior action 
does not invariable issue in a condemnation of the action, but sometimes excuses the 
actions (excusare). Now, it is worth pointing out that “excuse” does not have to mean 
something like “offering an excuse” or “making an excuse,” although it can. More 
simply, it is can be used just for the verb “to excuse.” We speak of persons “excusing” 
each other in various ways. So, to say that conscience “excuses” an action is not 
equivalent to saying that the conscience “pleas an excuse” (in the sense of Austin ([1979] 
2007a)). It is rather to say that, in considering a prior action, the conscience finds that the 
action was not wrong. 
 This is an important distinction. If conscience excused in the sense of making a 
plea, then, at least according to Austin’s analysis, conscience would be attempting to 
deny responsibility while acknowledging that the person did indeed perform the action in 
question (ibid., 176-77). Excuses, as understood by Austin, are contrasted with 
justifications, whereby the person accepts responsibility, while claiming that the action in 
question wasn’t actually bad (ibid.). The point that I wish to make here, with Austin’s 
discussion serving as a contrast, is that when conscience excuses, Aquinas understands it 
to be both excusing and taking responsibility. In excusing, the conscience is not 
necessarily also exonerating the person of responsibility. Yet, this is what you would get 
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on a distinction like Austin’s. Since excuse will feature prominently in the application of 
Aquinas’s understanding of conscience to Gibbons’s Puzzle, it is important to get this out 
into the open, up front, lest confusion creep in at a later stage.  
 Another way in which conscience comes apart, in its excusatory and justificatory 
functions, from those functions as understood by Austin, is that a justification implies the 
non-badness of the act being justified. I think that, for Aquinas, justification is more 
nuanced, depending on whether we are looking at the act of conscience ex ante or ex post. 
Ex ante, conscience justifies an action for the person, but ex post, conscience might show 
that while the person was justified, or appeared to himself to be justified, at the time, in 
light of further information the action is nevertheless wrong. That is, the presence of an 
ex post justification does not entail that the action is judged by conscience, after the fact, 
to be good, whereas for Austin justification ultimately implies non-badness. Aquinas 
does not treat conscience as infallible, so the presence of justification does not entail non-
badness for some action. Hopefully, the parallel with Gibbons’s Puzzle is evident: 
justification for a belief does not entail non-badness of the belief: it might be false. But 
more on that, below.  
 Before moving on, I should say a little more about the sources of error for 
conscience, since Aquinas does not hold the infallibility of conscience. Using the 
syllogism as his model, Aquinas points to faulty inputs and faulty application (faulty 
“matter” and faulty “form”). That is, conscience can err if the “knowledge” that it applies 
is actually not knowledge at all, but rather something false. Conscience can also err in the 
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reasoning by which it applies some knowledge to determination of the moral value of the 
action in question (De Ver. q. 17, a. 2, reply).  
3.2.2.2 Conscience binds 
 In two pairs of articles, Aquinas takes up the questions of (a) whether an erring 
conscience binds, and (b) whether an erring conscience excuses (ST IaIIae, q. 19, aa. 5-6; 
De Ver. q. 17, aa. 3-4). It is to this discussion that the following remarks refer. But before 
taking up this question, Aquinas asks whether conscience binds, and how it binds. 
Binding, Aquinas points out, is a metaphor from material things that, transposed into a 
spiritual key, means the imposition of necessity. However, the imposition of necessity is 
incompatible with “inner necessity” (ex se necessaria). This is a particular application of 
his more general point that reason and necessity are incompatible, which is how Aquinas 
demarcates the distinction between beings endowed with will (rational appetite) and 
those not endowed with will, who only possess “natural appetite.” The gift of reason 
allows man to be master of himself, in that self-mastery is made metaphysically possible 
by reason. In virtue of his capacity for reason, man is not determined by his nature to one 
particular course but can engage in a variety of actions.200  
 The idea here, as I interpret Aquinas, is that conscience, qua imposer of necessity, 
should not be understood as literally placing an inner necessity upon the person. That 
conscience is able to “bind” individuals is a function of the freedom of individuals not to 
                                                        
200 For the distinction between human acts, which are acts involving reason and will, and mere acts of a 
man, see ST IaIIae, q. 1, a. 1. For Aquinas’s discussion of the voluntary in human acts, see ibid., q. 6, a. 1. 
For discussion of the ways in which the will is moved, see ibid., qq. 9-10. For discussion of the array of 
rational acts by which man exercises voluntary control over his acts, see ibid., qq. 11-17. 
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be so bound (by an inner necessity).201 We are not slaves or thralls to our consciences. 
Although the experience of conscience may be such that we often feel that we have no 
other choice, it is not yet the experience of the impossibility of pursuing alternative 
courses of action. 202 People do violate their consciences, after all. So the metaphor of 
binding should not be taken too literally, but should instead be interpreted by reference to 
the lived experience of being bound by conscience.  
3.2.2.3 Does a false conscience bind? 
 Does a false conscience bind? In response to this question, it might be thought 
that Aquinas answers in the negative. But that is not so. According to Aquinas, a false, or 
erring, conscience does bind. In the ST, Aquinas begins his discussion of this point by 
contrasting his view with a view that he says is unreasonable (ST IaIIae, q. 19, a. 5, resp.). 
The relevant feature of the alternative account is the claim that an erring conscience does 
not bind a person to do what is evil in itself (per se mala) or not to do what is good in 
itself (per se bona). This might seem to be commonsense, especially for someone who 
holds that there are intrinsically good and intrinsically evil act-types, as does Aquinas. 
But it is precisely this view that Aquinas calls unreasonable.  
 It is unreasonable because it fails to see that the person who performs an action 
that he apprehends with his reason (incorrectly, to be sure) as wrong is doing something 
that by his own lights is wrong. This can also occur in the case of taking some action to 
                                                        
201 Cats, e.g., do not have a conscience. Not being free for reason and being determined by a natural 
necessity, they are not free to bind themselves by acts of conscience. 
202 A classic statement of this sentiment is due to Martin Luther who (supposedly) said, “Here I stand. I can 
do no other.” 
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be the right thing to do in the circumstances, and then not doing it. Although our 
apprehension of good actions as bad, and bad actions as good is erroneous, nevertheless, 
it is our apprehension. To acquiesce in the performance of an action that we take to be 
bad, even if it is in fact good, is nevertheless to do what is bad by our own lights, and 
thus to do something bad. To acquiesce in the omission of an action that we take to be 
good, even if in fact it is bad, is thus to omit something good by our lights, and thus to do 
something bad.  
 Now, Aquinas does not go so far—and this will be discussed below as well—as to 
say that to follow an erring conscience is something positively good. Rather, the point is 
negative: to disobey conscience, even if it errs, is to sin (De Ver., q. 17, a. 4). It is even 
worse when the reason apprehends something as the commandment of God, for then, as 
Aquinas says, “to scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn the commandment of God” (ST 
IaIIae, q. 19, a. 5, ad 2). Finally, lest Aquinas be thought not to take seriously his own 
words, he has even this to say (ibid., resp.):  
 In like manner, to believe in Christ is good in itself, and necessary for salvation: but the 
 will does not tend thereto, except inasmuch as it is proposed by the reason. Consequently, 
 if it be proposed by the reason as something evil, the will tends to it as to something evil: 
 not as if it were evil in itself, but because it is evil accidentally, through the apprehension 
 of the reason. 
 
A false conscience does indeed bind, even for what Aquinas would have thought of as the 
most important thing—belief in Christ. The act of conscience binds, whether it be true or 
false, and it binds equally. A false conscience does not bind any less than a true 
conscience. 
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3.2.2.4 Does a false conscience excuse? 
 But as we have already seen, this does not mean that following your conscience, 
or the actions that result therefrom, is (are) necessarily good. Aquinas frames the 
discussion of this further issue—what we might call the goodness of obeying a false 
conscience—in terms either of a distinction within the ways in which a false conscience 
binds (De Veritate) or in terms of the conditions under which a false conscience excuses 
(ST). But in both cases, the essential structure of the response is the same. An erring 
conscience excuses only so long as the error is involuntary. In other words: an erring 
conscience is exculpatory only so long as the error is involuntary. Put positively, if an 
error is voluntary, then an erring conscience does not excuse an action that is, in fact, 
wrong.203  
 Aquinas gives the example of fornication (which is bad in itself). When Jim’s 
conscience tells him that he must fornicate with Jen, his conscience is binding in a 
conditional sense. It is conditionally binding because Jim’s conscience binds him only so 
long as his conscience does not change. In contrast to a truly correct conscience, a 
conscience that is false or errs can change. Jim can (and in some cases, should) come to 
see the error; his conscience can (and in some cases, should) change. Assessing whether 
Jim’s action was good, or whether he is excused in performing it, comes to down to 
                                                        
203 Furthermore, we can understand this both in terms of commission and omission. We can apply this 
distinction, first, to the nature of the error itself. Was the error one of commission or omission? A classic 
example of the first is the person who gets himself drunk so as to drown out his conscience. The latter case 
is exemplified by those who take no care at for their moral education. We can also apply this distinction to 
the acts themselves performed (or not performed) at variance with conscience. Sometimes we do something 
from an erring conscience (commission), and sometimes we do not do something from an erring conscience 
(omission).  
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asking whether Jim’s conscience ought to have been different from what it in fact was, 
i.e., whether it could have been different, and whether it should have been different. Did 
Jim neglect some responsibility of his with regard to applying his knowledge to the act of 
fornicating with Jen?204 Or, even worse, did Jim deliberately do something to tamper with 
his conscience? Did he perhaps make himself drunk in order to facilitate his action, or, on 
a more intellectual note, does Jim deliberately never think about moral questions, so as to 
constrict the knowledge which is at the disposal of his conscience? Of course, Aquinas 
would maintain that Jim knows that “good should be done, and evil not done” but if Jim 
deliberately shuns moral thinking, it might be that the result of his conscience comes 
down to whether an act would “feel good for him” and (let us hope) whether it would not 
count as painful to another. The fraught question now becomes that of figuring out what 
is required of moral agents with respect to their acts of conscience, which is to say, what 
moral agents are required to know so that they have said knowledge at their disposal. 
Under this heading comes the paramount issue of the proper formation of conscience.  
3.2.3 Conscience as the Key to a Resolution of Gibbons’s Puzzle 
 In order to apply Aquinas’s treatment of conscience to Gibbons’s puzzle, let me 
first make some preliminary conceptual alignments, so that we are in a better position to 
see the parallels between Aquinas’s treatment of conscience and Gibbons’s description of 
the puzzle.  
                                                        
204 In Aquinas’s version of the example, his (today inapplicable) mitigating factor concerns the lighting: 
perhaps in the dark, Jim mistook Jen for his wife. 
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 First though, I need to make clear something that is implicit in the exposition of 
Aquinas I have just provided, namely, that we must distinguish between use of the word 
“conscience” simpliciter and use of the word “conscience” as implying a right 
conscience. This ambiguity is an instance of a general ambiguity that occurs whenever a 
concept has both descriptive and normative aspects. That is, we can discuss some things 
as just being what they are, and we can also discuss those same things as being in some 
way right, correct, true, apt, appropriate, and so on. We speak not just of blame, for 
instance, but of “right” blame, i.e., appropriate given certain facts. We speak not only of 
justice, for instance, as something that “is the result of” our legal system, but also of true 
justice, as when, beyond being the outcome of some legal proceeding, we think of a 
verdict or proceeding as really being just. Finally, consider the law. There is law in the 
sense of what is handed down by a legislator or legislative body. Jim Crow was certainly 
the law in this sense. But in a deeper sense, a law is really a law only if it is also just.205 In 
this deeper sense, Jim Crow most certainly was not law.  
 This last point is helpfully analogous with the present situation. When someone 
acts because the law commands him so to act, or does not act because the law forbids him 
to, but the (committed or omitted) act is nevertheless the wrong (right) thing to do, is the 
action’s accordance with some law sufficient for the action’s being good? I think not, 
and, in general, the defense that “I was just following orders” is hardly taken to be 
automatically exculpatory. That is, there is a sense in which being “bound by the law” is 
                                                        
205 See ST IaIIae, q. 95, a. 2, resp. 
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conditioned by extra-legal truths about right and wrong.206 If it is wrong to F, then the 
fact that F-ing is commanded by the law does not suffice to make some individual’s F-
ing good, even if it was commanded by a law, and the individual was “just following the 
law.” 
 The analogy with conscience is apt insofar as we are wont to think of the 
conscience as a sort of interior law. Indeed, this is not a misleading way to think of it for 
someone like Aquinas, for whom the notion of conscience is related to the notion of the 
natural law.207 But I raise this point not to introduce another concept into the discussion, 
but merely to show the aptness of the analogy. Being bound by one’s conscience, just like 
being bound by the law, is not, without further ado, sufficient to excuse or defend some 
action, not, that is, to make such an action good and hence right.208  
 Conscience, then, has both a wide and a narrow sense. In its wide sense, 
conscience signifies just the act of conscience, which, as we have seen, is the application 
of knowledge to some action. Restricting our attention to the second and third functions 
of conscience as understood by Aquinas, we can say that it is the application of 
knowledge to some action not-yet-performed (in which case, the person is asking whether 
it would be good to do so), or the application of knowledge to some action already-
performed (in which case, the person is asking whether it was good to do so). In its wide 
                                                        
206 Aquinas argues for this point at ST IaIIae, q. 96, a. 4, resp.: human law, if it is unjust, does not bind in 
conscience.  
207 See below for further discussion of this point. 
208 If you are worried about the move from goodness to rightness, I would just say that within the 
Thomistic-inspired framework of this discussion, goodness is thick enough to do the job. For Aquinas, the 
goodness of an action is a matter of many elements, including the species of the act, the circumstances, the 
interior act of the will behind the act, and any foreseen consequences of the act. 
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sense, the mere mention of “conscience” does not entail that the act of conscience was 
true (i.e., free of error). In its narrow sense, we are referring to a true conscience, one 
that is the correct application of knowledge to some act, such that S’s F-ing in the given 
case is good and, hence, right.  
 In addition to having these two senses, we can also speak of conscience, as does 
Aquinas, as being at times ex ante and at times ex post. As we have seen, sometimes 
conscience is exercised with respect to an action the agent is considering performing, and 
sometimes with respect to an action that the agent has already performed.  
 Now, the question is where to line up Gibbons’s norm J. I think that norm J is 
somehow related to conscience as we are discussing it—let us call conscience as we are 
discussing it one’s “intellectual conscience” because it is the application of what one 
“knows” (I will use this term in a less restricted sense than Aquinas, and speak of what 
the person believes) to the matter of whether it would be good to believe that p, or 
whether it was good to believe that p (or, alternately, whether it is good to continue 
believing that p, since belief, unlike action, is not a one-off event).  
 Is Gibbons’s norm J more like ex ante or ex post intellectual conscience? 
(Another way to put this, using contemporary language, is whether Gibbons is interested 
in ex ante or ex post justification (see Wedgwood (2013b, section 5)).) Following 
Wedgwood, I think that when we are talking about norms of belief, we have our eye on 
the ex ante. This approach also seems right given Gibbons’s insistence on guidance, as 
we saw in the first half of this chapter. So I think that we should align norm J with ex 
ante conscience as applied to belief. This makes sense. As we saw, ex ante conscience 
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“binds,” “urges,” and “incites” the person to act. Norm J, as formulated by Gibbons, 
likewise binds the person to believe whatever he is justified in believing. That a belief is 
justified for a believer is sufficient for that believer being bound by his intellectual 
conscience to believe the proposition in question.  
 The next question to ask is whether justification is like ex ante conscience 
according to the latter’s wide sense, or according to the latter’s narrow sense. That is, in 
saying that justification is sufficient for “ought-ing” to believe that p, are we using this 
term in a way that presupposes that the resulting belief would automatically be good 
(narrow sense) or are we merely presupposing that it would justified (wide sense)? Given 
Gibbons’s understanding of J, we should line up J with the narrow sense of conscience. 
In following J, one is following one’s intellectual conscience, where this is understood to 
mean that the belief in question is good for me to hold, given that I am justified in 
holding it.  
 It is here that we can begin to see how we will part company with Gibbons and 
sketch an objectivist solution (to use Gibbons’s taxonomy) to the puzzle. Recall that, for 
Aquinas, conscience in its wide-sense, while it does bind, does not inevitably excuse. 
That is, whereas it might be that violating one’s conscience is bad, the mere fact that an 
action is in accordance with one’s conscience does not (all by itself) suffice to make it 
good and right. Whether this is so depends on whether the conscience in question is 
“true” (i.e., free of error) or “false,” (i.e., erroneous, whether with respect to its input or 
with respect to its form of reasoning). Put in terms of the question of whether to believe 
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that p, a false intellectual conscience excuses only in cases where the errors cannot be 
imputed to the person whose act of conscience it is.  
 This points to the necessity of the primacy of the normativity of truth. For 
consider what is required in order to speak of errors of conscience in the first place. For a 
typical case of action, this is the actual rightness or wrongness, the actual moral value, of 
the action in question.209 In the case of belief, what marks out the distinction is the actual 
truth-value of the proposition in question. In other words, it is not enough for a belief to 
be good or right, that the person believing it be justified in believing it. The belief must, 
in addition, be true.  
 Now on the other hand, this is not to say that Aquinas is a kind of intellectual 
utilitarian, concerned only with maximizing the number of true beliefs that a person has. 
This sort of position is indeed possible and is held by some contemporary philosophers.210 
But this is not Aquinas’s position. For while Aquinas would deny that a false justified 
belief is good or right, he would also deny that someone believing something that 
happened to be true, but which they thought unjustified (a true unjustified belief—the 
other, albeit undiscussed case to which Gibbons’s puzzle applies) was doing something 
good or right. Recall from above, that Aquinas thinks that the will that tends to something 
that reason apprehends as evil is itself evil, even if the action in question really isn’t evil, 
but only accidentally so (as a result of being apprehended as such by reason). So if 
                                                        
209 Now, it must be conceded that if you think that the moral rightness or wrongness of an action is 100% 
determined by the quality of the will tending to the action, then we have reached an impasse. If you take 
what is called, in a fast-and-loose way, a “Kantian” ethic of intentions, then we have reached an impasse. 
But if, like Aquinas, you think that there is more to an action’s being good or right than its being the result 
of a good or right will, then we can go on together. 
210 For a thorough overview and critique of this cluster of positions, see Berker (2013). 
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someone does something that their conscience tells them is evil, then they sin, even if in 
fact, what seemed evil was really good.  
 Applied to the case of belief, this consideration entails that someone who believes 
what her intellectual conscience tells her is unreasonable for her to believe, is doing 
something wrong. All of this points up an interesting asymmetry (mentioned above): it is 
easier to do something wrong than to do something right, and it is easier to have an 
incorrect belief than a correct belief, at least when it comes to beliefs over which we 
deliberate. Aquinas is neither a Kantian nor a utilitarian, and his position is a principled 
one that can be applied also to the case of belief.211 For Aquinas, not only is it not enough 
merely to be justified, it is also not enough merely to have hit upon a true belief (if you 
think that it is false). For Aquinas, T and J are both relevant to determining the goodness 
of a given belief.212 
 Let me reiterate, however, that this is not to say that there are not cases in which, 
through no fault of his own, a person’s intellectual conscience is erroneous and so his 
beliefs false. In such cases, he is bound by his false conscience, and even excused by it. 
                                                        
211 If anything, he is (and this is hardly surprising) Aristotelian and Christian in this regard: see, for the 
former, EN 1109a24, 33-34: “it is no easy task to be good…since to hit the mean is hard in the extreme.” 
For the latter, see St. Matthew’s Gospel, 7:13-14: “Enter ye in at the narrow gate: for wide is the gate, and 
broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow is the gate, 
and strait is the way that leadeth to life: and few there are that find it!” 
212 A similar point is made by Jeffrey Stout, who seeks a pragmatist account for our interest in “getting it 
right” with respect to our beliefs. Illustrating his point by means of an analogy with archers, he argues that 
getting it right is a distinct goal from holding beliefs to which we are entitled. Aiming to satisfy these goals 
is, in essence, aiming to satisfy the truth- and justification-norms, respectively (2007, 20). Stout presses his 
point, arguing that even if, from the first-person point of view, trying to satisfy these goals comes to the 
same thing, and the goal of getting it right is embedded in the goal of only holding beliefs to which we are 
entitled, it remains the case that if we omit mention of the goal of getting it right “we are bound to lose 
track of one dimension of success or failure that matters to anyone actually participating in the activity” 
(ibid., 21). 
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The crucial thing to remember, though, is precisely that the general normativity of truth is 
required in order even to make sense of talk of erroneous conscience in the first place. 
That this Thomistic view sometimes countenances the believing of falsehoods does not 
weaken its commitment to the normativity of truth, but rather strengthens it.  
 Maintaining the relevance of both T and J, then, is crucial. Of course, by this 
point it should be clear that there is something highly artificial about how Gibbons 
formulates the truth-norm and justification-norm. T and J are isolated from each other 
and completely decontextualized. The brilliance of Aquinas lies, as already indicated, in 
integrating these into a normative whole that, at the same time, does not make the 
mistake of collapsing truth and reason or of making us out to be infallible. Rather, the 
situation is one whereon we are bound to believe by the lights of our intellectual 
conscience, but also whereon this is not sufficient—all on its own—to excuse or make 
good a given belief. 
 What this framework does is call our attention to the fact that, when it comes to 
the question of what we ought to believe, there are two perspectives: an internal and an 
external.213 From within the internal perspective, T and J do not (typically) come apart for 
the individual believer. That is, from within the internal perspective, we never think of 
ourselves as satisfying one without the other. If we take something to be true, then we 
take it that we are therefore justified in believing it (if only just because it is true). If 
something is justified, then we take it that it is true. It requires an intrusion, if you will, 
from an external perspective to call this into question. Sometimes we even do this for 
                                                        
213 Stout (2007, 21ff) discusses these two perspectives as the first-personal and the third-personal. 
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ourselves (especially if we are “philosophical”). But more often (and more importantly) 
the external perspective is given in an interpersonal setting. You believe something that I 
know is false. I can criticize your belief, even if I also grant that you are justified in 
holding the belief, i.e., that your intellectual conscience “bound” you to it. Furthermore, 
even if I do not know that your belief is false, but merely believe that it is false (assuming 
I have reasons), I can still criticize your belief. The project of arriving at the truth is an 
interpersonal endeavor, not an individualistic one.214 We arrive at the truth (in part) by 
advancing and criticizing beliefs and the reasons that we take to support or undermine 
those beliefs.215 (This is the intellectual equivalent of a similar practice in morality 
concerning what is good.)  
                                                        
214 Stout notes how Rorty’s arguments against the idea that truth is a goal of inquiry only seems to apply 
when we focus exclusively on the first-person perspective. From the first-person perspective, after all, 
getting it right and only having beliefs to which I am entitled amount to the same thing in practice. Once we 
incorporate the historicity of the person, and the situation of the person in communicative interaction with 
others, however, these interests come apart in practice. Assessing and interpreting what others say involves 
a departure from how things look from the first-person perspective, giving rise to two distinct “proprieties”: 
(a) the kind exhibited by a person believing responsibly (believing only that to which he is entitled) and (b) 
the kind exhibited by person “getting it right” (2007, 21). Moreover, this distinction is what allows us to 
say whether others are entitled to their beliefs, as well as to say that while we were entitled to a belief that p 
(in the past), our past belief that p did not “get it right” with respect to p (ibid.). This backward-looking 
moment can become a forward-looking moment, such that we hope, or desire, to get things right in the 
future (perhaps even about things about which we currently have beliefs to which we are entitled). This 
forward-looking moment provides further evidence that getting it right is a distinct goal of inquiry (ibid., 
22). The big upshot of these considerations for the pragmatist is the claim that “normative notion of 
objective correctness arises in discursive social practices” (ibid., 24, cf. 27, 29). Although I do not endorse 
the claim that the normativity of truth arises only in discursive social practices, I do agree that such 
practices are what make sense of the distinction between the internal (or first-person) perspective and the 
external (or third-person) perspective, such that we can assess others’ beliefs both in terms of entitlement 
(reason, justification) and in terms of getting it right (truth). Ultimately, though, what I wish to argue is that 
the normativity of truth is what makes sense of these interpersonal processes of assessment, interpretation, 
and criticism. Although this may not be incompatible with a pragmatist account of how the truth-norm (a 
normative notion of objective correctness) arises from social practices, my own account (developed in 
chapters IV-V) takes a different road. 
215 Under this heading come a whole slew of ordinary language criticisms, such as: you should not have 
jumped to conclusions; you should not have been so gullible; you should not have been taken in; you 
should not have believed him. 
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 The next question, naturally, is what makes the interpersonal practice of mutual 
criticism—that is, the whole interplay between the internal and external perspectives of 
belief—licit. It is here, once again, that primacy of the normativity of truth comes into its 
own. Justification is not enough, at least not in the sense of an individual’s act of 
intellectual conscience as discussed here. A proposition p’s being justified for a believer 
S is partially a matter of S’s doing certain things and being a certain way that “makes” p 
justified for him in his situation. Given that a belief of his is false, we can ask about S 
himself, e.g., whether he made a mistake for which he is culpable, or whether he was 
negligent in knowing what he ought to have known. (In Aquinas’s terms, we can ask 
whether his error was “voluntary.”) 
 The truth-norm is required for the criticism of belief, just as the “moral-norm” is 
required for the criticism of action. Without these norms, we have nothing grounding the 
licit criticism of those whose actions and beliefs are wrong (false) even though 
sanctioned by the person’s ex ante conscience. A conscience is a dangerous thing if it is 
not properly formed: it can present the good as evil, and the evil as good. As the Scripture 
says, “Woe to you that call evil good, and good evil: that put darkness for light, and light 
for darkness: that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter” (Isaias 5:20). Without the 
interpersonal context of an orientation to the truth, individual acts of conscience risk 
becoming divorced from “the true and the good.” Conscience must, therefore, to return to 
theme of the first half of this chapter, allow itself to be led by the truth. The problem, of 
course, that one might raise—one far beyond the remit of this dissertation—is that of how 
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we arrive at the truth by which our consciences are formed. Or, to put the question more 
baldly, how do we reason our way to the truth, by which our reason is then to be guided?  
 But putting the question in this way betrays the presupposition, against which I 
have argued, that we can divorce reason (via its situation within our intellect as a whole) 
from the truth. Aquinas, for one, argues that what he calls the natural law is a matter of 
reason (ST IaIIae, q. 90, a. 1, resp.). Law is a dictate of reason, and those general and 
indemonstrable principles that the practical intellect naturally knows are the principles of 
the natural law (ST IaIIae, q. 91, a. 3, resp.). The precepts of the natural law thus occupy 
the role of first principles with respect to the operation of the practical intellect (ST IaIIae, 
q. 94, a. 2, resp.). These principles—foremost of which is the dictate that good should be 
done, and evil avoided—are common to all men, and, in the majority of cases, so too are 
those principles (of increasing detail and particularity, taking into account the 
circumstances of persons) that are more detailed and are, as it were, conclusions from the 
first principles of the natural law (ST IaIIae, q. 94, a. 4, resp.).  
 Without going too far into detail on Aquinas’s theory of the natural law, we see, 
again, that there is an alternative to the divorce of truth and reason in matters practical. 
Just as the speculative intellect has a native rootedness in the truth about being, so too 
does the practical intellect have a native rootedness in the truth about the good.  
 A final point in this vein is worth making, and it considers how the interpersonal 
orientation to the truth through practices of criticism can reach a level both deeper 
(individually) and wider (as applying to whole communities or traditions). Consider the 
possibility that a person’s conscience can itself become, as it were, deformed. These are 
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not simple errors of “inputs” (premises) and the form of one’s reasoning. Reason can be 
overcome, for instance by passion, with the result that a person is distracted, opposed, or 
even bodily hindered216 in correctly applying knowledge to action (ST IaIIae, q. 77, a. 2). 
Similar considerations apply to belief. We can be distracted, opposed, or even bodily 
hindered, in intellectual matters as well. We can be opposed by our passions (and not 
necessarily just at a subconscious level): think of the effect that our emotions have on 
how and what we believe. And, as any philosopher or student of philosophy will concede, 
we can even be delivered by the betrayal of our bodies unto error and falsehood.  
 There is, furthermore, the effect of both the individual and the community’s 
habituation in the performance of bad actions and the maintenance of false beliefs. 
Aquinas cites Caesar’s observation that among the Germans theft was no longer 
accounted as evil (ST IaIIae, q. 94, a. 4, resp.) and similar observations of St. Paul’s 
Epistle to the Romans concerning theft and “unnatural vices” (ST IaIIae, q. 94, a. 6, 
resp.). If you live in a community where theft is rampant, then it no longer seems 
contrary to the natural law to engage in theft. The parallels with belief here are especially 
pronounced. For example, if you lived in the antebellum American South, where certain 
racist beliefs and certain beliefs about the morality of slavery predominated, then what 
passed for a “perfectly reasonable” belief was the egregiously false belief that Africans 
and their descendants are natural slaves and not fully persons, with all the attendant 
practical beliefs that this entails.  
                                                        
216 Aquinas has in mind something akin to the effects of fatigue and alcohol. 
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 Moreover, there are also cases in which groups of people—either from within the 
community or from without—attempt to hijack the intellectual consciences of persons. 
The former occurs, e.g., whenever the state engages in propaganda, or when certain 
individuals or interest groups gain control of media outlets for the purposes of pushing 
out certain news stories or interpretations thereof. The latter can occur whenever a group 
from outside one’s community engages in a campaign of misinformation. An example of 
this would be the misinformation sown by Russian state television, e.g., in the Ukraine.  
 Aquinas wonders whether the natural law can, in circumstances such as these, be 
blotted out from the heart of man. His answer is that yes, in certain ways, it can. While 
the first principles cannot be blotted out, we can be hindered in our application of them. 
Even worse is the case of the secondary principles of application: here not only do simple 
errors of reason crop up, but also the effects of “evil persuasions,” “vicious customs,” and 
“corrupt habits” (ibid.). We never cease to know that the good ought to be done, but our 
ability to know what this means in concrete circumstances of our lives can be thwarted by 
influences both from within (oneself and one’s community) and without. In the case of 
belief, the equivalent claim is that we never cease to know that the truth ought to be 
believed, but our ability to know what this means in the concrete circumstances of our 
lives can be undermined both ad intra et ad extra. 
 The lesson here is thus a return to, and extension of, the one drawn above. Earlier, 
it was a matter of calling into question another person’s justified belief as false. Here it is 
a matter of calling into question not only his justification, but also the basic 
presuppositions of justification. If one’s intellectual conscience has been malformed as 
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the result of certain passions, customs, habits, actions, etc., then one’s conscience is—to a 
greater or less degree—cut off from the truth. Thus, we return to the conclusion drawn 
above: that the truth-norm needs to be the primary norm.217 Truth is the court of last 
appeal. It is what underwrites our licit criticisms of individuals and communities. Not, to 
reiterate, merely for the sake of criticism, but for the sake of making intelligible the 
interplay between the internal and the external (interpersonal) perspectives that partially 
constitutes how human persons advance in their knowledge of the truth.  
 Summing up, the main lessons gleaned from our creative retrieval of Aquinas are 
threefold. First, just as conscience alone is not the whole story behind the goodness or 
badness of an action, despite its binding force, so too justification is not the whole story 
behind the goodness or badness of a belief, despite its binding force. Second, there is the 
asymmetry between good and bad, or right and wrong, such that it is easier to do wrong 
than right. Believing without justification is bad, but so is believing that which is false 
(albeit excusable if the error is “involuntary”). Finally, we saw how Aquinas articulates a 
dialectic that balances the human person’s prospects for knowledge of the truth against 
prospects for error. This appears at a number of levels. It appears in the distinction 
between acts of the mind, the first of which is always essentially true, while the second 
and third admit of error. It appears within the life of the individual, who not only knows 
first principles (both speculative and practical), but whose reasoning can be led astray. 
                                                        
217 One way to put this point in Gibbons’s language is to maintain that the truth-norm must be the universal 
norm. But actually, this is already to concede too much. As formulated, T and J are completely sanitized of 
the contextual features that we take to have a bearing on action—e.g., the circumstances. As I will ask in 
the next chapter (and appendix II), is it really the case that the norms of belief really just boil down to 
Gibbons’s T and J? Is it really the case that we ought to believe something just in case we are justified in so 
doing? And, if not, in what sense is there a deep conflict between truth and justification? 
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Finally, it also appears within the life of the community as a whole which can serve to 
corrupt, as well to enhance, the intellectual and moral caliber of its members. What 
underwrites this structure is the possibility of error and the interpersonal practice of 
criticism and correction.218 We can ask whether a given act of conscience was true or 
false, whether the individual is on the hook for its falsity, and the extent to which the 
conscience of the individual is malformed as a result of individual or communal 
influences. What this means is that, across justificational contexts, it is truth that is—and 
must be—the fundamental norm.  
3.2.3.1 Some further thoughts 
 Before ending this section, I wish to make two final points in response to 
Gibbons, the first of which partially reiterates something said above. The supposed 
universality of J fails to consider the concrete conditions of the person who is the believer 
S in any given instance of the J-schema. In other words, it just assumes that the range of 
beliefs that a given person ought to believe is exhaustively determined by what he would 
be epistemically or rationally justified in believing, without taking anything else into 
account, e.g., the intellectual acumen of the person involved, or his partially-doxastic-
constituted commitments, such as friendship, or membership in certain communities, 
such as a church or party. It also fails to consider the possibility (discussed above) that in 
certain communities, the conditions might be such that what passes for “perfectly 
reasonable” is a belief that is not only false, but egregiously so. Since Gibbons does not 
                                                        
218 One could draw a connection here with the Christian practice of fraternal correction. 
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say much about how he understands reason and rationality as they relate to these issues, 
all that I can do here is raise the question.  
 Finally, I wonder about certain propositions that you ought to know, even if the 
only way to know them is by faith, and not by an act of human reason. This is another 
application of Aquinas: there are some truths that are beyond the ken of human reason, 
which can only be known by faith. They are not irrational insofar as one could, by reason, 
show that their negations are false. Truth, after all, does not contradict truth.219 To say 
that you only ought to believe a proposition if you are justified in doing so, where this is 
understood in terms of unaided human reason, raises the question whether Gibbons’s 
solution excludes obligations to believe by faith. Similar considerations, however, do not 
pertain to the truth-norm. For no matter how you believe, what you ought to believe is the 
truth, whether by faith or reason. The manner in which S believes, and ought to believe, 
that p, is something that must take into account the concrete, particular circumstances of 
S, p, and the relationships that obtain between them. But what S ought to believe is the 
truth. Summing up this second set of reflections, then, we have two further reasons to 
maintain the primacy of truth: (1) in order to criticize false beliefs that go by the name 
(perhaps a misnomer) of “perfectly rational” or “perfectly reasonable” and (2) in order 
not to exclude, a priori, obligations to believe by faith.  
 
 
                                                        
219 For this discussion of faith and reason, see ST Ia, q. 1, a. 1 and, for more detail, SCG Book 1, chs. 3-7. 
For the point that the truth of faith does not contradict the truth of reason, see ibid., ch. 7. 
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4 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we looked at two challenges to the truth-norm of belief, challenges 
that focus on truth. The first was that truth cannot be a norm of belief because truth 
cannot provide guidance to believers. The main response to the guidance problem was to 
call into question the presuppositions about guidance that are implicit in the terms of the 
problem. This involved arguing against overly strict temporal restrictions on guidance. It 
matters not so much when living by a norm makes a difference, so much as that it does 
make a difference. How does the truth-norm make a difference? I advanced the 
possibility of guidance-by-value. Norms guide by pointing to the values that they 
objectify, and through the fact that grasping those values involves grasping that one ought 
to realize and exemplify them. Even norms that superficially take the form of a 1:1 
correspondence with an explicit rule (e.g., the norms of the Ten Commandments) do not 
guide solely through compliance with such a rule. Being guided by norms involves 
grasping the plenitude of values that they present to us and responding creatively to their 
call. Turning to the truth specifically, we saw how (again with the help of Aquinas and 
Marcel) truth is a doubly-peculiar value, depending for its flourishing in the human world 
upon human acts of intellect, and the existential-personal act of incarnating the spirit of 
truth. Grasping the value of truth thus involves grasping how we are called to incarnate 
the value of truth.  
 We then turned to Gibbons’s puzzle, which concerns the incompatible results (we 
might say, guidance) offered by his norms T and J. But whereas Gibbons solves his 
puzzle by embracing J as the general norm, I have sought to present an alternative picture 
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whereon the normativity of truth is accorded pride of place. This alternative relied upon a 
creative appropriation of Aquinas on conscience, as applied to the question of what one 
ought to believe. The most important point made in the respect was the observation that 
the normativity of truth is required to make sense of the licit practice of interpersonal 
criticism (both doxastic and moral).  
 Now it may be that all that is required to continue to hold the normativity of truth 
for belief is Gibbons’s weakened, particularized version of T. If so, then nothing turns on 
accepting my alternative picture. But even so, I think that my arguments provide at least 
some evidence for according pride of place to the truth-norm. The point, as in chapter I, 
is not so much that you completely accept (at this juncture—though you may in the end) 
my responses to these problems, so long as you are moved to accept some response, or at 
least to suspend judgment until we arrive at the positive account of the normativity of 
truth in chapters IV and V.  
 But before we get there, we must first reconnoiter the philosophical landscape. 
Having looked at belief and truth, we must now turn to normativity. There are two 
dominant accounts of the source of truth’s normativity for belief in the contemporary 
literature: the teleological and normativist views. The next step is to a look at these 
views, and objections to them, with an eye to establishing conditions of adequacy for any 
satisfactory account of the normativity of truth. 
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Chapter III: The Normativity of Truth for Belief 
1 Introduction 
 In the last two chapters, I examined three substantial objections to the thesis that 
truth is a norm of belief. The first was the argument from involuntariness. The second 
was the guidance problem. The third was Gibbons’s Puzzle concerning the 
incompatibility of the truth- and justification-norms (as he formulates them).  
 Along the way, I have not only critiqued the arguments for these objections, but, 
more importantly, have called into question the presuppositions that lie behind them. In 
the case of the argument from involuntariness, I questioned the thin notion of belief that 
has slanted the debate against doxastic voluntarism. In the case of the guidance problem, 
I questioned the restricted notion of guidance that has slanted the debate against the idea 
that the truth-norm can provide guidance. Finally, in the case of Gibbons’s puzzle, I 
questioned the presupposition of the radical separateness of truth and reason, as well as 
turned on its head how Gibbons thinks of the relationship between them. Along the way, 
I have made clear that my criticisms need not be taken in toto for us to proceed—for 
anyone who disagrees with these positive suggestions, I have indicated alternative 
solutions on offer in the contemporary literature.  
 However, it is well to review briefly the three positive suggestions raised to this 
point. The first, already mentioned, is that the notion of belief as it features in the 
contemporary literature on the truth-norm is greatly impoverished. When it comes to the 
question of what ought I to believe, the notion of belief and believing at stake is not 
merely that of an attitude that I bear toward some proposition that I regard as true, nor is 
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it, I have argued, the more substantial notion of such a state whose “aim” is truth. It is 
rather that of belief as an ambiguous, “analogous” commitment to the truth. This notion, 
along with what I called its two species (the “belief mode” and the “opinion mode,” or 
“non-opinionated belief” and “opinionated belief”) were fleshed out with the help of 
Aquinas and Marcel.  
 The second positive suggestion was that norms need not guide along the model of 
an explicit rule of the form “Do X when in C.” Rather, norms provide guidance by 
pointing to, and objectifying, certain values for us. Values are intimately related to 
persons insofar as persons are those entities that can grasp values. In grasping values, we 
grasp that they “ought to be” and thus, ceteris paribus, that we ought to exemplify and 
realize them. These general principles were the result of wading into the work of 
personalists such as Scheler, Hartmann, Stein, von Hildebrand, Wojtyla, and Marcel. 
Applied specifically to the truth, I argued that truth, as a value that calls for realization, is 
doubly dependent on the human person. It is both ontologically dependent on human 
persons as intellectually endowed entities, and “existentially” dependent on human 
persons as those beings who can incarnate—but also, tragically, spurn—its value.  
 Finally, the third positive suggestion was to resolve the supposed tension between 
truth and justification (or truth and reason) by appropriating Aquinas’s account of 
conscience. Here we saw that while we are, in some sense, “bound” to believe what 
seems reasonable to us, the normativity of truth remains fundamental. While it may be 
wrong to disbelieve what is proposed to us by our intellectual conscience, it is not, by any 
means, necessarily (or eo ipso) good so to believe if what we believe is false. Most 
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critically, we found that the primacy of the truth-norm is necessary in order to make sense 
of certain licit practices of criticizing what persons believe (or do) as a “matter of 
conscience.” Conscience does not automatically excuse. The authentic development of 
conscience must always be a matter of its formation in the truth. 
 That, then, is where we have been. Now it is time to shift focus one more time. 
We have already looked at belief and truth. Now it is time to look at normativity itself. 
My question in this chapter frames the bulk of the remainder of the dissertation. It is that 
of the source of the normativity in question, understood as a response to the question: 
“But why ought I to believe truly?” While I will focus on the truth, such a question may 
be asked of other candidate norms of belief, such as the justification-norm considered in 
the last chapter. Thus, a broader way to put the spirit of the question taken up in this 
chapter is: “But why ought I to believe according to the norms of belief?” The answer I 
give will focus on the normativity of truth, but it should hopefully be clear how the 
account could be extended to account for other norms of belief, especially justified (or 
reasonable) belief. 
 The plan for this chapter is primarily to consider the two dominant ways in which 
contemporary epistemology has accounted for the source of the normativity of truth for 
belief. On the one hand, there is the teleological account, also known more recently as the 
instrumentalist account. I will refer to it as “TI.” On the other hand, there is the 
normativist account, also known more recently as “intrinsicalism.” I will refer to it as 
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“NI.”220 My goal in this chapter will not, however, be to document these accounts 
exhaustively and show them to be definitively false. Rather, I will point to some of the 
prominent criticisms of them that have been offered by others. My own goal is twofold. 
First, I will argue that neither account actually constitutes an answer to the question that 
is my concern here, despite appearing to do so and despite purporting to be accounts of 
the source of doxastic normativity. Second, I will extract from my discussion several 
desiderata or conditions of adequacy for my own account, which I will begin to introduce 
at the end of this chapter. Before I do that, however, I need first to clarify further the 
question that is at stake in this chapter—the normative question as applied to norms of 
belief.  
2 The Normative Question as Applied to Norms of Belief: What It Is, and 
 What It Is Not 
 In the past two chapters, we looked at objections to the thesis that truth is a norm 
of belief. In this chapter, we will look at a question that strikes at the heart of this thesis. 
If I say to you that you ought to comply with the truth-norm, and you ask me why, what 
answer can I give? 
 We can frame this issue—as does Hazlett (2013, 136)—in terms of what 
Korsgaard (1996) calls the “normative question.” As Korsgaard describes it, the 
normative question is the question of what justifies the claims that morality makes on us 
(ibid, 9-10). In other words, morality makes demands on us—sometimes very demanding 
                                                        
220 Interestingly, Wojtyla (whose work will be discussed in the next two chapters), also distinguishes 
between normativism and teleology as two fundamental “forms” of ethics ([1969] 1993d, 131).  
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demands, you might say—and what we want is an account of the source and authority (or 
force) of those demands. Why is it the case that I ought to meet the demands of morality? 
We can ask a similar question in the domain of doxastic normativity. The truth-norm 
makes a demand on us. I do not think that it is irrational to ask what justifies its 
demands.221  
 Before moving any farther, I wish to make a distinction. The debate into which 
we are wading is described as a debate regarding the source of epistemic normativity. I 
think that this is a misleading term, since we are interested in norms of belief, and not 
norms of knowledge. As Austin ([1979] 2007b, 78) observes:  
 We never seem to ask ‘Why do you know?’ or ‘How do you believe?’… ‘How do 
 you know?’ suggests that perhaps you don’t know it at all, whereas ‘Why do you 
 believe?’ suggests that perhaps you oughtn’t to believe it. There is no suggestion that 
 you ought not to know, or that you don’t believe it. 
 
That is, while knowledge itself may be a normative notion (see, e.g., Smithies (2012), it 
is not the primary notion in the neighborhood to which we apply norms. This passage 
also suggests two different normative projects. On the one hand, norms of knowledge 
would be norms for introducing claims of knowledge into discourse—describing 
conditions under which you may say that you know that p. On the other hand, norms 
attach more directly to belief itself, insofar as there are conditions under which you may, 
or may not, believe that p. Keeping in mind that the primary target in the debate under 
consideration is belief, I propose to call the sort of normativity that I am interested in 
“doxastic normativity,” and an answer to the question of the source of doxastic 
                                                        
221 Since “justification” has a distinctive meaning in epistemology, I will often refrain in what follows from 
putting the normative question in terms of justification, to spare us the confusion. Instead I will adopt 
Korsgaard’s other idiom of speaking of the “source” of normativity. 
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normativity will be an answer to the normative question about norms of belief as I framed 
it above. I will reserve the use of “epistemic normativity” as a name for the sui generis 
“kind” of normativity that is posited by NI.222 That is, I will use “epistemic normativity” 
to refer to one answer that has been given to the question of “doxastic normativity.”  
 Anticipating a more detailed discussion in the sections to follow, I interpret the 
two dominant accounts of doxastic normativity as answers to the normative question in 
the following way: 
TI: The source of the normativity of truth is the aim of belief. Why ought you to 
believe something only if it is true? Because either that is what you want out of 
your beliefs (what you aim to do in believing), or else because the sub-personal 
belief-forming processes themselves behave as if aimed at truth. 
NI: The source of the normativity of truth is the very concept of belief. It is 
constitutive of belief that it is governed by a standard of correctness that is the 
truth-norm. Why ought you to believe something only if it is true? Because 
otherwise you wouldn’t count as possessing the concept of belief. You might still 
have beliefs—of the sort that are caused at the subpersonal level—but you will 
not be able to deliberate over whether to believe that p at the personal level. 
Another way to see the distinction is in terms of the question of reduction. Is doxastic 
normativity brute, sui generis, and irreducible? This is the way things are according to 
NI. Is doxastic normativity reducible to some other form of normativity? This is the 
                                                        
222 This means, of course, that “doxastic normativity” should not be taken to refer to a sui generis kind of 
normativity.  
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answer of TI—specifically, that doxastic normativity is just instrumental normativity 
with the aim of truth “plugged in.” Another way to put this point is to say that NI claims 
that the answer to the question of doxastic normativity requires its own kind of 
normativity, whereas TI claims that we can answer the question of doxastic normativity 
by reduction to some other, more familiar kind of normativity—the normativity of 
means-and-ends, or instrumental normativity. 
 We can understand what this means by appealing to a staple of Kantian ethics, 
namely the distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. According to 
TI, the truth-norm is a hypothetical imperative. If you aim at truth, then you must take the 
means to getting the truth. (This includes the constitutive means of believing the truth.) 
So, if you aim at truth in believing, then you ought to believe the truth. On the other hand, 
NI thinks of the truth-norm as a categorical imperative that is constitutive of the concept 
of belief. A belief just is such that its constitutive norm is the truth-norm.  
 Now, I am not interested in the question of reducibility per se, but it does help us 
to see (up front) what each view is committed to. Some thinkers of a naturalistic bent take 
it that one thing TI has going for it is that it is amenable to a naturalistic reduction.223 I am 
not a naturalist, nor do I think of amenability to naturalism as a theoretical virtue, all on 
its own. So I am not worried about reduction for reduction’s sake. Nevertheless, keeping 
                                                        
223 For the connection between TI and naturalism, and the question of naturalism as a constraint on answers 
to the question of doxastic normativity, see, e.g., Hazlett (2013, § 5.5, § 6.1.3, and § 8.3), Steglich-Petersen 
(2013c, 205-6) and (forthcoming, 2), Kelly (2003, 619), Cowie (2014, 4006), and Côté-Bouchard (2016, 
3185, 3195-6). Côté-Bouchard observes that while a constitutive view (like NI) promises to be amenable to 
naturalism (3185), it is actually an instance of a non-naturalistic view (3195).  
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this in mind will help us to understand how an adherent of TI must interpret certain 
features of her view. 
 This brings me to the second part of this section—indicating what the doxastic 
normative question is not. It is not, as I just said, the question of reduction. I am not 
interested in reduction for its own sake. The other thing that I am not concerned with, 
which must be mentioned lest we become confused in what follows, is the normativity of 
epistemic justification per se—that is, I am not going to wade into the debate between 
adherents of the orthodox position (see next paragraph), according to which epistemic 
justification takes its normative force (and value) from the “epistemic (final) value” of 
true belief, and those who would dispute this position. 
 The risk of confusing this question with my own question of the source of 
doxastic normativity stems from the fact that the dominant answer to the question of 
epistemic justification does refer to the notion of true beliefs in terms of ends and goals—
and thus looks a lot like TI’s answer to the question with which I am interested. As David 
(2001, 151-152) and Berker (2013, § 3) have pointed out, the dominant account of 
epistemic justification is in terms of the epistemic value of true belief.224 As both authors 
observe, the acceptance of such an account cuts across other debates in epistemology, 
such as the internalism/externalism divide (ibid.). Such theories explain either why we 
                                                        
224 Another way in which the questions risk becoming confused is that the question I am interested seems to 
have emerged out literature responding to the question of the normative aspect of epistemic justification. 
Consider, e.g., Alston (1988), much discussed in chapter I, and which is primarily an attack on the view 
that the normativity of justification should be understood deontologically. In any event, what David and 
Berker are pointing out here is that a teleological understanding (or, Berker would say, a 
teleological/consequentialist understanding) of the matter has become something of an orthodoxy in 
epistemology. 
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value justified beliefs, or why we ought to believe that p only if we would be justified in 
so doing, in terms of the epistemic value of true beliefs, or in terms of furthering a goal 
that we have (usually called the “truth-goal”) to believe as many truths and as few 
falsehoods as possible. Most authors speak in terms of goals, but Berker (2013, 344-5) 
argues that values and goals, in this context, are equivalent. Regardless of whether this 
identification of goals and values is correct (and I suspect that it is not),225 the basic 
structure of such a theory of epistemic justification is as follows. First, the theory 
identifies what is of epistemic final value, i.e., valuable epistemically for its own sake. 
Second, it derives what is of overall epistemic value from what is of epistemic final 
value. (This derivative value is usually thought of as what is of epistemically 
instrumental value). Finally, the “deontic” component of the theory assigns deontic 
properties, such as “justified,” on the basis of the theory of overall epistemic value (ibid., 
344, 347-8).226  
                                                        
225 My main reason for suspecting that these ways of talking are not equivalent is that Berker (2013, 162) 
denies that the veritistic theory (whereon the value of justification is derivative from its instrumental value 
in furthering the goal of maximizing the number of one’s true beliefs) requires that persons have the goal of 
having true beliefs. This does not make sense to me. It seems to me that if we want to speak in terms of 
goals, we are going to have to say whose goals they are—whereas there is a way of talking about value that 
does not necessarily involve saying whose value. That it, there is the notion of the intrinsically valuable. 
Identifying goal-talk with value-talk seems to presuppose naturalism. See Côté-Bouchard (2016, 3193), for 
another thinker who maintains that grounding norms in values is distinct from grounding them in aims, 
pace Berker’s claim of equivalence. 
226 Such theories have their own problems. The most infamous problem for such views is what Zagzebski 
(2003b) calls the “value problem.” This problem, originally directed at reliabilist theories of epistemic 
justification, has since been discovered to be of more general import. The problem is that if we understand 
epistemic justification as valuable merely in terms of its truth-conduciveness, then we are unable to account 
for why knowledge is more valuable than (mere) true belief. Pritchard (2007, 86-87) discerns another, 
related, problem—what he calls the secondary value problem—which is the problem of accounting for why 
knowledge is more valuable than any epistemic standing that falls short of knowledge. In a nutshell, the 
problem is that epistemological orthodoxy has construed the value of justification (and thus, by its lights, 
the normativity of justification) in a merely instrumentalist way. Once the aim of justification is achieved, it 
is hard to make sense of why justification is still valuable, and thus why, e.g., a justified true belief is more 
epistemically valuable than a true belief. For a thorough overview of the value problem—also known as the 
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 It should be clear in any event why it is that the sort of theory Berker criticizes 
cannot serve, by itself, as an answer to the doxastic normative question. Such theories as 
he identifies (and critiques) just posit, or stipulate, that which is of “epistemic final value” 
(e.g., having true beliefs). But we are imagining here an interlocutor who is wondering 
precisely about that—why she ought to comply with norms that are derived (say) or 
defined in terms of, what is posited as being epistemically finally valuable. Why, she 
might ask, should I “epistemically value” true beliefs, or why should I have the 
(epistemic) goal of true beliefs? The doxastic normative question I wish to address thus 
lies at a level deeper than (and a post code away from) the problem to which the theory 
David and Berker address is an attempted solution.227 
 This leads me to a few terminological notes before closing this section. The first 
is that TI, which I will discuss in the next section is not the same as what Berker calls 
“teleological/consequentialist” theories of epistemic normativity. As I argued, these are 
(more narrowly) theories of epistemic justification as situated within a theory of 
epistemic value, of making the justification-norm out to be explanatorily grounded in the 
                                                        
swamping problem—see Pritchard (2011). See also his (2007) for a survey of work on epistemic value, as 
well as his (2014) for a defense of truth as the fundamental epistemic good. For other attempted solutions 
of the swamping problem, see Carter and Jarvis (2012), Dutant (2013), and Stapleford (2015a). For other 
defense of truth as the fundamental epistemic good, see Ahsltrom-Vij (2013) and Goldman (2001). See 
Ahlstrom-Vij and Grimm (2013) for a view whereon truth is taken as one species of a genus of epistemic 
accuracy, which view they call “accuracy monism.” Berker (2013), who is primarily concerned with 
criticizing this sort of theory raises another: according to him, such views violate what he calls, following 
an analogous problem in consequentialist ethics, “the epistemic separateness of propositions,” i.e., such 
views countenance believing falsehoods if doing so leads to a greater number of true beliefs overall. 
227 To use Korsgaard’s way of putting things, such a theory doesn’t itself call into question the value of true 
belief. Rather, it is a way of expressing confidence in said value, through its definition of the value of other 
things (e.g., justification) in terms of it. Korsgaard (1996, 39-41) charges realists about the source of 
normativity with this problem. Such theories do not answer the normative question, but express confidence 
that it need not be answered. In our context, the expression of confidence is in the claim that truth is 
“epistemically valuable,” without saying why. 
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epistemic value of true beliefs. The opposite of such a theory, according to Berker, is 
deontological in nature, whereon the value of true beliefs would be explanatorily 
grounded in the satisfaction of certain laws (or norms) of belief, such as the justification-
norm (see Berker 2013, 341). Although NI might seem to be an instance of a 
deontological theory (albeit superficially), TI is not a “teleological/consequentialist” 
theory in Berker’s sense.228  
 To restate, the question at issue here is the normative question as applied to 
doxastic normativity—specifically regarding the truth-norm. What is the source of the 
normativity of truth? Is it constitutive of the concept (or essence) of belief? Or is the 
source of normativity (and its force for the person) the more workaday notion of 
hypothetical, or instrumental, normativity?229 It is also not the question of reducing one 
kind of normativity to another per se, nor is it the question of the correct theory of 
epistemic value. These are questions, about which an answer to the actual question of this 
chapter may have a bearing, but they are not the subject of the present investigation.230 
 
                                                        
228 I say “superficially” because, really, it is not. A deontological theory targeting the phenomenon Berker 
has in mind would be of the sort critiqued by Alston (1988): an account of why it is appropriate to evaluate 
or assess beliefs (and believers) as being epistemically justified in terms of epistemic duty. NI inquires into 
the source of those very duties to which a deontological theory (in Berker’s sense) would merely be 
appealing to. 
229 Incidentally, I think that this view is worthier of the title of teleology. For according to this view, the 
source of normativity is the end or telos of belief. The theories Berker has in mind are more clearly 
consequentialist, being concerned with maximizing good epistemic consequences (true beliefs) 
(notwithstanding his all-too-quick identification of the consequentialist and the teleologist) (2013, 342). For 
the distinction between consequentialist and teleological value that is missing in Berker, see Zagzebski 
(2003a). 
230 For instance, my answer might say something about epistemic value (or the absence of said value), it 
might entail the reduction of doxastic normativity, and it might have something to say about the value and 
normativity of justification. But these are, as it were, fringe benefits of answering the question at hand, not 
ex ante constraints on the answer. 
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3 The Teleological/Instrumentalist Account (TI) 
3.1 Exposition of the Account231 
 An early statement of TI is due to Velleman (2000, 252): 
What distinguishes believing a proposition from imagining or supposing it is a more 
narrow and immediate aim—the aim of getting the truth-value of that particular 
proposition right, by regarding the proposition as true only if it really is. Belief is the 
attitude of accepting a proposition with the aim of thereby accepting a truth, but not 
necessarily with any designs on truths in general, or Truth in the abstract. 
 
 Since this passage stands at the headwaters of the contemporary discussion of TI, 
it is worth a close look. The first thing to bear in mind is that Velleman’s project in his 
chapter is not primarily doxastic normativity. Rather, he is interested in the claim, 
advanced by Bernard Williams and discussed in chapter I of this dissertation, that belief 
aims at the truth. Velleman is concerned, then, with the nature of belief, with 
individuating belief qua propositional attitude from other such attitudes, such as desiring, 
hoping, wishing, assuming, imagining, and supposing that p (ibid., 247, 250). But he does 
acknowledge that investigating the truth-directedness of belief has the advantage of 
shining some light on what has been called the “normativity of content.” The normativity 
of content thesis, usually traced back to Kripke’s (1982) work on Wittgenstein is, to put it 
simply, the claim that contents imply norms. To use Kripke’s example (1982, 37), it is 
the claim that if you mean addition by “+”, then the relation between this supposition and 
one’s response to the question “What is 68+57?” is normative, i.e., the relation is not 
                                                        
231 Adherents to some version of this view include Velleman (2000)—since converted to the opposite view 
(see Shah and Velleman (2005))—Stelgich-Peteresen (2006, 2009, 2011, 2013b, 2013c, and forthcoming), 
McHugh (2012a), Cowie (2014), and Sharadin (forthcoming). 
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such that one will answer “125,” nor even that one is disposed to answer “125,” but that 
one should answer “125.”  
 What Kripke does for linguistic meaning and assertion can be applied to mental 
content and belief (cf. Boghossian (2003) and (2005)). All that is relevant for present 
purposes is that Velleman points to the normativity of content as an area of research 
toward which one might apply the fruits of studying the truth-aimedness of belief. Since 
the normativity of content is considered problematic from a naturalistic perspective (and 
since it also seems to run afoul of the Humean dictum that we cannot derive an “ought” 
from an “is” alone (see Gibbard (2005))), it would be helpful if we could reduce the 
normativity of content to doxastic normativity, and then naturalize the doxastic 
normativity through investigating its truth-aimedness (Velleman 2000, 245).232 
(Presumably, that is, by carrying out the indicated reduction to instrumental normativity.) 
Already here, then, we find an early statement of the naturalistic constraint favored by TI.  
 Next, we should observe how Velleman understands the “truth-goal” or “truth-
aim.” According to him, this is a goal that we have with regard to particular propositions. 
Unlike the veritistic proposal that we looked at in passing in the last section, the goal here 
is not the goal of maximizing the number of one’s true beliefs. It is not even clear that one 
                                                        
232 A related, though seemingly non-naturalistic project, is undertaken by Boghossian (2003, 40-45) and 
(2005, 213-216): that of maintaining that if our grasp of the role of contents in propositional attitudes 
depends on a constitutively normative notion such a belief, then content is itself a normative notion. Unlike 
Velleman, Boghossian thinks that we can maintain the normativity of content (rather than explain it away) 
by looking at the constitutive normativity of belief. These two projects are thus diametrically opposed to 
one another, even though Boghossian (2003, 44-45) and (2005, 217-18) argues that, ironically, the 
naturalist has reason to accept his claims. 
 244 
 
has the truth-goal for every possible proposition.233 This is another way in which 
Velleman’s proposal is a forbearer of more recent TI, which eschews talk of one’s 
evidence as providing, all by itself, a reason to believe. When we consider a particular 
proposition, and believing is what is at issue, then the aim that is operative is that of 
getting it right. Thus, Velleman does not build a commitment to a strong version of the 
truth-norm into his interpretation of the truth-goal.234 
 Finally, there is the question of how the truth-aim, or truth-goal, regulates belief. 
Velleman is happy to endorse either the prospect that it is deliberate (i.e., regulation by 
the person), or non-deliberate, in the sense that subpersonal belief-forming mechanisms 
behave as if “designed” to be truth-regulating (2000, 252).235  
                                                        
233 See Horwich (2006, § 10) for a discussion of the proposal that we do have such a particular-truth-goal 
with respect to every proposition. Lynch (2004a, § IV) criticizes such a view. One motivation—as in 
Horwich—for such an interpretation of the truth-goal is that it is compatible with a minimalist theory of 
truth. For an attempt to reconcile minimalism with the value of truth that does not depend on Lynch’s 
(2004a and 2004b) account of truth as a good-making property of belief, see Coates (2009). For other 
discussions of minimalism and whether it can support the value of truth, see Moad (2008) and Mölder 
(2008). 
234 That is, one that is universally-quantified and says that, for all p, we ought to believe that p if, and only 
if, it is true that p. In this respect, his interpretation of the truth-goal is akin to Stout’s pragmatist account of 
getting it right discussed in chapter II. 
235 This is a third way in which Velleman’s discussion has set the agenda. TI will itself bifurcate into views 
that target each of these possibilities, with the latter attempting to derive the norms of belief from the 
evolutionary history of the cognitive processes that cause belief. Since such a view is analogous to TI 
proper, I will not discuss it explicitly in what follows. I take it that if we cannot make sense of doxastic 
norms in teleological terms, where the teleology is explicit and conscious, then trying to derive such norms 
from the natural history of belief-forming mechanisms is not going to work. (For critiques of evolutionary 
views, see Hazlett (2013, ch. 7) and Côté-Bouchard (2016, § 3).) Furthermore, recall the discussion of 
chapter I, section 6: the beliefs that we are concerned with here, for which norms of belief really matter, are 
not those beliefs that are just produced, but those over which we deliberate, wrestle, ponder, and debate. 
Even if we could make sense of truth as a norm of belief on the basis of natural history, this would at best 
give us a sense in which truth is the standard for well-functioning mechanisms. This is normativity of a 
sort—the normativity of the thermostat, the pumping heart, and the secretion of gastric juices (cf. chapter I, 
section 3)—but not of the sort that we are interested in here. 
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 So, Velleman concludes, in the passage cited above, belief is a truth-regarding 
propositional attitude (i.e., that it regards its propositional object as true) with a particular 
aim with respect to the particular proposition in question: to believe that p with the aim of 
thereby getting the truth-value of p right. In this way, we distinguish belief from, say, 
assumption, which is also truth-regarding, but with a different aim (the aim of taking 
something for the purposes of argument) (ibid., 246). 
 Building an account of doxastic normativity on the back of this understanding of 
belief involves assimilating doxastic normativity to the normativity of means-and-ends, 
or instrumental normativity. It is to derive the claim that we ought to believe that p only if 
it is true that p from the fact that this is just what one is trying to do in forming a belief 
that p in the first place. An early application of Velleman in this way is Steglich-Petersen 
(2006). Contrasting his position with a normativist view (specifically, that of Shah and 
Velleman (2005) discussed in section 4.1 below), Steglich-Petersen (2006, 499-500) 
elucidates TI by contrasting the different terms in which the two views criticize believers 
who believe something false. According to NI, such believers have done something 
wrong, whereas according to TI, such believers have failed to do what they were trying to 
do. Putting the matter in this way assimilates doxastic normativity to instrumental 
normativity. One has some end in mind (true belief regarding p) or perhaps a more global 
end in mind (believing all truths, or maximizing the number of one’s true beliefs), 
thereby setting up the standard against which one’s belief that p is to be judged. It is not 
something mysterious and “outside” the believer that sets up the standard, but the 
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standard is what it is by the believer’s own lights. The source of the normativity of truth 
for belief is the believer’s own aim in believing.  
 Cowie (2014, 4003-4) and Sharadin (forthcoming, 2) also put the point in this 
way, claiming that the instrumentalist understands reasons to believe in accordance with 
one’s evidence in terms of instrumental rationality—the rationality exercised in attaining 
one’s aims. Although these authors are discussing an evidence-norm, as opposed to a 
truth-norm, the basic approach applies to doxastic normativity in general. When you get 
down to it, doxastic normativity is just instrumental normativity, with the aims that one 
has in believing “plugged in.”   
 How does TI understand the truth-goal? One way, following Velleman (2000) and 
discussed in Steglich-Petersen (2009), is that it is essential to the nature of belief. 
Stelgich-Petersen (ibid., 404) writes that “an acceptance of p is a belief if it is formed and 
regulated in an attempt to comply with that aim” [that is, the aim of accepting that p if, 
and only if it is true that p]. This is to endorse what Hazlett (2013, 156, 162) has called 
“attempt essentialism about belief” and its corollary “truth-goal essentialism about 
belief.” Hazlett defines the latter as follows: “Necessarily, in virtue of the essential nature 
of belief, S believes that p only if S wants to believe that p only if p” (ibid., 162). (Note 
that this is a weaker formulation than Steglich-Petersen’s, but we can ignore this.) Truth-
goal essentialism, together with the principle that you ought to take the means to your 
ends, accounts for the source of doxastic normativity. Put simply, we have the truth-goal 
when we are considering whether to believe that p, and this is why we ought to believe 
that p only if it is true. It is what you want, desire, or are seeking to “get out” of your 
 247 
 
belief that p—a true belief. In response to our hypothetical interlocutor, we say, “you 
ought to believe the truth, and not the false, because that is just what you are trying to do 
and want to do.” 
 Another way to put TI is in terms of a story that we tell about reasons to believe. 
According to TI, such reasons are “value-based,” depending on the value of the result of 
believing (that p) or the intrinsic value of believing (that p) (Steglich-Petersen 2011, 13). 
According to the standard versions of such a view, this involves claiming that reasons to 
believe (or “epistemic reasons” as they are known in the literature) obtain in virtue of the 
derived or intrinsic value of the epistemic properties of the beliefs they support. To see 
what this means, consider the justification-norm (ibid., 17). According to this view, it is 
the derivative or intrinsic value of justified beliefs that gives you reason to believe that p 
only if you would be justified in doing so.236  
 This view reduces epistemic reasons to instrumental reasons. You have a reason 
to believe that p just in case believing that p promotes something of epistemic final value. 
The question is how TI understands this kind of value. Given its naturalistic ambitions, 
the view seems committed to characterizing epistemic value in terms of what epistemic 
agents themselves (in fact) value. What qualifies the value as being “epistemic” is that it 
is what epistemic agents value from what has been called the “epistemic point of view.” 
But what epistemic agents value from the epistemic point of view is just what epistemic 
                                                        
236 These are Steglich-Petersen’s labels for the types of value in question; bearing in mind the lessons of 
Korsgaard (1983), it might be better to render this claim in terms of instrumental and final value.  
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agents qua epistemic agents pursue.237 This has been taken by many—as pointed out by 
David (2001) and Berker (2013) (see above)—just to be the accumulation of true beliefs, 
or else (minimally) true belief with respect to a proposition that is being considered at a 
given time. But this just takes us back to the notion of what a believer is aiming at, qua 
believer. This vindicates Berker’s identification of teleological/consequentialist accounts 
of epistemic justification in terms of values and aims, though only within the proposed TI 
framework. This framework is naturalistic and thus committed to reducing values to what 
is valued by believers, i.e., what they desire and hence what they aim at and pursue 
accordingly.238  
 Applied in terms of truth, as opposed to evidence or justification, TI says that you 
have reason to believe that p only if it is true that p because believing that p when p is 
true is either of instrumental or final value—that is, it is either something that you value 
as a means to other things you value, or it is something that you value for its own sake. 
Alternately, and equivalently within the TI framework, we formulate the view in terms of 
your aims: you have reason to believe that p only if it is true that p insofar as that is what 
you aim at doing in believing, or (weaker) insofar as doing so will further certain other 
aims of yours. As we shall see in the next subsection on objections to TI, much will turn 
on whether persons have the truth-goal (desire, aim) or not. 
                                                        
237 This sort of line is traced, in another context, by Brandom (1994, 42-43). Its locus classicus is Mill’s 
Utilitarianism, where he argues that the only proof that a thing is desirable is that it is actually desired 
(1966 [1982], 192).  
238 Cowie (2014) and Sharadin (forthcoming) also discuss the view in terms of reasons. Côté-Bouchard 
(2016, 3190) calls this strategy “reasons internalism.” This seems to be an unfortunate name since it risks 
confusion with “internalism” about reasons and motivation. 
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 To sum up, then, TI, which has its origins in views about the nature of belief as 
truth-aimed, reduces doxastic normativity to instrumental normativity. Persons aim at the 
truth, or else desire true beliefs, and that is why they ought to believe that p only if it is 
true that p.239  
3.2 Criticisms of TI 
 The structure of TI suggests two objections that go for the jugular. The first 
targets the supposed value of true belief. It may be conceded, for purposes of this 
objection, that people actually claim to desire true beliefs for the sake of truth. But the 
question is raised whether persons really have this desire, whether persons really value 
having true beliefs for the sake of truth. Even more strongly, one might wonder whether 
truth is even a good thing at all, something to be valued—or whether this all rests on a 
mistake. The second sort of objection is related to the first. This is the objection that 
persons do not in fact have the truth-desire (goal, aim) or, less stridently, that persons do 
                                                        
239 A related, though, distinct account of the normativity of truth might be discerned in Brandom (2000). 
Like the pragmatist account of getting it right that was mentioned in chapter II (Stout 2007), Brandom’s 
account sources epistemic norms in discursive social practices (2000, 159, 161, 164). However, with 
Brandom’s dialectic of naturalism and historicism, we seem to get not merely a pragmatist’s version of TI, 
but rather a type of view we might call “meta-TI.” Speaking in terms of vocabularies, Brandom writes, 
“deploying vocabularies can be a useful means of getting what we want…but vocabularies do more than 
just help us get what we already want. They also make it possible to frame and formulate new ends” (2000, 
169). The truth-goal (as it features in TI) answers to what Brandom identifies as the naturalistic purpose of 
(normative) vocabularies (helping us to get what we want—in this case getting it right when it comes to our 
beliefs). The historicist purpose of normative vocabularies, however, is to help us set new ends. In both 
ways, normative vocabularies serve as useful “tools” (ibid.). Applied to our context, we might read 
Brandom as suggesting an account of the truth-norm as itself being a tool. The truth-norm, as it arises in 
discursive social practices, serves a preexisting end, namely holding each other accountable for the beliefs 
we hold, by assessing each other’s entitlements to our doxastic commitments (ibid., 164-165). It is worth 
pointing out that, by the pragmatist’s lights, this was itself once a new end, one that arose as a result of 
social practices and the use of normative vocabulary. What is now the naturalistic purpose of the truth-
norm once arose as a result of the historicist function of normative vocabularies. This opens up the 
possibility that the truth-norm, qua tool, will in time come to serve new ends or, less radically, will enable 
us to formulate new ends for ourselves and our social groups. 
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not have the truth-desire with respect to every proposition for which they have 
(epistemic) reason to believe. Thus, this account of doxastic normativity fails to 
underwrite the scope of doxastic norms—as applying to all of a person’s actual or 
possible beliefs, and not just those for which they happen to have the truth-desire. If the 
first objection is that truth is not actually something desired, sought after, or valued and 
that it isn’t something worth desiring, seeking after, or value, the second objection is 
agnostic on the actual worthiness of truth as a desire, goal, or aim, but is downright 
skeptical as to whether persons have this desire, goal, or aim, enough of the time to 
capture the full breadth of doxastic norms. 
3.2.1 The First Type of Objection 
 The representative par excellence of this first type of objection is Jane Heal, who 
argues that “the transparency of truth allows whatever valuable features there are in a 
situation or project to shine through but does not itself contribute anything of substantive 
value” ([1988] 2013, 125).240 Belief does not aim at truth at such, nor is the truth as such 
(however elucidated) a good thing. In an oft-cited passage, Heal comes to the climax of 
her attack: 
 [T]here is no goddess, Truth, of whom academics and researchers can regard themselves 
 as priests or devotees and whose service must be accepted as some justification for any 
 endeavour. Rather there are as many different projects as there are different subjects of 
 enquiry and each one of them will have its own justification in terms of usefulness or 
 intrinsic interest ([1988] 2013, 135). 
 
                                                        
240 To be clear, “transparency” in Heal’s sense is not the same as the phenomenon of transparency described 
in Shah (2003). 
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 Heal’s argument is essentially linguistic in nature. She begins by claiming that we 
have a rough handle on the distinction between evaluative and non-evaluative terms 
(ibid., 125). She states that insofar as we talk about truth being a “Good Thing,” 
something that we aim (or should aim) at in our assertions and beliefs, “truth” clearly 
falls on the evaluative side of the distinction. Her argument, simply put, is that “truth” 
does not fall on the evaluative side of the distinction. Thus, claims about truth being a 
good thing for beliefs to be, or that at which beliefs aim, or ought to aim, which entail 
that “true” is evaluative, must be false.  
 The linchpin of her argument is the claim that evaluative discourse has, as (one 
of) its function(s) the role of making intelligible what a given person “saw” in some 
action (ibid., 125). Putting aside worries about assimilating belief to the category of 
action (ibid., 130), she says that vindicating the claim that truth is a good thing (aim, right 
aim) for belief requires making sense of the idea that truth, all by itself, makes intelligible 
the activity of inquiry (ibid.). She goes on to argue that true beliefs are only ever valued 
as a means to some end, or else as essential components of some end, and never just “for 
themselves” (ibid., 131-32). She then offers a second argument, a reductio in essence, 
against the claim that we value truth for its own sake. Assuming that we do value the 
truth for its own sake implies that we think that every truth is worth having just in virtue 
of its being a truth. She then runs through an early statement of the trivial truths 
objection. There are plenty of “worthless” truths that it is not good to believe or know. 
Furthermore, even if you were to tell some story to the effect that such worthless trivia 
might be worth believing in certain circumstances, this achieves nothing but (says Heal) 
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making her point: for then you will have reduced the value of truth to the value of truth 
relative to something else, and it is this something else—some other feature of your 
situation—that makes the true belief good (ibid., 133). Already inquiring into the 
circumstances under which a certain truth would be considered good to believe gives lie 
to the notion that truth itself is the good-maker of the beliefs in question (ibid., 134). 
Thus does she arrive at the climax of her argument in the above cited passage (ibid., 135). 
 Situating Heal within this first cluster of objections, let us assume that someone 
claims to value true beliefs for the sake of their truth. Heal has argued, in turn, that truth 
is not a good thing for beliefs to be, that it is not, in fact, what they aim at, and, as seems 
implied by the non-goodness of truth, that it is not what they should aim at.  
 Although I do not aim to save TI, it is well to make a few points in response to 
Heal, given that I will ultimately be defending the claim that truth is a value. The first 
comes from Diamond (1994, 211) in her powerful response to Heal (and Rorty) qua 
debunkers of the value of truth.241 Diamond notes that Heal restricts the uses of “true” 
that she takes to settle the meaning of “true” and “truth.” Heal’s sole reliance on the 
notion of truth as it has been debated by analytic philosophers renders her unable to see 
what might be valuable about the truth. That is, instead of looking to those who have used 
the words “true” and “truth” to flag something of value, she looks at a logical-semantic 
sense of “truth” and claims to have debunked the claim that truth is valuable. Targeting 
the linguistic base of Heal’s argument, Diamond’s response looks especially to 
                                                        
241 For themes, similar to those of Diamond, but not directed specifically at Heal and Rorty, see Marcel 
(1965). 
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literature242 for uses of “true” and “truth” as capturing something of deep importance to 
the human person.243  
 Secondly, you might, like Bernard Williams, deny Heal’s claim that if x is 
valuable, then every instance of x is valuable. His example is that of music (2002, 66). 
We might find music qua music to be valuable, even if we do not in fact value every 
single instance of music.  
 This points to a third response, which I wish to advance myself. It is that Heal’s 
argument only has its persuasive force against the background of a cartoonish notion of 
the claim that truth is a value, or that truth is a “Good Thing.” (Even her capitalization 
here flags a scornful attitude from the beginning of her discussion.) This cartoonish 
notion is encapsulated by the sort of epistemological theories criticized by Berker (2013): 
those that take the basic “intellectual,” “cognitive,” or “epistemic” goal out to be 
believing as many truths as possible, the accumulation or acquisition of true beliefs, 
maximizing one’s true beliefs over one’s false beliefs, and so on.244 Heal speaks in these 
terms as well when she uses a word such as “pursuit.” The value of truth, it is assumed, is 
discoverable only if we can make sense of people having the cartoon-version of the desire 
for truth. But there might be a better way of articulating the truth-desire, such that Heal’s 
arguments lose much of their punch. As Haack (1996, ¶ 8) says, the true inquirer’s love 
                                                        
242 Diamond looks at Orwell, among others. 
243 Austin, who argues for the claim that truth is an evaluative dimension of belief (1975, 140-145; cf. 
[1979] 2007b, 130 and [1979] 2007d), would also seem to be a natural opponent of Heal’s project of 
denying that “true” has an evaluative meaning. 
244 Hibbs (1999, 589-590) argues that on a true-belief model (arising out of a rejection of certain premodern 
views about the universe and the mind’s place therein), it becomes “quite natural to think of cognitive 
progress in merely quantitative terms as the endless accumulation of true beliefs.” 
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of truth is not like the love of a collector for antiques: the “true reasoner” does not collect 
true propositions. Nevertheless, this way of characterizing the “aim of belief” and the 
notion of “epistemic value” at issue in TI shows that such a refined notion of the truth-
desire would not necessarily save the account. That is, the presence of this refined sense 
of the truth-desire in the human person would not necessarily salvage the reduction of 
doxastic normativity to instrumental normativity. In fact, I suspect that when we 
appropriately appreciate what answers to “the desire for truth” in the life of the human 
person, we will find that, far from supporting TI, it will in fact savage its simplistic 
reduction just as much as does Heal’s objection. In this sense, Heal does the debate a 
service, by calling attention to TI’s understanding of doxastic aims or epistemic values, 
and how, impoverished as it is, is unable to answer the doxastic normative question.245 
 Similar to Heal’s is the position of Rorty (1995). In that work, Rorty leverages the 
pragmatist’s principle that if something makes no difference to practice, then it should 
make no difference to philosophy. The determination of whether p is true is the same 
activity as that of determining whether p is justified (1995, 281). The fact that a belief can 
be justified but false does not suffice to show that, in addition to justification, there is also 
a norm of truth imposed on belief. It merely shows that justification is relative to one’s 
audience, and that what passes as justified for one audience may not pass as justified by 
another audience (ibid., 288).246 Taken together, Heal and Rorty present a challenge that 
                                                        
245 For a generally supportive commentary on Heal, see Dodd (2013). For a different sort of pragmatist take 
on truth, see Misak (1999). 
246 For a response to Rorty, according to which the difference between truth and justification is a difference 
that makes a difference (in terms of explanation), see Volpe (2015). 
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targets both the value of true belief qua true, and the truth-goal.247 True belief is not 
valuable, and true beliefs are not the goal of inquiry or, a fortiori, belief. Rather, what is 
valuable is what is useful or interesting to us, relative to some project, and our goal is but 
the ability to justify our beliefs to some given audience. Truth is not something we should 
aim at, since it is not a Good Thing or even something practically distinct from 
justification, and it is not, in fact, something that we even do aim at.248 Thus, the first 
cluster of substantial objections to TI. 
3.2.2 The Second Cluster of Objections 
 The first cluster of objections might be rejected insofar as they presuppose the 
sort of pragmatism embraced by Heal and Rorty. But, in fact, the criticisms of Heal and 
Rorty generalize beyond pragmatism and are thus related to the second cluster of 
objections. Simplifying my verbiage, I will continue to speak of the truth-desire, though 
we might also speak of the truth-aim or truth-goal.249 The objection here is that whatever 
“truth-desire” we may have, it is not strong enough to ground the scope of doxastic 
normativity. In addition to Heal and Rorty, Sosa (2001), David (2001) and (2005), 
Grimm (2008) and (2009), Kelly (2003), Hazlett (2013, ch. 6)250, and Côté-Bouchard 
                                                        
247 Although, in another way, Rorty and Heal are not such obvious bedfellows here, given Rorty’s 
recognition of cautionary and endorsing (i.e., evaluative) uses of true (1991, 128). I discussed the case of 
Rorty in the introduction; see fn 40. 
248 For a pragmatically inclined thinker such as Heal, these would seem to amount to the same thing. 
249 On a consistent naturalistic, or would-be naturalist picture such as TI, these come to the same thing. 
250 Hazlet also introduces what he calls the problem from unrefined thinkers in this chapter: TI has the 
consequence of denying beliefs to those who do not consciously have the aim of truth. See Papineau (1999, 
31) for another statement of this problem.  
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(2016) all argue for the absence of a truth-desire that would suffice to ground the 
normativity of truth in its full scope.251  
 What is the scope of doxastic normativity, according to this objection? It is no 
less than all possible beliefs in any proposition, which view has been given the name of 
“epistemic universalism” by Hazlett (2013, 142). Epistemic universalism, or 
“universalism” for short, can be given two interpretations, or, rather, there are two sorts 
of universalism that are lurking here, closely related to each other. The first is that 
defined by Hazlett, that “epistemic evaluation is appropriate for all possible beliefs” 
(ibid.). Call this “Universalism1.” Related to this is another sort of universalism, that 
consists in the claim that there are reasons to believe propositions that arise 
independently of any practical or instrumental reasons to believe. That is, that one’s 
evidence, or epistemic position more generally, gives rise to reasons to believe certain 
propositions, even when the person does not have any non-epistemic reason to form the 
beliefs in question. Call this “Universalism2.” We can see how these theses are related: it 
is the existence of such reasons that underwrites the universal scope of epistemic 
evaluation. Universalism2 grounds Universalism1. Accordingly, the objection splits in 
two, each taking a different kind of universalism as its starting point. 
 First, the objection claims that doxastic norms apply even in the absence of a 
desire for a true belief with regard to some proposition p. That is, there will be 
                                                        
251 There is also the possibility, raised by Owens (2003) and discussed in chapter I, that belief just does not 
have an aim. I have contended that it is wrongheaded to think of the belief-truth relationship in terms of an 
aim. Since this was already discussed, I here omit it. For a teleologist’s response, see Steglich-Petersen 
(2009). 
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propositions for which you do not desire to have a true belief, or even a true belief as 
opposed to a false belief. Examples adduced here include that of certain entries in the 
telephone book, the right- or left-handedness of certain historical personages, the relative 
locations and distances from each other of certain grains of sand on a beach, the quantity 
and disposition of dust motes on certain tables, and so on. It should thus be clear that this 
objection is related to, or an application of, the trivial truths objection mentioned in the 
introduction. The problem is that TI cannot explain the applicability of the truth-norm to 
these propositions since the person does not have the requisite truth-desire. If there is no 
such desire, then the truth-norm, as understood by TI, loses its force. Put in terms of our 
imaginary interlocutor, who asks why she should believe something only if it is true, 
when it comes to truths she doesn’t have a desire to believe, TI has no response. 
Instrumental normative force breaks down where the truth-desire does not obtain. Thus, 
this first form of the objection argues for the incompatibility of TI with Universalism1. 
We cannot get the universal scope of epistemic evaluation if the scope of the truth-norm 
(or doxastic norms more generally) is not universal. 
 The second objection in this cluster concerns the putative existence of epistemic 
reasons to believe, even in the absence of the truth-desire (and thus takes Universalism2 
for its starting-point). It is easier to see the point being made here in terms of one’s 
evidence for a proposition p. That is, shifting gears for a moment from the truth-norm to 
the justification-norm for ease of exposition, the objection maintains that you ought to 
believe that for which you have sufficient evidence. The reasons you have for doing this, 
it is held, are not dependent on the presence of the truth-desire. If you have sufficient 
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evidence to believe that Ford won Rutland County, Vermont, in the 1976 election, then 
you ought to believe it, even if you couldn’t care less. 
 The two objections are of a piece, however, since Universalism2 is what grounds 
Universalism1. It is the existence of such epistemic reasons to believe that grounds the 
universality of epistemic evaluation. Thus, the second cluster of objections is based in a 
commitment to universalism, understood as the conjunction of Universalism1 and 
Universalism2. 
 In earlier work, Steglich-Petersen (2011) confronts this problem. He maintains a 
distinction between epistemic reasons to believe that p and reasons for even forming a 
belief about p in the first place (2011, 20-21). The relationship between these types of 
reasons is governed by the following relationships: if you have an all-things-considered 
reason to have a belief about p, then if you have an epistemic reason to believe that p, you 
ought to believe that p; and, if you have an epistemic reason to believe that p, then, if you 
have an all-things-considered reason to have a belief about p, then you ought to believe 
that p (ibid., 24). The result is a picture of epistemic reasons which are hypothetical and 
instrumental, with the normative force coming from the reason to have a belief about p, 
rather than one’s epistemic reasons to believe that p (ibid., 26-29).  
 In more recent work, however, Steglich-Petersen (forthcoming) observes that the 
universalist intuition is one that is fading as the debate progresses, citing the ascendancy 
of Whiting’s [(2010), (2012), (2013a-c), and (2014)] understanding of the content of the 
truth-norm as merely a permission to believe the truth, and a prohibition on believing the 
false. In his forthcoming work, Steglich-Petersen argues for the wedding of TI with 
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permissivism about the truth-norm as a package of views (in implicit opposition to the 
marriage of NI with universalism).  
 Now permissivism is not, as such, a view defined by contrast with universalism. It 
is rather a view about the correct formulation and content of the truth-norm: that we may 
believe the true but ought not to believe the false. Its invocation here is meant to dispel 
universalism by denying that there are reasons to believe that p just in virtue of p’s being 
true, or our having adequate evidence for p. As Whiting (2012, 290-91) explains, the 
permissivist formulation of the truth-norm gives rise to a view whereon evidence for p 
does not provide a normative reason to believe that p. Thus, it undermines Universalism2, 
and, by implication, Universalism1.   
 This sort of response concedes, then, that TI does not get us universalism in either 
sense but denies that this is something to be concerned about. Insofar as NI holds that this 
is something to worry about, we come to see the general pattern of debate upon which the 
dialectic threatens to founder: a differing base of intuitions deemed worthy of rescue 
driving philosophers into the different camps. 
 The question, then, is whether we find it necessary to maintain Universalism2 and 
Universalism1. I discuss this question below. For now, there is one more rejoinder to 
consider. It is that permissivism is too weak, that there are cases in which one has an 
obligation to believe that p, because it is true, or because one has adequate evidence.  
 Steglich-Petersen (forthcoming, 7) acknowledges that this is a problem to be 
reckoned with, but maintains that permissivism is the strongest general principle about 
doxastic normativity. Nevertheless, in the case of particular propositions, there might be a 
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stronger obligation to believe the truth, as opposed to a mere permission to believe the 
truth. His solution to this problem (or the beginnings thereof) is reminiscent of, though 
not equivalent with, his earlier (2011) solution. It consists in the following principle, 
which he calls “Transmission-e”:  
 If there is reason for one to pursue the aim of coming to a true belief as to whether p, and 
 there is positive probability conditional on one’s adopting a belief that p, that this helps  
 bring about that aim nonsuperflously, then that is a reason for one to adopt a belief that p, 
 whose strength depends on the reason for one to pursue the aim and the probability 
 (forthcoming, 13). 
 
Such an attempt, once again, is non-universalistic, but tries to make room  
for a positive doxastic obligation (as opposed to a mere permission) that is nevertheless 
faithful to the terms of TI. What ultimately grounds such an obligation is still the 
existence of reasons to pursue the aim of coming to the truth about some matter in the 
first place. The existence of practical reasons is still what constitutes the answer to the 
normative question. Why should I, to use Steglich-Petersen’s example, believe what my 
evidence supports about the harmful environmental impact of my chemical lawn repair 
kit? Because I have a practical reason for doing so.  
 Having considered the major types of objection to TI, let us now turn to the other 
dominant account of the source of doxastic normativity, itself born out of considering the 
supposed shortcomings of TI. 
4 The Normativist/Intrinsicalist Account (NI) 
4.1 Exposition of the Account 
 On the other side of the debate is the position that is known as normativism, or, 
more and more commonly of late, intrinsicalism. Proponents of a view that falls under 
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this heading include Shah (2003), Shah and Velleman (2005), Engel (2011), (2013a) and 
(2013b), Railton (1994), Boghossian (2003) and (2005) and Wedgwood (2002), (2013a), 
and (2013b).252  
 The basic idea behind the normativist view is that the truth-norm is constitutive of 
the very concept of belief. A typical way of putting this is in terms of the standard of 
correctness of belief. Truth is taken by both sides of this debate to provide the standard of 
correctness for belief. We can explain TI by saying that for TI this standard of correctness 
is furnished by the desires, aims, or goals of believers, as we saw. The normativist takes 
the name of his view from the fact that he interprets this claim about truth being the 
standard of correctness of belief in terms of a norm—the truth-norm.  
 To be clear, since this account is normative, and not descriptive, it does not entail 
that all beliefs are formed in accordance with the truth-norm. This has been taken as a 
virtue of the account. What it does entails is that when one is explicitly deploying the 
concept of belief—in cases of first person doxastic deliberation regarding whether to 
believe that p—one does so with regard to a state (belief) to which one applies truth as 
the standard of correctness. If you do not accept this, then you do not count as 
deliberating with respect to what you ought to believe.  
 This is how the most influential early treatment (Shah (2003) followed by Shah 
and Velleman (2005)) frames the issue. Since Shah’s original concern was to account for 
the phenomenon of transparency within doxastic deliberation, his account of the truth-
norm is tailored to save that phenomenon, which, he argues, TI cannot save. This is the 
                                                        
252 Some also include Brandom (1994) here, although it is not so clear to me that this is correct. 
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so-called “teleologist’s dilemma” that is the centerpiece of Shah (2003) and Shah and 
Velleman (2005).  
 Before stating the dilemma, I should define the following term: “exclusivity” 
refers to the thesis that one’s epistemic reasons are the only considerations that can 
motivate conscious belief-formation. This is important, because the teleologist’s dilemma 
turns, in part, on accepting the thesis of exclusivity. The dilemma begins by noting that 
TI depends on an interpretation of what it means for beliefs to be “truth-regulated.” The 
dilemma is that either the interpretation of truth-regulation is too strong, accounting for 
exclusivity, but failing to account for the fact that (subconsciously) beliefs are formed that 
are sensitive to non-epistemic considerations, or it is too weak, accounting for such 
evidence-insensitive beliefs, but unable to account for exclusivity and transparency. The 
classic example of a problematic case is that of beliefs that are caused as a result of 
wishful thinking. If TI’s account of truth-regulation is too strong, it will entail that such 
beliefs just do not exist, i.e., they will not count as beliefs. Yet it seems that (given the 
way in which the parties to this debate understand belief) this would be to artificially 
restrict the class of belief. So TI needs to weaken its account of truth-regulation to 
include such beliefs. But once TI does so, it falls on the other horn of the dilemma, for 
then it cannot account for the case of doxastic deliberation. Shah argues that in cases of 
first person deliberation regarding whether I ought to believe that p, such deliberation is 
always (and only) resolved by determining whether it is true that p. If the interpretation of 
truth-regulation is too weak, TI is unable to make sense of this fact. Another way that one 
might put the dilemma is in terms of the consciousness of belief-formation. The 
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formation of beliefs, as understood by the parties to this debate, is something that ranges 
from the fully conscious to the totally subconscious. As such, any univocal sense of 
“truth-regulation” seems to bound to fail, insofar as it will somehow have to make sense 
both of the truth-regulation of beliefs consciously and subconsciously formed.  
 The “teleologist’s dilemma” illustrates the central positive argument-type that 
adherents of NI offer. Adherents of NI put forward a given doxastic phenomenon—e.g., 
transparency and the exclusivity of evidence as reasons to believe—and argue that TI 
fails to account for it. Hazlett (2013, ch. 8) calls this the “Master Argument” for NI and 
adds doxastic involuntarism and the impossibility of recognized false belief to 
transparency and exclusivity as phenomena that TI is unable to account for.  
 We saw doxastic voluntarism is chapter I, and transparency was just discussed. 
The claim that recognized false beliefs are impossible simple enough: we cannot 
recognize a belief as false, and yet continue to hold it as a belief. Although I glossed 
exclusivity quickly above, let me say more about it. Exclusivity is the claim that 
epistemic reasons for belief (as opposed to pragmatic reason for belief) are the only 
considerations that can consciously motivate belief-formation.253 To see this, consider a 
simple example. You are wondering whether your spouse remembered to pick up milk 
from the grocery store. Your epistemic reasons to believe that she did include your 
evidence for the proposition that she did remember. For example, walking by her car in 
                                                        
253 We might understand exclusivity in terms of the conceptual evidentialist view discussed in chapter I 
(Adler (2002), Adler and Hicks (2013)). I think that it needs to be interpreted this way, since the 
normativist understands exclusivity to be necessarily true. For an argument that transparency provides an 
argument for evidentialism, see Shah (2006); for rebuttal, see Stelgich-Petersen (2008). 
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the driveway, you see a receipt from the grocery store in the car. Your pragmatic reasons 
to believe that she remembered include non-evidential considerations, e.g., your desire 
that she remembered and your aversion to going back out to buy the milk yourself. What 
exclusivity says is that the former set of considerations (epistemic reasons) are the only 
reasons that can rationally motivate, i.e., serve as reasons for, the conscious formation of 
a belief that your wife remembered the milk. Thus, exclusivity and transparency are 
closely related. Indeed, it might be the case that exclusivity explains the phenomenon of 
transparency. That is, the fact that only epistemic reasons can motivate conscious belief-
formation explains the fact that, when deliberating whether to believe that p, we settle the 
matter by asking whether p is true. 
 In short, these four phenomena (doxastic involuntarism, the impossibility of 
recognized false belief, exclusivity, and transparency) are taken to be necessary features 
of belief, and the Master Argument for NI is an inference to the best explanation of these 
necessary features. 
 Naturally enough, the form of the Master Argument suggests the sort of 
objections that will be leveled against TI. That is, it suggests a strategy of countering NI 
by either attacking the phenomena themselves, or attacking the claim that NI alone (or 
best) is able to explain them. But before moving to criticisms of NI, let us look at the 
work of Engel (2013a-b), who provides nice schematic outlines of NI in contrast with TI.  
 In his (2013b, 36), Engel distinguishes NI from TI in four areas: (1) on the 
grounds of reasons to believe, (2) ontology, (3) epistemic norms, and (4) epistemic 
rationality. (1) When it comes to reasons to believe, NI says that these are grounded in 
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the truth-norm, whereas TI says that they are grounded in some kind of value (final or 
intrinsic).254 (2) NI presupposes an ontology of norms over an ontology of values. (3) NI 
says that doxastic norms derive their normative status from the truth-norm, whereas TI 
grounds them hypothetically (they are contingent upon our having certain aims) and 
instrumentally (they are contingent upon the norms in question guiding us to achieve 
those aims). (4) This implies two different conceptions of epistemic rationality: NI’s, in 
terms of categorical norms, and TI’s, in terms of hypothetical norms. 
 Let us pause here a moment to make two observations. It is important to note that 
Engel speaks interchangeably of values and aims.255 This speaks to the way in which 
value is being understood by the parties to this debate. It is being understood in terms of 
the distinction between what is valued for its own sake, versus what is valued for the sake 
of something else. Second, Engel, so far as I know, is unique in calling attention to the 
metaphysical dimension of this issue, to the different ontologies that each camp 
presupposes. This is an issue that has not been given its due attention and which will be 
addressed, however obliquely, in later chapters.256 
 In other work, Engel (2013a, 203) also lays out some basic conditions on a view 
counting as an instance of NI. These are (1) that the truth-norm is constitutive of the 
                                                        
254 It isn’t clear whether he really means “intrinsic” here; bearing in mind the lesson of Korsgaard (1983), it 
is probably better to understand him to be referring to final value. 
255 Engel speaks of “value” in (1), then moves to speaking of “aims” in (3), where he also speaks of the 
aims and values as interchangeable, and of the interpretation of this “aim” either in terms of a fundamental 
epistemic goal, or in terms of some intrinsic value (2013b, 36).  
256 Here, TI seems to have the advantage. What is an ontology of norms? I do not know. An ontology of 
values, by contrast, understood according to TI, is just an ontology that includes desires as states of 
persons. A naturalistic reduction of values seems easier to pull off than a naturalistic reduction of norms, so 
long as you equate the valuable with the valued as, historically, did Spinoza and Mill. 
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concept of belief; (2) that the standard of correctness of belief is determined by how 
belief fits a certain feature; and (3) that the truth-norm gives us a way of evaluating 
beliefs. (1) and (3) are boilerplate NI—the first is the basic statement of the view, and (3) 
seems to encode a commitment to epistemic universalism. (2), however, is not obviously 
boilerplate, depending on whether it is interpreted as presupposing acceptance by the 
normativist of a Fitting-Attitude (FA) theory of value.257 Since I do not wish to become 
embroiled in the debate over whether NI is committed to FA, I will not characterize the 
essence of NI as including (2), pace Engel. That is, I do not interpret NI as essentially 
committed to the claim that the standard of correctness of belief is determined by the 
fittingness of beliefs to be true.258 
 An additional variable amongst NI theories concerns the exact interpretation of 
the truth-norm. While it is agreed to be “categorical,” as opposed to the hypothetical form 
of the teleologist, its exact interpretation has been given different treatments. Engel 
(2013a, 204) understands the truth-norm in terms of an “ideal of reason,” and not a 
prescriptive norm, whereas Shah (2003, 470) originally understood it to be a prescription 
(as do Boghossian and Wedgewood) before endorsing the possibility of a permissive 
norm (Shah and Velleman (2005, 519)).  
 Prescinding from the areas in which the view is in flux, what emerges is a basic 
commitment to the truth-norm as constitutive of the concept of belief, where this implies 
                                                        
257 Engel acknowledges the consonance of (2) with FA theories of value (ibid.). 
258 Not to mention that even a former adherent of TI, McHugh, has come to propose understanding the 
standard of correctness in terms of fittingness (McHugh, 2014b). See McHugh and Way (forthcoming) for 
a more general treatment of a “fittingness-first” approach to FA. 
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a view about epistemic reasons and rationality (categorical, grounded in the fundamental 
truth-norm), ontology (norms over values), and epistemic norms (categorical and 
grounded in the truth-norm versus hypothetical and grounded in the aims of believers), 
but leaves open the exact interpretation of the truth-norm. The view answers the question 
of doxastic normativity in terms of a sui generis kind of normativity—epistemic 
normativity—that is not reducible to instrumental normativity. 
 The “master argument” for this approach to doxastic normativity is, as above 
mentioned, an inference to the best explanation, where the phenomena to be explained 
are doxastic involuntarism, transparency, exclusivity, and the impossibility of recognized 
false belief. These four phenomena are taken to be necessary features of belief. Hence, 
Hazlett notes (2013, 225), adherents of NI claim that these phenomena require an 
explanation in terms of some necessary truth about belief (namely, NI). The best way to 
explain these putative features of belief is by recourse to sui generis epistemic 
normativity.  
 NI is also the strongest way to secure universalism. One way to see this is in 
terms of how NI and TI differ in their interpretation of the claim that beliefs aim at truth. 
As the structure of Hazlett (2013) and Côté-Bouchard (2016) strongly suggest, the 
dialectic between TI and NI is perhaps best understood in terms of how they interpret 
Bernard Williams’s famous claim that truth is the aim of belief. TI interprets this claim 
teleologically, as a claim about the aim of believers, whereas NI interprets this 
normatively, in terms of a norm that is constitutive of the very concept of belief. Thus, 
whereas TI fails to secure universalism, NI does not. Truth is the norm of belief 
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regardless of whether anyone actually cares about the truth. It is, to use an analogy of 
Hazlett (2013, 210) the difference between the normativity of trying to hit the target with 
your arrow, and the normativity that derives from the very concept of an archery 
competition. It does not matter what you desire, aim at, want, or care about: belief is 
constitutively, conceptually, governed by a norm of truth. 
4.2 Criticisms of NI 
4.2.1 Regarding the Master Argument 
 One type of criticism levelled against NI targets the master argument for NI. 
Here, there are a couple of options. The first is to deny that the doxastic phenomena 
pointed to by the argument are necessary features of belief. Consider, e.g., the supposed 
phenomenon of doxastic involuntarism. The reader has but to refer back to chapter I for 
references to those who deny that involuntarism is necessary, starting with Alston (1988). 
The second is to deny that the phenomena are genuine. For example, if doxastic 
voluntarism is true, then involuntarism is not a genuine phenomenon of belief. 
Furthermore, if voluntarism is true, then it casts doubt on whether transparency and 
exclusivity are genuine.259 Another example of this strategy is that of McHugh (2013b), 
who calls exclusivity an illusion.260 In its place, he proposes what he calls 
“demandingness” and defines thus:  
 You cannot deliberatively form an outright belief in a proposition if you regard your 
 evidence for that proposition as less than sufficient, where sufficiency involves more than 
 having better or stronger evidence for the proposition than for its negation. You require 
 what you take to be some high degree or strength of evidence, or some particular kind of  
 evidence, for the proposition. (ibid., 1120)  
                                                        
259 Though not the impossibility of recognized false belief. 
260 Another way to push back against exclusivity is to motivate the claim that pragmatic reasons for belief 
can motivate conscious belief-formation. See, e.g., Reisner (2008). 
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McHugh argues that cases that seem to support exclusivity—which, he points out, are 
usually cases involving some reward for believing—are better explained by 
demandingness (ibid., 1122). In order to demonstrate exclusivity, what would be required 
is a case in which the believer takes her evidence to be sufficient and yet even in such a 
case cannot be motivated by non-evidential considerations (ibid.). 
 A third strategy is to deny that NI actually explains one or more of the putative 
phenomena. Here McHugh and Steglich-Petersen provide examples. Both thinkers cast 
doubt on NI’s ability to explain transparency. McHugh (2013a, 452-63) and Steglich-
Petersen (2006, 506) both raise the following problem. It seems that NI requires an 
implausibly strong version of internalism in order to work. That is, Steglich-Petersen and 
McHugh argue that in order to explain transparency, NI has to assume that the 
acceptance of a norm necessarily motivates you to comply with that norm (Steglich-
Petersen 2006, 506).261  
 In response, McHugh offers what might be thought of as a dilemma for NI, 
similar to the Teleologist’s Dilemma (2013b, 457ff). NI requires some version of 
internalism in order to explain transparency. But either the version of internalism is weak 
enough to be plausible but does not rule out a role for non-truth-related considerations in 
doxastic deliberation, or it is strong enough to rule out such considerations, but 
                                                        
261 More specifically, McHugh distinguishes between weak and strong transparency and argues that NI 
requires implausibly strong versions of such motivational internalism to explain each of them. To explain 
weak transparency, NI requires the following version of internalism: “Int1: If S accepts a norm N of the 
relevant kind for act-type Φ, then S will be deliberatively motivated to Φ, if at all, only by N-directed 
considerations” (McHugh 2013b, 453). Explaining strong transparency requires an even stronger version of 
internalism: “Int2: If S accepts a norm N of the relevant kind for act-type Φ, then S will be deliberatively 
motivated to Φ or to refrain from Φing, if at all, only by N-directed considerations” (ibid., 454). 
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implausible as a form of internalism.262 Hence, either NI fails to explain transparency, or 
it does so at the cost of adopting an implausible version of internalism. 
 In addition to an argument that NI cannot explain transparency, there is also the 
possibility of TI stepping in and doing the job itself. Steglich-Petersen (2013b) argues 
that TI is perfectly able to explain transparency. According to TI, deciding whether to 
believe that p is an aim-directed activity. Now consider the following principle, (G): It is 
not possible to F with aim A, while being aware that F-ing will not further A (ibid., 68). 
This seems like commonsense. You do not count as engaging in an aim-directed activity 
if you perform that activity in such a way that you are fully aware does not realize the 
aim at all. Given (G) and TI, the following explanation of transparency ensues (ibid., 68-
9, the numbering and formatting is mine).  
                                                        
262 To see this, consider the following. You accept the truth-norm. Since McHugh’s interlocutor here is 
Shah, the norm that you accept is to believe that p only if p. As McHugh points out, however, a norm of 
this form only tells you to not-believe-p if it is not the case that p. It doesn’t actually tell you to believe that 
p, when p is true. To say that acceptance of the norm necessarily motivates you to believe that p only by 
“N-directed considerations” (see fn 261), is effectively to make believing impossible. There are no N-
directed considerations (given Shah’s formulation of N) that would get you to form a belief that p, because 
the truth-norm as Shah formulates it never actually tells you to believe anything (McHugh 2013a, 454). 
This is still a fairly abstract point, having to do with the technicalities of what would count as an “N-
directed consideration.” So consider a more everyday example. Consider the case (discussed in chapter II) 
of guidance-by-values. There one of my main examples was the fourth commandment. Consider now the 
third commandment, to keep holy the Sabbath day. We can formulate this, as the precepts of the Catholic 
Church do, in terms of a norm that tells you to attend Mass on Sundays and other Holy Days. We can 
imagine someone who accepts this norm (e.g., Otto, from chapter I). McHugh’s dilemma transposed to the 
present case would say something like this. In order to explain transparency with regard to this norm (i.e., 
that the question of whether to attend Mass is transparent with respect to the question of whether it is 
Sunday or a Holy Day), we need to suppose that Otto’s acceptance of the norm is such that he is motivated 
to attend Mass only by these “N-directed considerations.” But this is implausible. Otto need not be such he 
is necessarily motivated to go to Mass only if it is a Sunday or Holy Day. Consider the contention, from 
chapter II, that norms provide guidance-by-values. Otto may very well accept the norm to attend Mass on 
all Sundays and Holy Days, and yet be motivated to attend Mass (on any given Sunday) by an appreciation 
of the infinite value of the Mass itself. “N-directed considerations” are not the exclusive springs of his 
attending Mass, even when he is deliberating with respect to whether to go to Mass. Thus, the required 
internalist thesis is false. Since internalism is necessary to explain transparency, transparency is also false.  
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 (1) Deciding whether p is true is an aim-directed activity: trivially, it involves the aim of 
 getting it right as to whether p is true. 
 (2) Deciding whether p is true on the basis of some consideration is a way of deciding 
 whether p is true.  
 (3) And deciding whether p is true on the basis of some consideration that is not relevant 
 to the truth of p is a way of deciding whether p is true that will not further the aim of 
 getting it right as to whether p is true.  
 So, (4) if someone is trying to determine whether p is true on the basis of considerations 
 she is aware do not bear on the truth of p, then G implies that it would be difficult to 
 think of her as someone genuinely trying to decide whether p was true in the first place.  
 
Thus, we have an explanation of transparency that does not require NI. TI, plus a 
relatively commonsensical principle about aim-directed activities is all we need.263 
 To recap, here is how things stand with respect to the four phenomena and the 
dialectic between TI and NI. The adherents of TI and NI seem to agree on the phenomena 
of doxastic involuntarism and the impossibility of recognized false belief.264 On the 
phenomena of transparency and exclusivity, there is, however, disagreement. The 
adherent of NI maintains that NI best explains transparency and exclusivity, whereas the 
adherent of TI begs to differ. Not only have adherents of TI advocated alternative 
explanations of these phenomena (e.g., Steglich-Petersen), but they have also called into 
question whether they are genuine doxastic phenomena in the first place (e.g., McHugh). 
                                                        
263 In fairness, Steglich-Petersen only claims that this explains what he calls “transparency*.” Earlier in his 
paper, he argues that Shah’s articulation of transparency is not accurate enough. Thus, not only does he call 
into question the necessity of NI as an explanation of transparency, but he also calls into question the 
adequacy of how NI characterizes transparency. According to Transparency*, “one can consciously decide 
the question [whether p is true] in a way that issues directly in forming a belief as to whether p, only on the 
basis of considerations one takes to be relevant to [whether p is true].” (2013b, 67). The difference between 
this formulation and the spirit of Shah’s formulation is that Steglich-Petersen disputes Shah’s claim that we 
cannot even deliberate about the non-evidential features of a belief. Whereas Shah’s version of 
transparency rules this out, Steglich-Petersen’s allows for deliberating with non-evidential considerations, 
and only rules out the possibility that such considerations directly issue in a belief at the conscious level of 
doxastic deliberation (ibid., 65-7). 
264 An exception is Shah (2002), who advances arguments for doxastic voluntarism. 
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In short, the objections to the so-called Master Argument for NI reveal not only 
differences of interpretation, but also more basic disagreements of fact. 
4.2.2 Other Objections 
 I will now briefly consider several other objections to NI that do not specifically 
target the master argument in one of the three ways I identified in the last subsection. In 
addition to those mentioned above, Steglich-Petersen (2006, 507-9) offers two further 
objections. The first is that NI fails to evoke the interest that we have in the truth in its 
explanation of doxastic deliberation. Why, when I am deliberating about belief, do I 
follow a truth-norm? He argues that Shah and Velleman cannot explain why we follow a 
truth-norm in terms of an interest in the truth because (a) it would make the truth-norm 
instrumental in a way anathema to how they understand transparency and normativism 
and (b) because evoking an interest in the truth would call into question why we need a 
norm to explain transparency in the first place. Secondly, and relatedly, NI fails to 
explain why it is that we demand different levels of evidence in different contexts. Once 
again, TI is better suited to explain this phenomenon. Our interest in the truth, together 
with the fact that different truths have different levels of importance for us, explains why 
in certain contexts we demand more evidence (ibid., 509). To use his example, I might 
form a belief about what is on TV tonight on very little evidence, but not about whether 
climate change is anthropogenic (ibid.). 
 There are two final objections to mention. First, there is the objection of Cowie 
(2014, 4007-8) that NI is saddled with a “striking coincidence” between the utility of 
believing in accordance with the evidence, and the existence of epistemic reasons to 
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believe. Given the striking coincidence, it seems that NI is saddled with an 
overdetermination problem: in addition to the prospect of practical utility grounding 
doxastic norms, there is also just a “brutely epistemic normative truth” (ibid.). Second, 
there is an objection from Côté-Bouchard (2016) that, in essence, NI does not answer the 
doxastic normative question. That truth is the standard of correctness for belief leaves 
open the question of “whether there is any good reason to have correct beliefs” (ibid., 
3194). Of course, he says, the normativist can (and often does) build genuine normative 
force into the standard of correctness, giving it its “normative” interpretation. But what 
grounds a normative interpretation of the standard of correctness? It cannot be the aim of 
belief, since this aim is not, for the normativist, something separate from the truth-norm: 
for the normativist, the truth-norm just is the normative interpretation of the claim that 
truth is the aim of belief. This objection claims, in effect, that NI cannot answer the 
doxastic normative question, bringing us full circle to the main question of this chapter. I 
will discuss this issue further in section 6.  
5 Other Accounts 
 Before turning to a discussion of what lessons can be learned from this 
consideration of the dominant views, I now briefly consider some alternatives. If you 
like, the dialectical landscape can be understood by an analogy with ethics. Just as 
consequentialism and deontology were the two dominant views until virtue ethics was 
resurrected, so too in this debate we have a Big Two, but also several contenders. Since I 
will offer my own account as such a contender to the Big Two, I will mostly refrain from 
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offering criticisms of these views, content to take what lessons I may from their 
discussion of these issues. 
 The first sort of proposal that exists involves a reduction of epistemic normativity 
to what we might call moral normativity. That is, it makes norms of belief out to be a 
matter of morality. In its way, this approach is similar in spirit to TI, which reduces 
doxastic normativity to instrumental normativity. Think of this, then, as an intermediate 
option between the supposed mysteriousness of positing a sui generis category of 
epistemic normativity and the equally mistaken reduction to instrumental normativity. 
The upshot of this “intermediate reduction” is that it places the doxastic normative 
question back firmly in the moral arena. Any answer as to what, if anything, justifies the 
claims that morality makes on our actions should now also cover the claims made by 
norms of belief. 
 Wrenn (2007) holds such a view. He denies that there are any epistemic “duties” 
in the sense of duties that are grounded in “purely epistemic considerations” such as 
evidence (2007, 119). Thus, he denies the position that you ought to believe that p just 
because you have sufficient evidence for p. Ultimately, Wrenn argues that in all cases 
where there is a supposed epistemic duty, there will also be a moral duty with the same 
content. He argues that if a person considers a proposition p, then that person has a pro 
tanto moral obligation to have the attitude toward p that is favored by her evidence (ibid., 
121). This obligation, he says, is but a special case of a more general moral principle: 
“Whenever a person has a range of mutually incompatible options, she has a pro tanto 
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moral obligation to take whatever option is best from the standpoint of promoting 
people’s ends (or one of those options, if there is a tie)” (ibid., 122-23).  
 In this respect, Wrenn’s account is similar to that of Grimm (2009). Wrenn argues 
that the obligation to believe in accordance with one’s evidence is a special case of his 
more general principle insofar as, to achieve our ends and to enable others to achieve 
theirs, we need accurate information (both from our own and others’ beliefs) and others 
need our beliefs to be accurate as well. Grimm makes a similar point by suggesting that 
we take truth to be a common good, which he articulates by analogy with clean drinking 
water (2009, 260-61). Just as any particular “parcel” of clean drinking water may not be 
valuable to me, so too any particular true propositions may not be valuable to me.  
 There is a hitch, though. Grimm and, implicitly, Wrenn accept universalism.265 In 
order explain universalism without recourse to NI, he needs to tell a story about a moral 
obligation that we have to believe the truth, even when we do not care about a given 
proposition. Whereas Wrenn talks about the need for accurate information in order to 
discharge our duty to promote the ends of ourselves and others, Grimm talks about the 
social and communal value of true beliefs. As potential sources of information for others, 
he argues, we have an obligation to have true beliefs, for we do not know when our 
beliefs will be relied upon by others as they seek to fulfill their own ends (ibid., 259). 
 One might argue at this point, pace Wrenn and Grimm, that their views are 
insufficient to secure universalism, for surely there are propositions that have nothing to 
                                                        
265 Grimm appeals to universalism as a critique of NI, as noted above. 
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do with helping anyone attain anything.266 Wrenn’s response to this objection is 
important, as it leads us to the next contender. Wrenn claims that we do not first decide 
whether a proposition is important before deploying our habits of mind upon it (2007, 
125). Therefore, he argues, we need to treat both significant and insignificant 
propositions alike, or else our habits of mind will be adversely impacted when it comes to 
those propositions that are important or relevant. I take his argument to be this. We have 
only one set of intellectual habits, which are not deployed in one way toward one set of 
propositions (the significant-to-me), and in another way toward another set (the 
insignificant-to-me). Therefore, Wrenn’s duty applies regardless of the proposition in 
question, for if we slack off when it comes to some, albeit trivial, propositions, our 
intellectual habits will be weakened when it comes to others that are important and 
relevant. Thus, Wrenn points the way to a virtue-theoretic account of the truth-norm.  
 Now, I think that Wrenn makes a mistake here. I think that we determine (and 
ought to determine) whether a proposition bears consideration given our current 
circumstances before we contemplate it or inquire into it. It does no good to stop fleeing 
the scene of an explosion because propositions about the dynamics of flying objects 
suddenly come to mind. Wrenn’s problem is yet another instance of a problem I have 
often hearkened back to: that of abstracting from the human person for whom truth is a 
norm. It is a short step from talking about intellectual habits to talking about virtue. But 
                                                        
266 We must be careful in formulating this potential objection, however. For although I have said that 
Grimm (and, implicitly, Wrenn) accept universalism, this is not precise enough. What they accept is a 
version of universalism tailored to their sort of account, but which nevertheless has the same ambitions of 
scope, namely, that all possible beliefs are morally evaluable.   
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the intellectual virtues, as (e.g.) Aquinas argues, do not, of themselves, motivate us to act 
(ST IaIIae, q. 57, a. 1, resp.; cf. De Virt., q. 1, a. 7, reply).267 We need the deliverances of 
the other virtues, especially prudence, to determine whether we should take up a certain 
proposition, or engage in a certain inquiry. The truly virtuous man will determine (e.g.) 
that counting the number of gum-balls in the tank is not worth his time. This does not 
entail that the truth in question is without value; it just entails that the virtuous man is not 
someone who stops to take it up. Furthermore, pace Wrenn, this does not seem to weaken 
the virtuous man when, acting in accordance with prudence, he takes up a certain 
proposition. If anything, it enables him to give himself over more deeply to such truths of 
greater significance. 
 Wright (2014) is one philosopher who explicitly takes up the norms of belief into 
a virtue-theoretic framework. The simplest statement of her view, which she goes on to 
refine, is that one ought to believe that p if, in the circumstances, the intellectually 
virtuous person would believe that p (ibid., 240). She appeals to a Stoic distinction 
between telos and skopos, or end and “local target,” in order to argue (against TI) that 
truth is not our epistemic telos, but that it is our skopos on particular occasions of 
considering a proposition. Our epistemic telos, as we might expect from a neo-
Aristotelian account, is to live in accordance with intellectual virtue (ibid., 243-44). 
Wright would agree with the point that I made in response to Wrenn: for various reasons, 
                                                        
267 Of course, this is disputed by some contemporary philosophers, but not in a way that adversely impacts 
the point I am making here. See, e.g, Zagzebski (1996, Part II, § 3.1), who argues that the intellectual 
virtues are a subset of the moral virtues, and so include a motivational component. Also, some 
contemporary thinkers prefer to integrate the virtues as having both moral and intellectual components, or 
as involving both the will and the intellect, as opposed to making the classic distinction between moral and 
intellectual virtues. See, e.g., Roberts and Wood (2007, 69-71).  
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we will not seek to learn every truth. Sometimes we positively should not seek to find out 
a certain truth, e.g., those contained in a friend’s diary. What is required is that prudence 
determine what truths are to be sought out or given attention, and which are not (ibid.). 
Thus, according to her final version of the virtue-theoretic truth-norm, we ought to 
believe not only such that we act in accordance with the intellectual virtues, but also such 
that we act in accordance with a proper aim in believing (ibid., 247). 
 In her own way, then, Wright can also be seen as endorsing a reduction of 
doxastic normativity to moral normativity, with an interpretation of moral normativity in 
terms of the requirements of virtue. What sets her view apart from those of Wrenn and 
Grimm is that there is no attempt here to save universalism. In this way, Wright’s account 
has a certain integrated quality to it. Like the virtuous person, her account submits the 
norms of belief to the tribunal of the totality of virtue, especially prudence. There is no 
reason to claim that whenever the virtuous person has evidence for p that he must believe 
that p simply on account of his having evidence. In short, Wright’s account agrees with 
Wrenn and Grimm in reducing epistemic normativity to moral normativity, but disagrees 
with them in eschewing universalism.  
 There are two other accounts to consider that come under this heading of 
eschewing universalism. The first is due to Zagzebski (2004). She argues that doxastic 
norms apply in virtue of the demands of what we care about, so that there is not a 
separate domain of epistemic value, or epistemic normativity (2004, 353). What we care 
about gives us a non-epistemic obligation to believe in a conscientious manner (ibid. 
356). She builds up the scope of her account in steps—beginning with the demands of 
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those domains that we care about (ibid., 357) versus those that do not (ibid., 359) to the 
demands of “our” (collective) caring about morality (363-67). Zagzebski argues that if 
you care about anything at all, then you have an obligation to be conscientious in the 
formation of beliefs regarding the domains that you care about. If you care about x, then 
you care about the truth of x, and thus, by your own lights, have an obligation to be 
conscientious in your beliefs regarding x.  
 At this point, it might just seem that Zagzebski is a teleologist who has bitten the 
bullet with regard to universalism (since she says that if one does not care about a 
domain, then one need not be doxastically conscientious in it (ibid., 359, 372)). But this is 
not so, for instead of speaking just about the cares of individual believers, she talks about 
our collective cares as well: morality and social roles (ibid., 368). So the scope of her 
account is such that doxastic norms cover cases in which we care about some domain 
together (the domain of morality and our inter-locking social roles), or in which 
individuals find that they care about some domain. 
 It is also important to note that Zagzebski’s account differs from a non-
universalist version of TI insofar as she invokes care as opposed to aims. The difference 
is not merely verbal, but phenomenological. Invoking the importance of what we care 
about calls to mind Frankfurt’s (1982) article by that name. The experience of the 
normative force of what we care about is not merely the force of instrumental 
normativity. What Frankfurt calls “volitional necessity” (1982, 264) is described as an 
experience that is both “liberating” and “enhancing” of one’s self (ibid., 267). I think that 
in reflecting on Frankfurt’s “obscure” kind of necessity, we find that it is different from 
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the “necessity” of taking the means to our ends. Such a necessity is far from liberating in 
many cases and is not such that it necessarily (or even often) enhances one’s self and 
one’s autonomy. Just think of cases in which our ends are pressed upon in some way by 
unavoidable need, or else unfortunate or evil circumstances. What we care about 
furnishes a necessity that is liberating and enhancing, but what we merely aim at does 
not. This is because not all aims are cares, and we do not always care (in Frankfurt’s 
sense) about that which we merely “aim at” in some way.268 Thus Zagzebski’s account is 
distinct from a non-universalist version of TI. 
  Finally, there is the account of Papineau (2013).269 Papineau also argues that there 
is no distinct, sui generis category of epistemic normativity, so that, where there is 
nothing of moral, “personal,” or aesthetic value at stake, there is no obligation to believe 
that p just because it is true, or justified by your evidence.270 In this respect, his account is 
similar to that of Wrenn and Grimm. But Papineau goes considerably further than do 
they, since he is both disinclined to insist on epistemic universalism, and to maintain that 
there is always some kind of moral, “personal,” or aesthetic value at stake that would be 
lost should one believe falsely (2013, 66-67).271 Finally, he argues that the truth-norm 
                                                        
268 For one example, consider this. We all “aim at” nourishing ourselves, giving ourselves adequate 
sustenance. But not everyone cares about what they consume, so that they are conscientious in finding out 
information of nutritional and gustatory import. (Just think of President Trump and his well-done steaks 
with ketchup.) But also think about someone for whom eating is a burden, due to some serious illness. He 
still aims at nourishing himself, but his heart, to use Frankfurt’s metaphor, isn’t in it. He recognizes the 
need to eat, but the force of such normativity is cold and blind—not liberating and enhancing. 
269 This paper follows up on his (1999). 
270 I have put “personal” in Papineau’s use of “personal value” in scare-quotes so as not to confuse it with 
what personalists like Scheler or von Hildebrand call personal value. Papineau uses “personal” just to 
denote that which a given person happens to desire. 
271 Although he does note that his view is compatible with universalism should one be inclined to defend it 
(ibid., 74). 
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arises out of the social practices of our society, and thus that its normativity is bounded 
by that practice (ibid. 76-77).272  
 Thus, the contenders. As we can see, what they share is a reduction of doxastic 
normativity to moral normativity, where this is not merely (or, in the case of Papineau, 
not always) instrumental normativity. They are divided by two issues. The first is 
whether they endorse universalism. Wrenn and Grimm want to hold onto universalism, 
whereas Wright, Zagzebski, and Papineau do not. The second is how they interpret the 
moral normativity in question. For example, Wright takes a virtue-theoretic approach, 
whereas Wrenn takes a deontological approach.  
 Now that we have looked at the two dominant positions, criticisms of each, and 
the contenders, the next step is to pull together the lessons that to be learned from the 
consideration of these positions. Specifically, I will use these positions to assemble a set 
of desiderata for the theory that I will begin to outline at the end of this chapter, and 
more fully articulate and defend in chapters IV-V.  
6 Desiderata for an Account of the Normativity of Truth 
6.1 The Primary Desideratum: Answering the Doxastic Normative Question 
 Apart from any other conditions of adequacy that we can discern from the 
existing accounts of the source of doxastic normativity, the primary desideratum should 
be obvious, given the question with which this chapter began. An account should provide 
                                                        
272 Ultimately, he thinks that there is an evolutionary story to explain the genesis of these practices and 
why, for instance, human beings cannot help being believers (ibid., 73, 78-9). But this answer does not, due 
to its practice-boundedness, have any prescriptive import and cannot close the normative question. His 
account is thus reminiscent of the pragmatist accounts mentioned above, and in chapter II (see Brandom 
(1994) and (2000) and Stout (2007). 
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a satisfactory, if not compelling, answer to the question of the source of doxastic 
normativity. That is, our account should hope to assuage our imaginary interlocutor who 
is asking for a justification of the demands of doxastic normativity. Although I do not 
claim to have offered a definitive argument against TI and NI, I have argued that these 
views come up short. In this respect, neither an account of allegedly sui generis 
constitutive norms of belief nor TI’s version of the truth-desire (that we have trouble 
locating) is going to work. Offering a satisfactory answer to the question of the source of 
doxastic normativity, then, is the primary desideratum.  
6.2 Lessons from the Contenders 
 In this section I will present lessons from the contenders to TI and NI that we 
should take to heart in crafting conditions of adequacy for an answer to the doxastic 
normative question. The first such lesson concerns the role of what we care about. 
6.2.1 The Importance of What We Care About 
 I have argued against the concept of belief that is presupposed by many parties to 
the debate regarding the normativity of truth. Part of that criticism turned on the fact that 
we care about belief (about our beliefs and those of others, and about being believers). 
Our understanding of belief should be able to account for this. Furthermore, it is this 
caring about belief that makes intelligible the project of uncovering the norms of belief. 
An analogue of Zagzebski’s (2004, 356) point is applicable here: if we care about x, then 
we should care about the truth of x and seek out the truth of x. In the setting of this 
dissertation, x is belief, and the truth about x is the truth about belief, including the norms 
(if any) of belief.  
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 What is required is an account of the source of doxastic normativity that dovetails 
with the fact that we care about belief. But what is the nature of the dovetailing in 
question? Pace Zagzebski, I do not think that it is promising to ground doxastic 
normativity in what we care about, if only because I am skeptical as to whether persons 
really care about the truth in such a way to get the scope of doxastic normativity right.  
 Now, you may recall that Zagzebski also speaks of what “we” collectively care 
about, such as morality and social roles. My worry here is that this talk of collective care 
is going to devolve, ultimately, into claims either about what everyone individually cares 
about, or what everyone individually ought to care about.273 I have already made clear my 
skepticism of the first disjunct. The second fares little better. It may get around the 
problem that many individuals do not care about the truth, but it does not constitute an 
answer to the normative question. All that it does is reformulate the question: why ought I 
to care about the truth?  
 Perhaps this reformulation is a better way of putting the question. Indeed, my own 
account can be read as providing an answer to this version of the question. It might be, 
then, that my account is not far off in spirit from Zagzebski’s. Nevertheless, for now I 
maintain the following distinction: between an answer to the doxastic normative question 
in terms of what we care about, and an answer that makes intelligible the fact that (many 
of us, at least) do in fact care about the truth. An answer of the first sort seems to be held 
                                                        
273 In later work, Zagzebski (2012, ch. 7, section 3) seems to have in mind the notion of a “collective 
person” or “collective self” that might lie behind the collective cares mentioned in her (2004). The notion 
of a collective person is a fraught one in personalism. Scheler (1973, ch. 6) endorses their existence, Stein 
([1922] 2000) wrestles with this issue, and Hartmann ([1932] 2007, ch. 25) emphatically opposes Scheler. 
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hostage to contingent desires of individual persons, while the second is not, though it 
does take upon itself the task of explaining why many do care about the truth, as well as 
rendering the truth attractive as something to be cared about. 
6.2.2 Just Say “No” to Epistemic Value 
 Another lesson from the contenders that I wish to appropriate is the rejection of 
“epistemic value” as distinct from other sorts of value. This rejection is shared by 
thinkers as otherwise diverse as Zagzebski and Papineau. In this section, I wish to explore 
the possibility of rejecting the notion of “epistemic value.” 
 One reason for rejecting the notion of epistemic value concerns what is called the 
“epistemic point of view.” Thinkers who invoke the epistemic point of view include 
Stapleford (2015a) and (2015b), Mizrahi (2012), Ahlstrom-Vij (2013), Grimm (2009) 
(who attributes it specifically to TI), Pritchard (2014), and Alston (1985) and (1988). 
Zagzebski (2004, 369-70) is critical of talk of an epistemic point of view. 
 As Hazlet’s review of epistemic value makes clear, valuing something from the 
epistemic point of view “has something to do with treating truth as a good, or end, or 
goal” (2013, 131). It is, therefore, closely connected with TI. (In fact, I could just as 
easily have included this subsection as a negative lesson discerned from considering TI. 
But I have chosen to include it here as a positive lesson discerned from considering the 
contenders.) Bearing this in mind, and bearing in mind also the naturalistic ambitions of 
TI, we can see that the epistemic point of view is also the (supposed) point of view from 
which we “have” the truth-goal, however that ultimately gets spelled out.  
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 With this in mind, let us consider a canonical statement of the epistemic point of 
view, namely, that of Alston (1985, 59): 
 That point of view [i.e., the epistemic point of view] is defined by the aim at maximizing 
 truth and minimizing falsity in a large body of beliefs…our central cognitive aim is to 
 amass a large body of beliefs with a favorable truth-falsity ratio. 
 
The problem with this is that it seems that the criticisms of those, canvassed above, who 
deny the existence of such an aim get the better of the epistemic point of view. Earlier, I 
made the point that Heal seems to operate with a cartoonish notion of truth as something 
that we value. However fair or unfair Heal is being to the facts, she is certainly being fair 
to the characterization of those facts by someone like Alston. If what is epistemically 
valuable is what is valued from the epistemic point of view, and the epistemic point of 
view is defined in terms of the desire to amass a large body of beliefs (while maximizing 
the ratio of truth beliefs to false beliefs), then individual true beliefs are epistemically 
valued (again: valued from the epistemic point of view) only insofar as they contribute to 
the satisfaction of this desire.  
 The question, then, is why it is that the epistemic point of view continues to be 
invoked, despite the fact that it seems as though we have no such desire to amass true 
beliefs. Alston introduces it in connection with the issue of epistemic justification, but as 
the citations above make clear, it has taken on a life of its own. I offer the following 
speculation regarding the prevalence of the epistemic point of view in the literature. 
 As discussed above, TI has a problem with the thesis of universalism. That is, it 
has a problem making sense of the universal scope of epistemic evaluation (evaluation of 
all beliefs in terms of truth-value). The problem, as Hazlet and other push it, is that we do 
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not in fact have the truth-goal (aim, desire) that TI puts forward as the source of the 
normativity of truth. The epistemic point of view seems to provide a neat solution to this 
problem. If we find that we do not in fact value true beliefs in the way required for TI to 
surmount the objection from universalism, then we find some abstract point of view from 
which, it is claimed, we do in fact value true beliefs in the required way. 
 The epistemic point of view thus seems ready-made to take in the homeless truth-
goal of TI and give it a “home” in the internal economy of the human person. The 
problem, however, is that the epistemic point of view is, as we saw above, itself defined 
in terms of the truth-goal, so that the goal shows up within the epistemic point of view, 
and the epistemic point of view just is the home of the truth-goal. This is circular. We 
might be able to make sense of the claim that human persons have the truth-goal if we 
could find something answering in ourselves to the epistemic point of view. But I do not 
think that the reverse obtains. Even if we had the truth-goal, why should this be thought 
to require the existence of a special point of view, “within which” we have the truth-goal? 
Why couldn’t it just be one of the many other goals that we juggle in an everyday sense? 
As Zagzebski (2004, 369-70) points out, all that this achieves is the mystification of 
epistemic value, making it seem incommensurable with other sorts of values, as if we 
cannot balance the pursuit of our intellectual goals against the pursuit of our other goals. 
 The chief problem, though, for the epistemic point of view is that it is an 
abstraction, which, I have speculated, has been embraced by adherents of TI as a way of 
maintaining the existence of a strong “desire for truth” as understood by TI. But consider 
the following argument. If a point of view P is defined in terms of our valuing-
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something-within-P that we do not find ourselves valuing in a regular way, then P cannot 
justify the claim that we do in fact value that thing, albeit from the point of view of P. 
That is, if we do not find that we value something in the everyday sense (from our 
“regular” point of view, so to speak), then the existence of a special point of view, 
posited to justify the claim that we do value the thing in question from the special point 
of view, is posited to no avail, and so just as well should not be posited.  
 Consider an example. Imagine that, in the far future (or even the near future), the 
preponderance of human persons does not value religion. Would it do any good to posit 
the existence of a “religious point of view,” such that, with respect to it, we can justify 
evaluating things from the point of view of religion, or justify ascribing to people some 
kind of religion-goal? If we do not care about religion in a regular way, from our regular 
point of view, we will not suddenly find that we value it from an abstract point of view.  
 The upshot here is that if we want to maintain that something is valued, we cannot 
just slap a label on it, call it “X-ly” valuable, and justify this by saying that the thing in 
question is valued within the “X” point of view. If the fact that we value X is what is 
being used to underwrite the normativity of X (as is the case with truth, according to TI), 
then it should be something that we value in the regular way, without invoking an 
abstraction like the epistemic point of view. If the naturalistic aspirations of TI are to be 
taken seriously, it must work with what nature gives it. If we are to understand 
normativity in terms of value, and value in terms of what is valued, and what is valued in 
terms of (variously) what aims, goals, or desires we have, then we need to find that we 
have the aim, goal, or desire in question. If we find that we do not have the desire in 
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question (as many authors have argued), then calling the value “epistemic” and housing it 
in a special “epistemic point of view” is not going to achieve anything but, as Zagzebksi 
says, mystifying how our different goals relate to each other. 
 Related to the strategy of invoking the epistemic point of view is Lynch’s (2004b, 
46-47) invocation of the distinction between prima facie and all-things-considered 
goodness. He also refers to prima facie goodness as ceteris paribus goodness, and the 
goodness of something considered by itself. When it comes to true belief in particular, he 
calls it a “cognitive good.” True belief is always prima facie good, i.e., it is good when it 
is considered by itself, everything else equal. It is good from the cognitive point of view.  
 Now, the problem which Lynch’s view attempts to solve is that of explaining the 
sense in which we value or aim at true belief, without having to claim that, for any and 
every true proposition, we ought to believe it. By including a ceteris paribus clause, 
Lynch hopes (to use one of his examples) to maintain both that believing that the number 
of motes under the carpet is n when it is n, is something that we value, and also that we 
need not form the belief in question. The very fact that Lynch is worried about this points 
to a problem both for his framework, and for the epistemic point of view, namely, that of 
making sense of why (given that we value all true beliefs, or given the aim at amassing 
true beliefs) it isn’t the case that we ought to go around simply hoovering up true beliefs.  
 But this is to invent an abstraction to solve a problem that doesn’t need solving. 
To see this, let us consider something that Pritchard (2014) says: we value true beliefs 
because they are true. I would say that true beliefs, if they are valuable, are valuable 
because they are true. That is, we only invoke the category of epistemic value (and the 
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epistemic point of view), or prima facie value because we understand the value of truth in 
terms of the value of having true beliefs and maximizing the number of true beliefs that 
we have.  
 It is this emphasis on the possession of true beliefs that is problematic.274 It is 
what, in this context, drives skepticism about the value of truth. How, it is asked, can 
truth be valuable, when there are so many truths (with an “s”) that I just do not care 
about, and would not care if I happened to be in error about?275 By tacitly shifting the 
locus of value from the truth itself, to the possession of true beliefs, we invite skepticism 
as to the value of truth, which we then attempt to patch over by invoking the abstraction 
of the epistemic point of view and what we “value” from that non-existent locale, or else 
the notion that truth is a “cognitive good,” one that is only good prima facie, or ceteris 
paribus.  
 We can contrast a Thomistic point—that truth is the formal object of the 
intellect—with the claim that truth is a “cognitive good.” We can also contrast the claim 
that truth is the end of the intellect with the claim that truth is a “cognitive good.” The 
first point is just that the intellect apprehends things under the aspect of truth. The second 
is that the final cause of the intellect is knowledge of the truth. It is the volitional and 
affective “spheres” or “dimensions” of the human person that apprehend being under the 
aspect of goodness. As Aquinas says, truth is but one good falling under the will, just as 
                                                        
274 As noted earlier, Hibbs (1999, 589-590) contends that this is the result of what he calls the “true belief” 
model in modern epistemology that results from the abandonment of certain features of premodern 
epistemology, especially the emphasis on contemplation. 
275 It is, to put the point somewhat metaphorically, not to be able to see the (value of the) forest for the 
(value of the) trees. 
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(the truth about) goodness is but one truth falling under the intellect (cf. ST Ia, q. 82, a. 1, 
ad 1; a. 4, ad 1). Truth is the good of the intellect, but it is not an intellectual-good. It is, 
more simply, a “species of good…contained under the common notion of good” (ibid.). 
 By divorcing the value of true beliefs from their basis in the value of truth, of 
course we make it seem only right and natural, that we should have as many of them as 
we can. Beliefs (it is perhaps naïvely assumed) can be itemized, and so we fall into the 
aggregative fallacy: it is a simple matter of addition: more true beliefs are better than 
fewer. But consider the case of music, to use an example of Williams (2002, 66). No one 
thinks that the value of music is reducible to the value of possessing musical recordings, 
say, or the value of having “taken-in” or “consumed” musical performances. No one 
thinks that from some musical point of view, the more music we consume, amass, or 
possess, the better.  
 The alternative that I am trying to motivate may be put in terms of Marcel’s 
distinction between being (être) and having (avoir).276 It is wrongheaded to assimilate 
values to the category of having. Values cannot be possessed. We can possess a knife, a 
collection of books, or a photo album. We can be said to “have” or even “own” these 
things. Difficult cases (that motivate Marcel’s inquiry) include such things as my body 
and my life. In whatever sense I have a computer, it is not the same sense in which I have 
“my” body or “my” life. Even less so should we think of values in terms of having or 
possession. Even if we source our values from what is merely valued, this would still be 
                                                        
276 For Marcel, this distinction is one that is primarily arrived at by reflecting on the relationship between 
me and my body. My body is not merely something that I have, nor am I (strictly speaking) identical with 
my body. See, e.g., Marcel ([1950] 2001a, 95ff). 
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false. We value our spouses, children, personal relationships, and communities, but these 
are most certainly not things that we have or possess.277  
 Any attempt to possess a “value” is both a contradiction-in-terms and doomed to 
failure. The value of truth—like all values—is something that must be incarnated.278 That 
is, we must come to embody, exemplify, realize in our own being the value of truth. The 
value of truth is not the “prima facie value” of having true beliefs. Rather, believing truly 
is one way in which we incarnate the value of truth in our being. There is a difference 
between having a belief, and being (identifying with, living out of) a belief. You can have 
a million true beliefs and never incarnate the value of truth.279 You can have one true 
belief, and incarnate that value deeply. Part of the account offered of belief in chapter I, 
section 6, was meant to suggest how belief properly so-called is a way in which a person 
can incarnate the value of truth. Truth itself is what is valuable, and that value can be 
incarnated in various ways.280 Wrenching one of those modes of incarnation (believing) 
                                                        
277 It might be that the advocate of epistemic value would agree with the spirit of this paragraph, conceding 
that we cannot possess values, but maintaining that we can possess valuable things (e.g., true beliefs) that 
are valuable in virtue of the value of truth (which we cannot possess). The problem is that once an advocate 
of epistemic value endorses this point, the locus of value shifts from true beliefs themselves to the truth. 
Once this shift occurs, the raison d’être of the epistemic point of view crumbles even further. Given the 
analogy with music, why maintain that the existence of a point of view from which we desire to amass as 
many true beliefs over false beliefs as possible? 
278 See Marcel ([1952] 2010, 133-35). 
279 Marcel writes: “However, when I reflect at the same time on the value of this accumulation, it seems to 
me absurd: what weight can what I was able to know or annex to myself have, when compared with what I 
have not seen or assimilated” (1964, 71). Applied to our context: how can the value of maximizing 
(accumulating) true beliefs be seriously taken to have any value, when you compare what we “have” of the 
truth, with what we do not have—nay, rather, even cannot and never will have?  
280 So too with music. The value of music can be incarnated in various ways. But to pull one of those ways 
out from the whole—e.g., listening to a recording of music—and making it what is of value raises the 
question whether it is really valuable to listen to every piece of music (no matter what), and, with it, the 
specter of skepticism about the value of music.   
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apart from the rest,281 transforming it into a mode of possession (the mere having of 
beliefs), and setting it (so transformed) up as what is valuable sets us down the path that 
leads to epistemic value, and the epistemic point of view.282 One false abstraction begets 
another. The lesson is clear: just say “no” to epistemic value. 
 This observation is, of course, not a complete argument for this point. What I 
believe I have succeeded in doing, though, is arguing against epistemic value and the 
epistemic point of view. The question is that of their replacements. I have suggested that 
truth can be thought of as a value simpliciter and not a special kind of value that we 
“value” from some special point of view. The question is how to understand value. The 
point about Marcel is anticipates one way in which we might think of values, such as 
truth, that doesn’t set us off down the road I’ve just argued that we should stay clear of.  
                                                        
281 Kelly (2011, 179) speaks in a related vein when he describes the moral imperfections that result from 
striving to be perfect according to one particular virtue. Inevitably, wrenching apart one virtue and singling 
it out for cultivation is going to lead to moral imperfection in terms of the other virtues. Courage, if 
wrenched apart from the whole of virtue, can make us inhuman; the single-minded pursuit of justice can 
make us forgetful of charity and mercy. In this context, Kelly is discussing the various “antimonies” that 
Hartmann argues exist among the various values (including the virtues). Although it would be theoretically 
satisfying if morality were such that satisfying one moral value perfectly did not lead to any imperfections 
in the satisfaction of other moral values, Hartmann is not at all sanguine that this theoretical desire can be 
fulfilled in human practice. Hartmann writes, “all valuational elements [i.e., values], taken in isolation, 
have in them a point beyond which they are dangerous, that they are tyrannical, and that for the true 
fulfillment of their meaning in their real carrier [i.e., the person] there is always a counter-weight” ([1932] 
2003, 424). The moral consciousness of the human person is more complicated than appeals to various 
“points of view” would have us belief. If Hartmann is right, then the very idea of the epistemic point of 
view is that of a perspective from which truth is a tyrant, with the human person merely balancing the 
tyranny of his desire to amass true beliefs set against the tyranny of his desire for other things. 
282 For an example from outside the doxastic domain, consider the following. A fraught issue in 
contemporary Catholicism concerns the reception of Holy Communion by those in certain relationships 
(e.g., divorced and remarried). To graft this (perhaps somewhat clumsily) onto the present framework, it 
seems that some parties to this controversy take the value of communion between God and man, wrench 
apart one of its modes of incarnation (the reception of Holy Communion), transform this into a certain kind 
of having (your right to come up and “take Communion” along with everyone else), and set up this regular 
having as what is of value. This leads down the road to a particular point of view, wherein it seems that 
nobody can be denied what is coming to them. In practical terms, this wrenches the reception of 
Communion apart from the whole set of sacred doctrine and practice within which it is set.  
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The point is also that we needn’t assume naturalism as an ex ante condition on our 
thinking. That is, instead of voluntarily contracting an intellectual cramp, and forcing 
ourselves to argue that truth is valuable only if, and because, persons in fact value it (a 
claim about which I have indicated my skepticism), we should feel free to argue that truth 
is valuable, quite apart from being valued. I shall say more about this in the next 
subsection, but for now the point is just this: a commitment to answering the normative 
question in terms of the value of truth need not turn on whether people in fact desire the 
truth, though it should make sense of the attractiveness of truth, as something that is 
desirable for the human person, i.e., as something that it makes sense for persons to care 
about. 
6.3 The Lesson from NI 
 The primary lesson to be learned by considering NI is that it does not answer the 
doxastic normative question. We are told something about the concept of belief: that it is 
partially constituted by a truth-norm, and that you do not count as possessing or 
deploying that concept unless you also accept and submit to the truth-norm. But this does 
not close the question, for we can always ask the question, why go in for belief at all?  
 The nerve of the problem here is that of locating the normativity of truth in belief. 
If you tell someone that they ought to believe truly, and then proceed to tell them a story 
about belief, they can always just shirk the duty by opting out of believing. What is 
needed is an account of the normativity of truth that comes from considerations about 
truth and its relationship to the human person. 
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 The question may be raised as to whether we can really opt out of believing. 
Perhaps we can, and perhaps we cannot.283 I think that what drives the sense that we 
cannot opt out of believing is, again, an understanding of believing that takes perceptual, 
and other low-level, beliefs as paradigmatic. Of course, we cannot opt out of belief in that 
sense. Or can we? I suppose it depends on whether you think that skepticism is really 
possible for a human being. We are also told that we cannot help but believe because, as 
we have heard, it is involuntary—like blushing or secreting gastric juices. You cannot 
just do it, and you cannot just not do it. But recall the lesson of subsection 6.2, the 
importance of what we care about. The more important question is whether we can opt 
out of higher-end beliefs.  
 I think that opting out of higher-end beliefs is possible, and my evidence for this 
is the fact that it seems that many persons have done just that, whether through apathy or 
through substituting mere opinions (or opinionated beliefs, to use the terminology of 
chapter I) for beliefs. Hence, being told that belief just comes with a truth-norm, take-it-
or-leave-it, rings hollow. It also seems that the possibility of opinionated belief as I have 
described it seems to apply to a great many persons, who do not seem to care a whit 
about the truth-norm and yet are coherently described as having “beliefs.” Nor can we 
just write them off as not engaging in what Shah and Velleman call “doxastic 
deliberation,” which is their strategy for dealing with such cases. For persons enthralled 
by opinionated beliefs are perfectly able to deliberate about what to believe next. It is just 
                                                        
283 For example, Papineau (2013, § 11) raises this question and concludes that, at best, there might be an 
evolutionary story to tell as to why this is impossible for human beings. 
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that instead of exemplifying a genuine openness to the truth, these deliberations are about 
propping up their preexisting (opinionated) beliefs.  
 What is required is that truth itself make intelligible the attractiveness of non-
opinionated belief, and believing, in the first place. This is precisely what NI cannot give 
us. Why ought I to believe truly? To reply that this is just because otherwise you’re no 
believer is no answer. A primitive, fundamental truth-norm is not an answer to the 
normative question. It is, to paraphrase Korsgaard, an expression of confidence that the 
question need not be answered.  
 As an account, NI is divorced from that being for whom truth is a norm. It is a 
general principle of norms that they are always norms for some entity or other.284 A norm 
N is a norm of x for some (kind of) entity e. Truth is a norm of belief, but for the 
believing human person. Therefore, I hold that it is a condition of adequacy that any 
account of the source of the normativity of truth (for belief or anything else) refer to that 
being for whom it is a norm. We cannot understand why something is a norm for us, if we 
do not include the “for-us” in our account of the norm.285 
 
 
                                                        
284 This is not to imply a sort of normative relativism, in the sense of “relativism” popularized by moral 
relativism, but rather to insist on an essential relatedness of norms to beings for whom they are norms. For 
this distinction of modes of relatedness, see von Hildebrand ([1977] 2016, 33-34). 
285 What, though, to say about the four phenomena which NI picks out and claims cannot be explained 
except by NI? As we saw, it is far from settled (a) that these phenomena are genuine, (b) that they are 
necessary, and thus require an answer that is a necessary conceptual truth about belief, and (c) that NI is the 
best explanation of them. In addition to citing skeptics about (a)-(c) in the literature, I also have motivated 
my own skepticism with regard to one of the four phenomena (doxastic involuntarism) in chapter I. Thus, I 
do not think that we need take these phenomena as ex ante constraints. 
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6.4 The Lessons from TI 
 In contrast with NI, at least TI attempts to make intelligible the connection 
between person, truth, and belief, by claiming that persons have a desire that their beliefs 
be true. However, as I pointed out in chapter I, section 6, belief is better thought of as a 
commitment. Furthermore, this commitment is susceptible to being lived in two 
completely different ways. I am skeptical, as I have indicated above, that persons (for the 
most part) have the sort of desire required by TI to make sense of the scope of doxastic 
normativity. That is, it might be that TI makes sense of norms being applied to beliefs for 
which persons have the requisite truth-desire, but as we saw in the criticisms of TI, it 
cannot make intelligible norms applying to beliefs for which there is no such desire on 
the part of the person.  
6.4.1 Whether to maintain epistemic universalism 
 You might wonder whether this means that I think that universalism is worth 
saving. As I set it out above, universalism is the conjunction of Universalism1 and 
Universalism2, with the latter grounding the former. Universalism2 is the claim that, as 
Hazlett puts it, epistemic evaluation is appropriate for all possible beliefs. This is 
grounded in the truth of Universalism2, according to which there exists epistemic reason 
to believe any proposition for which you have sufficient evidence, regardless of anything 
else (especially, regardless of whether you desire a true, or justified, belief that p).  
 Nothing I have said commits me to universalism as the conjunction of 
Universalism1 and Universalsim2. My worry is that the truth-norm as understood by TI 
does not generate all of the doxastic obligations that exist. But this does not commit me 
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to thinking that we have obligations to believe propositions just because they are true, or 
just because we have sufficient evidence to justify said belief. That is, while I do not 
think that TI is strong enough, this does not commit me to universalism, which is too 
strong, and which drives us into NI, or some universalist-friendly version of the 
contenders (Wrenn and Grimm).  
 If, however, Universalism1 were taken just to mean that all of a person’s actual or 
possible beliefs are subject to evaluation in terms of the truth-values of their propositional 
contents, then I am committed to universalism. Call this weaker sort of universalism, 
“Universalism*.” I understand Universalism* similarly to how McHugh (2012b) 
understands the truth-norm as an evaluative norm. It is good for beliefs to be true, and 
bad for beliefs to be false. However, I think that there is an asymmetry here. The 
goodness of truth for belief is best understood as a necessary condition on the belief’s 
being good, as one component or element of its goodness. The badness of falsity for 
belief, however, is best understood as a sufficient condition of its badness. In this, I am 
inspired by a remark of Whiting’s (2013b, 222; 2013c, 126-7) that there is an asymmetry 
when it comes to norms of belief: believing the truth is not always good, but believing the 
false is always bad. 
  This claim calls to mind a more fundamental asymmetry that comes out of 
Aquinas’s moral philosophy. Consider the following: 
 Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the ways mentioned above, from lacking 
 goodness in another way. And thus it may happen that an action which is good in its 
 species or in its circumstances is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa. However, an  
 action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since evil results from a 
 single defect, but good from the complete cause, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). (ST 
 IaIIae, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3) 
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Given that for Aquinas truth is the end, good, and perfection of the intellect (see SCG 
Book 1, chs. 59, ¶5, 60, ¶2, 71, ¶4; ST IIaIIae, q. 60, a. 4, ad 2), and since this is also the 
case (making some adjustments) for TI, the question is whether we can make sense of a 
given act of believing the truth being bad either in its species or in its circumstances. 
Since I do wish to have to presuppose anything controversial here about the individuation 
of action-types, let me focus just on circumstances. The question is what circumstances 
can render a given act of believing the truth out to be evil.  
 Here Aquinas, tapping into Augustine before him, offers an answer that it at odds 
with much contemporary thinking, but which I think it is worth mentioning. It concerns 
the vice of curiosity (ST IIaIIae, q. 167, a. 1). Now, strictly speaking says Aquinas, we 
must distinguish between knowledge of the truth and the desire, pursuit, and study of the 
truth. Strictly speaking, knowledge of the truth is good, but it may be evil accidentally. 
This occurs when the knowledge has some bad consequence(s), e.g., that it is the 
occasion of pride in the knower, or when the truth is used to an evil end by the person.  
 So a given act of believing the truth (to return to talk of belief) may be 
accidentally evil when, for the believer in question, believing the truth is an occasion of 
the vice and sin of pride. Better to be a humble fool than a proud genius. And better never 
to have believed some truth than to have believed some truth as part of the means to 
bringing about some evil course of action. 
 Now, although Aquinas distinguishes strictly between knowledge of the truth, and 
the desire, study, or pursuit of the truth with regard to analyzing the goodness or evil of a 
given belief, I think that we should not make this distinction out in too rigid a manner. 
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This is because it seems that the rightness or wrongness of a given act does depend in 
part on the desire that is bound up with a complete account of the action. Aquinas himself 
takes this point on board in his analysis of the goodness and evil of human actions in 
general. So I think that we can also look at the ways in which the desire, study, or pursuit 
of truth can go wrong, to see the circumstantial manner in which a given act of believing 
the truth is evil.  
 Aquinas distinguishes two types of ways in which the desire, study, or pursuit of 
truth can go wrong. The first type just repeats the two ways in which knowledge itself 
may be accidentally evil: the desire, study, or pursuit of truth might be put to evil ends or 
occasion the cultivation of vice. The second type targets the desire and study of the truth 
as being inordinate in some way. Here he gives four specific ways: (1) when a person 
studies x, where this prevents studying y, and the person is under an obligation to study y, 
(2) superstitious curiosity, whereby the person seeks to learn something from someone he 
should not take for a teacher, e.g., trying to divine the future with the help of demons, (3) 
when the person seeks to know the truth about creatures, without referring this to its due 
end, the knowledge of God, and (4) when the person seeks to learn the truth that is above 
the capacity of his intelligence, thereby placing himself at risk of error. 
 These are all ways in which we can make sense of the asymmetry observed by 
Whiting. Let me give an example of each to make this clearer, starting with (1). There are 
some things that we are obligated to study, and to find out the truth about. Some of these 
things are attendant on all human persons (learning the moral law might fit in here), some 
are attendant on particular roles you undertake (e.g., parents ought to study how to care 
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for an infant before the child is born, priests ought to study the Gospels (and much else 
besides)), and some are attendant on particular individuals (à la Zagzebski) insofar as 
they are bound conscientiously to seek out the truth about those things that they care 
about. For example, if you are a father-to-be who obsessively focuses on the details of 
your stamp collection, gathering all sorts of evidence, and believing all sorts of truths 
about stamps, to the neglect of those truths that you ought to be pursuing and studying 
about infant care, these beliefs are accidentally evil in themselves, and also essentially 
evil with regard to the acts of pursuit and study.  
 (2) might be naturalized286 in the following way: you ought not to learn things, or 
seek truths, from an evil source. If you want to know the truth about why your friend has 
stopped talking to you, hacking her phone and computer to read her communications with 
other persons is an evil source of acquiring these truths; similarly, if more dramatically, 
seeking out medical secrets at the feet of Nazi doctors who performed inhumane medical 
experiments on Jews is evil.  
 (3) can be naturalized to appeal to those who do not share Aquinas’s view that the 
final end of man is God. The point to be learned, minimally, is this: finding out the truth 
about our world cannot be set up as an all-embracing final end, all by itself. As I have 
already said, it is a mistake to take having true beliefs out of its placement alongside 
other human goods. The lesson here is that if your desire, study, and pursuit of the truth 
                                                        
286 By “naturalized,” I mean putting Aquinas’s claim in a way that does not overtly presuppose the 
existence of God. I think that Aquinas’s discussion of curiosity contains insights that are valid regardless of 
the question of God’s existence, and my “naturalizing” the discussion of curiosity is meant to uncover what 
these are. 
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becomes detached from the wider sphere of human goods, then some circumstantial evil 
has crept into your doxastic life. If you spend all of your time hitting the “Random Page” 
button on Wikipedia, or asking Google for trivium after trivium, while you neglect your 
relationships and withdraw into isolation, then something is wrong.  
 Finally, there is (4) the evil of seeking that which is beyond your ken. It is clear 
enough as it stands. For example, if you do not “have a mind for” advanced mathematics, 
and (we might add) have no reasonable hope of acquiring a mind for mathematics 
through mathematical training and education, then you should not study it: you are setting 
yourself up for many false beliefs.  
 This, then, is what we might call the Curiosity Argument for Whiting’s point 
about asymmetry.287 This, together with the general point about the asymmetry between 
good and evil when it comes to human action shows that we should be wary of embracing 
universalism in the second sense: that is, that you ought, or have reason to, believe that p 
just because p is true, or just because you have adequate evidence for p. Looking at the 
wider picture shows that we should be hesitant to endorse such an interpretation of 
doxastic normativity.  
                                                        
287 Though, to be clear, the argument is not Whiting’s. It is an application of some insights of Aquinas to 
give a better foundation to Whiting’s point. This point, about curiosity being a vice, may not sit well with 
some contemporary readers. Many, for example, might take the opening line of Aristotle’s Metaphysics as 
being an indication of the naturalness of curiosity. For an interpretation that does not endorse a reading of 
the “natural desire to know” in terms of curiosity, see the corresponding discussion in Aquinas’s 
Commentary on the Metaphysics. See also Aertsen (2005) for an excellent discussion of how Aquinas 
understands the natural desire to know, and how Aquinas negotiates the curiosity issue. Aertsen also calls 
attention (rightfully) to the fact the Heidegger appropriates this way of thinking about curiosity in Being 
and Time (¶ 36). On these themes, see also Ramos (2012b). (Although I have focused on Aquinas’s account 
of curiosity with regard to intellective knowledge, Aquinas also discusses it in regard to sensitive 
knowledge (q., 167, a. 2): it is this Augustinian theme that is especially picked up by Heidegger. 
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 To review, the lesson here is that while we need not assume that epistemic 
universalism is true, nevertheless TI, in virtue of the way in which it grounds doxastic 
obligations, is not strong enough to ground the full extent of those obligations. That is, 
there are propositions that you ought to believe, even when you could care less about the 
proposition in question. Still, there is a sense of universalism worth saving 
(Universalism*), which maintains that truth is an evaluative dimension of beliefs, without 
committing to the evaluation being specifically “epistemic.”  
 I have also endorsed Whiting’s claim about the asymmetry between truth and 
falsity with regard to their goodness for belief. I also argued that this asymmetry can be 
seen as but one instance of a general asymmetry between goodness and evil maintained 
by Aquinas. I applied this specifically to the case of belief by appeal to Aquinas’s 
discussion of curiosity.288  
 So TI, while attempting to render intelligible that truth is a norm of belief for the 
person by invoking its understanding of the truth-desire, is unable to capture the full 
range of our obligations, specifically those obligations we have to believe certain true 
propositions even when we do not desire to have the belief in question.  
6.4.2 On the formulation of the truth-norm 
 I have hitherto deliberately left the exact formulation of the truth-norm vague, so 
as not to become distracted by the tedious details of that debate. But now I think that, 
                                                        
288 The reader should note that this general asymmetry is also on display in Aquinas’s notion of conscience, 
discussed in the last chapter: while it is wrong to act against one’s conscience, it is not necessarily right to 
do so. Once again, more than one element (conscience) is required to make an action good, but the absence 
of one element is enough to make it evil. 
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with enough of the relevant discussion on the table, we are in a position to offer some 
positive remarks with respect to formulation. 
 Let me begin by introducing two sets of formulae, the first under the heading of 
principles of doxastic obligation, the second under the heading of principles of doxastic 
permission. 
 Principles of Doxastic Obligation: 
 (0) "p(£Bp « p) 
 (1) "p(£Bp ® p) 
 (2) "p(p ® £Bp) 
 Principles of Doxastic Permission: 
 (3) "p(¯Bp « p) 
 (4) "p(¯Bp ® p) 
 (5) "p(p ® ¯Bp) 
Where “£Bp” is interpreted as “you ought to believe that p,” and “¯Bp” is interpreted 
as “you are permitted to believe that p.” (0) and (3) are false because they entail (2) and 
(5), which are false. That p is true is not a sufficient condition for it being that the case 
that you ought to believe that p, for there may obtain other conditions (such as those 
described in the discussion of curiosity) that militate against this. What may be 
surprising, given my endorsement of Whiting’s asymmetry claim above, is that I reject 
(5), the principle that if p is true, then you may believe that p. It should be clear, however, 
from my discussion of Aquinas on curiosity that the truth of p is not sufficient for you 
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being permitted to believe that p. There are other facts that may prevent this from 
obtaining.  
 Now one might qualify (5) by saying that p gives prima facie permission to 
believe that p, or permission ceteris paribus. We have already seen such a strategy in our 
consideration of Lynch, who deploys such a strategy (in effect) to maintain (2) against 
objections. The problem, though, as I have already pointed out, is that such a conditional 
is uninformative, boiling down to: if p, then you may believe that p, unless you ought not.  
 So I think that it is best just to stick with (1) and (4), which has also been the 
conclusion of others as well.289 What these principles tells us is that it is a necessary 
condition on our doxastic obligations and permissions that the propositions referred to by 
those obligations and permissions be true.  
 Even these principles come in for objections of course. One is that they do not 
really tell us what to do, in the sense of offering a positive prescription. This was the 
argument from guidance, which I addressed in chapter II. Related to this is the objection 
of Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007), levelled against (1), but applicable also to (4), that 
such principles just do not tell you to do anything (see my discussion of this objection in 
the introduction). Then, there is also the argument that (1) and (4) are incompatible with 
similar norms formulated not in terms of truth, but of justification. This was Gibbons’s 
Puzzle, also discussed in chapter II.  
 Finally, you might ask what is so great about defending (1) and (4). Adopting the 
words of Steglich-Petersen (forthcoming, 7), we might say that these are the strongest 
                                                        
289 For example, Shah (2003), Boghossian (2003) and (2005) and Gibbons (2013). 
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general principles that we can defend. Colloquially, the norms are translatable into 
ordinary language as “you ought to believe that p only if p is true” and “you may believe 
that p only if p is true.” Truth is not sufficient for generating either an obligation, or a 
permission, but it is a dimension of the goodness or evil of a given (act of) belief.  
 Of course, the principles I have formulated to this point, and my brief 
commentary thereon, are provisional and over-simplified, as I have not taken into account 
the interaction of these principles as initially formulated, with what I said in response to 
Gibbons’s puzzle, in chapter II. So as not to get bogged down here, I include a more 
detailed discussion, as well as my more considered and (provisional) response to the issue 
of formulation in Appendix II.  
 This last conclusion is, I think, of a piece with the other desiderata that have 
emerged in this section. I am concerned to make intelligible the notion that truth is a 
norm of belief for the person. The normative lives of persons are seldom (if ever) a 
matter of considering only one normative standard, of pulling out only one normative 
thread, even in the case of belief. It is seldom enough that one factor counts in favor of 
some act, for the existence of an obligation, or even a permission, to perform that act. 
Even the case of a view according to which there are intrinsically good act-types, such as 
Aquinas’s, does not give us this simplification. There are questions of circumstance and 
consequence, intention and end, to consider.  
 But despite these nuances, it remains the case that there are absolute prohibitive 
boundary conditions to what one ought, or may, do. By contraposing (1) and (4), and 
applying the rule for converting negated modal claims, we obtain the following: 
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 (1') "p(~p ® £~Bp) (If p is false, then you must not believe p.) 
 (4') "p(~p ® ¯~Bp) (If p is false, then you may not believe p.)290 
Call this, if you must, the norm of falsity, as opposed to the norm of truth. But I maintain 
that this is ultimately a norm of truth (a) because falsity is only intelligible against the 
background of truth,291 and (b) because the ultimate grounding of these norms is the value 
of truth, and not the disvalue per se of falsity.  
 The positive point is the more important, however. Truth is but one element that 
makes for an act of belief that is good and right. There are many propositions that, were 
you to attend to them, you would see to be true. Consider, e.g., the numerous propositions 
about your immediate environment, and then add to those the conjunctions, disjunctions, 
double-negations, etc., of all those propositions. Being a wise steward of your life as 
valuable involves not fixating on any one value. Of course, you could just sit at your desk 
forming beliefs all day. But this would be to transform truth from a value to an idol—and 
since it is such a high value, the corresponding idolization would be grave. Truth is but 
one condition on the goodness and rightness of a belief.  
6.5 Summary List of Desiderata 
 Here is a list of the desiderata that have emerged in the course of this section, 
with regard to an answer to the doxastic normative question. 
                                                        
290 You may think that this isn’t quite right and that what is wanted is a permission to believe ~p, not 
merely the permission to not believe p. But recall that “~p” is itself a truth. If this were sufficient for 
permission to believe ~p, then we would be back to principle (5), which was rejected. 
291 Consider the following words of Aquinas: “as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so 
every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some truth” (ST Ia, q. 17, a. 4, ad 3). 
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 (1) It must make intelligible the fact that we care about belief as I have 
 presented it, and that we therefore care about the norms of belief. 
 (2) It must not make the mistake of invoking the epistemic point of view, or some 
 sui generis category of epistemic value. 
 (3) It must relate, in a meaningful way, to the subject of the normativity of truth—
 the human person.  
 (4) It must do so in a way that gets the relation to the person right. A purely 
 instrumental understanding is not adequate. 
 (4a) It must do so in a way that gets the scope of doxastic normativity right, i.e., it 
 must secure the applicability of norms of belief in a way that is stronger than what 
 is secured by TI, though not so strong as to entail universalism2. 
(3) and (4), of course, are central, being related to (1) and (2). Avoiding the mistake 
mentioned in (2), and satisfying (1), should constrain our thinking in such a way that we 
satisfy (3) and (4). (4a) is a corollary to this basic dilemma between (3) and (4): in 
negotiating the right way to relate truth, belief, and person in our account of doxastic 
normativity, we should be sensitive to the scope of the demands that our answer entails—
and aim for something that is neither too weak, nor too strong. 
 Now, as I have indicated, I will be turning to the work of several personalist 
philosophers in my bid to articulate a response that meets these desiderata.292 Before 
turning the corner, however, I think that some attempt at bridging the philosophical space 
                                                        
292 More specifically, I will appeal to European personalism (as distinguished from its idealist cousin, 
American personalism, advanced (e.g.) by Parker Bowne). I discussed this briefly in the introduction. 
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in which we have been tarrying and that to which we are travelling, is in order. This I 
propose to do in a very concrete way, by linking how two contemporary philosophers 
from “this side of the pond” approach the issue before us, with a seminal representative 
of personalism. This will also allow me the opportunity to clarify my own method, as 
well as introduce the account that I will be articulating and defending in chapters IV-V. 
7 Bridging Analytic Epistemology and Personalistic Ethics:  
 Lynch—Williams—Von Hildebrand 
7.1 The First Bridgehead: Lynch and Williams 
 At one end of our bridge stands the work of Michael Lynch, especially his 
(2004b), which I will discuss in what follows, but also his (2004a), (2009a), (2009b), and 
(2012). Of all the parties to this debate, Lynch is the one thinker whose approach comes 
closest to the one which I shall attempt in subsequent chapters. He grounds the 
normativity of truth in the value of truth, as I hope also to do. Let us then see how he sets 
about his task.  
 Lynch writes that, “Something is normative if it is worthy of aiming at, or caring 
about. But something is deeply normative, or a value properly so-called, when it is 
worthy of caring about for its own sake” (Lynch 2004b, 16). It is not clear whether Lynch 
thinks of aiming-at and caring-about as equivalent, or whether his account is meant to be 
disjunctive. I have already indicated that I think we should not be so quick to identify that 
which we aim at with that which we care about. Perhaps Lynch’s inclusion of the word 
“worthy” helps to solve the problem. I will pass this by, since, as we shall see, Lynch 
mostly sticks to the idiom of care.  
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 The first question to be resolved is that of making sense of the distinction that 
Lynch appeals to in the quotation cited. Taking our cue from his use of the word 
“deeply,” let us formulate this as a distinction between that which is deeply normative 
and that which is superficially normative. We know that he takes the deeply normative 
(or a value properly so-called) to be that which is worthy of being cared about for its own 
sake. The question is how to understand his category of the superficially normative. His 
subsequent example of love, and the discussion that follows (ibid., 16-17) indicates that 
he thinks of such superficial normativity in instrumental terms. He writes: 
 Love is arguably like this [i.e., deeply normative]. Being in love with someone isn’t good 
 only as a mean to other things…People value love even when it is highly impractical, or 
 even detrimental to their pursuit of other ends. Love is worth caring about for its own 
 sake. Indeed, to love someone just because it gets you something you want arguably 
 means that you don’t really love him or her at all. (ibid.) 
 
 Following up, he says of truth that it is “more like love than money. We—or at 
least most of us—care about truth, at least sometimes, for more than instrumental 
reasons. Truth is deeply normative; it is worth caring about for its own sake” (ibid., 17). 
Lynch’s distinction between the superficially and the deeply normative, then, is just the 
familiar distinction between that which is merely instrumentally valuable, and that which 
is finally valuable.  
 There is, however, an ambiguity in the category of final value. There is, on the 
one hand, that which is in fact valued for its own sake, and there is that which ought to be 
valued for its own sake. At this stage of his work, Lynch is clearly operating under the 
former interpretation. This can be seen by considering what he cites as evidence for the 
claim that truth is finally valuable. This evidence consists in his claim that we have a 
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“basic preference” for the truth—that is, that we prefer a true belief over a false belief 
even in cases where the beliefs are of equal instrumental value to us. He says that: 
 Normally, the fact that we care about something is very good evidence that we find it 
 worthy of caring about. Accordingly, if you care about truth for its own sake, then you 
 presumably believe…that truth is worthy of caring about in just that way. (ibid., 19) 
 
 Hence, Lynch interprets his superficially normative/deeply normative distinction 
in terms of instrumental and final value, and he understands the latter in terms of that for 
which persons have a “basic preference.”293 Now our question is whether Lynch’s 
arguments support the existence of a basic preference for the truth. For this, let us 
consider the final scenario on which he rests his case, the so-called Russell World. 
 In the Russel World scenario, we have a choice between living in one of two 
worlds. The first is the actual world. The second is a world in which everything is the 
same now, and will be the same going forward, as in the actual world, but the past is 
different: specifically, the Russell World is such that it came into existence a mere five 
minutes ago, despite seeming to be as ancient as the actual world (ibid., 18). The critical 
aspect of the scenario is that because the present and future are held fixed, our beliefs are 
of equal instrumental value (or so it is stipulated). Lynch argues that we would choose the 
actual world, despite no difference in instrumental value, because we want our beliefs 
(about the past) to be true, “to track reality” as he puts it, regardless of this making no 
difference, instrumentally speaking (ibid.).  
                                                        
293 Notice that this account is not the same as Zagzebski’s, considered above. On that account, the 
normativity of truth is grounded in other things (not the truth) that we care about, whereas on Lynch’s 
account, the claim depends on caring about the truth itself. 
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 David (2005) has criticized Lynch’s argument here as establishing nothing more 
than what he calls a de dicto desire that our beliefs, whatever they are, be true.294 This 
was one of the polarities of belief that I considered in chapter I, section 6, albeit under the 
heading of belief-as-commitment. David’s diagnosis seems at least as plausible as that of 
Lynch. You might, for instance, think of the preference for the actual world over the 
Russell World in terms of a horror of being duped. This, if you recall, was James’s way 
of describing those who emphasize the law of shunning error over the law of believing 
the truth. We can apply James’s insight here: what explains the “basic preference” is not 
a basic preference for the truth at all. It is a basic preference not to suffer the horror of 
being so colossally wrong. We like to think of ourselves as able to get it right in believing 
that the world is not merely five minutes old, if we can get anything right about the world. 
Imagine the horror of learning that we were unable even to get that right. Just for starters, 
it would impugn something as foundational as memory. Considered alongside Lynch’s 
“basic preference” explanation, I think that this explanation is at least equally, if not more 
plausible. Therefore, I do not think that Lynch has succeeded in demonstrating a basic 
preference for the truth, and thus he has failed, by his own lights, to have demonstrated 
that we do in fact care about the truth for its own sake.  
 We need, then, to go back to the ambiguity I pointed out above. Perhaps we 
should undertake the strategy of arguing that truth ought to be valued for its own sake. 
                                                        
294 Piller (2009, 206) makes a similar observation about Lynch, writing, “If I believe that the world is such-
and-such, he says, then, because of my interest in the truth, I want it to be such and such. The implausibility 
is right on the surface, and it still went unnoticed.” 
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What would this require? It would require showing that truth is intrinsically valuable. 
That is, that truth is valuable “in itself” apart from the fact that it is in fact valued. 
 The problem, though, as Lynch himself admits, is that showing something to be 
intrinsically valuable is notoriously difficult (2004b, 127). As Lynch understands it, this 
would involve showing that truth is valuable just in virtue of its intrinsic nature, without 
any regard for its relations to other things (ibid.).295  
 It is at this point that I think we need to invoke a richer set of distinctions within 
value. Consider the following reflection of Bernard Williams (2002, 90), who writes: 
 [H]ow intrinsic is intrinsic? There is a danger that if trustworthiness (or anything else) is 
 regarded as having an intrinsic value, it will be supposed that there is nothing else to be 
 said about its valuableness—it is good because it is good, and that is all there is to be said 
 about it. If, on the contrary, one gives an account of how its value might relate to other, 
 perhaps more primitive, values and needs, such as securing co-operative activity which is 
 in everyone’s interests, one seems to be giving a reductive and instrumentalist account of 
 the value—which shows (it will be said) that it is not really an intrinsic value at all. But 
 this opposition must surely be unreasonable. It offers us only the choice between an 
 inexplicable and self-subsistent intrinsic good, the value of which is self-explanatory, 
 and, alternatively, a good which  has to be understood merely in instrumental terms. What 
 we want, rather, is some insight into these values, some account of their relations to other 
 things which we know that we need and value, but an insight which does not reduce them 
 to the merely instrumental. What we want, once again, is explanation without reduction.  
 
Williams’s analysis is trenchant. Now Lynch does seem to recognize the need to 
investigate why it is that we find truth worth caring about (2004b, 120). He points to the 
connections between truth and happiness, truth and authenticity, truth and integrity, and 
truth and liberal politics (ibid.). In fact, he even seems to have something like Williams’s 
dilemma in mind when he says that the appeal to intrinsic value is a “conversation-
                                                        
295 Incidentally, part of the problem might be (to invoke how Scheler, Stein, von Hildebrand, or Hartmann 
might respond) is that the intrinsic value of x is not something that can be established by discursive 
argument. It requires an original intuition of the value in question. 
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stopper” and that such appeals are “notoriously difficult” to justify since we are relegated 
to the intrinsic nature of a thing instead of its “consequences or relations to other things” 
(ibid., 127). He writes: 
 A more helpful way of justifying our interest in something for its own sake is by showing 
 that it is an essential part of something that is good, for example, by showing that it is an 
 essential part of a good life. By a good life, I mean a flourishing life—a “happy” life, in 
 one meaning of that term…Thus being good because you are a part of something good 
 (like happiness) is different from being good as a means to it. (ibid., 127-8) 
 
 Notice the project here: Lynch speaks in terms of “justifying our interest in 
something for its own sake” (ibid.). This is not surprising, given that he thinks he has 
already proven that we have a basic preference for the truth. What he is doing now is 
justifying that interest (which means, I take it, that he finds such a preference in need of 
justification). This is related to how Williams discusses intrinsic value: what we want is 
an explanation without reduction, in terms of the relations of the value of x to other things 
that we need and value, and not just in terms of the relationship of means to ends.  
 What the basic structure of this achieves is driving a wedge between the merely 
instrumentally valuable (e.g., money to buy food, movies to pass the time on a long 
flight) and the mysteriously intrinsically valuable. The articulation of this category gets a 
handle by linking the “intrinsic” value of what is explained with other things that we need 
and value. The crucial difference between Lynch and Williams is between construing the 
project as justification versus genealogy. For Lynch, something is deeply normative, a 
value properly so-called he says, when it is worthy of being care about for its own sake. 
His evidence that truth is worthy of being cared about for its own sake is that we in fact 
care about truth for its own sake, and he sets about providing a justification of why that is 
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so. As I understand his use of “justification” here, it is in the neighborhood of pleading 
one’s case. “Why do you care about x for its own sake?”—“Well! Let me tell 
you…there’s this, that, and the other reason why.” But if we do not (or if many of us do 
not) care about x for its own sake to begin with, the project never gets off the ground.  
 Williams’s account, on the other hand, is genealogical, yielding what he calls a 
“constructed intrinsic good” (2002, 92). He outlines two necessary conditions on such a 
good: “it is necessary (or nearly necessary) for basic human purposes and needs that 
human beings should treat it as an intrinsic good; and, second, that they can coherently 
treat it as an intrinsic good” (ibid.). Another way of putting this, he says, is that the 
genealogical method shows how such constructed intrinsic goods arise out of “more 
primitive needs and desires” (ibid.).  
 The problem with such an approach is the general problem that befalls all 
genealogical stories: accounting for how it is that we come to, and should, “treat” truth as 
an intrinsic good, is not the same as arguing that it is such a good. Furthermore, I do not 
wish to prejudge against the claim that truth is an intrinsic value in the “mysterious” or 
“conversation-stopping” sense criticized by Williams and Lynch. So while I appreciate 
the relatedness of their projects to my own, I do not understand my project here as either 
being justificatory (pleading my case for why persons in fact value the truth for its own 
sake), nor genealogical (showing how we can “construct” the intrinsic value of truth as 
out of more primitive needs and desires). Rather, to make sense of the value of truth as 
grounding the normativity of truth, we need, as I have said, a reference to the person.  
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 My concern, however, is not to argue against either Lynch or Williams, but to 
offer my own account. As I have already said, my own account consists in an 
appropriation of the tradition of personalism to the problem of doxastic normativity. The 
purpose of bringing up Williams is to highlight the kinship of his category of a 
constructed intrinsic good with a category maintained by one of the best representatives 
of the personalist tradition, Dietrich von Hildebrand. This is his category of the objective 
good for the person (OGP).  
7.2 The Second Bridgehead: von Hildebrand and the OGP 
 The purpose of the previous section was to point to two ideas that have been 
floated concerning the normativity (Lynch) and value (Williams) of truth. Although I will 
not be engaging in either of their projects, I wish to take away the following general 
negative lesson from both: coming to know and appreciate the value of truth as 
something that is worth caring about for its own sake is not going to amount to justifying 
a pre-existing claim that we do in fact value the truth for its own sake, nor should we feel 
entitled to just stop at positing the inexplicable intrinsic value of truth. Rather, it is going 
to involve showing that truth is worthy of, or ought to be, valued for its own sake by 
demonstrating the relations between truth and other goods of the human person. But even 
this is not quite precise. More precisely, what I will argue that truth is a value that is 
normative for the human person, in part by indicating how it is that truth is an objective 
good for the person. 
 Unlike Lynch, I make no assumptions up front that persons in fact care about the 
truth for its own sake, though like him I try to connect truth with other things that we care 
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about. The difference is that Lynch and I use premises of a similar type to argue for 
different conclusions. I will argue to the conclusion that truth is an OGP, whereas Lynch 
argues to the conclusion that we in fact care about truth for its own sake and that he is 
merely justifying this preference. Lynch’s argument thus presupposes his earlier claim 
that we do in fact care about the truth for its own sake, whereas my argument will 
presuppose (though with argument) some basic metaphysical claims about the human 
person. Thus, our starting points are similar, but our auxiliary premises and sought-after 
conclusions are not the same.  
 With Williams, I share a conclusion (or a sub-conclusion): that truth is related to 
other fundamental needs, desires, and things of value to the human being. But our 
methodologies differ: whereas he hopes to construct a genealogical account of how we 
treat (and why we should treat) truth as an intrinsic value, focusing on more primitive 
needs and desires, I look to the metaphysical structure of the human person, to what is 
objectively good for the person given that structure. Hopefully this has made sufficiently 
clear how my account is both related to and distinct from those of Lynch and Williams. 
In what remains of this section, I will now briefly lay out von Hildebrand’s notion of the 
OGP and introduce some key principles for my account. 
7.2.1 Von Hildebrand on Value 
 The basic notion in terms of which von Hildebrand articulates his notion of value 
is that of importance. As he uses the term, “importance” denotes “that property of a being 
which gives it the character of a bonum or malum” ([1953] 1972, 24). More simply, it 
stands for the antithesis to neutrality or indifference (ibid.). As he understands the notions 
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of bonum and malum, they refer to what is able to “motivate our will, or engender an 
affective response in us” (ibid., 23). 
 The next question is that of the categories of importance. Von Hildebrand 
distinguishes three: the merely subjectively-satisfying, the objective good for the person 
(OGP), and the important-in-itself.  
 Initially, however, von Hildebrand only discusses the first and third of these 
(ibid., 34-35). The former is that which is good for someone, but only insofar as it 
subjectively-satisfies her.296 The latter is that which is important-in-itself, not requiring 
any reference to some person for whom it is important. To adapt his examples: being paid 
a compliment is not important-in-itself, but is important-to-me qua being subjectively-
satisfying-for-me, e.g., by satisfying my desire for praise, or by constituting a pleasurable 
experience for me. Witnessing the generous and noble act of a man forgiving someone a 
grave injury is important-in-itself. Its importance—that which makes it a good thing—is 
not merely that it conduces to my subjective-satisfaction. Rather, in perceiving such an 
act, says von Hildebrand, we grasp that it “ought to be,” that it is important-in-itself.297 
 At this stage, von Hildebrand also distinguishes the different ways that each of 
these categories of importance calls to the person. Everything of value properly so-called, 
that is, everything of importance-in-itself calls for an adequate response on the part of the 
person who encounters the value (though he is clear that the required response is not 
necessarily a specifically morally required response) (ibid., 38). In addition to 
                                                        
296 Von Hildebrand speaks of this satisfaction in terms of pleasure (ibid.), but in order not to prejudge the 
matter against a “desire-satisfaction” theory of the subjective-satisfying, I just use the more generic term.  
297 Compare this with my discussion of guidance-by-value in chapter II. 
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distinguishing importance-in-itself on the basis of the call that it issues to us, von 
Hildebrand also distinguishes the phenomenology of hearing these calls. Whereas values 
call to us in a way that appeals in a “sovereign, but non-intrusive sober way” to our “free 
spiritual center,” that which is merely subjective-satisfying appeals to us in an intrusive 
manner that is characterized by how it “lulls” us into a state where we “yield to instinct,” 
often taking the form of a “temptation, trying to sway and silence our conscience” and 
“dethrone our free spiritual center” (ibid.). Furthermore, whereas the encounter with 
value is a transcendent experience for the person, in which he is carried beyond himself, 
the encounter with the subjectively-satisfying is characterized by being closed up within 
oneself (ibid., 39).  
 It is in the context of arguing against a reduction of either of these categories to 
the other, that the third category of the OGP arises. As von Hildebrand reads him, Scheler 
makes the mistake of reducing all importance to the category of value/importance-in-
itself. As a representative of the opposite error, he cites Aristippus, who reduced all 
importance to the subjectively-satisfying (ibid., 47-49). Against both errors, von 
Hildebrand maintains both categories, as required by the phenomenology of motivation 
that is central to his notion of importance.  
 Von Hildebrand gets his notion of the OGP by considering those whose lives 
revolve around the thematic center of the subjectively-satisfying, who know only the kind 
of importance had by the subjectively-satisfying. Examples adduced by von Hildebrand 
include Cain, Iago, Richard III, and Don Giovanni. (I might add Fyodor Karamazov from 
The Brothers Karamazov.) It is by reflecting upon such individuals, for whom the 
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question of whether something subjectively-satisfying is really in their true interest or not 
is missing, that the category of that which is objectively good for the person emerges, 
distinguished both from value and the subjectively-satisfying (ibid., 49).  
 Von Hildebrand gets his reader to see this category by considering the case of a 
person who responds with gratitude to some benefit conferred on him. The true object of 
gratitude is, he says, the benefit conferred, and not the generous act as such. Now, while 
the generous act as such is something important-in-itself, which ought-to-be, and calls for 
a response of admiration on our part, the object of gratitude is the benefit. In the response 
of gratitude, we have disclosed to us the character of the benefit as an objective good for 
me. It is more than merely subjectively-satisfying (in the sense, as we saw, of pleasurable 
or desire-satisfying) to be benefitted in the way that calls for gratitude, but the true object 
is not something of importance-in-itself. It is an OGP (ibid., 50). 
 The OGP also discloses itself as a category by its distinctive role in our 
motivational economy vis-à-vis other persons. We often perceive something not only as 
important-in-itself, but simultaneously as objectively good for someone. Thus, when we 
rejoice over the repentance of a sinner, we not only perceive something important-in-
itself (the act of repentance), but also something objectively good for the person in 
question (that he has repented) (ibid., 58). The OGP is even more clearly shown in the 
intentio benevolentiae that is essential to loving another person: in seeking the other’s 
good, we do not consider what is merely subjectively-satisfying, but if we love the others, 
we seek out what is objectively in the other’s true interest (ibid., 59). 
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 In this first exposition of the categories of importance, von Hildebrand discusses 
the categories of importance as rationes of motivations. Further on, he discusses them as 
properties of beings (ibid., ch. 7): “we must now ask which of them are properties of 
being and of beings, independently of their function as objects of motivation” (ibid., 79). 
That is, which, if any, of the three categories of importance are properties of beings, even 
when we prescind from the question of their serving as possible rationes of motivation. 
More specifically, von Hildebrand asks, “what corresponds in beings as their objective, 
valid meaning to the three categories of importance which we distinguished in the realm 
of motivation” (ibid., 80). When it comes to the merely subjectively-satisfying, there is 
nothing corresponding in being to this category of motivation. The merely subjectively-
satisfying, says von Hildebrand, is just “an egocentric outgrowth of pride and 
concupiscence” (ibid., 83).  
 This bifurcation with regard to the spheres of motivation and of being does not 
afflict the category of the OGP. That something is objectively good for the person is both 
a source of motivation, as well as an objective feature of the thing in question. Von 
Hildebrand considers the example of health. Independent of the “pro”-character of health 
for the human person, health is an OGP, as a “gift” that is in accordance with the person’s 
true interest (ibid., 84). It is out of his consideration of health, as well as beauty, that we 
get an understanding of the roots of the significance of OGPs: they are rooted both in the 
nature of the OGP in question, and in the nature of human person (ibid.).  
 Finally, I need to introduce how von Hildebrand thinks of the relationship 
between values and OGPs, as part of this relationship will form a central plank of my 
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own positive argument. According to von Hildebrand, two major relations obtain 
between these categories as properties of beings. The first is this: If V is a value, then to 
be endowed with some x that participates V is an OGP (ibid., 89).298 If art is a value, then 
to be endowed with beautiful works of art, or trips to art museums, or artistic talent, is an 
objective good. If justice is a value, then participating justice by performing acts of 
justice is an objective good. The second relation is this: If x is a good, the possession and 
enjoyment of which confers true happiness on us, then x participates some value (and is 
thus something important-in-itself). For example, acts of charity toward our neighbor 
participate the value of charity (among others). According to von Hildebrand, however, 
value is still explanatorily prior: it is because its participating some value(s), that the 
possession and enjoyment of a good is able to effect true happiness in us (ibid., 90).  
 Let us introduce the following as a statement of the relation between values and 
the OGP: 
 (1) Being endowed with x is an OGP, if, and only if, and because, X 
 participates some value(s) V0, V1, … Vn.299 
There is an issue, however, concerning the case of the “elementary and pleasurable 
goods.” The latter are those things “legitimately agreeable and subjectively satisfying” 
                                                        
298 Although it may be linguistically awkward to do so, I do not restrict the sense of “being endowed with” 
in such a way that being endowed with something is merely passive. For example, x might be an act of 
justice, so that “being endowed with an act of justice” just means that you performed an act of justice. I 
think that “being endowed with” or some other, similar locution is necessary to incorporate the indexicality 
of the OGP to some person or other. 
299 Most of the time the value in question will have the same name as x, e.g., if being endowed with 
prudence is an OGP, then prudence participates some value, namely, the value prudence. 
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(ibid., 91).300 The former are those things that are minimally indispensable for an 
existence endowed with values, and include integrity of body, health, and minimal means 
of life-support such as shelter. The problem posed by these categories is that their status 
as OGPs does not seem to find its source in some value, in something important-in-itself 
(ibid., 90-91). So it seems as though (1) is false. But this is not so. Von Hildebrand says, 
at the first pass, that every OGP, insofar as it has a “pro”-character for the person, is at 
least indirectly valuable; therefore, it merely seems as though, in these cases, (1) is 
reversed: something is a value, because it has a pro-character for the human person.301 
Hence, we arrive at the following: 
 (2) Being endowed with x is an OGP, if, and only if, and  because, either (a) x 
 participates some value(s) V0, V1, … Vn, or (b) x has a “pro”-character for the 
 human person. 
 But the ultimate source of the objective goodness of x in the latter sort of case is 
the value of the human person. It is this value that is the “ultimate basis” of the indirect 
                                                        
300 Note that von Hildebrand does not make the mistake of claiming that legitimate sources of pleasure are 
never good for the person. 
301 The concept of “indirect value” in von Hildebrand is tricky, especially since von Hildebrand seems to 
use it in two different ways. When it first shows up, the distinction tracks the distinction between final 
value (the value of an end) and instrumental value (the value of a means) (ibid., 61-62). There is a twist, 
however, in that the direct/indirect distinction (which von Hildebrand also refers to as the 
primary/secondary distinction) is orthogonal to the categorial distinction among subjectively-satisfying, 
OGP, and important-in-itself. In other words, direct and indirect importance are not categories of 
importance that exist alongside the subjectively-satisfying, OGP, and important-in-itself. We can ask of a 
given thing, then, (a) which of the three categories it belongs to and (b) whether it is of direct or indirect 
importance. For example, von Hildebrand assigns penicillin (a) to the OGP due to its relationship to health 
and (b) to indirect importance, insofar as it serves as a means to health. When the concept shows up in the 
ontological discussion of values (chapter 7), however, von Hildebrand does not use “direct” and “indirect” 
to track the distinction between the value of an end and the value of a means (see ibid., 91, fn 1). In this 
usage of “indirect,” which is the usage I am appealing to above and in what follows, indirect value is the 
value had by an objective good (whether it directly participates any other value or not) in virtue of its pro-
relationship to the human person and the value of human personhood. Von Hildebrand is emphatic that 
indirect value, in this sense, must not be confused with mere instrumental value. 
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value just mentioned (ibid., 92). Von Hildebrand says that every OGP—indeed, the very 
category of the OGP—requires the value of human personhood (ibid., 94). Therefore, we 
can obtain, as our final formulation of Von Hildebrand’s principle: 
 (3) Being endowed with x is a OGP, if, and only if, and because, either (a) x 
 participates some value(s) V0, V1, … Vn, and human personhood is a value, or 
 (b) x has a “pro”-character for the human person, and human personhood is 
 a value.302 
 In all three of these formulations, however, we need to attend carefully to the 
following ambiguity. In one sense, “value” refers to that, participation in which makes 
some x an OGP. In another sense, however, “value” (in von Hildebrand’s text) refers to 
that which participates some value(s).303 In the first sense, we speak of the value music; in 
the second sense, we speak of the value (of) Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony or a concert 
performance thereof, or the value of the Missa Orbis Factor and the chanting thereof by a 
choir during Mass. It is in keeping with this second sense of “value” in von Hildebrand’s 
text that we can formulate the following principle, which will serve as part of my own 
argument in chapters IV and V.  
 (OGP) If being endowed with x is an OGP, then either (a) x is a value 
 directly, in virtue of x’s participating some value(s) V0, V1, … Vn, or (b) x is 
                                                        
302 Lest (3) be found wanting as an interpretation of von Hildebrand, let me here assume responsibility for 
it. Since my account is inspired by von Hildebrand, and not a work of secondary literature on von 
Hildebrand, it is more important that my appropriation be clear than that I present a pristine formulation of 
von Hildebrand’s own thought. 
303 Elsewhere, von Hildebrand clarifies this ambiguity by distinguishing more precisely between goods and 
values. In a narrow sense, says von Hildebrand, goods just are bearers of values, and values are that which 
make goods goods. Values are realized in goods. In responding to values, we are motivated by values, but 
our response as such (typically) refers to goods and not the values themselves (2009, 79-82). 
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 a value indirectly, in virtue of x’s pro-character for the human person and 
 the value of human personhood. 
What underwrites (a) is just the participation of x in some value(s) in the first von 
Hildebrandian sense of “value.” What underwrites (b) is von Hildebrand’s claim that the 
category of the objective good for the person (and hence every OGP) is “not indifferent 
from the point of view of value.” By virtue of the pro-character of x and the value of that 
for which x has such a pro-character (namely, the human person), x “has a positive value” 
and “acquires an indirect value” ([1953] 1972, 91).  
 I will take (OGP) for granted in chapters IV and V, as well as the value of human 
personhood—indeed the value of personhood more generally. The next step (in chapter 
IV) is to argue that being endowed with truth is an OGP. Less clumsily, I will drop, in 
what follows, the locution of “being endowed with truth” and speak just of truth as itself 
an objective good for the person. In effect, then, I am going to offer an explanation of the 
value of truth by way of arguing for the objective goodness of truth for the person.  
 In this, I part company with von Hildebrand, even while relying on his principles. 
For von Hildebrand, grasping a value V is not something that can be achieved by a 
derivation from “neutral facts” (ibid., 87). That is, we cannot (and should not) attempt to 
offer an explanation of why or that x is value. If you cannot grasp that truth is a value, 
then you are “blind” to the value of truth,304 and the solution, according to von 
                                                        
304 There are two linguistic difficulties with this sentence that threaten some confusion. The first is that I am 
forced to speak of “grasping that truth is a value.” However, it is not obvious that the act of grasping a 
value is the act of grasping the truth of some proposition of the form: V is a value. Certainly, Scheler did 
not think this is the case. So the formulation in terms of “grasping that” should not be taken to entail that 
what is grasped is just a proposition, or that the act of grasping is just the act of forming a judgment. A 
potentially more accurate, though problematic locution would be “grasping the value truth.” Secondly, I am 
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Hildebrand, the clearing-away of pride and concupiscence, so that your vision will clear 
(ibid., 87). 
 Now, I am sympathetic to the notion that philosophy is supposed to be edifying 
for the human person. But steering the reader away from any vestigial pride and 
concupiscence is not a task that I am up to, if only because I am not entirely free of these 
myself.305 Nevertheless, in a broader sense, I endorse, and apply, the words of Hartmann, 
who said that “philosophical ethics is the midwifery of moral consciousness” ([1932] 
2007, 62).306 So I am going to try being a midwife, one whose task is to bring about 
acceptance of the value of truth by someone not yet disposed to think of truth as a value. 
Thus, while (like von Hildebrand) I do not derive value from something neutral, or 
reduce value to something neutral, I also do not rely on anyone’s preexisting value-
perception of the value of truth. Instead, I try to enable such perception by appealing to 
the significant (and not-at-all neutral) fact that truth is an OGP.307  
                                                        
forced to use the phrase “value of truth”—again because of the extreme awkwardness of “value truth.” 
However, truth is the value in question. So this locution should not be interpreted as a genitive, as if the 
value of truth were the price of truth, or something like that. Rather, what is meant is the value that is truth. 
The problem is that we talk about values, being-valuable, and being-of-value somewhat interchangeably. 
Additionally, in analytic philosophy at least, the dominant idiom of propositions and propositional attitudes 
makes speaking of non-propositional grasping itself problematic for many readers.    
305 For a literary, philosophical, and spiritual classic in this vein, the author recommends Hildebrand’s 
Transformation in Christ. 
306 Since Hartmann’s was an ethics of values, this means that philosophical ethics is the midwife that births 
the consciousness of concrete values, whether never before discovered, or whether by clarifying the 
existing sense of a given value.  
307 The disagreement should not be overstated for another reason. In the aforementioned discussion of 
goods and values, von Hildebrand says that values are grounded in the nature of goods, and that values are 
intelligible through the consideration of the underlying being that is good (von Hildebrand 2009, 80). It 
would lead us too far astray to address the full extent of the agreement or disagreement here. The 
fundamental question appears to be whether my argument is best understood as a derivation in the strict 
sense, or whether it merely discursively captures the very process by which we come to grasp the value of 
truth and the normative upshot of that value. This strikes me as a very deep question which cannot be 
satisfactorily answered here. 
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8 Conclusion 
 We have covered a lot of ground in this chapter. I began by clarifying the 
“doxastic normative question.” That is, we are trying to find the “source” of doxastic 
normativity. I considered the two dominant accounts of the source of doxastic norms: TI 
and NI. Although I do not claim to have definitively shown either of them to be false, I 
presented several criticisms against each that have circulated in the literature, as well as 
posing my own hard questions. I also considered some other contenders to TI and NI.  
 My main goal in carrying out this task of survey and critique was not purely 
negative. I am more interested in being constructive than destructive, more interested in 
articulating and arguing for my own account that destroying anyone else’s. Rather, my 
goal was mainly, from a sustained reflection on TI, NI, and the contenders, to derive a set 
of conditions (both positive and negative) of adequacy for an account of the source of 
doxastic normativity that promises to answer the doxastic normative question.  
 Finally, with these desiderata in hand, I began to build a conceptual bridge, 
linking the questions and concerns that have dominated to this point, and the personalist 
tradition which I seek to appropriate in response to those same questions and concerns. 
We began with Lynch who argues (unsuccessfully, I maintain) that we do in fact care 
about the truth for its own sake, that this provides evidence for the claim that truth is 
worthy of being cared about for its own sake, and that this in turn underwrites the “deep” 
normativity of truth. Although I endorse his method of showing how truth is intimately 
related to other goods, I do not endorse his conclusions or pattern of argument. I do not 
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presuppose that we care about truth for its own sake, just as I do not presuppose (pace 
von Hildebrand) that you, the reader, have perceived or grasped the value of truth.  
 We then looked at Williams. As with Lynch, what I endorse is the claim that 
understanding the goodness of something for the person is going to require articulating its 
relatedness to other goods. Where I differ is, again, with respect to method (Williams’s 
account is genealogical) and respect to that which he takes as his target relata (namely: 
“more primitive needs and desires”). It should be clear from favorable exposition of von 
Hildebrand that focusing on desire per se, and not vis-à-vis the objective goodness of a 
given object of desire, is to get things wrong.  
 What I take from Lynch and Williams is ultimately the beginning of a method for 
arguing that truth is an OGP in von Hildebrand’s sense. I say, the “beginnings” of a 
method because my method is not theirs. I will examine the relationships that obtain 
between truth and another OGP. But I will not look at “primitive” needs or desires 
(Williams), nor will I look at the goods that Lynch looks to (happiness, authenticity, 
liberal politics)—even though these are all good places to look. Instead, I will place the 
meaning of the human person front and center and will consider the relationships that 
obtain between truth and friendship.308 This is the heart of the task that will be taken up in 
the next chapter. The goal of the next chapter is thus to arrive at the conclusion that truth 
is an OGP by showing how being endowed with truth has a “pro”-character for the 
                                                        
308 The fact that von Hildebrand cites friendship as an OGP is, I take it, promising ([1953] 1972, 90). The 
problem with Lynch’s list is that none of them spring from a consideration of the person as such, save 
perhaps happiness. Authenticity, if it is an OGP, is not as fundamental and as clearly one as friendship, and 
the same goes for liberal politics. 
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human person. If truth is an OGP, then (by principle (OGP)), truth is a value (in von 
Hildebrand’s second sense), either directly, in virtue of participating a value (in von 
Hildebrand’s second sense) or indirectly, in virtue of its pro-character for the human 
person. Simplifying somewhat, we can say that the project of the next chapter is to show, 
on the basis of truth’s having a “pro”-character for the human person, that truth is a value. 
The method for showing this is the method elucidated by reference to Lynch and 
Williams: drawing out the relationships between truth and other good(s) for the human 
person. It will then remain (in chapter V) for me to argue for the normativity of values for 
the human person.  
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Chapter IV: Truth as an Objective Good for the Person 
1 Introduction 
 At the end of the last chapter, the following principle emerged from the discussion 
of von Hildebrand. 
 (OGP) If being endowed with x is an OGP, then either: (a) x is a value directly, in 
 virtue of x’s participating some value(s) V0, V1, … Vn, or (b) x is a value indirectly, 
 in virtue of x’s pro-character for the human person.  
The question is how to get from (OGP) to the claim that truth is normative for the human 
person. One way in which personalism has sought to achieve this is by grounding norms 
in values. This type of strategy was alluded to in the discussion of guidance-by-value in 
chapter II. It is represented by Scheler, Stein, Hartmann, and von Hildebrand. The most 
straightforward way to capture this move argumentatively is by means of the following 
conditional: 
 (VN) If x is a value, then x is normative (or x is a norm) for the human 
 person.309 
 What is required is an account of the relationship between persons and values that 
can make sense of how values are normative for the human person. Values, according to 
the metaphysics and ethics of values of philosophers such as Scheler, Hartmann, and von 
Hildebrand, are mysterious, sui generis normative entities. As such, they seem to run 
                                                        
309 For instance, if justice is a value, then justice is normative (is a norm) for the human person. If courage 
is a value, then courage is normative (is a norm) for the human person. If love is a value, then love is 
normative (is a norm) for the human person. In fact, it is this last value that is at the heart of Wojtyla’ 
“personalistic norm,” which states that the person is “an entity of a sort to which the only proper and 
adequate way to relate is love” (1981, 41). 
 330 
 
afoul of the same broad concern that I raised against NI in chapter III. The question, then, 
is whether we can build up a more substantial relationship between values and persons, 
such that values are normative for persons. I think that we can, and such a task will be the 
main project of chapter V.  
 Before I can give a person-centered interpretation of principle (VN), however, I 
first need to make a case for the claim that truth is an objective good of the person. To 
remind the reader, my method, inspired by Lynch and Williams, will be to articulate a set 
of relationships that exist between truth and another candidate objective good for the 
person. Although many such candidates could have been chosen, I have decided to focus 
on the relationships that obtain between truth and friendship.  
 The first task of this chapter is to motivate this selection. Although I think that I 
would be on perfectly safe ground in assuming that friendship is something objectively 
good for the human person, I will attempt to vindicate this assumption before proceeding 
any further. I will then turn to articulating a threefold relationship between truth and 
friendship. Finally, I will consider an objection to the compatibility of truth and 
friendship. 
2 Friendship as an Objective Good for the Person 
 Before proceeding, however, I should elaborate on how the methodology of this 
chapter differs from the methodology endorsed by von Hildebrand. This was a point 
already discussed at the end of chapter III. 
 The difference between my approach and von Hildebrand’s can be captured in 
terms of the expression, quoted in chapter III, from Williams (2002): what I am seeking 
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is an explanation without reduction.310 At issue is the appropriateness of explaining why x 
is a value through offering an argument. At the heart of this chapter is the attempt to 
establish that truth is an OGP. Together with the principle (OGP), this entails that truth is 
a value.  
 Now, it might seem that this very project is necessarily a reductive project, i.e., a 
project whose aim is to reduce values to OGPs. Von Hildebrand himself condemns such a 
reductive project (and all reductive projects that aim to reduce values to something else) 
in his argument against what I will refer to as the “suitability view.” As von Hildebrand 
defines it, the suitability view is an account of value according to which “value is…the 
suitability of an object to bestow on us that which we objectively need for the full 
unfolding of our entelechy” ([1953] 1972, 102). 
 Based on the sentence preceding this statement of the Suitability View, von 
Hildebrand understands “our entelechy” as “an innate teleological trend in our nature” 
(ibid.). Von Hildebrand adduces several arguments against the Suitability View, but for 
present purposes I want to focus on just one of them. According to this argument, the 
Suitability View is false because it is unable to account for the value of the human 
person. According to the Suitability View, the value of human personhood would be 
nothing but the suitability of personhood to the full unfolding of our entelechy. But, asks 
                                                        
310 The alternatives to this approach appear to be (1) explanation with reduction, (2) non-explanation with 
reduction, and (3) non-explanation without reduction. Von Hildebrand’s position is, as we shall see in what 
follows, a form of non-explanation without reduction. The two fundamental questions are (1) whether it is 
appropriate to offer an explanation of claims of the form: x is a value and (2) whether we can reduce such 
claims (or, more directly, values themselves) to claims about something else (i.e., reduce values to 
something else). While I will agree with von Hildebrand that the answer to (2) is “no,” I disagree with him 
by answering the first question in the affirmative. 
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von Hildebrand, how could this possibly be correct (ibid., 103)? The question is well-
taken. Applying the Suitability View to the value of human personhood supposes that we 
can separate ourselves from our personhood, so that it would make sense to say, of our 
personhood, that it is the means to fulfilling our nature.311 But even according to a 
metaphysics that countenances a distinction between person and nature, this reverses the 
relationship. We do not say that natures have personhood, but that personhood has, or is, 
a nature of a certain sort. (For example, according to the traditional Boethian definition, a 
person is an individual substance of a rational nature.) 
 Furthermore, he considers the general strategy of the Suitability View, which is to 
interpret values as being of important only insofar as they are the means of fulfilling our 
nature. This strategy fails, however, because, according to von Hildebrand, it presupposes 
the notion of value. Specifically, it presupposes the value of our nature and its 
actualization. The attempt to reduce values to suitabilities merely “postpones the 
problem” of value (ibid., 104).  
 If the Suitability View does not solve the problem of value, then we might ask 
what motivates thinkers to accept it. Von Hildebrand thinks that what motivates 
acceptance of the Suitability View is the desire “to be able to prove why something is 
important, i.e., to make the character of importance more intelligible” (ibid., 102). 
                                                        
311 Von Hildebrand goes on to apply this to the value of truth. He concedes that “we have an objective 
tendency in our nature toward truth” (ibid.). Nevertheless, he considers it obvious that the value of truth is 
not nothing but its suitability to fulfill this objective tendency. He then goes on to gloss this in terms of the 
impossibility of deducing the value of truth from the suitability of truth to fulfill this tendency of our 
nature. 
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However, von Hildebrand thinks that this is fundamentally a misguided endeavor when it 
comes to grasping the importance-in-itself of values. He writes: 
 It seems to us that this same intellectual obstinacy underlies the attempt to give 
 importance a greater intelligibility by interpreting it as an importance for something or as 
 a functional power or suitability. One believes that in being able to give a “reason” why 
 something is important, one thereby makes it more intelligible. (ibid., 103) 
 
Von Hildebrand thus interprets any attempt to explain values as a misguided attempt to 
demonstrate the value’s importance for some kind of entity. Situating his position vis-à-
vis the slogan of Williams quoted above, we might say that von Hildebrand wants neither 
reduction nor explanation.  
 The problem, though, is that von Hildebrand appears to fail to keep distinct the 
order of being and the order of explanation (or knowledge). Offering an explanation of 
value is not (necessarily) to claim that the explanandum (value) is ontologically 
dependent on the explanans (the suitability of x for fulfilling the nature of the human 
person).312 A classic illustration of this is the “Five Ways” of proving the existence of 
God put forward by Aquinas (ST Ia, q. 2, a. 3). Prior to laying out the five ways, Aquinas 
takes up the question of whether it can be “demonstrated that God exists” (ST Ia, q. 2, a. 
2). In his response, Aquinas distinguishes between demonstrations propter quid and 
demonstrations quia. According to the first variety, we start with that which is 
ontologically prior, and arrive at that which is ontologically posterior (e.g., from cause to 
effect). According to the second variety, we start with that which is ontological posterior, 
                                                        
312 For instance, in Aquinas’s classic account of the transcendentals, the good is what all desire. That is, all 
that is is good insofar as it is related to the appetitive power of the soul. However, as Aertsen’s study of 
Aquinas’s doctrine of the transcendentals stresses, this is not to say that x is good because x is desired, but 
to say that x is desired because x is good (1996, 300). (Aquinas’s position is not Spinoza’s.) 
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and arrive at that which is ontologically prior (e.g., from effect to cause). The 
demonstrations of God’s existence that Aquinas advances are of the second variety. It is 
characteristic of demonstrations quia that they begin from what is prior relative to us, 
where the notion of priority in question is that of priority in our knowledge. 
Demonstrations quia are not forgetful of the fact that they are arguments from “effects” 
to “causes,” and not the other way around. In the order of explanation, conceived of along 
the lines of a demonstration quia, we are not positing an ontological dependency of the 
conclusion on the premises. So too in the present chapter: offering an explanation of the 
value of truth by starting from the objective goodness of truth is not to claim an 
ontological dependency, but to start from what is better known to us (to use the 
Aristotelian phrase) to arrive at the value of truth.313  
 Now von Hildebrand says that the category of importance under which 
suitabilities fall is that of the objective good for the person (OGP). That x is suitable to 
the unfolding of the nature of personhood is thus sufficient (because equivalent) with x 
being an OGP. OGPs in turn presupposes the notion of value ([1953] 1972, 105). At a 
minimum, this would appear to be the value of human personhood, if not the value of x 
                                                        
313 This makes sense. We start off in the world, not with any innate appreciation of the essences of values, 
but rather with a potentiality to acquire a (initially rough-and-ready) handle on the good for us. Aquinas 
draws attention to his point in his discussion of the natural law, when he writes, “in man there is first of all 
an inclination to the good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances” [that 
is, the inclination to preserve ourselves in being through seeking out that which conduces to our 
preservation and shunning that which does not], “second…an inclination to things that pertain to him more 
specifically, according to the nature which he has in common with other animals” [Aquinas’s examples are 
sexual intercourse and the rearing of offspring], and “third, there is an inclination in man to good, 
according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him” (ST IaIIae, q. 94, a. 2, resp.). 
Importantly for what follows in § 2, one of Aquinas’s examples of this third inclination includes the 
sociability of the human person. In short, then, it seems perfectly in keeping with the experience of the 
human person that we begin by acquiring a grasp on what is objectively good for us, and then grasp that 
which is important-in-itself (values).  
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itself. The latter is clearly von Hildebrand’s view, and he does see any advantage in 
adopting the former view, save for the misguided attempt to offer an explanation of some 
value.  
 Be that as it may, the fact remains that many values are not grasped by persons in 
the intuitive manner described by von Hildebrand in the Epistemological Prolegomena to 
his Ethics ([1953] 1972). I have already discussed this point at the end of chapter III: von 
Hildebrand’s prescription for such value-blindness is to aid the value-blind individual in 
removing the impediments of pride and concupiscence which together account for the 
blindness. I find myself manifestly unable to do this, if only because I am not free of 
these myself.  
 As such, I have to assemble the principles distilled from von Hildebrand into a 
form that he would be averse to, namely, into an argument that truth is a value. 
Nevertheless, if we bear in mind the distinct orders of being and explanation (or 
knowledge), this is not necessarily antithetical to von Hildebrand’s understanding of the 
categories of importance. To repeat, I am not arguing that the value of truth is 
ontologically dependent on the suitability of truth to the human person. But insofar as 
this suitability is equivalent with the objective goodness of truth and insofar as OGPs 
presuppose value, I am showing that we can arrive at the value of truth through 
considering its status as an OGP. That is, we can arrive at the premise that truth is a 
value. 
 On the precise metaphysics of values (what they are), I am admittedly perplexed. 
Fortunately, it is not my task here to inquire into the metaphysics of values. However else 
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von Hildebrand or others think that we have access to values, I am claiming, at a 
minimum, that our grasp of the nature of the human person, together with the conceptual 
relationships among the categories of importance articulated by von Hildebrand, allow us 
an explanatory entrance into values through engaging in a philosophy of the person. We 
get to the “fact” that truth is a value through such an explanatory approach. 
 When it comes to the question of normativity, however, I am driven to diverge 
further from von Hildebrand. As already alluded to, I think that when it comes to norms, 
there is no avoiding their “for”-structure. Norms are essentially norms for some (kind of) 
entity or other. If we follow von Hildebrand, it is a defining feature of values that they 
lack this structure. Values are not “for” anyone or anything (ibid., 104). To say that 
values are norms, or are normative, is to engage with the ontological order—or so I 
claim. The normativity of values depends, not just explanatorily, but ontologically, on the 
existence of persons. This, however, a topic for chapter V. For now, it is enough for me 
to have clarified that while I take on board the distinctions of categories of importance 
drawn by von Hildebrand, as well as the conceptual relationship articulated between the 
categories of value and OGP (see chapter III), I do not also take on board his repudiation 
of explanation. But precisely because I am after explanation, my arguments should not be 
read ontologically, and so there is no fundamental disagreement (at least for now) when it 
comes to values. I am not here advocating a reduction of values to something else, but I 
am offering an avenue of explanation that starts with the nature of personhood and 
“works up” to the value of truth. 
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2.1 The Objective Goodness of Friendship for the Human Person 
 In this section, I give an account of the person as “intrinsically relational.” It is 
through the intrinsic relationality of the person—as a potentiality of personhood to be 
actualized, and as something good for the person—that I show that friendship, as a kind 
of interpersonal relationship, is an objective good for the person.314  
 What is meant, then, by the “intrinsic relationality” of the person?315 One 
particularly strong metaphysical interpretation of this aspect of personhood would be that 
the person is constituted exclusively in terms of his relations to others, i.e., that the 
person is not a substance in the Aristotelian-Thomist sense at all, but exclusively relation. 
Macmurray ([1961] 1999, 24-28, 92), and Ratzinger (1990, 448, 452) lend themselves to 
this sort of interpretation.316  In opposition to these relation-only accounts of the person 
                                                        
314 In the language of the last pages of chapter III, I show that friendship is such an objective good by 
considering its pro-character for the person. My method for showing the existence of such a pro-character 
is that of illustrating how friendship constitutes the actualization of a potentiality intrinsic to personhood. 
315 Perhaps a prior question is that of what is meant by “intrinsic.” To avoid the reader importing certain 
well-known definitions of intrinsicality (e.g., that of Langton and Lewis (1998), Lewis (2001), or Molnar 
(2003, ch. 6)), let me say this. I understand “intrinsic” here as modifying “relationality” so as to specify that 
the relationality of the person is not something extrinsic to her being-a-person. In other words, this is to 
deny the possibility of the person apart from the person-as-relational. It is not a mere accident that the 
person is relational. (The question, addressed next, becomes that of interpreting this essential relationality.) 
Perhaps a helpful (non-personal) example of this use of “intrinsic” comes from the relationship between an 
acorn and an oak tree. It is no mere accident that an acorn develops into an oak tree. It is intrinsic to being-
an-acorn that is has this potentiality. The analogy with the person is helpful, though not entirely precise. 
While there is a developmental story behind the ability of a person to enter into relations, it is not a matter 
of mere development. Although the person is essentially relational, this can be thwarted, twisted, or 
channeled in way not altogether healthy or good for the person, in a way that the development into an oak 
tree is never unhealthy or bad for the acorn. (I owe this example to Professor Dahlstrom.) 
316 A related denial of the substantiality of the person comes from Scheler. In Scheler, however, the 
emphasis is not on the relationality of the person, but on the person as “the concrete and essential unity of 
being of acts” (ibid., 383; cf. 383-393). Just as Clarke maintains substantiality against pure relationality, 
Wojtyla maintains the substantiality of the “acting person” against Scheler: for Wojtyla, the person is not 
only integrated and immanent in her acts, but she also transcends them. See Parts Two and Three of The 
Acting Person (1979a). See also Savage (2013, 43) for discussion of this movement in terms of 
“horizontal” and “vertical” transcendence. For a discussion of this theme in Wojtyla’s philosophy, see 
Taylor (2009, 421-29). 
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stands the account of Clarke (1993, 13-19, 57-60), who maintains that the person is also a 
substance, and that this falls out of his general Thomistic analysis of what it means to be, 
namely, that to be is to be substance-in-relation (1994b). Crosby (1996, ch. 4; 2015) is an 
example of a non-Thomist who also maintains the substantiality of the human person.317  
 I am sympathetic to the view that we must maintain the substantiality of the 
person together with his relationality, on pain of losing the metaphysical basis of the 
interiority that is also characteristic of the person, as well as the metaphysical basis of 
that which is given to the other in interpersonal relationships.318 But the details of these 
metaphysical disputes are not my primary concern here.  
 If “intrinsic relationality” is not to be understood in terms of the distinction 
between the being and non-being of persons, then how ought, or how can, it be 
understood? I propose shifting gears to the distinction between actuality and potentiality. 
In this sense, intrinsic relationality specifies something about being-a-person, namely, 
that to fully be a person, in the sense of actualizing one’s personhood, requires the 
existence of persons (in the plural) to whom you can (and do) bear relations. As Clarke 
observes, “Person exists in its fullness only in the plural” ([1993, 76, emphasis mine).  
 Now for a few preliminaries. The first thing to note is that relationality is often 
understood (at least partially) in terms of communication. At a minimum, relationality 
requires communication for its actualization. It is, as it were, the manifestation of the 
intrinsic relationality of the person. Since the theme of communication will be prominent 
                                                        
317 Spencer (2015b) explores a synthesis and reconciliation of these strands of Catholic philosophy of the 
person. 
318 In addition to Clarke, another Thomist who makes this point is Pieper (1989b, 81-83).  
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in what follows below and in the next section, I will here refrain from saying more. I will, 
however, note that it is with respect to the notion of communication that Thomistic 
personalists and more phenomenologically-oriented personalists are on common ground. 
While the project of Thomistic personalism involves “deriving” the communication 
proper to the relationality of persons from more general metaphysical principles in 
Aquinas’s thought,319 a phenomenologically-oriented personalism just proceeds to 
describing how this communication is encountered in the lived experience of the person. 
(Such an account (that of Mounier) will structure the remainder of this section.) 
 The second preliminary is to note that relationality is often construed as part of an 
overall dynamic structure that elucidates the nature of the human person. This structure 
has gone by different names, and is, as it were, a genus with several species, but I shall 
primarily refer to it as the structure of interiority and relationality, or interiority and 
communion. Macmurray, for instance, refers to the “rhythm of withdrawal and return” 
(i.e., withdrawal from the other, and return to the other) ([1961] 1999, ch. III). He 
distinguishes these as the “poles” of individuality, with its illusory ideal of perfect self-
sufficiency, and personality, which is necessarily relational, subsuming the individual 
under an “I/Thou” complex. Maritain is another thinker who aligns these two “poles” of 
the personal dynamism with individuality and personality, calling them (respectively) the 
                                                        
319 The best collection of references to the Thomistic corpus in this regard is to be in Clarke (1993, 6-7). 
This is what Maritain calls the ontological generosity and poverty of all being ([1946] 1966, 47-48). Clarke 
(1993, Part II) and Maritain ([1946], 1966, 41-42) are good examples of the Thomistic personalist 
approach. Applying other elements of Thomism, they articulate communication at the personal level in 
terms of acts of knowing and (more especially in the case of Clarke) loving others. 
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material and spiritual poles of man ([1946] 1966, 33). Still a third example is that of 
Sciacca (1960), who likewise distinguishes between individuality and personality. 
 Although this way of interpreting the dynamic has some plausibility, I worry that 
it obscures that the interpretandum is the personal dynamic insofar as Macmurray and 
Maritain makes personhood, as such, a part of the dynamic, rather than that of which the 
dynamic is an elucidation.320 In this regard, Mounier (and Marcel, among others) gives us 
a better way to articulate the structure. This is especially so of Mounier, who works out 
the dynamic in great detail and clarity. It is primarily his elucidation that I will outline 
here, appealing to Marcel (an influence and fellow countryman), as well as others, where 
adventitious. 
2.1.1 Mounier on the Personal Dynamic  
 Mounier (1952, chs. II-III) characterizes the human person in terms of a dynamic 
between (1) communication and (2) the complement of communication, which he styles 
“the intimate conversion.” These correspond to what I have called the relational, or 
communicative, and interior dimensions of personhood. We might also call them as 
“moments” of personhood, to call attention to their situation within a dynamic that is 
experienced as temporal by the person.321 That is, these moments of communication and 
interior conversion are experienced not as occurring simultaneously, but successively. 
This is not to say, however, that they are experienced as isolated from each other. This 
                                                        
320 I suspect that part of the problem is due to the ambiguity between speaking of personhood and speaking 
of personality. I shall stick to the former. 
321 To be clear, I am not using “moment” here in any technical (primarily German) philosophical sense. My 
meaning should be clear from the context above. 
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will become clear as the discussion of Mounier proceeds. Another sense in which it is 
appropriate to call them “moments,” is that they are momentous in the life of the person, 
moments of truly living as person, moments in which the value of his personhood and all 
its many possibilities are made clear to him. 
 Following Mounier’s order of exposition, let us first consider the dimension of 
relationality or communion. Here, Mounier advances five distinctive acts by which the 
relationality of the human person is incarnated: (1) going out of oneself, (2) 
understanding, (3) taking upon oneself—sharing, (4) giving, and (5) faithfulness.  
 The first—going out of oneself—is a basic condition on relationality. We must be 
able to “decenter” ourselves, or engage in a “self-dispossession,” if we are to be truly 
available to others. Here, the affinity with Marcel is especially pronounced. Marcel also 
speaks of decentering and “availability” (the most common translation of a central 
concept of his thought: disponibilité).322 The former is, according to Marcel, of a piece 
with contemplation, but contemplation not understood as mere introversion, but as 
conversion.323 Such moments of conversion may happen when we are struck by a 
situation of which we are part, and which we cannot ignore. We are forced in such 
situations to turn our awareness of that which is “external”-to-us inward. But, 
paradoxically, it is precisely through this turning inward that we come to see our situation 
                                                        
322 Although, as he notes in his Gifford lectures, a better translation might be “handiness,” in the sense of 
having oneself ready-to-hand to respond to the call of others ([1950] 2001a, 163). “Disposability” has also 
been used as a translation (e.g., Marcel (1964, ch. 2)). I am thankful to Professor Dahlstrom for reminding 
me of the Heideggerian pedigree of the “ready-to-hand” and how Marcel’s usage (applying it, as he does, to 
the person herself) is distinct from the sense that “ready-to-hand” has for Heidegger (that is, as the manner 
of being of tools). 
323 Not necessarily in a religious sense, however. 
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from the point of view of others, thus “to enter into the depths of one’s self means here 
fundamentally to get out of oneself” ([1950] 2001a, 131).  
 Marcel interprets this conversion, as a unity of inwardness and decentering, as an 
“act of inner creativity or transmutation”—a return to oneself, albeit not one’s self as 
unchanged, or unaffected, by the contemplation of one’s situation (ibid., 132). Hence it is 
more proper to speak of “conversion” as opposed to mere “introversion.” The key idea 
here is creativity (a theme to which I will return later in this chapter): there is nothing 
essentially creative about mere introversion. I can engage in introversion simply by 
casting about my memory, searching for what I had for breakfast yesterday. Conversion, 
by contrast, is essentially creative. To transcend ourselves in this way is not merely to 
step outside, or beyond, ourselves, but to take that which is “outside” into our own depths 
and emerge from the act converted.324   
 Furthermore, such conversions make possible the availability of one person to 
another, where this involves having oneself and one’s resources ready-to-hand to respond 
                                                        
324 Marcel’s example is literary-historical, concerning the emperor Augustus. Religion furnishes us with the 
best illustrations. Here I think especially of the Parable of the Prodigal Son (Luke 15: 11-32). Contrition 
and repentance are conversions par excellence, whether or not they are experienced by the contrite in 
religious terms. But even politics can furnish us with examples. When two persons come together from 
across some ideological divide, encountering for the first time someone of the “other side,” there exists the 
possibility for a moment of intimate conversion. This is not to identify conversion with persuasion. Such 
conversions (in a broadly “political” sense) occur whenever the beliefs of the other person are confronted 
on their own terms (i.e., not purely with an eye to crafting possible counter-arguments) in such a way that 
allows for a deeper appreciation of one’s own beliefs, and the beliefs of the other. The possibility of civic 
friendship seems to depend upon the latter possibility, i.e., of partisans of different sides being able to 
understand each other’s beliefs, with an eye to understanding not only what divides, but also what unites 
them. Still another set of examples comes from considering love. There are moments in which one person 
realizes that he loves another, and so takes his external situation vis-à-vis the other into his depths, to 
consider the newfound love. In such moments, e.g., the lover discerns the kind of love that is at issue 
(friendly or romantic, as a potential mate, or like a sister, etc.), and begins to create himself as that sort of 
lover.  
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to the calls made upon us by other persons (ibid., 163-64; cf. Marcel [1952] 2010, 16-17). 
These calls involve not only calls to one’s will (to action), but also calls to one’s heart (to 
sympathy, to being able to imagine the situations of others). Just as with “decentering,” 
availability is essentially related to creativity (Marcel 1964, 53). For by remaining 
anxiously unavailable, we prevent ourselves from leading truly personal lives. The 
unavailable person treats his life as if it were a fixed sum of money, which he is 
anxiously trying his best to preserve, to make it last as long as he can. It is this anxious 
solicitude which “discourages every élan, every worthy initiative” and which can be 
“reabsorbed into a state of inner inertia in which the world is experienced as stagnation or 
putrescence” (ibid., 54). This brings us back to interiority, which must be open to others, 
lest it contract the sickness identified by Marcel. Mere inwardness, the fixation on one’s 
self, leads to inertia in one’s life as a person, a condition by which one merely “goes 
through the motions” of life. Instead of giving ourselves to others, in the act of which we 
receive ourselves back,325 we anxiously cling to what we have, striving but to preserve 
ourselves amid a world that is gradually rotting away around us, trying to preserve our 
lives amidst the inevitable and ongoing process of dying and decaying.326 
 Mounier’s second act of communication is closely related to this first: 
understanding. By understanding, Mounier means the ability to understand oneself from 
the point of view of others, as well as to understand others as unique persons in their own 
                                                        
325 Cf. Luke 17:33 
326 Here, I detect a resemblance with how Maritain describes individuality in terms of the ego: “In each of 
us, individuality, being that which excludes from oneself all that other men are, could be described as the 
narrowness of the ego, forever threatened and forever eager to grasp for itself” ([1946] 1966, 37). 
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right, and as persons. Specifically, this is manifested in the resistance of persons to 
psychologizing each other. As Mounier says, “a taste for psychology is not an interest in 
other persons” (1952, 21). In this regard, I detect a similarity with Scheler (1973, 477-78) 
who argues against a reduction of understanding to explanation when we are dealing 
with other persons qua persons. In such a reduction of understanding to explanation, 
causality replaces sense, stimuli replace objects, and processes replace intentions.327 Such 
replacements may be proper for someone who is, to use Scheler’s word, mad,328 but not in 
general. For psychological objectification is, Scheler says, depersonalizing, as it reduces 
the other to a mere psychic being.329  
 The third act, taking upon oneself—sharing, is the act of offering up one’s heart to 
others, taking upon oneself the “destiny,” “troubles,” and “joys” of others (Mounier 1952, 
22).330 If understanding is the act whereby, to use von Hildebrand’s terminology, we 
                                                        
327 As an illustration of this, consider the treatment of those who appreciate certain goods of high value, by 
those who are scornful of said goods. This is displayed, e.g., in those who insist on a certain level of 
decorum. If a matriarch insists on her children and grandchildren dressing up to attend Mass, this is 
interpreted as her “rigidness,” “close-mindedness,” or “backward thinking.” Or else as her desire to be seen 
impressively dressed by others. In general, this is a great and diabolical evil when applied to values, for it 
represents the attempt to discredit values by explaining the perception and incarnation of values by persons 
in terms of disreputable motives. It is akin to what von Hildebrand calls “satanic pride”—see his ([1953] 
1972, 442-44) and ([1948] 2011, 151-55). Such pride is characterized by an “impotent attempt to dethrone 
all values, to deprive them of their mysterious metaphysical power” ([1953] 1972, 442). Szalay (2011, 56) 
speaks similarly of “ontological pride.” 
328 According to Scheler, “possession of a wholly sound mind—in contrast to madness” is a condition on the 
applicability of the concept of person to a human (1973, 476). 
329 Though as we shall see in section 3.3 (below), it is open question whether it is necessarily 
depersonalizing. 
330 Notice the relation of Mounier’s second and third acts to what was said about Marcel a couple 
paragraphs ago. Whereas Mounier carefully distinguishes the different acts, Marcel’s discussion is less 
precise and analytical. Using Marcel’s terminology, we might say that Mounier leans more toward primary 
reflection and Marcel more toward secondary reflection. The former is concerned with analysis, dissection, 
classification, breaking things down, whereas the latter is “recuperative,” restoring unity to our reflection, 
in keeping with the unity of our experience (see Marcel ([1950] 2001a, ch. 5)). However, this only goes so 
far, as Mounier’s work demonstrates secondary reflection as well. 
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make an intellectual or theoretical response to another person, Mounier’s third act is that 
whereby we make an affective response to the other person, opening our hearts up to her. 
This act is important, for the reason that we must make room for the fact that we can lend 
our hearts to others even in cases where we do not (maybe even cannot) understand them 
and the conditions of their life, and are unable to do anything (excepting, let us say, pray) 
for them.331 
 The fourth act of communication is the act of bestowing oneself generously on 
others. This is the “gift of self” that is so essential to personalism, especially in the work 
of Wojtyla, who taught that it is only through such a gift of oneself that one fulfills one’s 
personhood ([1981] 1993c, 194).332 Here again, the relationship to interiority is evident. 
Just as the previous three acts of communication refer to the interiority of the person as 
necessary for said acts, so too does Wojtyla’s work bring out what is required in order for 
the person to make a gift of himself to another. Without engaging in a lengthy digression 
on the details of his account, what is essential for the person’s ability to make a gift of 
himself to others is the potential of persons for self-possession and self-governance 
(ibid.). What you do not have, and what is not yours to dispose over, cannot really be 
something that you give to others. Thus, again we see the complementarity of interiority 
and relationality: with interiority making relationality possible, and one’s relations with 
others enriching and fulfilling interiority in turn. 
                                                        
331 This is not to minimize the significance and effectiveness of praying for others. 
332 For discussion of the so-called “law of the gift,” see Salas (2010). Its influence is explicit in the pastoral 
constitution Gaudium et spes of the Second Vatican Council which states, “Man, who is the only creature 
on earth which God willed for itself, can fully find himself only through a sincere gift of himself” (¶ 24). 
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 This is a point worth dwelling on for a moment. It points to the fact that the 
dynamic structure that we are here considering is no barren abstraction. It is tied to the 
fulfillment and perfection of the human person qua person. To say, therefore, that the 
person is intrinsically relational is not merely to engage in abstract metaphysics, but also 
at the same time to make clear the structures that make for personal flourishing. Thus, 
there is fundamental unity, rather than division, between the emphasis on personhood as a 
potentiality to be actualized, and personhood as a value to be realized.  
 Finally, there is the act of faithfulness, for communication is only made perfect in 
continuity (Mounier 1952, 22). Here, like Marcel, Mounier stresses the creative aspect of 
fidelity. Fidelity is not the barren monotony of repetition. The friend, e.g., who takes a 
late-night call for third time in as many days to be present to a friend in dire straits is not 
engaged in something monotonous. The friend who faithfully checks in with a sick friend 
is not merely going through a tedious ritual. Since we will have reason to return to the 
theme of fidelity later in this chapter, for now it is just important to note that it is the 
crowning act of communication, whereby communication is made perfect in the 
committed gift of oneself to another. Communication is not merely synchronic, but 
diachronic, perfecting the person not for a moment, but through the entirety of his life.333  
                                                        
333 Though not, as hopefully the examples make clear, as part of a self-conscious effort at fulfillment. This 
is an old insight, but it bears repeating as it comes up in the discussion between Thomists and thinkers like 
von Hildebrand: we might all be aiming at self-fulfillment, but that doesn’t mean that in any given act such 
as those cited above, that we so act for the sake of such fulfillment. In fact, if that were the case, we would 
fail to attain the very fulfillment we seek (von Hildebrand 2009, 114-15). Furthermore, we would hardly 
recognize our friends as faithful if they acted faithfully toward merely for the sake of their own fulfillment. 
As Marcel says, of a related issue (namely, cases where friends are “faithful” only to assuage their 
consciences), “I shall say of him that his behavior has been beyond reproach, that he has been absolutely 
correct; but how could this correctness of behavior be confused with fidelity strictly speaking? the former is 
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 The foregoing completes our gloss of the five acts of the communicative, or 
relational side of the person: decentering, understanding, sharing, giving, fidelity. As we 
have seen, these involve a readiness to such communication borne of contemplation and 
conversion, as well as (applying von Hildebrand’s rubrics of intellectual, volitional, and 
affective responses) respective acts whereby we give ourselves to others intellectually 
(understanding), affectively (taking upon oneself—sharing), and volitionally (giving 
oneself and remaining faithful).334 Finally, we have also seen already how the acts of the 
relational dimension of the human person are intimately related to the interiority of the 
person, both depending on it as its ground, as well as perfecting it through its operation. It 
is with this in mind that Mounier makes the turn to considering interiority, which he calls 
“the intimate conversion.”335 Thus, Mounier: 
                                                        
only a semblance of the latter. He is without reproach: it is like a diploma I feel obliged to confer on 
him…However, I cannot…say of him that he has been a faithful friend to me” (1964, 154-55). 
334 I should also offer the following clarification: communication is not inevitable. This much should be 
obvious, but sometimes, in personalist accounts of the nature of the person, we move back and forth 
between the descriptive and the normative. Personalists are not universally sanguine about the prospects for 
such communication. Mounier speaks of “tragic optimism” (1962, 15-16), Marcel of the “broken world” (le 
monde cassé) ([1950] 2001a, ch. 2; his ([1952] 2008) can be read as a sustained reflection on this theme), 
and Maritain ([1946] 1966, 42) writes, “Such communication is rarely possible…personality in man seems 
to be bound to the experience of affliction even more profoundly than to the experience of creative effort.” 
335 It is worth pointing out here that in the very choice of the phrase “intimate conversion,” Mounier stands 
against Macmurray—for he says that he deliberately chooses this phrase over more traditional terms such 
as “subjectivity,” “inner life,” or “inwardness,” since these have the connotation of a withdrawal, and thus 
of the opposite of communication (ibid., 33). Whereas Macmurray ([1961] 1999, 90) understands his 
“rhythm of withdrawal and return” in terms of positive and negative phases (hence opposites), Mounier 
explicitly casts the dimension of interiority as complementary to communication. Thus, it is not a matter of 
the person against the individual (as in Macmurray and, so it seems, in Maritain), but of the person as 
characterized by complementary, non-antagonistic moments. Interiority ought not to be too quickly aligned 
with individuality—at least, so long as individuality is understood to have the somewhat negative 
connotation that it does in Macmurray and Maritain. The negative connotation in Macmurray comes from 
the depersonalization of individuality, since the ideal of individuality (an illusory one, to be sure) is self-
sufficiency and thus destructive of personhood ([1961] 1999, 92, 94-95). In Maritain ([1946] 1966, 33, 37-
38), it comes from the alignment of individuality with the materiality of man, as well as the egocentricity of 
which we are all-too-capable. Thus, we receive from Mounier the insight that the moments of personhood 
are not opposed, but complementary. 
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 If the person is, from the beginning, a movement toward others (being-toward) from 
 another point of view it reveals something else, no less distinctive, the pulsation of a 
 secret life which is the ceaseless spring of its productivity. (1952, 33)336 
 
Here again Mounier details a number of distinct elements. They are (1) self-recollection, 
(2) the secret, (3) intimacy/privacy, (4) “the vertigo of the abyss,” (5) the rhythm of self-
affirmation and self-denial, (6) vocation, and (7) the dialectic of interiorization and 
objectivity. As before, I will briefly go through each, highlighting any relevant points of 
contact with other personalist thinkers along the way. 
 “Personal life,” says Mounier, “begins with the ability to break contact with the 
environment, to recollect oneself, to reflect in order to re-constitute and re-unite oneself 
on one’s own centre” (1952, 34). The person must go “backward” (i.e., into himself) in 
order to go forward. Here, he points specifically to the goods of silence and retreat 
which, he notes, are “never more widely forgotten nor more needful of remembrance than 
they are today” (ibid.). In this way, his work echoes that of Pieper ([1963] 2009a) who 
discusses leisure and silence. Pieper’s insights are just as trenchant today as they were 
several decades ago. True leisure is replaced more and more with slothfulness (acedia), 
restlessness, and idleness (ibid., 43-44). Citing the scholastics, Pieper says that 
“idleness…means that a man renounces the claim implicit in his human dignity” and 
(citing Kierkegaard) that acedia “is the despairing refusal to be one’s self” (ibid.).  
                                                        
336 A related statement of this dynamic comes from Clarke (1993, 68) who writes, “there is an alternating 
rhythm (or spiral movement, if you will) going on. Relations come into us and call us outward first; then 
we (should, normally) return to our own center to reflect on the result and integrate it into the abiding 
center of the self, expanding it and enriching it in the process. This permits the enriched self to then reach 
out further to others, with a surer and more profound sense of self-possession and ability to communicate 
and share our own riches.” 
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 The inability to be silent in oneself, the utter replacement of leisure with a 
dissipation of the person in all manner of distractions is a theme that has been picked up 
by many philosophers, as Mounier observes (1952, 33). This is especially true of Pascal 
(Pensées S165/L132ff; 2004, 38-43). As Mounier diagnoses this general phenomenon, it 
is rooted in the fact that the person may live as though he were not a person, but rather as 
a mere thing (1952, 33). But to do so pricks the conscience, as it were, and drives man 
into all manner of distractions and deceptions from the fact that he is not living an 
authentically personal life. The first act of the intimate conversion, then, is just the bare 
ability to return to oneself and be silent.  
 The second element concerns what such self-recollection hopes to find. What it 
hopes to find is not an “inventory” or “analysis” of one’s self, but rather the presence of 
oneself that always exceeds any such inventory. The contrast with the notion of an 
inventory comes from Marcel. For Marcel, a presence is something that can only be 
invoked or evoked. He tries to illustrate his meaning by comparing the use of a word to 
name an object in an inventory, and the use of the same word in a poem. The latter, but 
not the former, illustrates what he means by a presence. Perhaps more clearly, he says 
that most actual presences are not encountered by us as presences. Presences become like 
“furniture” and it takes an extraordinary situation, such as a serious illness, to shake us 
out of our torpor (Marcel ([1950] 2001a, 208-209).337 Applied to oneself as presence, I 
think that this be can paraphrased in terms of how we become inured to our own 
                                                        
337 In the case of serious illness, this is especially the case with the body, which suddenly becomes present 
in a more significant way. 
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personhood. We forget the mystery, or even the “magic” (to use Marcel’s word), of our 
personhood. That we are persons recedes into the background as we go about our lives, 
especially if these are filled with distraction, deception, and inauthenticity.338 
 Wojtyla makes a similar point, admonishing his reader that “man is the first, 
closest, and most frequent object of experience, and so he is in danger of becoming usual 
and commonplace; he risks becoming too ordinary even for himself…man should not 
lose his proper place in the world” (1979a, 22). This, it seems to me, drives home 
particularly well the danger of neglecting the interiority of the person. We are so close to 
ourselves that we become forgetful of ourselves as persons in a way that we can never be 
forgetful of ourselves as embodied (think: hunger, thirst, sexual desire). But personhood 
as such has its situations which arouse it, of which the wonder that is the source of 
philosophy is one of the best examples.  
 This forgetfulness amid distraction must be countered by the act of recollection. 
But what must we seek, and what will we find? We must seek out our own personhood as 
an interior presence—the uniqueness, mystery, and even grandeur of our personhood. 
More concretely, Mounier says that we find here our secrets (1952, 35-36). In our 
communication with others, we are always exemplifying certain qualities, and not 
exemplifying others. We are always, as it were, displaying ourselves before others, 
parading ourselves more-or-less clothed in front of our fellow persons. The concern with 
                                                        
338 As Pascal so wisely observes, it is precisely these diversions that lead to our unhappiness, not only 
because they deprive us of the conditions of true happiness, but also because we invest them with the power 
to determine our subjective state of “happiness,” so that, without them, we find that we are unhappy (2004, 
38-43). This is akin to the misery—more or less brought to self-consciousness at different times in our 
lives—that we are seeking the right thing (happiness), but in the wrong places (amusements). Compare the 
saying of Augustine, “Seek what you seek, but it is not where you seek it” (Confessions, Book IV, Ch. 12). 
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secrets is the realization of, and desire to hold onto, our personhood as transcending any 
delimited set of manifest qualities. We are not ashamed of our nakedness, i.e., our 
personal traits in all their nakedness, as Mounier says, but of seeming to be no more than 
those traits (ibid., 36).339 Furthermore, as we shall see next (and in a later section), 
without such secrets from the wider world of persons, we lose the capacity to enter into 
intimate relationships with others. 
 Next, then, come intimacy and privacy, the space that is carved out between one’s 
secret life and one’s public life (ibid.). This is the interiority of the person as being (or 
feeling) at home, from which we can engage in intimate conversation with others. 
Mounier takes the notion of being at home over from Marcel (see (1964, 27-29, 89-92) 
and ([1950] 2001a, 117-18).340 One’s home stands in a unique position between the 
secrecy of one’s inmost life and one’s public life, as Mounier says. The home, however, 
is also unique in offering a place where interiority and communication meet. For one’s 
home is, in the first instance, that place to which one withdraws, in the world, from the 
world. It is, as such, a place of profound intimacy. It is thus an act of intimacy to invite 
another person into your home. Moreover, the home, as Marcel observes, is the place of 
reception par excellence. In our homes, on a material level, who we are overlays 
everything we have–our possessions and their arrangement, for instance–and thus invests 
them a certain power to convey more than just certain truths about what we happen to 
                                                        
339 There is an interesting connection, therefore, that Mounier draws between this aspect of personhood and 
modesty. 
340 See also von Hildebrand (2009, 85-92) for discussion of the “mine-ness” of one’s home, and of the sense 
of being or feeling at home; see also Caputo (1979, 46-48) for this theme. 
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own. Marcel quite rightly notes that we cannot receive (and do not speak of receiving) 
someone in a wilderness or even, really, in our yards ([1950] 2001a, 118). Thus, the 
communicative and relational dimension of personhood depends on the notion of a home 
as an intersection of interiority and relationality, where one’s interiority is expressed and 
where we welcome others into a more intimate relationship. To be clear, this needn’t 
literally be a house. In general, the discussion of the home points to a concrete 
incarnation of this space, but to speak of reception or receptivity at all—as I will below—
requires an antecedent “orientation of the feelings or ordering of the mind” (ibid.). Thus, 
being at home is not merely a spatial notion, but it also points to the interior disposition 
of readiness to receive the truth of others and communicate the truth of oneself to others.  
 Self-affirmation and self-denial essentially concern one’s good and seem, in their 
way, to be an extension of being at home.341 As Mounier describes it, self-affirmation is 
“first of all to give oneself scope and living space” (1952, 39). Of course, possession can 
exert a corrupting influence. This requires the movement of self-denial to cancel out the 
relationship-suffocating corruption that possession can inflict upon the person. At the 
heart of this moment is the realization that, as Mounier puts it, our true riches are those 
things that we have left to us when stripped all of else, that we have with us at the hour of 
                                                        
341 I have moved the discussion of the “vertigo of the abyss” to this note to enable me to better draw the 
connection between being at home and self-affirmation/self-denial. The vertigo of the abyss is that 
“essential anguish, arising from within personal existence as such, from the terrifying mystery of its liberty, 
from the realization of its mortal struggle, and from the wild explorations to which it is impelled in every 
direction” (Mounier 1952, 38). On this I have no more to say, except that to fully recollect oneself does 
seem, in part, to become aware of the possibilities of personhood—for the heights of a life endowed with 
the best things, but also for the grim prospect of depersonalization and brutality. It is, after all, only the 
person that is able to perform the most monstrous sins. 
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our death.342 This is, I think, a crucial aspect in the development of one’s interior life. It is 
that moment in which one confronts one’s implicit (or explicit) acts of valuing certain 
things, and subjects them to this crucial test: is it really valuable? Indeed, at the hour of 
your death, it seems that all you have left is that which is endowed through the two 
dimensions of your personhood—whatever interiority is left you (sometimes, it is true, 
robbed by certain diseases), and your relationships—be you attended only by angels and 
saints at your passing, or whether you be surrounded by loved ones.  
 We can understand the next moment of the intimate conversion by keeping in 
mind this confrontation of our lives with what is really valuable. It is in the act of 
discerning our vocation that we seek out that upon which our lives will form a “living 
unity” (ibid., 41). This is not to be confused with the mere selection of a profession, 
which often enough has a dominant external cause for its explanation, e.g., parental 
pressure. Furthermore, in addition to seeking his particular vocation, each person must 
realize his own vocation qua person. In this generic sense, the vocation of the person is 
above all to personalize the world, by opposing the forces of depersonalization, 
especially through the five acts of communication discussed above (ibid., 21).  
 Finally, there is the dialectic of “interiorization and objectivity.” In one sense, this 
is just a reaffirmation of the general dynamic structure we have been tracing throughout 
this section. In another sense, though, it involves a crucial reference to truth. We cannot 
“re-discover and strengthen” ourselves without the truth (ibid., 43).343 Nor can we truly 
                                                        
342 It should be no surprise that I think of truth as one of those things that you can have left to you at the 
end. 
343 See also Crosby (1996, 156-57, 98-106). 
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make a gift of ourselves to others and, a fortiori, enter into relationships with others, if 
we insist on “cultivating,” “preserving,” and “protecting” a certain self-image, a task that 
can “fill the entire horizon of a life” (ibid.).344 An encounter with the truth—the “moment 
of truth” as Wojtyla calls it in another context—is required in order to actualize and 
realize both dimensions of human personhood: the interior and relational-
communicative.345  
 In sum, using Mounier as our primary source and supplementing his discussion 
with other perspectives, we have seen how it is that the person is intrinsically relational. 
This relational structure is part of the overall dynamic structure that marks out the person 
as the unique being that he is. 
 Grafting this onto the von Hildebrandian language with which this chapter began, 
we can say that relationality is suitable for the human person. As such, by von 
Hildebrand’s subsumption of such suitabilities under the category of the objectively good 
for the person, we can conclude that relationality is an objective good for the person. Of 
course, such relationality has many concrete modes in the various kinds of interpersonal 
relationships. One of the paradigmatic kinds (perhaps even the paradigm) of interpersonal 
relationship is friendship. Falling under the genus, if you will of interpersonal 
relationships, friendship is one objective good of the person, answering to the 
intrinsically relational nature of the person. Hence, we have vindicated the assumption 
                                                        
344 This idea will be important in the discussion of the friendship objection, below. 
345 In this connection, we might bring in the whole fraught of issue of defining personal identity in terms of 
narrativity, with the question always being one of privilege: whose perspective is to be privileged in 
constituting the narratives by which a person is identified. In this connection, see Schetchman’s (1996, 119-
130) discussion of the “reality constraint” on self-narratives, as well as the discussion of Rousseau in 
Williams (2002, ch. 8, section 2).  
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(uncontroversial, I hope) that friendship is an OGP. I now turn to the argument that truth 
is also an OGP, by drawing out the threefold relationship between friendship and truth. 
3 The Threefold Relationship Between Truth and Friendship 
 I now set out to elaborate a threefold relationship between truth and friendship. 
Truth is antecedently, concomitantly, and consequently related to friendship. The overall 
structure of this relationship is inspired by Aquinas, who employs the antecedent—
concomitant—consequent structure in a number of places.346  
 Antecedently, truth is required for friendship insofar as an encounter with the truth 
is necessary for entering into friendships. In part, this is due to the necessity of truth for 
freedom, insofar as friendships can only be commissioned against a certain background 
of freedom. It is also necessary insofar as acts of communication and reception of the 
truth are required for friendship to come about at all. Concomitantly, truth is related to 
friendship insofar as friendship, as a type of interpersonal communion, is itself partially 
constituted by the mutual advance in the communication of, and belief in, the truth of the 
friends. Consequently, truth is related to friendship insofar as it is a consequence of 
friendship. Not only does friendship come about only as the result of the concomitance of 
                                                        
346 Specifically, I am thinking of the discussion at ST IaIIae, q. 4. In article one, Aquinas distinguishes four 
ways in which one thing may be necessary for another: as “preamble and preparation,” “as perfecting,” “as 
helping it from without,” and “as something attendant upon it.” In article four, he applies this to rectitude of 
the will, saying that it is “necessary for happiness both antecedently and concomitantly” (resp.). In article 
five, he makes clear that “as perfecting” is understood in two ways: when something constitutes the essence 
of the perfection of x, and when something is necessary for perfection. In article eight, Aquinas maintains 
the necessity of friendship for happiness in this life. In speaking of a threefold structure, I am adapting 
Aquinas’s four ways of understanding the necessity of x for y, together with his language in applying this 
schema to rectitude of the will. Applied to the present relationship between truth and friendship, we might 
say that truth is a preamble and preparation for friendship, as well as helping it from without (antecedent), 
truth is perfective of friendship (concomitant), and truth is attendant upon friendship (consequent). 
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truth and friendship, but it is also the case that it is only in friendship with others that 
certain truths about oneself become disclosed in the first place. Furthermore, it is partially 
through friendship that one is creative of who one is, and so friendship also calls into 
being, as it were, “new” truths about the friends.  
 Looking ahead to a point that will made later (in section 3) let me flag that of 
these relationships, the antecedent and consequent have more to do with the interiority of 
the person, whereas the concomitant has more to do with the relationality of the person. 
This is not to make any hard separations, but just to note how the threefold relationship 
being articulated here is to be grafted onto the personal dynamic that was just elucidated 
with the help of Mounier and others.347 
 In the remainder of this section, I discuss each of these relationships in more 
detail. Along the way, I anticipate and incorporate potential objections into my discussion 
(though not always explicitly). However, I will reserve for its own dedicated section a 
particularly strong objection that strikes at the heart of my attempt to link truth and 
friendship. This objection, which I dub the “friendship objection,” is the subject of 
section 4. My response to the friendship objection provides me an opportunity to further 
illustrate the concomitant and consequential relationships between truth and friendship. 
 
 
                                                        
347 We might also consider the fittingness of aligning these three relationships with Aquinas’s three ways of 
defining truth (see introduction) as follows: antecedent (ontological truth, truth as intelligibility)—
concomitant (logical truth, truth as known by the intellect)—consequent (ontological truth; truth as being-
made-manifest). 
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3.1 The Antecedent Relationship 
3.1.1 Truth and Freedom 
 The first element of the antecedent relationship between truth and friendship 
concerns freedom. I will assume that only someone who is free can enter into a 
friendship.348 More specifically, I will discuss how the encounter with truth makes us free 
for friendship.349 By contrast, in situations where one is unable to encounter the truth, one 
is depersonalized in ways that uproots the possibility of friendships.350 To see how this is 
so, I will focus on Marcel’s (1965) discussion of truth and freedom,351 with an eye to 
extracting the essence of his argument and its applicability to our present concern.352  
 The first such lesson is that there is a connection between truth, one’s self-respect 
and what Marcel calls the “will to be recognized.” This will to be recognized is 
crystallized in the demand, “what do you take us for” (Marcel 1965, 229). The situations 
in which such a demand is made are those in which there is a systematic attempt to 
prevent persons from encountering the truth, e.g., through propaganda and official lies.  
                                                        
348 In his essay on friendship, Montaigne makes freedom a necessary condition on friendship—freedom not 
only in inaugurating the friendship, but also in continuing it. In this way, he distinguishes friendship from 
marriage. While marriage is voluntarily contracted, there are various forms of coercion designed to prevent 
its dissolution (Montaigne 2011, 27-28).  
349 In this respect, I am concerned with what Dahlstrom (2008, section 4) calls “interpersonal freedom,” the 
freedom that enables me to, and that derives from, the commitment of myself to others. As Dahlstrom 
makes clear, such freedom both presupposes more rudimentary forms of freedom (connected with self-
mastery and self-interest) as well as a “renunciation of the unqualified pursuit, not only of narrowly defined 
self-interests, but even self-mastery” (ibid., 47). 
350 My topic not being the metaphysics of free will, as that topic is usually discussed (in terms of the 
opposition of compatibilism and incompatibilism, libertarianism, and determinism), I am not articulating a 
sufficient condition for freedom in this subsection. It may well be that we are not free (although I happen to 
think that we are), but I will assume that we are free, and thus that bona fide friendships do, in fact, exist. 
351 See Diamond (1994) (mentioned in the last chapter in response to Heal and Rorty) for a work that is a 
kindred spirit with Marcel (1965). Although Diamond does not refer to Marcel, there are several parallels. 
352 In his (1965), worries about totalitarian governments are in the foreground of Marcel’s thought, as well 
as his worry about the tendency of even putatively democratic states toward totalitarianism through the 
increasing scope and power of bureaucracies (see, e.g., [1950] 2001a, 31-32). 
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 Being cut off from an encounter with the truth is bound up with an attempt to 
deprive a person of her interiority. Such desensitization to the truth is undertaken with the 
purpose of emptying persons of their interiority, so that they become pliable. This is done 
so that the oppressor of truth can fill up the desensitized person with the desired “beliefs.” 
This is dramatically displayed in the means by which states extract false confessions of 
crimes from dissidents, in order to break them interiorly (ibid., 229-30).353 By 
undermining and working to destroy a person’s ability to encounter the truth, oppressors 
(be they agents of a state or not), destroy that person’s sensitivity to truth, undermining 
their self-respect and refusing to recognize them as persons. Those who deploy 
propaganda, Marcel argues, claim to have the right to manipulate the consciences of men, 
and “cynically refuse to recognize that ordering of man’s awareness in subordination to 
truth” ([1952] 2008, 51). But beyond the “everyday degradation” brought about by 
propaganda, there is also the degradation (already mentioned) of persons by the use of 
techniques designed to break them as persons. As Marcel observes, we who live in the 
contemporary world do not even have the retreat of Stoicism, when there exists the 
means to destroy us even in our interior lives (ibid., 12-13; cf. 1965, 229).  
 My argument, however, is not meant to be primarily political. It is rather that, 
whether the sources of oppression are agents of a state or not, a basic condition on the 
ability for genuine interpersonal communion is a world in which the sensitivity to truth is 
not under attack, where the distinction between the true and the false is maintained and 
respected, and wherein persons are not violated in their interiority. I do not say that such 
                                                        
353 The parallels with Orwell’s 1984 should be obvious. 
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conditions absolutely make friendship impossible—rather they make friendship 
exceedingly difficult to the degree that they predominate. Recall, from our discussion of 
Mounier, the connections between interiority and the prospects of communion. It should 
be clear from what has been said how the denigration of the former cuts off the flowering 
of the latter. That is, given the dynamic unity between the moments of communication 
and the intimate conversion (interiority), subverting the latter subverts the former. If 
persons feel cut off from the truth—both the truth about the states of affairs in which they 
find themselves and the truth about themselves (represented dramatically by the situation 
of the person bombarded with official lies and psychological manipulation)—then they 
have nothing that would (or could) constitute an offering or disclosure of the truth to 
another (potential) friend in acts of communication.  
 Developing this theme further, we can also point to various “domains” of truth 
which are particularly important vis-à-vis freedom. Following Marcel and Wojtyla, I 
identify these as, respectively, the truth about the person, and the truth about the objects 
of our wills.354 Since these are specially connected, it is appropriate to discuss them here, 
before turning to the theme of the communication and reception of truth more generally 
in the next subsection. 
 In order to be truly free, persons must be in touch with the truth about what it 
means to be a person. Without this “moment of truth” (to use Wojtyla’s phrase—see 
below) about what it means to be a person, persons lose the freedom-for living an 
authentically personal life. Mistaken views about what it means to be a person can have a 
                                                        
354 This is not a strict separation, as Wojtyla also speaks about what he calls “the truth about man.” 
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drastic impact on the course of one’s life. To take an extreme example, consider someone 
for whom a materialist way of thinking is predominant. For such a materialist, the arc of 
his life will take a certain shape that will itself confirm that very way of thinking. That is, 
as Marcel argues, by thinking materialistically, persons tend to create a world in which 
such materialism “comes true.” Thus Marcel: 
 Thanks to the techniques of degradation it is creating and perfecting, a materialistic mode 
 of thought, in our time, is showing itself capable of bringing into being a world which 
 more and more tends to verify its own materialistic postulates. I mean that a human being 
 who has undergone a certain type of psychological manipulation tends progressively to 
 be reduced to the status of a mere thing…man depends, to a very great degree, on the 
 idea he has of himself and that this idea cannot be degraded without at the same time 
 degrading man. (1952] 2008, 14) 
 
By not being in touch with the full truth about the meaning of personhood, the world 
tends to become such as to exhibit a certain truncation (at best) and a certain degradation 
and depersonalization (at worst). Marcel, of course, is focused on the latter possibility, 
which is called into being by the application of techniques of degradation. But the former 
is equally likely and, perhaps, even likelier (at least, in places where the deployment of 
techniques of degradation is not widespread). Such a truncation occurs when persons turn 
aside from their personhood, and so lose their freedom for fully personal lives. 
 The notion of such a “truly personal life” will be discussed in chapter V but, for 
now (following Mounier, Marcel, Wojtyla, and Clarke) I understand this in terms of a 
certain kind of fulfillment—of one’s personal potential—as well as the incarnation of 
values in the concrete details of our lives.355 Now, it may be that many a person, upon 
                                                        
355 A word on the distinction between incarnation and fulfillment. Fulfillment is brought about the 
incarnation of certain values. In one sense, then, incarnation is related to fulfillment. In another sense, 
however, incarnation merely expresses our manner of being as concrete and embodied. 
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learning this truth, will not take up the mantle of personhood, but will, like the young 
man of St. Matthew’s Gospel, go “away sad for he had great possessions” (Matthew 
19:22). Just as likely, however, is the prospect that, constantly throwing himself from 
distraction to distraction, the person will never come to realize the meaning of his 
personhood and will lead a severely truncated life. Having never known what he could 
be, he was not truly free to become it.356  
 In addition to this point about the necessity of encountering the truth about the 
person, note the second half of the quote from Marcel, where he flags how the 
degradation of the idea of the person degrades the person. The truth or falsity of our ideas 
about personhood can mean the difference between being free-for fulfillment, or being 
“free-for” (perversely) degradation.357 We cannot be truly free if we do not even know 
who and what we are and, a fortiori, if we aren’t even facing who and what we are, and 
trying to figure it out, to begin with. As Marcel says: man is a person, and can only 
“assert his rights as a free man…to the extent that he is engaged or involved in an 
encounter…[with the] truth” (1965, 233). 
                                                        
356 In this respect, the influence of Pindar (Pythian 2)—“you have learned what kind of person you are: now 
become that man”—on certain personalists is evident (e.g., Clarke (1993, 51) and Maritain ([1946] 1966, 
44)). This does not requires that the non-philosophically-inclined be required to “do philosophy” in a 
rigorously academic way. Following von Hildebrand and others, I think that all persons are able to grasp 
values and make an adequate response to them (save the value-blind, whose ranks may increase or decrease 
in accordance with the condition of the world). I also think that ordinary persons are able to have 
experiences that show them the depth of the interior life, as well as the depth of interpersonal communion. 
The problem is that, in different times and places, these experiences rise and fall in number. In this 
historical context, all that the personalist tries to do is make explicit the potential and value of human 
personhood (descriptively) and issue a call to persons to respond to who and what they are.   
357 The twentieth century is stained with the blood of ideologies that brutalized the person. Many of the 
great personalists lived through such horrors. Wojtyla, through Nazi and communist rule of Poland. Marcel, 
through two world wars, the Nazi occupation of France and the treachery of the Vichy collaborators. Von 
Hildebrand, standing up to the Nazis, only to have to flee through Europe and eventually to America. Stein, 
born a Jew and later a convert to Catholicism and Carmelite nun, killed at Auschwitz. 
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 In addition to encountering the truth about human personhood, freedom also 
depends upon a “moment of truth” about the objects of our wills (Wojtyla). Working 
within a Thomistic framework, Wojtyla speaks (plausibly enough) of things that present 
themselves to our appetites as good (sub ratione boni). The person however, as that being 
who acts, and is not merely acted upon (i.e., that is not merely the locus of certain 
“happenings” or “events”), must have some way of ascending above the mere appearance 
of the object of the will as something good.358 That is to say, it must have a “moment of 
truth about goodness”359 with respect to the object. It is this ascendancy that makes the 
person free for genuinely human acts (the actus humanus as opposed to the actus hominis 
of Aquinas)360, whereby the person is able to transcend himself in action, thereby 
endowing himself with moral value or disvalue, and either fulfilling, or failing to fulfill, 
himself as person.361  
 We are those beings able to call into question the appearance of goodness, whose 
sensory and affective responses to things is always also bound up with an intellectual 
response. As Wojtyla writes: 
 Experience is always the first and most basic stage of human cognition, and this 
 experience, in keeping with the dual nature of the cognizing subject, contains not  only a 
 sensory but also an intellectual element. For this reason, one could say that human 
 experience is already always a kind of understanding. ([1981] 1993c, 188)  
                                                        
358 For this distinction in Wojtyla, see his (1979a, 61-62). 
359 This is the title of chapter 3, section 7 of The Acting Person. For discussion of this element of Wojtyla’s 
thought, see Szostek (1986). Szostek also shows how the point that I have attributed to Marcel (the need for 
an encounter of the truth about the person) is an aspect of Wojtyla’s thought as well. 
360 See ST, IaIIae, q. 1, a. 1, resp. The hallmark of human actions is that they manifest the person as 
dominus sui, master of himself, through reason and will. 
361 This enormously simplifies Wojtyla’s treatment of these issues (see 1979a, 138-169). 
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It is this interpenetration of our intellective and appetitive powers (something already 
noted by Aquinas)362 that enables us to respond to our world—from inanimate objects up 
to our fellow persons—in a way that does not make us slaves to the appearances. As 
such, when friendship is what is on the table, we are able to freely enter into friendships 
with others in part because of this ability for ascendancy, in the moment of truth, over the 
appearances. We are not bound to be friends with anyone, no matter how pleasant and 
compelling an appearance they put forth. The decision to cultivate a friendship, to make 
the gift of oneself involved in friendship, is a decision freely made, and a gift freely 
given, only through an initial encounter with some aspect of the truth of the other person. 
Thus, this aspect of the antecedent relationships leads us to the next: the requirement of 
an initial communication and reception of truth for friendship. 
3.1.2 Truth, Communication, and Reception 
 The second way in which truth is antecedently related to friendship concerns the 
encounter with truths about other persons, other would-be friends. The encounter with 
these truths about others makes friendship possible. This subsection thus goes a level 
deeper, in certain respects, than does the previous subsection. Truth is antecedently 
related to friendship insofar as truth is communicable and insofar as friendship requires 
(not only antecedently but also, as we shall see, concomitantly) acts of communication of, 
and receptivity, to the truth of others.363  
                                                        
362 For the interpenetration of intellect and will in Aquinas, see ST Ia, q. 82, a. 3, ad 1, a. 4, ad 1. 
363 It is worth noting that there are no rules quantifying how much communicative groundwork is required 
for friendship; for example, although Montaigne likewise notes the necessity of communication for 
friendship, he also acknowledges that sometimes friendships are able to form more spontaneously (though 
not in a vacuum) and without the (typically) longer period of preliminary conversation (2011, 27, 29). In 
modern parlance, we might say that some people “just click.” 
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 As already noted, for the Thomistic personalist, Aquinas’s writings are rich in 
resources for making sense of this communicability. As we saw in the brief foray into the 
doctrine of transcendental truth in the introduction and chapter II, according to Aquinas 
everything is potentially intelligible to intellectual beings such as ourselves—that is, 
everything is relatable as true to our intellects. We are those beings for whom truth is an 
issue.  
 However, one certainly does not need to endorse the doctrine of transcendental 
truth in order to accept the point that I am making here. It suffices to observe that there 
must be some truth about oneself to communicate to other, potential friends, and that 
truths of this sort must be communicable, i.e., intelligible, to them.364 For the Thomist, 
that such a truth exists, and that it is communicable, is true of everything that is. But all 
that is required for my purposes here is that we see that such truths must exist and be 
communicable at the level of persons. If there were no truth to communicate, and if we 
were unable to make that truth intelligible to others in acts of communication, then we 
would be unable to form friendships. 
 Beyond the bare existence and communicability of these truths, there must of 
course also be acts by which they are communicated. Again, for the Thomist, this is a 
natural result of a thing’s being in act. The primary way in which such communication is 
carried off is through the characteristic operation of a thing. For the Medievals, this falls 
                                                        
364 Just what is this truth? In the first instance, it is the truth about the person (significant and peripheral), 
but it can also be the contents of the knowledge that the individual has acquired. In this I follow Clarke 
(1993, 78, 91-92): we share our wisdom and love, who we are, what we believe in and stand for, our 
“story.” Note that the inclusion of this last item does not entail a narrativity theory of personal identity. 
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out of the adage operari sequitur esse and the distinction between the first act of a being 
(its act of existence) and the second act of a thing (its operation).365 Again, for my 
purposes, we need not endorse any general metaphysical claims about acts of 
communication as proper to being as such. It is only important that we accept that, just as 
with the existence and communicability of the truth of oneself, we cannot enter into 
friendships without some acts whereby we communicate said truth. These are acts of self-
disclosure, or self-revelation, and can range, in their content, from the relatively central to 
the relatively peripheral. 
 Next is required the act whereby we make ourselves receptive to the truth that is 
being communicated to us. Clarke (1993, Part II, section 5) argues, on Thomistic 
grounds, that receptivity is a “possible perfection of being,” complementary with self-
communication. At the personal level of friendship, he discusses this in terms of love 
(ibid., 84). I think that the same point needs to be made in terms of truth. Again, we need 
only see how this is necessary at the personal level. If persons disclose themselves to 
others, but the targeted receivers are not properly oriented to them, then the disclosure 
falls on deaf ears. There is by no means anything automatic or inevitable about the 
attitude of receptivity. Just as, at the personal level, the act of communication is one that 
is voluntarily undertaken, so too is the “act” of receptivity. Moreover, qua voluntary act, 
both may be performed in a way that is more or less virtuous. (In this respect, see the 
                                                        
365 This is theme mentioned by Clarke in his Aquinas lectures (1993, 90-93) and developed in later work on 
activity as a transcendental property of being (1994a). The point, as applied to the person, is that it is only 
through action that a person learns about herself. (Communication counts as action in this context.) Stein 
(2002, 376) makes a similar point: we only learn our capabilities through action. 
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discussion of the virtue of sensitivity, in section 3.2 below.) Just how to describe the act 
of receptivity, and its virtues, is a task that I must leave for future work. What is required 
above all is a certain art of listening. In one sense, what is required is that we silence 
ourselves before the other the better to receive her self-disclosure. This refers back to 
Mounier, and how our interior life affects our prospects for receptivity as well as 
communication. It is also akin to a point that we observed in Pieper back in chapter I: that 
intellectual contact with reality requires a kind of asceticism. We must not allow our own 
desires to distort what is communicated to us from others. That this is all too common, 
and sometimes to ill effect, makes it clear that reception must be perfected by virtue.366 
 On a par with the point about silence is that receptivity must not be reduced to the 
eagerness of a curious disposition. Intellectual curiosity was discussed in the last chapter 
with reference to Aquinas. But Aquinas also discusses sensitive curiosity, following 
Augustine on the concupiscence of the eyes. This latter sort of curiosity can either turn 
away from the useful, or (worse) toward something harmful. The examples given by 
Aquinas are particularly apropos here. He cites looking on another with lust, and the 
“busy inquiry” into other’s lives for the purposes of detraction (that is, the sinful 
revelation of another’s faults) (ST IIaIIae, q. 167, a. 2, resp., ad 1-3). Both of these are 
borne out in our experience. There are those whose receptivity toward others is a matter 
of desiring the other and wanting to seem desirable to her. With regard to detraction, this 
is the vicious mode of receptivity whereby we listen with an eye to gaining an advantage 
                                                        
366 Two classic examples of this include (1) wanting the other to be a certain way, and so “hearing” her in a 
way that confirms what we want, or (2) wanting our relationships with others to be of a certain sort, and so 
interpreting her communication in a way that supports this desire. 
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over the other, seeking out her faults so that we may broadcast them publicly, or use them 
to secret advantage.  
 As previously noted, Heidegger picks up on this Augustinian-Thomistic367 theme 
in Being and Time (¶ 36).368 He is worth quoting in full: 
 When curiosity becomes free, however, it concerns itself with seeing, not in order to 
 understand...but just in order to see. It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to 
 another novelty. In this kind of seeing, that which is an issue for care does not lie in 
 grasping something and being knowingly in the truth; it lies rather in its possibilities of 
 abandoning itself to the world. Therefore curiosity is characterized by a specific way of 
 not tarrying alongside what is closest. Consequently it does not seek the leisure of 
 tarrying observantly, but rather seeks restlessness and the excitement of continual novelty 
 and changing encounters. In not tarrying, curiosity is concerned with the constant  
 possibility of distraction. 
 
Such curiosity is, Heidegger says, “everywhere and nowhere,” ““never dwelling 
anywhere”” (ibid.). It receives others solely for the gratuitous novelty of it, the thrill of 
learning something new about someone new—the more salacious the better. What such a 
person cannot do is “tarry” alongside the other, and genuinely receive her in a way that 
conduces to the prospects for understanding. Receptivity requires time, and a certain 
rootedness of oneself in the relationship, whereas curiosity is, as Heidegger puts it, a 
mode of Being-in-the-world “in which Dasein is constantly uprooting itself” (ibid.).  
 Of course, lest we forget it, such vicious modes of receptivity have natural 
analogues in the acts of communication. There can be a dissipated sort of 
communication, an exhibitionism of the self that is made with an eye to scandalize, seize 
                                                        
367 In Augustine, the point about curiosity is put well in the Confessions (Book X, Chapter 3) when he 
writes, “Men are a race curious to know of other men’s lives, but slothful to correct their own. Why should 
they wish to hear from me what I am, when they do not wish to hear from You what they are 
themselves?...But as to what I now am while I am writing my Confessions, there are many who desire to 
know—both people who know me personally, and people who do not, but have heard something from me 
or about me. Yet they have not their ear at my heart, where I am what I am.” 
368 As mentioned in Aertsen (2005) and Ramos (2012c). 
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attention, titillate and arouse. Such exhibitions, as Mounier noted, are akin to the 
exhibitions whereby people parade themselves about unclothed. What is needed is a 
certain modesty (Mounier 1952, 36). We cannot truly communicate ourselves to anyone 
in particular if we are constantly flouting ourselves before everyone in general. 
Friendship, it is worth repeating, is always, properly speaking, between particular 
persons. The more universal the exhibitionism, the fewer the prospects for friendship. As 
noted in the discussion of the home, friendship requires the possibility of intimacy, i.e., 
that there is “space carved out” for such intimacy. But if one’s public persona is all-
consuming, then there is no such space. Communication, then, no less than reception, 
requires the correction of virtue to make the encounter with truth necessary for friendship 
possible.  
 You might be wondering, at this point, what this has to do specifically with belief. 
Although it should have been clear, in the last section, that belief enters into the picture 
through the beliefs that we have about the nature of the person and the nature of the 
objects of our wills, it may be that the focus here on communication and reception has 
made it harder to get belief into your sights.  
 Here is how I think that belief is implicated. Recall from chapter I that Marcel 
draws a distinction between belief-in and belief-that. A large part of that discussion 
concerned my development of the undeveloped notion of belief-that in Marcel. Belief-in, 
however, is fairly well described by Marcel. It essentially involves the act of extending 
oneself as a credit to the other (Marcel [1950] 2001b, 77; cf. 1964, 134). It is through this 
act of believing-in the other person, that we manifest (at least, in part) the orientation 
 369 
 
toward the other required to receive her self-revelation. Through the orientation of 
believing-in the other we, who are persons, enact the receptivity of truth that is required 
for entering into a friendship with her. Our belief-in translates into various beliefs-that. 
This is not, to be clear, to imply the infallibility or completeness of such beliefs—I 
discuss such errors below, when I make clear that truth is also a consequence of 
friendship. It is just to say that some initial exchange—communication and reception—is 
required to get friendships “off the ground.” Part of the groundwork that makes 
friendship possible is the initial disclosure and revelation of self to another 
(communication) and the orientation of the receiver to the other who is revealing herself 
(reception). What is received results, in the beginning, in beliefs, and beliefs about one’s 
friends remain the basic unit, out of which, to invoke the Anselmian motto mentioned in 
chapter II, flowers an understanding our friends: credo ut intelligam. 
 To recap, friendship requires that there exists a truth to be communicated, that this 
truth be communicable, that the truth be communicated, that the truth be receivable, and 
that the truth be received. Furthermore, it requires that the acts of communication and 
reception not be vicious in certain ways. Above all, I have stressed that these acts cannot 
degenerate into pure acts of voyeurism (curiosity) and exhibitionism if the prospects of 
authentic friendship are to be preserved. At any rate, this general structure must be in 
place for an encounter with the truth of others and for friendships to come into being. The 
actual truths communicated and received need not be exhaustive, and there is always the 
possibility of falsity creeping in. But what is required is that there be a “start in the truth.” 
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It remains for friendship, in the concomitant and consequent relations with truth, to build 
upon (and, sometimes correct) this initial encounter with the truth of the other. 
 There remains one final element to discuss under the present heading, and that is 
the relationship of communication to certain underlying “forms” that enable 
communication. As Aquinas notes in his discussion of friendship (ST IIaIIae, q. 23, a. 1), 
one of the ways in which types of friendship are distinguished is on the basis of the form 
of communication that underlies them.369 Thus, we have friendships that arise out of the 
context of shared blood, shared nation, even shared destination amongst travelers. I think 
that we should interpret this, in the present discussion, as that which provides the 
necessary context in order for communication to be appropriate or apt in one’s situation. 
We do not merely go about revealing ourselves to others. Persons are self-disclosing, 
self-revealing beings—but, again, this is not to say that they are self-exhibitionists.370 The 
contexts pointed to by Aquinas, and which underpin different classifications of 
friendships, indicate the various embodied situations in which our social practices deem 
that it is fitting to make certain disclosures to others.371 We may quibble with Aquinas’s 
examples, and we certainly would want to add to them from the experience of 
contemporary life, but his principle is correct.372 
                                                        
369 For a study of the various interpretations of “communicatio” in this article of the ST, see Bobik (1986). 
370 It should be noted that a further reason for maintaining and reaffirming this is that friendship is not 
merely for extroverts. Introverts are quite capable of having intense friendships as well. 
371 I take this to be one upshot of Aquinas’s claim that, “to state that which concerns oneself, insofar as it a 
statement of what is true, is good generically. Yet this does not suffice for it to be an act of virtue, since it is 
requisite for that purpose that it should also be clothed with the due circumstances, and if these not be 
observed that act will be sinful” (ST IIaIIae, q. 109, a. 1, ad 2). His examples concern those who praise 
themselves without due cause, or who unnecessarily publicize their sins.  
372 Another way to put what comes (more-or-less) to the same point is the observation, made by C.S. Lewis 
in his chapter on friendship in The Four Loves, that friendship “supervenes” on forms of companionship 
 371 
 
3.2 The Concomitant Relation 
 Next, there is the concomitant relationship between truth and friendship. Before 
discussing this relationship, however, I would like to pause to raise the following 
concern. It might be wondered why it is worth our while to articulate more than the 
antecedent relationship of the past section. The reason is that if I were to rest my case 
with the antecedent relationship, then my account would have the appearance of a merely 
instrumentalist, understanding of the relationship between truth and friendship. Truth 
would seem to be a mere means, or instrument, the “use” or “acquisition” of which 
enables one to cultivate friendships. Friendship, in turn, would be thought of as merely 
the object of one desire among many, and not as corresponding to any deep-seated aspect 
of our nature as persons. Such a position would be antithetical to the approach pursued 
here. Truth is not merely a necessary enabling condition on friendship. It is also bound up 
with what it means to be friends and a natural consequence of friendship. 
 There is another concern that needs to be raised, if only to clarify what I am trying 
to accomplish in this subsection. It is the ever-present problem of vagueness. Are there 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for friendship? One might interpret the 
remarks of this subsection as providing a necessary objective condition on whether two 
persons are friends, but it is far from being sufficient, as I acknowledge below. In any 
event, it is not my business here to provide necessary and sufficient conditions. What I 
                                                        
(1960, 65). Further, I should note that while my inspiration for the articulation of this aspect of the truth-
friendship relationship comes from reflection upon Aquinas, Marcel, and other personalists, I was pushed 
by my reading of Brandom (1994) to say a little more about this structure qua practice than I might 
otherwise have done. For this, I am thankful to Professor Decosimo, for recommending Brandom’s work. 
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am undertaking is not a conceptual analysis of friendship; it is rather a robust description 
of that part of the experience of being-friends that falls under the heading of truth. My 
project is more phenomenological (in the broad sense of that word) than analytical. In 
any event, however, the project of providing such conditions is fraught, due to the 
interplay between subjective and objective determinations that make for the existence of 
a relationship. That is, in addition to certain objectively describable features that must be 
satisfied in order for there to exist a friendship between two persons, there is also the 
matter of whether the individual persons would endorse the claim that a friendship exists. 
How are these two sorts of features to be brought together in the determination as to 
whether a friendship exists?373 Since I am not aiming to provide a set of jointly sufficient 
conditions on friendship, I am not troubled, in what follows, by this worry. While I think 
that what follows can be construed as a necessary objective condition on the existence of 
a friendship, it is, to reiterate, far from being sufficient. 
 Having flagged these concerns, let us return to the concomitant relationship 
between truth and friendship. Here is how I think that we should understand it. Consider 
two persons who are (relatively) new friends. That is, they are friends, they identify as 
friends of each other, but the friendship is still in its early days. There will exist, in each 
of them, a certain deficit of truth with regard to the other. That is, each will have many 
true beliefs about the other, but there will be much still shrouded. It is part of what it 
                                                        
373 One case that crops up is the case of unacknowledged friendships, i.e., the case of two persons who are 
clearly friends, but who do not acknowledge their friendship to each other (either interiorly, or before the 
other), or who wait many, many years before doing so—e.g., the friendship between Miss Daisy and Hoke 
in Driving Miss Daisy. 
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means to be friends with another, that one of the characteristic activities of the friendship 
is a reduction of these deficits in both persons, so as to reach (roughly) both greater depth 
in one’s beliefs and understanding of the other, as well as striving to maintain a 
semblance of equality in the deficits. That is, the reductions are not only reduced, but 
balanced.  
 Consider, for example, an extreme case where Jane knows everything about 
Thomas, and Thomas knows only that Jane works for a grocery store and keeps a large 
garden in her free time. Their relationship is hardly a friendship. Diagnosing why it is not 
a friendship will involve, in part, tracing why it is the case that Jane knows so much 
about Thomas, and Thomas so little about Jane. Is Jane averse to sharing? Does Thomas 
just not care about Jane? Does Jane wish to acquire information about Thomas for some 
other purpose, external to the friendship and possibly nefarious? Does Thomas have a 
similar aim, albeit one for the sake of which he withholds himself from Jane? This is, of 
course, an extreme case, and, again, the problem of vagueness rears its head. Deficit 
reductions need not be perfectly balanced, and the question is how much of an imbalance 
a friendship can tolerate. To this, I neither have a precise answer, nor perhaps is one 
likely.374 Still, I am confident that persons are able, upon reflection, to discern such 
imbalances (“You know…I don’t really know anything about her”; “You know…I know 
so much about him, but we never seem to talk about my life”) and withhold, or drop, their 
subjective endorsement of the friendship’s existence.  
                                                        
374 Just as there is no exact answer in general as to how much lying a practice of communication can sustain 
before the practice is undermined. 
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 These considerations provide the basis of my understanding of how truth is bound 
up with what it means to be friends with someone. I have already qualified this in two 
ways: (1) that friendship involves reducing deficits of truth; (2) that these reductions are, 
salva amicitia, roughly balanced. In the remainder of this section, I will further qualify, 
and so develop, my understanding of this aspect of friendship. To anticipate, these 
qualifications will concern: (1) the question of explicit versus implicit; (2) the question of 
essential versus incidental; (3) friendship as a form of being-with; (4) the situation of this 
aspect of friendship within the overall relationship of friendship. 
 First, the activity of deficit-reduction need not take the form of any explicit 
practice of “reducing the deficit.” Friends are not accountants whose ledgers record 
shared truths. It is more often the case that it is implicit in the “art,” if you will, of 
friendship, that friends communicate (share) truths. Sometimes this can be made into an 
explicit practice all on its own: you tell me something I do not know about you, and then 
I will do the same.375 I suspect that this is rather more common at the beginning of 
various relationships, when the friends are most eager to search out for the scope of what 
they share in common.376  
 So, the mutual reduction of their deficits of truth need not, though can be and at 
certain times usually are, explicit manifestations of the ars amicitiae. In considering this 
matter, it is well also to consider the “vehicles” in which truths are communicated. This 
                                                        
375 This is not to say that this practice, if explicit, is a mere quid pro quo. The relationship between 
Hannibal Lecter and Clarice Starling is not an exemplar. 
376 I have adopted the term “art of friendship” since my worry is that the term “practice” as applied to the 
love of friendship makes it sound too much like the application of a technique, whereas “art” suggest room 
for the scope of creative fidelity. I will, however, continue to speak of the “practice” of deficit-reduction as 
part of the “art” of friendship. 
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was a matter left unaddressed in the last subsection. Typically, what comes to mind are 
assertions, clothed in the garb of declarative sentences. However, such sentences are not 
exhaustive of the act of communication.377 This in itself points to the possibility of the 
practice of deficit-reduction being implicit, for we communicate the truth of ourselves not 
only through the overt statement of declarative sentences, but in other forms as well. 
Mounier already grasps this possibility when he says: 
 Since this infinitude can never be fully expressed by direct communication, the person 
 sometimes prefers indirect communication—irony, humor, paradox, myth, symbol, 
 pretence etc. (1952, 35) 
 
The “infinitude” of which he speaks is the “sense of an infinite life within” the person 
(ibid.). To recall the earlier discussion of Mounier, this “infinite life” is what it found in 
the turn to self-recollection and the confrontation with one’s secret life, a life that is not 
reducible without residue to some mere set of observable traits.  
 As for what Mounier means by “direct communication,” I interpret it as a 
reference to overt assertion in a declarative sentence. “Indirect communication,” on this 
interpretation refers to the possibility of such communication of the truth that is not 
rendered explicitly in what is “traditionally” considered a truth-evaluable form. The depth 
of interpersonal communication is such that it is communicative of truth, even when the 
forms in question do not lend themselves to the being assigned truth-values in any 
                                                        
377 This is not to knock declarative sentences, however. As Sokolowski (2007, 43, 47) argues, it is through 
the use of such sentences that we take a certain sort of responsibility for our claims to truth. We indicate to 
others that we are what Sokolowski calls “agents of truth” (ibid., 48). Sokolowski argues that our status as 
such agents of truth is only actualized in interpersonal settings (2006b, 205). The concept of an agent of 
truth is also found in his (2006a). 
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currently orthodox way of doing so. As I understand it, the possibility of implicitness 
goes hand-in-hand with the broader set of “forms” that communication can take.378  
 However, we must be careful here. For in making this facet of the ars out to be 
implicit, we need not, and should not, make it out to be accidental or incidental to 
friendship. C.S. Lewis serves as a useful foil here. Lewis’s contribution to the philosophy 
of friendship was already alluded to in the last subsection, where I mentioned his claim 
that friendship supervenes on companionship. Although I think that there is much in 
Lewis’s account that is correct, I have a fundamental disagreement with it, concerning its 
characterization of (what I call) deficit-reduction as incidental or casual. 
 Consider the following, with which I agree:  
 Where the truthful answer to the question Do you see the same truth? would be “I see 
 nothing and don’t care about the truth; I only want a Friend,” no Friendship can arise—
 though Affection of course may. (Lewis 1960, 66) 
 
This much is correct. Lewis, however, thinks that the truth in question must essentially be 
something external to the friends, even if it is about something as (seemingly) 
insignificant as “dominoes or white mice” (ibid.). The following makes clear the contrast 
between my view and Lewis’s: 
 For of course we do not want to know our Friend’s affairs at all. Friendship, unlike Eros, 
 is uninquisitive. You become a man’s Friend without knowing or caring whether he is 
 married or single or how he earns his living. What have all these “unconcerning things, 
 matters of fact” have to do with the real question, Do you see the same truth? In a circle 
 of true Friends, each man is simply what he is: stands for nothing but himself. No one 
 cares twopence about any one else’s family, profession, class, income, race, or 
 previous history. (ibid., 251). 
                                                        
378 An expansion of the current project would thus attempt to describe how truth is communicated and 
received using the forms suggested by Mounier. One avenue of such research would be to incorporate the 
role of performatives and other speech acts within friendships, focusing on the issue as to whether such 
speech acts have truth-values. For classic positions on this, see Austin ([1979] 2007c, 236), who says that 
performative utterances are not also true statements, and Searle (1989, 553) who says that they can be. 
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According to my view, it is, by contrast, essential to friendship that we do care about our 
friend’s affairs. I think that we are usually hurt when our friends, for whatever reason, 
feel as though they cannot share their lives with us in this way.  
 Sometimes, of course, there is good reason for withholding information—and 
friends understand this. But, in general, I think that we are wounded when our friends do 
not care to share their joys and sorrows, their burdens and good fortune, just as we would 
be wounded to learn, of our friends, that they did not really care about these things even 
when we did share them. Furthermore, this has nothing to do with an eroticizing of 
friendship, which seems to be Lewis’s principal worry.379 We do not eroticize friendship 
merely by calling attention to the concrete interpersonal structure of friendship.  
 For Lewis, for whom the defining question of friendship is whether the friends 
“see the same truth” (about whatever is in question), friendship risks being confused with 
(or, rather, reduced to) a mutual admiration society. In response to Lewis, we must 
maintain that friendship is not only turned outward, on a shared appreciation of some 
truth (be it about God or goldfish, Chaucer or comic books), but also turned toward the 
other friend herself. As von Hildebrand observes, there is a difference between 
admiration and love—and friendship is a form of the latter (2009, 66). In being friends 
with somebody, our own subjectivity and happiness are implicated—we put our prospects 
for happiness on the line, as it were, in making and being friends, in a way that Lewis’s 
                                                        
379 Lewis is arguing the claim, aired by some of his contemporaries, that same-sex friendships are always 
“unconsciously, cryptically, in some Pickwickian sense—homosexual” (1960, 60). 
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account seems curiously unable to account for.380 The reason for Lewis’s inability is the 
fact that friendship for him is so cerebral as to verge on making the other person 
interchangeable with others who admire the same things that you do. Consider the 
following illustrative passage (boldfaced emphases mine): 
 This is the Kingliness of Friendship. We meet like sovereign princes of independent 
 states, abroad, on neutral ground, freed from our contexts. This love (essentially) 
 ignores not only our physical bodies but that whole embodiment which consists of 
 our family, job, past and connections. At home, besides being Peter or Jane, we also 
 bear a general character; husband or wife, brother or sister, chief, colleague, or 
 subordinate. Not among our Friends. It is an affair of disentangled, or stripped, 
 minds. Eros will have naked bodied; Friendship naked personalities. (ibid.) 
 
 Now, it may be that friendship ignores the physical body. Though of course, even 
this seems an exaggeration for the sake of preserving the non-erotic character of 
friendship. I love my friend, not as a “stripped mind” or a “naked personality” (what even 
are these?), but as another person—body and soul, as it were. In short, the myth of 
Platonic love does not become any less mythical when we name it “Friendship”—and we 
do a disservice to friendship by (falsely) describing it in this way. Being friends with 
another person is not divorced from the “whole embodiment” of the other, nor can it be 
so divorced. 
 Now Lewis does acknowledge that we know nobody so well as our friends, but 
that it is the medium of the common external truth or endeavor that is primary (ibid.). So 
I do not want to overstate the disagreement—significant though the passage cited above 
makes it out to be. In a word, I think that what I have styled “deficit-reduction” is 
                                                        
380 The von Hildebrandian point that lies behind this is that love is not only a value-response to others, but 
also a “super-value-response,” whereby the other becomes an objective good for me, and source of 
happiness for me (see von Hilidebrand (2009, 118-19). 
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essential to friendship, and not something that merely comes along for the ride, as a 
byproduct of the common outward-facing admiration of some truth, or the pursuit of 
some common project. It is also such a consequence, as I make clear in the next 
subsection. It is a result of friendship that (quite apart from the activity of deficit-
reduction as explicitly or implicitly essential to friendship) friends mediate and bring into 
being certain truths about each other. It is possible (and, I hope, plausible) to assimilate 
Lewis’s observations to this aspect of the relationship between truth and friendship. 
Where I draw the contrast, however, is against the “cerebralization” of friendship, as if 
the truth about the other was not central, as if friendship occurs in a decontextualized 
setting.  
 Another way of putting the contrast between the account pursued here, and that of 
Lewis, is by emphasizing the fact that friendship, as a form of interpersonal communion, 
is a form of being with another. One of the ways that its application to friendship should 
be understood is that it requires that friends share a world. This section can then be taken 
as describing at least part of what is involved in sharing a world with another person as a 
friend. This involves the reduction of deficits of truth about each other: the 
communication and reception of such truths is part of what it means to be with another, in 
the sense of sharing a world with her. What I have been arguing, using Lewis as a foil, is 
that sharing a world is not something casual or incidental to friendship, but essential—
albeit some of the time left implicit. 
 Harry Frankfurt’s essay On Truth (2006, ch. VII) gives us further resources for 
thinking through the relationship between truth and sharing a world with one’s friends, by 
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considering the question of how it is that lying injures one’s friends. What Frankfurt says 
is the “most irreducibly bad thing about lies” is that they prevent us from encountering 
the truth. The liar, by misleading us, attempts to impose (or successfully imposes) his will 
on us.381 As Frankfurt writes:  
 A person who believes a lie is constrained by it, accordingly, to live ‘in his own world’—
 a world that others cannot enter, and in which even the liar himself does not truly reside. 
 Thus, the victim of the lie is, in the degree of his deprivation of truth, shut off from the 
 world. (2006, 78)382  
 
 Moreover, not only is the one lied to a victim but so too, in his own way, is the 
liar himself. Discussing a verse of the poet Adrienne Rich, Frankfurt observes how the 
liar is “unutterably lonely” (ibid., 79). This is because the liar “cannot even reveal that he 
is lonely—that there is no one in his fabricated world—without disclosing, in doing so, 
that he has lied” (2006, 79-80). Frankfurt continues: 
 He hides his own thoughts, pretending to believe what he does not believe, and thereby 
 he makes it impossible for other people to be fully in touch with him. They cannot 
 respond to him as he really is. They cannot even be aware that they are not doing 
 so…[the liar] denies them access to an elementary mode of human intimacy that is 
 normally more or less taken for granted: the intimacy that consists in knowing what 
 is on, or what is in, another person’s mind. (ibid.) 
 
 He goes on to say that this is especially grievous in the case of one’s friends 
(ibid., 81-84). These insights help us to understand the concomitance of truth and 
friendship. That lying prevents sharing a world reveals how the ongoing communication 
of truth, and reduction of the deficits of truth (sharing a world) is part of friendship. The 
                                                        
381 In this, there is an affinity between Frankfurt’s discussion and that of Marcel (1965) (see above). The 
liar, by working to undermine our sensitivity to the truth, attempts to make us pliable in his hands, to “fill 
us up” with whatever he wants us to believe. 
382 In his essay on liars, Montaigne has similarly serious words about lying and its effect on the liar: “in 
plain true, lying is an accursed vice. We are not men, nor have other tie upon one another, but by our word” 
(2011, 12). Lying depersonalizes the liar: the liar is no longer a man, nor has he any interpersonal ties. 
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liar is unable to be a friend, precisely because of the way that he abuses the truth and 
prevents the existence of a shared world between himself and others. In short, the reasons 
why a liar cannot be a friend reveal to us how friendship is a way of being with 
another.383  
 The final qualification to be made concerns the integration of the concomitance of 
truth and friendship with the friendship-relation as a whole. I am not claiming that 
friendship is nothing but growth in communicating and receiving the truth about the 
other. This is only one element, however important.  
 LaFollette and Graham (1986), who argue for the necessity of truthfulness for 
intimate encounters (upon which intimate relationships are built), provide us with a way 
of understanding the need to integrate the self-disclosive character of interpersonal 
relationships within such relationships as a whole. The key is a virtue, which they call 
sensitivity, and which comes in two varieties: communicative sensitivity, and interest 
                                                        
383 The following Heideggerian points may be helpful here. Dasein, says Heidegger, is essentially being-
with. This is not to be understood merely in the sense that “factically I am not present-at-hand alone, and 
that Others of my kind may occur.” Heidegger, in a way that is reminiscent of Scheler’s distinction between 
solitude and being-alone (see the aside at the end of the present section), distinguishes between the being-
with of Dasein and Being-alone. Their relationship is such that Being-alone is a “deficient mode of Being-
with.” As such, the mere presence-at-hand of another human being “beside me” does not by itself mean I 
am not alone. Applied to Frankfurt’s discussion of the liar, we might say that although the liar exists 
alongside other persons, nevertheless he is not with them. (There is also a parallel with Marcel, who 
distinguishes between being with someone and being merely next to them.) By reason of his lies, the liar 
steers himself into a deficient mode of Being-with. Nevertheless, it is the very possibility of such being-
with, essential to Dasein, that makes possible such deficiencies—i.e., makes possible both “opening oneself 
up and closing oneself off.” Furthermore, since “knowing oneself is grounded in Being-with,” these 
deficiencies of being-with have implications for (to shift back to the language of this chapter) encountering 
the truth about oneself and being able to communicate that truth to others. Heidegger observes that 
“when…one’s knowing-oneself gets lost in such ways as aloofness, hiding oneself away, or putting on a 
disguise, Being-with-one-another must follow special routes of its own in order to come close to Others, or 
even to ‘see through them’.” Finally, since it bears on friendship though is not a concern in the present 
chapter, I should note that for Heidegger the possibility of empathy is itself grounded in the Being-with of 
Dasein. (For this discussion, see Being and Time ¶ 26). 
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sensitivity. The former regards the effort made by the revealing person to tailor his self-
revelation to the other’s capacities and background. As such, being communicatively 
sensitive is part of his effort to make himself understood by the other (ibid., 5). It is a 
virtue of the act of communication as such.  
 The latter, which is the one relevant for present purposes, involves attending to 
the non-communicative interests and desires of the other (ibid., 5). I would add to their 
description that this virtue must not only govern acts of communication so that they take 
the interests and desires of the other as an individual into consideration, but also the other 
“interests” or “desires” of the friendship itself. For example, friends should be sensitive 
to the fact that sometimes there is just too much talk. Sometimes this is just a matter of 
attending to quantity, all by itself. Some persons just do not realize, because they are not 
sensitive to the fact, that they spend too much time jawboning. Interest sensitivity clues 
the person into when the time has come to be silent. Another possibility is that a person 
comes to realize that other aspects of the friendship are suffering from an over-emphasis 
on talk. For example, you might come to realize that you never go out and do anything 
with your friend, never share any experience with her, however humble an experience it 
may be (sharing a meal, a movie, a ball game). Then there are the risks that attend 
communication as such, namely that they degenerate in various ways, e.g., into gossip, or 
mere verbal exhibitionism and voyeurism, or else into serving as a mere Pascalian 
diversion from anything of importance. My point here is that anything that is good, and 
“part” of something good can, if wrenched apart from the whole, be spoiled.   
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 The hard question, of course, concerns how to balance the demands of sensitivity 
against the demands of truth. It has become all-too-easy to claim that truth is not, in fact, 
what we want from our friends. As LaFollette and Graham (1986, 7-12) argue, however, 
this is not the case. Engaging in practices of falsehood, however slight, puts pressures on 
the friendship that erect a barrier, as it were, between the friends. Moreover, as they 
argue, sensitivity itself depends on a background of habitual honesty, and cannot replace 
it. This is quite right: sensitivity without a basic background of truthfulness has no 
backbone to stiffen it. It risks being abused to justify dishonesty and lies, to get out of 
difficult moments in a relationship, e.g., the revelation of a painful truth that needs to 
come out into the open. Too often sensitivity is confused with coddling, a view that 
LaFollette and Graham argue against (ibid., 17). Their lesson is that we must not slip into 
the mode of treating those with whom we would be, or with whom we still are friends, as 
though they needed to be shielded or protected from the truth (ibid.). Spouting off 
untruths is much easier than dealing with a serious issue in a friendship, and the extent to 
which a habit of such coddling takes holds is the extent to which the friendship is 
eroded.384    
 To sum up, truth is concomitant with friendship vis-à-vis the art, essential to 
friendship, of reducing the deficits of truth that exist between friends. This is a practice 
that need not, though it can be (and sometimes typically is) explicit. The fact that it can 
be implicit, however, does not imply, pace Lewis, that it is merely the casual result of 
                                                        
384 Since my primary concern is belief, however, the question that I must specifically take up is that of how 
to negotiate what we might, following LaFollette and Graham, call sensitivity and honesty in our beliefs. I 
will take up this matter below, in response to the friendship objection. 
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what really matters in friendship. No, pace Lewis, the other person, the truth about her, 
her life, joys, sufferings, etc.—the entire embodied context that Lewis claims that we do 
not care about, and need not know about, as part of friendship—matters. The 
communication and reception of truths that deepen the beliefs, and, in turn, the 
understanding that we have of our friends is just part of what it means to be friends at all. 
Being friends means, in part, sharing a world, an act that requires the truth and is literally 
blocked by abuses of the truth (e.g., lying). But it is not the entire meaning of being 
friends. Friendship is a complex, many-faceted type of interpersonal relationship. Friends 
must exercise sensitivity, both with regard to the contents of their disclosures, as well 
with regard to balancing this aspect of being friends against others and protecting it from 
abuse and degeneration.  
 Despite my disagreement with Lewis, however, his observation that coming to 
know one’s friends does happen (I say it does not merely happen) in the course of the 
friendship is correct. This points out to us the next type of relationship that exists between 
truth and friendship. Truth is also a consequence of being friends. This relationship is the 
subject of the next subsection. But first, an aside. 
 Aside: Friendship and Silence. In this section, I wish briefly to digress upon what 
I consider to be some evidence for the claim that truth is part of the meaning of being 
friends, that comes from a characteristic experience of mature friends that seems possible 
only against a background of truth. It is a distinctive of friends that they are able to dwell 
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together in silence, simply being with one another. Here I can only appeal to my own 
experience, and certain popular sentiments to back this up.385  
 Here, I think that a distinction drawn by Scheler is helpful (1973, 562, fn 246):  
 Solitude has nothing to do with objective “being-alone.” The former occurs most purely  
 and more frequently in societal relations and, indeed, in the relatively most intimate 
 communal relations (friendship, marriage, family).  
 
It is this possibility for solitude amidst intimacy or, to use the earlier terminology, the 
possibility of resting in one’s interiority in company with others, that makes sense of the 
phenomenon of the truly comfortable and enjoyable silence with others, of the rest that 
can occur alongside others in mutual solitude without being-alone. If part of friendship is, 
as I suggest, the ability to share such silences, to enjoy solitude together with others, then 
there must be a certain maturity in the truth. A fortiori, there must not be any pending lies 
that remain unconfessed. In such cases, there is also the question of whether their gravity 
is such that the friendship is effectively over, despite the pretense that it continues. Even 
in cases where the friendship is able to limp along, whether because the lies are not yet so 
widespread and systemic, the presence of such lies impede the prospects of enjoying 
solitude together in silence that is so distinctive of mature friendships. For how can the 
liar be at ease with the other in silence, while the lie burns his conscience, the guilt 
pressing down upon him or, at least, while under the pressure and stress of having to 
maintain the lie. One cannot be at ease in such situations, for the mind must always be 
sharp, vigilant lest it be found out, anticipating problems, contriving ways to plug holes 
                                                        
385 As Uma Thurman’s character Mia puts it in Pulp Fiction: “That's when you know you found somebody 
really special, when you can just shut the f--- up for a minute, and comfortably share silence.” 
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in one’s story.386 Thus, we see again the point implicit in Frankfurt, that the liar cannot be 
a friend. Part of what makes a friendship (at least, of a certain maturity) is this ability for 
solitude in company, and rest in silence together: simply being together with the other.  
3.3 The Relationship of Consequence 
 Finally, there is a relation of consequence between truth and friendship. This is a 
twofold relationship. On the one hand, friendship serves to mediate certain truths. On the 
other hand, friendship is creative of certain truths. In other words, just as friendships arise 
out of truths communicated and received (antecedent and concomitant), so too do the 
discovery and creation of certain truths arise out of friendship. 
 First, however, I need to call attention to a certain circularity that might have 
occurred to the reader. It is this. In a way, there is a parallel between the antecedent and 
consequent dimensions of the relationship between truth and friendship. That is, certain 
encounters with the truth are necessary for friendship to get off the ground, but they are 
also the consequence of friendship. Lest this be thought a vicious circle, let me say 
something about this. 
 In short, there is no circle. A fortiori, there is no vicious circularity. What would 
be vicious would be the two errors into which we would fall if there weren’t a parallel 
between the antecedent and consequent relations of truth to friendship. Let me say some 
more about each of these, by way of clarifying the account that has been pursued in this 
chapter. 
                                                        
386 LaFollette and Graham (1986, 12) make a similar point in their discussion of whether sensitivity trumps 
honesty. 
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 The first error would be to maintain that, in order to be friends, we must come to 
other persons, as possible friends, with the truth about ourselves and the world “all 
figured out.”387 That is, that we must come to others as fully-developed, static selves with 
fixed personalities. The relationship between truth and friendship would be reduced in 
two ways. First it would be reduced to a mere ex ante condition on establishing 
friendships. I have already discussed this misconceived reduction (at the outset of section 
3.2). Second, it renders the relationship completely static. That is, to write off the 
possibility of truth as a consequence of friendship is to deny, out of hand, the fact that 
friendships change persons, and therefore change the truth about persons. Friendship also 
helps to reveal truths about persons, truth which are perhaps inaccessible save through 
friendship. This first error would also deny this out of hand. 
 The second error would be to deny that any antecedent encounter with the truth is 
required at all. This is just as bad. It implies that we come to each other as blank slates, 
divorced of the context of our previous encounters and relationships with others. This 
ignores the fact that, as persons, we are always thrown—to use some Heideggerian 
language—into such relationships and encounters, and cannot (save artificially) divorce 
ourselves from them.388 The fact is that, as persons, we are—again, to use a Heideggerian 
turn-of-phrase—“always already” involved in an encounter with the truth (about 
                                                        
387 As LaFollette and Graham (1986, 11) point out, we do not come to others as such fully-worked-out 
static selves, nor is the commitment to honesty merely the commitment to reveal such static selves, but to 
“engage in the mutual uncovering, refurbishing, and creating, of a mutual, amorphous self.” This is a theme 
that will be picked up in section 3.3.2. It should be clear from the discussion of the errors in the present 
section, however, that while I agree with the first part of this quote, I disagree that we should leap to the 
extreme of speaking of a mutual amorphous self. 
388 A fact observed and detailed by Macmurray ([1961] 1999, ch. 2). 
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ourselves, others, the world), or else engaged in an effort (more or less explicit in our 
intention) to distract and divert ourselves from such encounters. (Sometimes engaged in 
both simultaneously, albeit with respect to different things.) As such, we cannot come 
before others as blank slates, as purely plastic in the hands of our relations to others. We 
always come before others as we are, as the history of our encounters with, and 
diversions from, the truth has made us.389  
 This points to another structural parallel between the antecedent and consequent 
relations. They are both, for the most part, emphases on the intimate conversion, the 
interiority, and even the substantiality of the person, whereas in the concomitant relation, 
the focus is on communication and relationality. The twin errors under discussion, then, 
are errors that rob the person of aspects of her interiority: the first denies the possibility of 
enrichment and growth. The second robs one of any stable interiority, making it a 
whirlwind of change that entirely replaces creative “conversion” with complete 
absorption in one’s relations. Furthermore, it seems that each of these deficiencies of 
interiority comes through a distortion within the relational dimension of the person. In the 
first case, the error is to deny the creative power of relations. In the second case, it is to 
give so much power to relations that it overwhelms the person by making her out to be 
nothing more than the set of her relations (Clarke 1993, 59).  
                                                        
389 At a metaphysical level, Clarke (1993, 57-60) calls attention to how the denial of the substantiality of the 
person and an extreme one-sided emphasis on relationality undermines interiority. The loss of this 
interiority is the loss of any self to give to others in friendship, and the loss of “protection against the 
pathological feeling of loss of self and fusing into others, so that we become totally passive to what others 
expect and wish of us, and finally lose any sense of “who we are”…so that we become a mere doormat or 
mirror for them, losing our sense of uniqueness and dignity in the process” (ibid., 57-58). 
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 My account is intended to hold onto both aspects of the person, without distorting 
either of them. That is to say, it aims to avoid both the mistake of denying previous 
encounters with the truth, and that of denying the creative power of friendship. As I have 
said, my account is not truly circular, for it is not as if the encounter with the truth is the 
same “before” and “after” one’s friendships. One doesn’t just “get back” in truth on the 
“other side” of friendship what one had to begin with. Friendship requires an antecedent 
encounter with the truth, is itself an ongoing creative encounter with the truth in 
communion with the friend, and has, as consequences, further such appreciations of 
truths—old and new. Marcel puts it well when he says, of the seeming “circularity” 
involved in both the necessity of knowing oneself before making commitments of fidelity 
to others and the fact that we only truly come to know ourselves when we have made 
such commitments: 
 This, however, seems to be a vicious circle only to the mind of the bystander who views  
 fidelity from without…What from without seems to be a vicious circle, is experienced 
 within as growth, as a deepening or an ascending. (1964, 163) 
 
3.3.1 “Mediators” and “Custodians” of the Truth 
 Marcel’s apparent circle points to the twin elements of this final relationship 
between truth and friendship. There is both the sense that friendship enables us to access 
certain truths about ourselves, and also the sense that friendship is itself creative of the 
truth of ourselves.  
 The first respect in which truth is a consequence of friendship is that friends are 
able to serve as mediators of the truth about each other. Crosby (1996, 152-57) makes 
this very point in the context of discussing the licit objectification of other persons. His 
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main point is to clarify the way in which we can objectify others without thereby also 
depersonalizing them (ibid. 152, 155). Since “objectify” and “objectification” have come 
to take on particularly loaded meanings, e.g., in feminist philosophy, it is well to specify 
what is meant here.  
 Following von Hildebrand, we can distinguish between a licit and an illicit 
manner of objectifying other persons. Licit objectification refers to the situation in which 
another person is the object of my intentional consciousness. Von Hildebrand argues that 
the fact that a person stands over against me in intentional consciousness (i.e., in the 
subject/object situation) does not necessarily imply that the “object” before me is, 
ontologically speaking, a mere thing. We must distinguish, he says, between object in the 
sense of an object of consciousness, and object in the same of a mere thing (von 
Hildebrand 2009, 145-46). The former is wider than the latter, so that persons (non-
things) can also be “objects” in the sense of objects of consciousness. I would add that we 
must also distinguish between taking a person as an object (objectifying her) in the sense 
of an object of intentional consciousness versus taking the same person as an object in the 
sense of a mere thing (non-person). I can certainly think about my friend (take her as an 
object of intentional consciousness) without thereby taking her to be a mere thing. 
Likewise, she can enter into other intentional acts of mine without my thereby reducing 
her to the status of a thing. I can believe of her that she has a good character, worry that 
she has made a mistake, or desire her happiness—all without illicitly objectifying her.390  
                                                        
390 The difficult cases concern certain types of specialists. Does a therapist, in objectifying me, regard me as 
a person, or as a psyche? Does my doctor regard me as a person, or as an organism? 
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 Crosby’s argues that it is the existence of the truth that is mediated by such (licit) 
objectification that preserves such objectification from being depersonalizing. He writes, 
“My view of another as object can have its own truth, and indeed a truth that the other 
has to receive from me; such a view need not, therefore, have anything to do with 
depersonalizing the other” (Crosby 1996, 155). As I read him, Crosby’s argument is that 
since there are truths that can only be mediated through other persons taking each other 
as objects in the licit manner of objectification, and since these are truths that are about 
the person as a person, then such objectification cannot be depersonalizing.391  
 To clarify, Crosby’s primary interlocutor in this section is Scheler, who thought 
that objectifying persons is always to “lose them as persons” (ibid., 152). As Crosby 
reads him, Scheler thought that we could only relate to persons as persons through 
empathy, sympathy, or “experiencing others as co-subjects” (ibid.). In contrast with this, 
Crosby is at pains to argue that “much of our relations to other persons unfold in the 
subject-object polarity of intentional action, and that this can occur without any 
depersonalization of them” (ibid.). He also argues that, without such objectification, “a 
rich dimension of personal and interpersonal life would not be possible” (ibid.).392  
                                                        
391 Hartmann might be read as offering a similar argument, albeit from the point of view of coming to learn 
certain truths about oneself; he writes, “on the whole we learn to understand ourselves more in observing 
others than we learn to understand others in observing ourselves” ([1932] 2002, 126). 
392 Since my topic is not empathy or sympathy, I will steer clear of getting caught up on the nature of these 
ways of relating to others in a “subject-to-subject” manner. It is a further question whether we can build 
objectivity into empathy or sympathy, so that they are able to mediate the truth about oneself. Stein (1989, 
ch. III, sections (m)-(p)) seems to articulate an account of empathy that captures the very things that Crosby 
is interested in, e.g., one’s moral qualities (ibid., 86). As Stein describes it, empathy is required to “fulfill” 
the act whereby we receive the interpretations, by other persons, of ourselves (ibid., 88). This is not to say 
that Stein maintains that empathy is exhaustive of the aids to coming to understand ourselves. There is also 
“inner perception” which works “hand in hand [with empathy] to give me myself to myself” (ibid., 89). 
Each makes corrections for the deceptions that afflict the other. 
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 In making his case, Crosby starts with the fact that there is nothing wrong (and, 
presumably, something right) with objectifying oneself for the purpose of gaining self-
knowledge. He argues that if there is nothing wrong with this act of objectification, then 
surely it is not necessarily the case that to do so with others is wrong (ibid., 154). That is, 
if we want to maintain the permissibility of our taking our own selves as objects in 
intentional consciousness, and we are persons, then there can be no absolute prohibition 
on such acts of objectifying other persons.  
 That, at least, is how I read Crosby’s initial argument. However, he goes on to 
offer a stronger argument for his position. Others can see in us what we often miss about 
ourselves. Thus others “enable [us] to find far more in…self-examination than [we] could 
have ever found by [ourselves]” (ibid.). The problem is that if others only ever deferred 
in their understanding of me to my own understanding of myself, then others would leave 
me “confined within my natural limits and would do nothing towards helping me to 
surpass these limits and to surpass myself” (ibid.). This is especially the case with moral 
faults, as well as moral excellences, as Crosby’s example makes clear (ibid., 154-55).393 
 What this argument assumes, but does not make explicit as a premise, is that 
persons are supposed to help other persons surpass themselves. It is one of the 
                                                        
393 A specific way in which I think that friends are able to mediate the truth about the moral caliber of each 
other is through their serving as correctives to pride and false humility. Through pride we come to think 
more highly of ourselves than is warranted, and our friends can correct us by reproving and admonishing 
us. False humility, which arises when humility becomes divorced from the truth and leads a person to assert 
something about himself that is not true, such as that he is wicked in a certain way, can likewise be 
corrected. A related point—made by Lewis in The Four Loves—is that in friendships properly speaking, 
each friend is humble before the other (1960, 82). However, because of the exclusivity of friendships (I am 
friends with you, and you are friends with me, but neither of us is friends with him) the transition from 
“individual humility to corporate pride is very easy” (ibid., 83). Thus, while friendships are a school of 
virtue, they suffer from the ever-present possibility of becoming a “school of vice” (ibid., 80). 
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imperatives of being a person that you help others in the actualization of their own 
personhood, which requires aiding them in the self-transcendence that is proper to 
personhood.  
 The question, of course, is whether it is really the case that we ought to leave this 
imperative at the generic level of the person. I am inclined rather to lay this imperative 
upon persons qua friends. I doubt whether most persons are able to provide this kind of 
help to any old person. It is specifically within friendships (as well as other interpersonal 
relationships) that persons are able to provide this assistance in a way that regards the 
other objectively without depersonalizing her. This will be a theme of section 4 (below).  
 I agree with Crosby that other persons (specifically, I would say those who exist 
in certain interpersonal relationships with us, especially our friends) are able to serve as 
the “mediators” and “custodians” of certain truths about us that we are unable to access 
on our own. I also agree that this is especially evident in the moral domain. Thus, I think 
that friendship, at least in principle, is such as to lead to the discovery of “old” truths 
about one friend through the mediation of the other. Sometimes this activity gets taken up 
and thematized in a friendship as part of the concomitant relationship between truth and 
friendship—i.e., sometimes the communication and reception of truths that reduce the 
deficits of truth are not about the one communicating, but about the one receiving. 
Sometimes, though, it is rather the case that this act of mediation is a “byproduct” 
(though not an accident) of friendship, of simply being with the other and spending time 
with her. We come to learn a great deal about our friends, to which they might be blind, 
and so we are able, sometimes with very little speech, to disclose new depths of self-
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understanding to them, allowing them to grow and “surpass” themselves, as Crosby says, 
in a way that is not possible in the absence of friendship. 
 The deeper question is how to do this in a way that negotiates the demands of 
truth and love. It is the tension between these that has been exploited as an objection to 
the integration of norms of belief such as the truth-norm into the context of friendships 
and similar relationships. I address this objection in section 4.  
3.3.2 “Creators” of the Truth 
 Not only does friendship serve to mediate the truth about persons, but it is also, in 
part, creative of that very truth—thought not, to reiterate the cautionary point made above 
(Clarke), creative of the entire truth of friends. 
 Here again, my primary inspiration and source is Marcel. One of the persistent 
themes of Marcel’s thought is that of creative fidelity, i.e., of the creative power of 
fidelity for persons who make commitments to others, typified, in Marcel’s discussion, 
by the vocation of marriage. 
 How is it that fidelity to others is creative? In at least two ways. The first is 
related to the discussion of mediation in the last subsection. Marcel writes: 
 The fact is, however, that I really know myself only when I have committed myself. The 
 dilatory attitude which involves sparing myself any trouble, keeping myself aloof (and 
 thereby inwardly dissipating myself), is incompatible with any self-knowledge worthy of 
 the name. (1964, 163)  
 
Thus, the first way in which faithful commitments to others are creative of the truth of 
ourselves is by bringing into the open truths that remain in the dark outside of the context 
of such commitments. This points to the absolute necessity of such commitments for the 
ability of persons to create themselves by transcending themselves, for such 
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transcendence is only possible in the light of “self-knowledge worthy of the name.” In 
this respect, Marcel condemns as “puerile” any attempt to “resolve the problem by 
compromise” (ibid.). He goes on to say, in an instructive passage: 
 I allude in this respect to the idea of a pre-marital trial whereby the future spouses begin 
 by surrendering to an experience which commits them to nothing, but which is supposed 
 to enlighten them about themselves; it is all too clear that such an experience is 
 immediately nullified by the very conditions under which it is performed. (ibid.) 
 
In a sense, you might say that certain things just aren’t either true or false about you until 
you commit yourself to another, whether by marriage or some other form of interpersonal 
communion.394 Marcel points to concrete modes of how this creation occurs. He writes: 
 The fact is that when I commit myself, I grant in principle that the commitment will not 
 again be put in question. And it is clear that this active volition not to question something 
 again, intervenes as an essential element in the determination of what in fact will be the 
 case. It at once bars a certain number of possibilities, it bids me invent a certain modus 
 vivendi which I would otherwise be precluded from envisioning. Here appears in a 
 rudimentary form what I call creative fidelity. My behavior will be completely colored by 
 this act embodying the decision that the commitment will not again be questioned. The  
 possibility which has been barred or denied will thus be demoted to the rank of a 
 temptation. (ibid., 162) 
 
 This passage points to a phenomenon that is ubiquitous in this life. We are faced 
with a number of possibilities. We cannot really know ourselves until we have chosen 
some possibilities (or one possibility) and foreclosed the others. In a stronger, 
metaphysical, sense, we cannot be ourselves (fully, as persons) until we have opted for 
some possibilities and foreclosed others. As Marcel puts this point in another place, we 
cannot be ourselves until we opt for certain commitments because it is only through such 
commitments that we can determine the answer to the question: what is my life? In the 
                                                        
394 Even if this is too strongly put, it is surely the case that such truths are utterly inaccessible until, and 
unless, one makes, and lives out, such a commitment. 
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end, the only satisfactory answer is that my life is what it is, and is lived in the fullest 
sense of the word, only through an act by which I consecrate myself to something 
([1950] 2001a, 132-34), 395 where this must be a “personal or suprapersonal reality” 
(1964, 135).396  We must, in the concrete acts by which we opt for some commitments 
over others, put our most fundamental commitments beyond question, reducing the 
counter-possibility of abandoning them to the status of a temptation (however, strong it 
may wax at different times of our life). These decisions “color” our lives henceforward, 
influencing our behavior and enabling us to go about crafting a way of life commensurate 
with the possibilities we have opted for and committed ourselves to. 
 Nothing could be more wrong, as Marcel points out, than confusing the fidelity 
that is creative with mere constancy or with merely being physically before others (1964, 
153-54). Fidelity is creative through its power to renew the commitments it governs, to 
prevent the staleness and rancidity which are the defining marks—the scent, if you will—
of a commitment that has devolved into mere constancy and physical presence (ibid., 
152). When it comes to faithful interpersonal commitments, however, nothing could be 
farther from the truth. There is nothing stale or rancid—nothing merely constant and 
                                                        
395 Marcel acknowledges the influence of the American philosopher Josiah Royce. The influence is evident 
here. Royce writes, “the answer to the question, “Who are you?” really begins in earnest when a man 
mentions his calling” (1908, 168). Royce defines the person in terms of loyalty to some such calling (ibid., 
168, cf. 168-172). Loyalty requires decisiveness and fidelity, both of which are mentioned in the passage of 
Marcel I just cited (ibid., 185-96). (Marcel also shares with Royce an insistence on the incarnation of such 
loyalties or consecrations (ibid., 93). In this respect, the European personalism which is the province of this 
dissertation, comes into contact with American personalism through the Marcel-Royce connection, for 
while Royce never called himself a personalist (see Parker (2014)) his (1908) work exudes personalist 
themes. European and American personalism thus have as their point of contact two thinkers who never 
explicitly called themselves personalists!  
396 If the latter, one which the person consecrating himself somehow personalizes (ibid.). 
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physical—to the husband who wakes up each morning next to his beloved to give himself 
to her another day—to the priest who rises early to offer the daily Mass for the faithful 
entrusted to his care—to the religious who breaks sleep in the middle of the night to offer 
prayers of intercession for the whole world.397  
 One might wonder whether friendship, the relationship at issue in this chapter, can 
be comparable to the sort of vocational examples that I have just adduced, and that 
clearly served as an inspiration for Marcel. Here, I can only indicate that I think that they 
are comparable, if not as exalted. Certainly, we do not make vows before our friends, but 
we do make commitments to our friends (at least to those who are our friends in a way 
that is greater than the attenuated notion of a friendship of pleasure or utility found in 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics).398 For we can only—as Aristotle himself observed—be 
friends with so many others (NE 1170b20-1171a20). Already, then, the choice to pursue 
and cultivate friendships with some closes off the prospect of being friends with others. 
Moreover, the choice of friends, and the ensuing relationships has, as experience shows, 
an impact on who we are, and thus on the truth about ourselves. For this reason, parents 
rightly fret over whether their children “fall in with a bad crowd.” Friendships, if in a less 
                                                        
397 This is not to set aside the challenges attendant upon forms of fidelity that are ritualized and therefore 
susceptible to being reduced to mere constancy. Nor does Marcel set them aside. As the quote above makes 
clear, it is part of fidelity to call these challenges what they are—temptations—and to strive manfully 
against them. In the case of highly ritualized expressions of fidelity, norms governing those rituals can (and 
should) take this into account. This is, I think, part of the Catholic Church’s wisdom in restricting the 
number of times that a priest may celebrate Mass on a given day.  
398 Our commitments to our friends are also typically not unconditional. But even this is not precisely true. 
While it is not the case that we enter into friendships in the unconditional way that we take vows of 
marriage, or vows of chastity, poverty, and obedience, neither is there a moment wherein we erect 
conditions on the continuation of a friendship. I think that what this indicates is that friendships aspire to 
unconditionality unless they are of the meaner sorts (friendships of utility or pleasure). What can happen is 
that, in the course of the friendship we find out that there were implicit conditions that creeped in. I discuss 
this in section 4 in the context of idealizing our friends.  
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exalted way than marriage, say, or religious consecration, reveal to us who we are, and 
help to make us who we are. Thus, not only is friendship a mediator and custodian of the 
truth, but also creative of the truth.399 In both ways, truth is consequentially related to 
friendship. 
 Thus, we now have before us the threefold relationships between truth and 
friendship: antecedent, concomitant, and consequent. Before recapping these and setting 
the stage for the next chapter, however, a final task remains. This is the work of 
addressing the objection, already alluded to, that the demands of friendship are 
incompatible with norms of belief, such as the truth-norm. If this is so, then it threatens 
seriously to undermine the argument of this chapter. It is thus to this objection, and to the 
further development of my account that responding to it affords, that I now turn. 
4 The Friendship Objection 
 It has been objected that friendship and its imperatives are not compatible with 
the normativity of truth.400 In this section, I respond to this supposed incompatibility, 
which threatens the argument of this chapter. But more than being merely a defensive 
                                                        
399 For another discussion of the creativity of interpersonal relationships, see Stein ([1922] 2000, 264-272). 
As a sample, she writes, “there’s the possibility that contact with another awakens something in me that 
until now has been slumbering in me, and brings entirely new traits of my personality into bloom” (ibid., 
268). Also, “Because a person’s conditions have an influence on the development of her properties, if other 
persons are inducing conditions in her, then at the same time they must be…contributing to the formation 
of her character too…there are…properties that can develop only in union of persons: humility and pride, 
servility and defiance, power lust and affability, team spirit and helpfulness; in short, all “social” virtues 
and vices” (ibid., 266-67). 
400 Principally by Stroud (2006) and Keller (2007, ch. 2), though they are channeling the earlier concerns of 
Meiland (1980) and Heil (1983). Price (1969, 115) discusses a version of this objection. See Kawall (2013) 
for a contemporary response. LaFollette and Graham (1986) can also be read in response to this concern. 
 399 
 
maneuver, this discussion will also afford us the opportunity to see better how truth is 
related to friendship.  
4.1 An Instance of the Friendship Objection—Two Possible Solutions 
 Let us begin with a case. You are friends with a co-worker, Jay, who holds a 
position that is less taxing than yours. One day, your boss, Kay, offers to train Jay to 
perform your more demanding job. You wonder whether Jay will be able to handle the 
harder job. What ought you to believe? Ought you to believe strictly what is true, or, 
indirectly, what is best justified by your evidence (which, say, is that Jay is not up to the 
task)?401 Or ought you to believe, irrespective of your evidence, that Jay can do the job? 
The friendship objection argues for the latter, as a requirement of your friendship with 
Jay. If this is so, then a requirement of friendship conflicts with the truth-norm. 
 Similar stories could be multiplied. How are we to respond to this objection? 
There are two basic types of solution. On the one hand, we could give up on the 
universality of doxastic norms and claim that they do not apply to beliefs about one’s 
friends. On the other hand, we could argue that being a good friend does not require that 
one violate doxastic norms. Beliefs about our friends ought to be formed and maintained 
in accordance with the same norms that govern any other belief. 
 The first kind of solution, however, is problematic in that it presupposes that we 
can neatly disentangle beliefs about our friends from the rest of our beliefs. This doesn’t 
seem plausible. Consider the scenario described above: beliefs about Jay’s capacity to do 
                                                        
401 Note that it doesn’t really matter whether we focus on truth or justification here—the problem afflicts 
both norms equally. 
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the harder job will not easily be detached and isolated from your beliefs about the job 
itself. Nor will they be easily detached from beliefs that you hold about yourself. 
Suppose, e.g., that you believe (truly, and with good reason) that you are more intelligent 
than Jay, and that you find the job just barely manageable given your level of 
intelligence. Beliefs of both kinds are not isolatable from your beliefs about Jay. That is, 
how could you hold yourself to the standards of truth and evidence when it came to 
beliefs about the rigors of the job and your own level of comparative ability and 
intelligence, and yet somehow drop these standards when it comes to beliefs about Jay’s 
ability to do the job? If we take the norms of truth and evidence seriously, we risk 
“infecting” our beliefs about our friends with the wrong kind of standard, and if we take 
the friendship “norm” seriously, we risk infecting our other beliefs with the wrong kind 
of standard.  
 The second type of solution, on the other hand, doesn’t require any problematic 
disentanglement, but it does run afoul of what John Heil describes as the “vaguely 
disturbing notion that beliefs about one’s friends…are to be epistemically apportioned in 
the very same way as one’s beliefs about persons to whom one has no special moral ties” 
(1983, 761). There is indeed a vague sensibility that friendship ought to translate into 
some differential way of forming beliefs about one’s friends, but the question is whether 
this entails that friends must violate doxastic norms in the formation of beliefs about each 
other. It is this question that will frame the remainder of this section.  
 Responding to this question requires delving deeper into the discussion of truth 
and friendship that has been the theme of this chapter. In this section, starting from the 
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Aristotelian insight that friendship either is, or is accompanied by, virtue, I will outline an 
account of one of the virtues of friendship.402 Once in place, the account will show how 
the friendship objection is committed to a false dilemma about friendship, and thus fails 
as an objection to the compatibility of friendship and doxastic norms. It will also point to 
a way in which the two sets of norms (of belief and of friendship) can be reconciled and, 
therefore, to a way in which these two aspects of human personhood can be reconciled. 
 Before turning to my account, however, there is one final preliminary to attend to. 
This concerns the sort of beliefs at issue in the friendship objection. The objection is 
neither charitably nor plausibly cashed out in terms of obviously false or unjustified 
beliefs, since we cannot expect our friends to be able to consciously hold such beliefs—
unless we wish to maintain that friendship is irrational.403 So we need to refine the class 
of beliefs at issue. As Cocking and Kennett (1998, 503) argue, a central feature of 
friendship is that one allows oneself to be interpreted by one’s friends. I accept this as a 
feature of friendship in what follows. Since friendship is a reciprocal relation, this implies 
that friends also actively engage in the interpretation of each other. I therefore propose to 
cash the friendship objection out in terms of the beliefs that result from, or else constitute 
such acts of interpreting one’s friends.  
 I should, however, flag a certain ambiguity that afflicts (at least in a certain 
popular idiom) the word “interpretation.” The ambiguity concerns the relationship 
between interpretation and truth. Are interpretations constrained by the truth? Ought 
                                                        
402 See Nicomachean Ethics 1155a3-4. 
403 Stroud (2006) criticizes contemporary accounts of rationality for making friendship out to be irrational. 
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interpretations be constrained by the truth? Writ large, these are significant questions in 
their own right. However, for present purposes, I think that the ambiguity actually helps 
me to make my point about the relationship between truth and friendship. For at least one 
of the ways, I will argue, in which friendship descends into pseudo-friendship is precisely 
through an interpretation that is no longer constrained by the truth. Interpretation, with its 
ambiguity, thus provides a common currency that I can trade across the divide between 
friendship and pseudo-friendship.  
 What I seek, then, is that virtue by which persons interpret each other in a way 
befitting friendship. As I will draw it, this virtue will observe a broadly Aristotelian mean 
between two vicious modes of interpretation—vicious, that is, if applied to those we call 
our friends. To anticipate, these vicious modes of interpretation will be understood as 
distorting the interpretation proper to friendship through (excesses or deficiencies) of 
truth and love. 
4.2 The First Vice: Idealization 
 On one side of the mean is the vice of idealization. This is the vice of overlooking 
and ignoring the faults (bad qualities, words, acts) of the other, or of failing to 
acknowledge them as faults by always explaining them away. This translates into a 
blindness as to who the other really is and results, not in a friendship with the other, but 
rather in a pseudo-friendship with one’s idealization of the other. But such a pseudo-
friendship is obviously no friendship at all. Friendship, as a form of love, is essentially 
expansive, admitting others into one’s life as they really are, widening the circle of one’s 
care. Pseudo-friendships with an idealization, on the other hand, are essentially 
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contractive. They are contractive because they imprison the other in our idealization of 
her. Rather than remaining open to who the other really is, we instead close ourselves off 
by erecting conditions on our relationship. To idealize the other is to say that we will not 
be friends with the other unless she conforms to that ideal. This in turn either blinds us to 
certain unpleasant truths about the other, or else, when the unpleasant truths become too 
obvious to ignore or explain away, to reject the other. 
 To fill this in a little more, consider the situation from the perspective of the 
friend who is being idealized. Applying some insights of Marcel ([1952] 2010, 53) we 
can say that the “friend” in this case is faced with a devastating trilemma of her own: to 
lie and so actively submit to the falsity of the idealization, to flee from the friend, perhaps 
someone whom she loves, or else to submit passively to the idealization, losing herself to 
an absorption in the willfulness of the idealizing “friend.” In any event, and from both 
sides of the relation, as it were, the “friendship” is held hostage to the conditions of the 
idealization. By excessively idealizing others, we fail to reach them as friends.  
 To be clear, this need not always be explicit (it often is not), nor stem from 
malevolent motives. In such cases, the movement from friendship to pseudo-friendship is 
even tragic. You might, for instance, consider two friends, one of whom in the course of 
the friendship develops certain “problems” (an addiction, say, or a difficult domestic 
situation) with the result being that the other friend places the condition on the friendship 
that so long as the problems can be ignored, overlooked, or explained away, all will be 
well. But should the fiction be shattered, then, face-to-face with the “problematic” friend, 
the idealizing friend says, “I cannot be friends with a problem now. I cannot deal with 
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this.” In such a case, one imposes a tragic choice upon one’s friend: to “keep it together” 
and submit to the idealization, or else to be seen as a mere set of problems. Thus, it is 
often the case that idealization stems from some original love. But it is a love that has 
gone off the rails, for, as the Aristotelian tradition rightly has it, to be friends with others 
is to be solicitous for their good, and for their own sake.404 But this is precisely what we 
cannot be if our understanding of the other is imprisoned in the cell of our idealization. In 
an excess of false-love, we no longer interpret the other faithfully, and so lose the 
friendship.405  
 Of the two vices at issue, then, this is the one that we are more susceptible to fall 
into from an original position of virtue.406 It is therefore one against which those who are 
                                                        
404 See Nicomachean Ethics 1166a2-3. 
405 It should be noted that such non-malevolent false-love can stem from another sort of motive as well and, 
in fact, can even be generated more from the side of the friend who is idealized. For instance, consider a 
friendship wherein one friend (Angela) looks up to the other (David) as a pillar of sanctity, someone to look 
to for guidance and stability amidst the turbulence of the world. Let us even suppose that this is grounded 
in the truth about David. Nevertheless, it can happen in the course of time that this becomes unjustified. 
Say, e.g., that David commits some grave sin and is hardly the saint he is taken to be. Yet he maintains the 
image of being such a saint, e.g., through saying the right words at the right times. Here, there has been no 
explicit (or even implicit) idealization on the part of the friend who looks up to him, yet David still has the 
sense of bearing a burden, of being obliged to maintain the quasi-idealization. I say, “quasi-idealization” 
deliberately, for if, ex hypothesi, Angela’s interpretation of David is based on truths she knows (and she 
does not yet know—perhaps may never know—of the secret sin), then we cannot speak of a full-throated 
(explicit or implicit) idealization. Rather, it is as if David anticipates and feels obliged to draw an 
idealization of himself for Angela’s sake and, in so doing, makes himself both perpetrator and victim of the 
idealization. Nevertheless, this still has implications for the state of the friendship for it is after all, on 
account of Angela and the relationship he has with her, that he has come to engage in this idealization to 
begin with. 
406 It might be wondered whether we can even say that a relationship in danger of such idealization has the 
appropriate “virtue.” Such a worry is motivated by a strict Aristotelian sense of virtue as a stable state. 
Although I can see how this would be a concern if I were countenancing the ordinary possibility of a 
sudden and dramatic shift from not idealizing to idealizing, the fact is that I am not countenancing such 
sudden shifts as ordinary to friendship. If such sudden shifts were an ordinary possibility for a given 
relationship, then the relationship would not be a friendship. At the very least, we would have some 
evidence that it is not a friendship. In actual experience, these shifts are very slow, and sometimes 
undetectable for some time. There is, though, always the possibility of some extraordinary action or 
happening—usually catastrophic—suddenly spoiling the friendship and sending it into a tailspin. To appeal 
to the example of David and Angela (above), when one friend commits a grievous sin, it not only destroys 
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already friends must be especially vigilant. But it is precisely this vicious form of 
interpretation that the friendship objection claims that we need to practice when it comes 
to our friends. The friendship objection thus implies that good friends place doxastic 
conditions on friendship. Such doxastic conditions can come, furthermore, from either the 
interpreting friend or the interpreted friend. In the former case, the conditions are of the 
form: I will continue to call you my friend so long as you fulfill, or at least do not 
violently abrogate, the idealized representation that I believe of you. In the latter case, the 
conditions are of the form: I will continue to call you a friend so long as you interpret me 
in accordance with my own idealized self-image.407  
                                                        
virtue in the sinner, but can also have an adverse effect on any relationships to which the sinner is a party. 
If Angela commits the sin of detraction against David, and (say) David does not know, Angela’s guilt may 
cause her to come to idealize Thomas in certain ways, by way of satisfying a desire for restitution that 
cannot be satisfied without confessing to David. The tragedy is that such a confession may very well 
destroy the friendship if the detraction was explosive enough in its contents. It might be wondered, of 
course, whether Angela would even have counted as a friend of David’s if she was able to commit such a 
sin against him. Here I do not know what to say, except that I (unlike Aristotle) cannot set aside the fallen 
condition of man. No matter how well things are going for you, disaster in the form of a personally 
committed sin is never impossible. As such, even the “virtue” of friendship is fraught with potential 
destruction. If the horizon of our discussion is merely the natural and human, then we may well have to 
jettison the language of virtue (at least in Aristotle’s strict sense) and settle for something like mere 
continence. But if the horizon is supernatural, taking into account (e.g.) the possibilities of grace, 
theological virtues, and infused virtues, then we can hold onto such language. In this sense, I think that 
Aquinas represents an improvement over Aristotle, particularly insofar as he makes room for the corruption 
and decrease of virtues (ST IaIIae, q. 53, aa. 1-2), and discusses this in relation to sin (ST IaIIae, q. 71, a. 4). 
In fact, in situating the discussion within this expanded horizon, we may find that “idealization” and 
“clinical objectivity” are no longer truly appropriate categories (i.e., if consider the love of friendship as a 
form of charity or as involving the theological virtue of charity). I maintain, however, that in the more 
limited perspective of the present discussion, these parameters are appropriate, helping us to discern liminal 
cases and feel our way up against the (always admittedly vague) boundaries between friendship and 
pseudo- (or non-) friendship on either side. 
407 Oliver Wendell Holmes relates an amusing story that illustrates the lack of contact with others that is 
occasioned by our idealization of others and ourselves ([1858] 1960, 51-52). He writes, “It is not easy, at 
the best, for two persons talking together to make the most of each other’s thoughts, there are some many 
of them...When John and Thomas, for instance, are talking together, it is natural enough that among the six 
there should be more or less confusion and misapprehension.” He then goes on to distinguish the six 
“personalities” present in the dialogue between John and Thomas: (1) the real John, (2) John’s ideal John, 
(3) Thomas’s ideal John, (4) the real Thomas, (5) Thomas’s ideal Thomas, and (6) John’s ideal Thomas.  
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 But it is precisely the placement of conditions like these, and the erection of 
interpersonal barriers that they imply, that is anathema to friendship. Such conditions, if 
mutually erected, establish something more akin to a mutual admiration society than a 
friendship, more concerned with reinforcing and buttressing one’s own idealizations 
about oneself and others than about really getting to know the other person.408 But it is 
precisely this “really getting to know the other” that is so central a feature of friendship 
and which, as Kawall observes in his own response to the friendship objection, is a 
condition on the possibility of a whole host of acts and attitudes constitutive of 
friendship, e.g., acceptance, encouragement, and forgiveness (2013, 356-57). Such 
idealization fails to consider the deeper goods of friendship, goods which are to be had 
only against a background of friends believing and understanding the truth of each 
other.409 By getting hung up on the question of what we want our friends to believe about 
us, we risk hollowing out the depth of friendship.410 
4.3 The Second Vice: Clinical Objectivity 
 Friendship must remain grounded in the truth, and thus in a sort of objectivity. 
But there are different ways to practice objectivity.411 Whereas we might characterize the 
                                                        
408 As Mounier says, “The cultivation of a certain image of the self in order to preserve and protect it, may 
then come to fill the entire horizon of a life” (1952, 43). 
409 This is a theme of LaFollette and Graham (1986, 7-8) as well, who built the possibility of intimate 
relationships upon the background of habitual honesty. 
410 In response to a question that has been raised, I would like to distinguish between the truth about a 
relationship, considered externally, and the truth about the parties to the relationships, and how they are 
currently related, internally. According to the former perspective, e.g., we can maintain that “idealization” 
is the truth about the relationship. We can say that there is idealization going on in that relationship 
without this necessarily entailing that the relationship in question is still a friendship, and that the objective 
truth is irrelevant to assessing whether the relationship is a friendship. At a more mundane level, this is just 
to remember that we still talk about two persons as related and assess the relationship qua relationship at a 
generic level, without presupposing or implying that the relationships must fall under a particular species. 
411 To return to the discussion of Crosby, this must be an objectivity that is not depersonalizing.  
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first vice of interpretation as lacking objectivity, the opposing vice is rather one that is 
objective, but in a way unbecoming to friendship. This is the vice of “clinical 
objectivity.”412 Instead of reducing our friends to an ideal and denying or explaining away 
any data which contradicts it, clinical objectivity reduces our friends to someone who is 
just-another-person. Such clinical objectivity sees the other as a “specimen” of humanity, 
someone to be observed in a detached and disinterested manner.413 This mode of 
interpreting the other is like that of someone engaged in creating a character-profile of 
someone she does not know. Every bit of information about the other is taken discretely 
and as providing equal insight into who the other is. Everything we learn about the other 
is taken as just one more element out of which we fashion our profile. Instead of 
interpreting information we learn about the other against the background of our 
friendship, we interpret the other purely against the background of the individual bits of 
information that we learn about her.414 
                                                        
412 To be clear, this is not an equation of objectivity as such with a vicious mode of interpretation. The vice 
is a specifically impersonal form of objectivity, which I have dubbed “clinical.” 
413 The insistence that persons are not just “specimens” of humanity is a persistent personalist theme. See, 
e.g., Crosby who makes not only the rational nature, but also the “unrepeatability” of the person a source of 
the dignity of the person (2001, 298; cf. 1996, 19). See Royce who contrasts the person with an organism 
and a psychological specimen: the person is not just these, but more (for him and Marcel, this is essentially 
understood in terms of loyalty or consecration) (1908, 168-69). See also Maritain ([1946] 1966, 38) who 
contrasts our individuality as specimens of humanity, with our personhood (cf. Marcel 1964, 114 for the 
point about individuality). Marcel ([1950] 2001b, 41-42) observes how the contemporary world, with its 
drive to “level down,” makes beings out to be more and more mere “specimens which it is increasingly 
difficult to differentiate.” Finally, there are the words of Wojtyla (1979b, 289) who writes, “Man as an 
individual of the species is, and never ceases to be a man, regardless of any configuration of interhuman or 
social conditions; but man as a personal subject may in these circumstances by alienated or to some extent 
dehumanized.” 
414 Of course, such clinically derived “character profiles” play an epistemic role. Since friendship does not 
confer infallibility on its insights, and since circumstances can always militate against the veracity of its 
insights, such clinical objectivity can, if its reports diverge widely enough from the insight of friendship, 
call into question those insights. Although I cannot discuss the matter here, the issue raised in this note 
concerns Scheler’s distinction between the basic moral tenor (BMT) and the character of a person (1954, 
122; 1973, 111-120). The latter is akin to what I just called a “character profile.” We infer a person’s 
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 This is still a bit sketchy, however. To get a better handle on the vice of clinical 
objectivity, let me consider a couple of objections that have been raised against it. It has 
been suggested, for one, that the vices of clinical objectivity and idealization do not form 
a genuine vice-virtue-vice triad.415 I have tried to portray the “scale” at issue in this triad 
as a scale of objectivity, with idealization being a lack of objectivity, and clinical 
objectivity being the wrong kind of objectivity. The objection, as I understand it, is that 
the scale is understood “quantitatively” on one end (too little objectivity) but 
“qualitatively” on the other end (the wrong kind of objectivity). What would be required 
to fix the scale is either recasting clinical objectivity as “too much” objectivity, or 
idealization as also being a “wrong kind” of objectivity. 
 Another supposed problem with the triad is that, while those who engage in 
idealization still seem to be friends, albeit in a weakened sense, those who engage in 
clinical objectivity do not seem to be friends at all, and seem unable to become friends so 
long as the clinical attitude remains thematic.  
 In response to both problems, I would emphasize, first, that both vices come in 
degrees. One can more or less idealize another or be more or less clinically-objective 
toward another. The limiting cases on both sides either prevent or destroy (as the case 
                                                        
character inductively on the basis of a series of observations of the person. Scheler argues that the 
formation of such a profile, however, (at least in cases of sympathy) is guided throughout by a “blueprint” 
we have of the person (their basic moral tenor) and which we know a priori (1954, 122). I must leave for a 
future work the task of working out the epistemology of the basic moral tenor and how this relates to the 
epistemology of character profiles and my own virtue of friendly interpretation (discussed below). For 
discussion of the basic moral tenor in Scheler, see Frings (1996, ch. 2(c)).  
415 Here I must acknowledge participants (especially Professor Lawrence Jost and Alexander Bearden) at a 
graduate conference on virtue hosted by the University of Kentucky in the spring of 2017. 
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may be) a possible or actual friendship. Friendships can weather some degree of these 
vicious modes of interpretation, but they have their limits.  
 In response to the second objection, I would also say, anticipating the discussion 
of Kierkegaard (below), that there is a way in which we might claim that the clinically-
objective person is still “friends” with the other, just as the idealizer is still “friends” with 
the other, in cases where the degree of viciousness of interpretations has not completely 
destroyed the friendship. Kierkegaard describes the condition of duplicity with regard to 
those we love. This is a condition whereby we treat the other both as just-another-person, 
and as beloved. Kierkegaard writes, “It is rather as if you had two ears and did not, as is 
common, listen to one thing with both but listened to one thing with one, and something 
else with the other” (2009, 162). In such a case, it is as if “there were a third person 
always present,” one who coldly scrutinizes the other, disturbing the intimacy of 
friendship, becoming, as Kierkegaard says, even disgusted with the relationship and the 
beloved. These latter cases occur when one’s fastidiousness takes over: such persons, 
with a warped sensibility, find that they cannot love the other, or anyone, because they 
can find nobody worthy of their love (ibid., 162-63).  
 Applying these insights, we might describe cases of clinical objectivity in which, 
no less than in certain less-than-extreme cases of idealization, some vestige of a 
friendship remains. But such vestigial friendships suffer from the divided heart of at least 
one of the friends, for whoever exemplifies clinical objectivity in this Kierkegaardian 
way will find her interpretation of her friend characterized by a tension, between an 
interpretation of the other as beloved, and as unworthy of love. 
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 Here is where the point made at the outset of this section—concerning the 
ambiguity of interpretation—comes into play. Interpretation, I flagged above, serves as a 
common currency across the divide between friendship and pseudo-friendship or non-
friendship. What constrains the interpretation proper to friendship—interpretation carried 
out by the virtue of friendly interpretation (see next section)—are the constraints of love 
and realism.416  
 We can therefore conceive of the vices of interpretation in terms of the extremes 
of a false-love and a false-realism.417 The idealizing “friend” exemplifies the former, 
thinking it more “loving” to engage in the sort of idealizations described above, whereas 
the clinically-objectifying “friend,” thinking it more proper to having a realistic 
understanding of the other, interprets the other clinically-objectively. The virtue is thus 
the mean point, where love and realism unite, where having a realistic understanding of 
the other, we love her, and loving the other, have a more realistic understanding of her. 
Marcel puts this unity forcefully when he writes:  
 Between love and intelligence, there can be no real divorce. Such a divorce is apparently 
 consummated only when intelligence…becomes merely cerebral; and…when love 
 reduces itself to mere carnal appetite. ([1952] 2008, 7)  
 
Clinical objectivity mistakes intelligence for a coldly cerebral, aloof attitude, whereas 
idealization mistakes love for the mutual satisfaction of desires to see, and be seen, in 
                                                        
416 In the related issue of narrativity accounts of personal identity, there is likewise a reality constraint on 
one’s self-narrative. See Schetchman (1996, 120-130). 
417 The word “realism” here (it should be clear) does not come with any philosophical baggage. Perhaps it 
would be better to express this point with the phrase, “a falsely realistic attitude,” in the sense of an attitude 
which, “desirous” of being realistic (i.e., one that purports to see the “unvarnished” truth about the other) 
falsifies itself precisely through a lack of love. The point (made below by Marcel) about the unity, at their 
upper limit, of love and intelligence can be paraphrased by saying that the truth of love and the truth of 
intelligence, when love and intelligence are properly integrated, are the same truth. 
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certain ways by our friends. The vices thus “falsify” friendship precisely through 
destroying the “true” unity between loving the other and a having a realistic acquaintance 
with her. 
 My response to the objection is thus, in a way, “quantitative”: too much love on 
the one hand, and too much realism on the other. However, at a deeper level of 
discernment (epitomized in the quote from Marcel), already to speak of too-much or too-
little love, as versus too-much or too-little realism, is to show that the love, or realism, in 
question is already a false-love or a false-realism. It is more accurate to say, then, that 
with the integration of love and truthfulness, we find not a compromise between two 
ideals, nor an act of trading the one against the other. Rather, loving readies us to receive 
the truth about the other; knowing this truth, we love her as she is. The virtue and vices of 
friendship point beyond themselves. Being a good friend is itself a school for the more 
general integration of the person’s potentialities for both love and knowledge.  
 Returning to the dilemma of the friendship objection, we can see that just as we 
were able to map the vice of idealization onto the friendship objection, so too can we map 
the vice of clinical objectivity onto the friendship objection. For while idealization maps 
onto the sort of behavior that the friendship objection presupposes is required by 
friendship, clinical objectivity maps onto the sort of behavior that the friendship objection 
presupposes is required by adherence to doxastic norms. Thus, we have before us the 
false dilemma of the friendship objection, namely, that friends must either engage in 
some form of idealization, or else in a friendship-deadening clinical objectivity.  
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4.4 The Virtue of Friendly Interpretation418 
 But this is a false dilemma, for there is a third way.419 Borrowing an insight of von 
Hildebrand, we might say that friendship, as a form of love, essentially involves an act of 
“crediting” oneself to the other (2009, 67-72). The act of crediting is also found in the 
work of Marcel. For Marcel, the act of crediting oneself to another is characteristic of the 
act of believing in the other person (1964, 134; [1950] 2001b, 77). This act of crediting 
oneself should be divorced from the erection of conditions on that credit (ibid.). But, as 
should be clear from Marcel’s words about love and intelligence in the last section, the 
act of credit that is constitutive of belief as an element of loving someone should not be 
divorced from a realistic understanding of the other. This would be to replace the act of 
crediting with the act of idealizing.420 The difference is that with the latter, but not the 
former, there is the possibility of, to extend the credit-metaphor, default. My 
disappointment with the other when she fails to be who I thought she was is made 
possible by the fact that my relationship with her is still characterized by the imposition 
of conditions. Again, this is a matter of degree. The act of credit is part of the act of the 
virtue of friendly interpretation. It is part of the gift of oneself that is of the essence of 
friendship. To the extent that this “gift” comes with more and more strings attached—
                                                        
418 This virtue, while related to the virtue of sensitivity described by LaFollette and Graham (1986) is not 
merely a doxastic analogue of it. For their virtue, what we are sensitive to are the capacities, and non-
communicative interests and desires, of the other person, not to their overall value as persons, and the 
particular values they incarnate. 
419 This is already evident once we observe that friendship is not a strictly binary affair but is rather a matter 
of degree, a fact which the friendship objection, ignoring the element of virtue, fails to see. 
420 The act of credit should not be understood merely as giving greater credibility to the assertions of one’s 
friends, either. I thank my commentator at the aforementioned conference on virtue for raising this 
possibility. 
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especially related to my beliefs about the other, and what I expect the other to believe 
about me—the gift becomes a pseudo-gift, an invitation to a doxastic quid pro quo, a 
mutual disregard for one’s shortcomings, and with that, a refusal to engage in the 
mutually uplifting work of friendship.421 
 Von Hildebrand also picks up on the theme of crediting oneself, or making a gift 
of oneself, to one’s friends via the interpretive act, developing it in more detail than 
Marcel. Friendship, as a form of love, requires what he calls an “interpretation from 
above,” which, as an expression of the generosity of love, does not refuse to see the faults 
of the other, but rather sees them in a way befitting the love of friendship (von 
Hildebrand 2009, 68). Furthermore, to adopt another von Hildebrandian insight, love 
always presupposes an affirmation of the other in her fundamental value as a person 
(ibid., 66). This grasp itself presupposes, or comes by way of, an antecedent grasp of 
particular values exemplified by the person, e.g., certain moral, intellectual, or aesthetic 
values, such as humility, a discerning intellect, and beauty.  
 Since friendship, as a form of love, always presupposes this grasp of the other, the 
interpretation proper to friendship must remain grounded in the other’s value as a person, 
as well as in any particular values exemplified by her. Because of this, friendship cannot 
                                                        
421 Let me say a word about why “credit” is appropriate in the present discussion. There are, I think, two 
reasons. The first concerns its relationship to the word “believe” (both in English and in French). “Credit,” 
in English, is derived from “crédit,” a Middle French word meaning “belief” or “trust” that in turn has its 
origins in the Latin credo, credere (to believe). It is thus a word whose roots are in the act of believing. 
However, it is also related to a commercial idiom, having a concrete meaning in the extension of one’s 
resources (and, by implication, oneself) to another person. Given Marcel’s insistence upon concretizing 
philosophical issues, it seems appropriate that he would use a word that has both an established relationship 
to the philosophical concept at issue (belief) and a down-to-earth application. For the etymology of 
“credit,” see Online Etymology Dictionary, s.v. “credit,” accessed 28 July 2017, http://etymonline.com/. 
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and should not interpret the other clinically-objectively. It is characteristic of the 
interpretation proper to friendship to identify the other with her good qualities, words, 
and actions, and to see her bad qualities, words, and actions, in terms of her true value 
qua person, and the particular values she exemplifies.422  
 This mode of interpretation can take different forms, according to the relation that 
exists between what is being interpreted (the words, qualities, or acts of one’s friend) and 
both the particular values and the overall value qua person of the friend.423 There are at 
least three such general interpretation-types, two of which (the first and third) can be 
discerned in von Hildebrand’s analysis. Sometimes, we interpret something bad as the 
“back side” of something good (2009, 70). We might, e.g., interpret someone’s 
loquaciousness as the back side of warmth and amiability. What von Hildebrand appears 
to be describing here are the manifestations of good qualities in not-so-good words and 
actions. Sometimes we can trace a given bit of language, or a given action, one that is bad 
considered in itself, to an underlying quality or disposition that is itself good, but not 
perfect. That is, the underlying disposition is not such that it is immune to misfiring: bad 
manifestations of an essentially good disposition are the misfiring of dispositions in 
certain contexts.  
                                                        
422 Stein writes, similarly, “This is not to deny that I can find fault with a person whom I love or find merits 
in a person whom I hate. I can be fully aware of the disvalue that attached to the loved person, but I’m not 
loving her as someone burdened with this disvalue. Rather, the disvalue of a property or of a single 
action—insofar as that disvalue on the whole is vividly felt—is eclipsed or cancelled by the value which 
inheres in the person’s overall repertoire of being. And the pain over the felt disvalue doesn’t diminish the 
love; it merely gives it a particular coloration…So in a certain way it’s correct to say that love is based 
upon the apprehended value of the beloved person, but on the other hand, the worth of a person is fully 
completely accessible only to the lover” ([1922] 2000, 212-213). 
423 For specific discussion of how to respond to reports by others of such bad words, acts, and qualities, see 
von Hildebrand (2009, 334-335). 
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 In other situations, we might interpret something bad as indicating progress 
toward some good. To use a (perhaps clumsy) example from the news about seven years 
ago: then Pope Benedict XVI said something to the effect that an STD patient’s use of 
condoms (absolutely morally wrong by the Pope’s lights) could be seen as indicating 
growth in the moral value of sensitivity to the consequences of his actions for others.424 
This time, rather than seeing an action as the misfiring manifestation of an underlying 
good disposition, we see it as indicating a direction of growth, a movement toward the 
cultivation of new and better dispositions.425 
 Finally, at the extreme limit, there is an interpretation of a friend’s faults, not as a 
manifestation of some value, however faint, but as a lack of fidelity, to use von 
Hildebrand’s words, on the part of the other to who she really is (2009, 69). Consider, 
e.g., someone who overindulges in something to an unhealthy extent: e.g., food or 
alcohol. In some cases, we can interpret this in terms of the first interpretation-type. That 
is, in such cases, a friend does not merely stop at the belief that the other person has an 
unhealthy lifestyle, but takes this fact up into the interpretive act of friendship. Sure, Jack 
overindulges, but it is the manifestation of a certain joie de vivre. But in some cases, there 
is no such valid interpretation. Instead, the friend acknowledges Jack’s overindulgence 
                                                        
424 See Benedict XVI (2010, 118-19). It is worth pointing out that the Pope Emeritus is an admirer of von 
Hildebrand. Perhaps, though this is entirely speculative, he had something like von Hildebrand’s analysis in 
mind when he offered this comment. 
425 Scheler builds this sort of growth in the exemplification of higher values into his account of love, 
writing, “love itself, in the course of its own movement, is what bring about the continuous emergence of 
ever-higher value in the object” (1954, 157). However, it is important to clarify that, according to Scheler, 
this characteristic of love is not the result of any deliberate purpose on the part of the lover. The lover 
always loves the beloved for who she is, and it is precisely by loving her that growth in the exemplification 
of higher values occurs (ibid., 159). 
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with some sorrow, knowing that no such interpretation of the first type is truthful. 
However, the friend does not stop at this, but armed with a grasp of Jack’s overall value 
and beauty as a person, firmly believes that in these cases Jack has failed to be faithful to 
that value and beauty, that he has betrayed who he is and who we know that he can be.426    
 In short, whereas the clinically-objective person lacks an appropriately loving 
interpretation, and the idealizing person lacks an appropriately realistic interpretation, 
friends interpret each other in a way that is both loving and truthful. It is with the 
successful navigation of the joining of truth and love that the virtue of interpretation 
proper to friendship is concerned. The virtuous mode of interpreting our friends thus 
promises to reconcile being a good friend with the applicability of doxastic norms to 
beliefs about one’s friends.427 The argument that has emerged in the course of this 
discussion is that the friendship objection presupposes a false dilemma. It assumes that 
we must either engage in some degree of idealization about our friends, or else that we 
must be objective in a way unbecoming to friendship. What this account of the virtue and 
vices of interpretation has attempted to show is that friendship steers a course between 
                                                        
426 The introduction of beauty is inspired by von Hildebrand, who considers the metaphysical beauty that 
we grasp in grasping the overall intrinsic value of another person. In beholding another as valuable in 
herself, and in her exemplification of an array of individual values, we delight in the beauty that she has as 
a person. See von Hildebrand ([1977] 2016, chs. 2-3) on what he calls “metaphysical beauty.” See von 
Hildebrand (2009, 22-23) for the concept of “overall beauty.” You might say that in this final 
interpretation-type, what the friend sees in Jack is the disfigurement or veiling of his overall beauty and 
metaphysical beauty by actions of distinct disvalue.  
427 For a concrete, real-life example of someone living the virtue of friendly interpretation, I think that we 
can look to von Hildebrand’s philosophical obituary for Max Scheler. See von Hildebrand (2005). 
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the horns of this dilemma. It is partially definitive of friendship that it is a relationship 
that strives to achieve an interpretation that is neither unloving nor untruthful.428  
4.5 A Rejoinder: the “benefit of the doubt” by another name? 
 There is, however, a rejoinder that the objector might press, namely that the 
requirements of the virtue of friendly interpretation, as I have described them, are 
reducible to, or equivalent with, the more general moral requirement to extend to others 
the “benefit of the doubt,” or, to “believe the best about others.”429 Historical examples of 
such views can be found in the work of Aquinas (ST IIaIIae, q. 60, aa. 3-4) and 
Kierkegaard (Works of Love, Part II, Chapter 2). In what follows, I will discuss each of 
these possibilities in turn, using Aquinas and Kierkegaard to formulate, respectively, two 
forms of the objection that I have confused a requirement of friendship with a more 
general moral requirement. The form of the objection inspired by Aquinas sees the virtue 
of friendly interpretation as nothing more than “interpreting doubts for the best.” The 
                                                        
428 Before proceeding to the next section, I would like to briefly acknowledge a fact about friendship that, 
while it has not been explicitly thematized here, has been referred to at various junctures in the present 
discussion. There always exists the possibility of tragic misunderstandings between friends. There is always 
the possibility that something happens that strikes the friendship down in an instant. I have, in various 
examples, nodded to some of the more dramatic ways in which this can happen (committing a grave sin, 
becoming afflicted with health problems of health, difficulties in other relationships, becoming “needy” in 
certain ways). In this life, however, even seemingly trivial matters can, under the right circumstances strike 
down a friendship. A perceived slight, an omitted action, an unconsidered word, can, interacting with a 
concrete situation and the character of the persons involved, kill a friendship no less definitively and 
suddenly. Friendship is fraught with the potential for tragedy, a point acknowledged (in a more general 
way) by Christian personalist thinkers. (Recall, from above, Mounier’s “tragic optimism” or Marcel’s 
“broken world.”) The eschatological perspective of Christianity enables faith in the ultimate rectification (if 
not damned) of hearts, wills, and intellects, even if the prospects for full reconciliation in this life seem 
dim. Insofar as loving at all is to put oneself on the line, tragedy is unavoidable, and any account of 
friendship that cannot acknowledge this is, to that extent, false. As C.S. Lewis puts it so eloquently in The 
Four Loves, “the alternative to tragedy, or at least to the risk of tragedy, is damnation. The only place 
outside Heaven where you can be perfectly safe from all the dangers and perturbations of love is Hell.” 
429 Again, I am indebted to participants of the aforementioned conference on virtue, especially, in this 
regard, Rob Elisher who pointed me out to me the passages of Aquinas and Kierkegaard discussed below. 
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form of the objection inspired by Kierkegaard sees the virtue of friendly interpretation as 
nothing more than believing the best of others. In the next two subsections, I will argue 
that these requirements, if such they are, are requirements not of friendship, but of justice 
and neighbor-love, respectively. I will then use the discussion of Kierkegaard to help 
clarify the position of friendship in the “space” of relationships.  
4.5.1 Interpreting for the best as a requirement of justice (Aquinas) 
 Aquinas’s argument is very straightforward. If someone “thinks ill of another 
without sufficient cause, he injures and despises him.” No one should injure another 
without “urgent” cause. Therefore, in the absence of such “evident indications” that the 
other is wicked, we ought to interpret doubts about the other’s goodness for the best (ST 
IIaIIae, q. 60, a. 3, resp.). 
 In what sort of position are we, when interpreting for the best is called for? 
According to Aquinas, these are situations in which we have mere suspicions about the 
other’s supposed evil. In such cases, Aquinas points to three ways in which, acting from 
mere suspicions, we harm the other person. First, we can merely have doubts as to the 
other’s goodness. This, Aquinas observes, is a ubiquitous feature of human life. Second, 
we can treat the other as if she were evil. Third, we can positively judge the other to be 
evil (ST IIaIIae, q. 60, a. 3).  
 Suspicion is a somewhat technical term for Aquinas, denoting the state of 
“inclining” to one of a pair of contradictory propositions on account of some “slight 
motive” (ST IIaIIae, q. 2, a. 1, resp.; q. 60, a. 3, resp.). According to Aquinas, the motives 
in question include (1) being evil oneself and being inclined to see one’s own evil in 
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others, (2) bearing ill-will toward the other, and (3) long experience, associated with old 
age (ST IIaIIae, q. 60, a. 3, resp.). We might call these “projection,” “hatred,” and 
“wariness” (though bearing in mind that this is not to appropriate Aquinas’s account of 
hatred per se). Of these three, only the third, according to Aquinas, diminishes one’s guilt 
insofar as experience reduces the extent to which the attitude in question is one of mere 
suspicion.430 The other two motives, on the other hand, “connote perversity of the 
affections” (ibid.). Acting on one of these motives is an insufficient reason for treating or 
judging the other to be wicked, thus making such judgment an unjust harm to the other.  
 That this requirement to interpret doubts for the best is not the same as the 
requirements of the virtue of friendly interpretation should hopefully be clear. For 
Aquinas, interpreting doubts for the best is a matter of justice to the other, that we not 
harm the other without urgent cause. In the context of judgment, which is partially an 
epistemic matter, the distinction between urgent and non-urgent causes can be made out 
in terms of evidence. When our evidence is insufficient, we ought not treat or judge 
another as evil. Furthermore, the fact that we do treat or judge others as evil illicitly 
indicates something about us: our own evil that we project onto others, our hatred or 
malice directed toward others, or our wariness of others.  
 Thus, this requirement flows not from friendship, but from justice, and is less 
rigorous than the requirement of friendly interpretation. Alternately, and without 
explicitly invoking justice, interpreting for the best merely requires that we not harm 
                                                        
430 Experience does provide evidence, even though we might say that one should not let their world-
weariness slide into an unjustified world-wariness. 
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others through treating or judging them as evil on the basis of a combination of slight 
evidence and evil affections. It follows from the more basic moral duty not to harm others 
without a sufficiently good reason. It does not require that we interpret the evidence in 
question (something learned by gossip, say) in the way that a friend would. It is all the 
difference (e.g.) between, on the one hand, not joining in with the departmental gossip 
about somebody and condemning her explicitly and implicitly, and, on the other, if she is 
your friend, taking the content of that gossip (assuming it is true) up into the interpretive 
act. This is an important distinction, because non-friends cannot hope to carry off the 
interpretive act proper to friendship. Rather, non-friends are held to the “weaker” 
requirement of justice not to not judge on mere suspicion and its accompanying motives. 
4.5.2 Believing the best of others (Kierkegaard) 
 The second form of the objection under consideration is that I have confused the 
requirements of friendship with the more general moral requirement to believe the best of 
others. Our interlocutor in this context is Kierkegaard, who dedicates a chapter of Works 
of Love to the claim that “love believes all things.” In this chapter, Kierkegaard draws a 
distinction between two kinds of love, a higher or “true” love, and a lower love. The 
lower sort of love is what we might call “transactional love” following its description by 
Kierkegaard. Transactional love sees loving as a “demand” and being loved as something 
to be acquired (2009, 223). As such, this sort of love is dominated by the theme of 
possible deception. Within transactional love, there is the ever-present possibility that one 
will “pay out” one’s love to another, and yet get nothing in return. In such cases, the lover 
(A) is deceived by the beloved (B), who managed to extract A’s love without having to 
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pay anything in return. Kierkegaard goes on to argue that anyone caught in the web of 
transactional love is, at bottom, only in love with themselves (ibid., 224).  
 Transposed into the key of this paper, we might interpret Kierkegaard as follows. 
Those who claim to have been deceived in love are those who have placed a condition on 
that love, namely a condition specifying the description under which the lover desires to 
be interpreted. For example, A desires to be seen and interpreted as a superior and long-
suffering lover, and this self-image, which is the real object of the A’s love, is not, in A’s 
estimation, adequately “honored” by B. The deceiver, B, sees A merely as a possible 
means to obtaining love, nothing more. Ultimately, A reveals herself not to be a true lover 
because she imposes a condition of reciprocity, instead of loving B for B’s sake. B reveals 
himself not to be a true lover insofar as he pursued A merely as a means to “acquiring” 
love and nothing more. 
 Thus it is, says Kierkegaard, that those who have only the lower concept of love 
are always seeking to avoid deception—and to practice deception—for the sake of 
assuaging their own self-love. This “temptation” drags persons into a world of “mean-
mindedness and wrangling, where one fools others and is fooled” (ibid., 225). The true 
lover, however, “believes all things” and so is immune to deception. Now, this claim 
looks implausible at first glance. Surely, if you believe all things of the other, then aren’t 
you deceiving yourself, e.g., by not believing of the other that she has a bad character? 
Put in my terms, does not “believing all things” sound like the vice of idealization?  
 Kierkegaard’s response is to turn things on their heads, by arguing that it is rather 
the deceiver who is necessarily deceived when she attempts to deceive the true lover. For 
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the true lover “loves in truth,” and by believing all things maintains herself in love, in a 
position above the fray of the world of transactional love from which the deceiver fails to 
dislodge her. It is as if the true lover, by refusing to play the game of reciprocity and 
conditions, is immune to the temptation of transactional love. Such a temptation calls to 
the true lover, and tests her by attempting to induce her to give up believing all things of 
the beloved. But so long as she remains true to love, the true lover does not succumb to 
this temptation, for “precisely by unconditionally not requiring the slightest reciprocity 
the true lover has assumed an unassailable position” (ibid., 228). On an analogy with 
financiers, it is the unassailable position of one who is giving her money away, and so 
cannot be deceived by someone scheming not to pay it back (cf. ibid., 227).  
 This analogy brings us back to the act of credit as portrayed by Marcel and von 
Hildebrand. But recall that Marcel and von Hildebrand make allowances for our coming 
to believe, of the other, that she has come to exemplify some morally bad quality, or has 
performed some wrongful act, whereas Kierkegaard’s position seems, on the surface at 
least, to require not believing these things. Is this the case?  
 Not necessarily. While his initial response in this chapter seems to rely on a 
radical version of doxastic voluntarism—he says that the true lover “knows that 
deception and truth stretch equally far and that consequently it still is possible that the 
deceiver is not a deceiver, and therefore he believes all things” (2009, 229)—we can look 
back to an earlier chapter in Works of Love for clarity.  
 In an earlier chapter, Kierkegaard emphasizes the need to love those we 
encounter, and not hold back our love until we find some perfectly worthy object for our 
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love.431 Nor should we invest those we encounter with perfections that they do not 
possess (ibid., 161-62, 164). Rather, we must take others as they are, and love them for 
who they are, though all the while maintaining the “worthy desire” that the beloved come 
to perfection (ibid., 161-62). This is crucial, for love, which “builds up” love in the 
beloved, cannot create such love, but must presuppose it (ibid., 206). Putting this 
together with the discussion of love and belief, we might say that it is by believing all 
things of the beloved, that one helps to enkindle that presupposed love into greater and 
greater actuality.432 What we get is not a picture whereon we should believe patent 
falsehoods about others out of love, but one on which we “believe in others” in such a 
way that we have faith that that they will come to greater goodness, together with the 
“worthy desire” to see that happen.433 Furthermore, since Kierkegaard takes it to be a duty 
of true love to love all those we encounter, it is clear that what he is discussing here are 
the requirements of neighbor-love.434 The requirement to “presuppose love” in others, and 
                                                        
431 We have a duty to love those we see, as chapter title of Works of Love declares. In this, I detect a 
connection with Chesterton ([1905] 1986, 140): “We may love negroes because they are black or German 
Socialists because they are pedantic. But we have to love our neighbor because he is there—a much more 
alarming reason for a much more serious operation. He is the sample of humanity which is actually given 
us. Precisely because he may be anybody he is everybody. He is a symbol because he is an accident.” 
432 Note the parallels with Scheler, for whom love is creative of the exemplification of higher values by the 
beloved, without in any way making love conditional on such exemplification (1954, 154, 159). 
Furthermore, this involves something like what Kierkegaard calls “presupposition.” According to Scheler, 
the lover sets up an “‘idealized’ paradigm of value”—not, to be clear, in a way that violates the virtue of 
idealization, for this paradigm is already implicit in the other’s values that have been disclosed 
empirically—that serves as an “objective ideal challenge to a better and more beautiful fulfillment of the 
whole” (ibid., 154). In a different context, Price describes similar cases of beliefs about one’s friends, that 
are “self-verifying,” i.e., such that they cause (or tend to cause) states of affairs that make them true (1969, 
359-360). Believing that my friend will ace the exam makes likelier that she does. 
433 Also important to understanding Kierkegaard is a point that I made earlier in this chapter. Friendship by 
its very nature has truth as one of its consequences (both as mediator and as “creator” of truths). It is 
because of this dynamism of the truth about persons, indicated by their ongoing development, that we can 
speak of “believing” something of others, even when it is not yet an iron-clad “fact.”  
434 This is clear from the scripture citation that prefaces the chapter (ibid., 153). 
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believe the best of others, is rooted in the general duty (or permission, if neighbor-love is 
supererogatory) to love our fellow human persons. It is thus not equivalent with the 
requirements of the virtue of friendly interpretation. 
4.5.3 Situating friendship 
 I have argued that the requirements of giving someone the benefit of the doubt, or 
believing the best about others, are distinct from the requirements of interpreting one’s 
friends according to the virtue of friendly interpretation. By considering a representative 
of each of these oft-cited maxims of our common moral wisdom (Aquinas and 
Kierkegaard), I have argued that the obligation to extend the benefit of the doubt is a 
matter of justice or, more basically, the duty not to harm others. With regard to the 
obligation (if such it is) to believe the best of others, I have argued that it is rooted rather 
in the obligation to love one’s neighbor. The interpretive act of one’s friends is something 
distinct from both of these more general and impartial moral obligations. 
 To be quite clear, though, I have been presupposing the existence of special 
obligations that we have to our friends. My question has not been the more fundamental 
one of whether we have such duties, but whether, if we do, these obligations can be 
reconciled with doxastic norms. It may be that we ultimately have no such special 
obligations, and that all that we have are the general, impartial obligations described by 
Aquinas and Kierkegaard. However, if this is so, then the friendship objection itself starts 
from a false premise. Thus, the resolution of the friendship objections to universal 
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doxastic norms is bound up with resolving what we might call the friendship objection to 
impartiality in morality (cf. Stroud 2006, 498-99).435  
 Friends need not believe anything false or unjustified about each other but must 
always take the truth of each other up into an interpretive act that situates a friend’s 
words, qualities, and acts against the background of love and the special grasp of the 
other in her value as a person and as exemplifying particular values, that love 
presupposes. What we give to others in the love of friendship is not a promise to look 
away from questionable acts, less-than-desirable character traits, or inappropriate 
language. That would be a promise to look away from the friend herself, and to fail in a 
friend’s responsibility to be truly solicitous for her growth as a person—to become mere 
apologists. What we do give to our friends is a gift to always seek a higher understanding 
in love, and an interpretation of all our friend’s words, qualities, and deeds that is faithful 
to who they most authentically are. 
5 Conclusion 
 Before concluding this chapter, let me very briefly address one more objection. It 
might be worried that, by limiting my discussion to the relationship between truth and 
friendship, all that I have explained is the normativity of truth for beliefs about one’s 
friends. To this, I would briefly make the following responses. The first, to point back to 
the discussion of the first possible solution type to the friendship objection, is to note that 
this counter-argument presupposes an implausible (maybe even impossible) separation 
and disentanglement of certain “classes” of belief from each other (in this case: beliefs 
                                                        
435 For discussion of this question, see Baron (1991). 
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about one’s friends from the rest of one’s beliefs).436 The second is to remind the reader 
that I have already mentioned that friendship is just one of the goods which is intimately 
bound up with truth. Lynch (2004b) argues for a relationship between truth and 
happiness, authenticity, and liberal politics. In Aquinas, there is the subsumption of truth 
under justice (ST IIaIIae, q. 109). These are just a few examples, but it is plausible to 
think that we can expand the project begun here to other goods, and thus fill in the full 
scope of our beliefs. Such a project would constitute a long-term research program. 
Third, I would refer the reader back to the discussion of belief in chapter I, section 6, and 
the desiderata articulated in chapter III. The project of accounting for the normativity of 
truth for belief attaches in the first instance to these full-bodied beliefs, and to others by 
way of participation in the “exemplary form” or “nature” of belief. I think that friendship, 
together with an extension of the account to other goods, would suffice to secure 
sufficient scope in this respect. It would remain to extend the account to lower-end cases 
of belief. Fourth, I think that we can begin to gesture toward such an extension in the 
case of friendship by referring back to the discussion of friendship as requiring a shared 
world. Without adherence to the truth-norm, the possibility of such world-sharing, and 
therefore of friendship, is cut off.  
 In this chapter, I began by articulating an account of the person as intrinsically 
relational. On this account of the human person, the objective goodness of friendship for 
the person follows from the equivalence (drawn by von Hildebrand) between identifying 
suitabilities to the deep nature of the person, and objective goods for the person (OGPs). 
                                                        
436 It doesn’t take a particularly strong view of belief holism to see the implausibility here. 
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In keeping with the methodology articulated in chapter III, I then proceeded to articulate 
a threefold relationship between friendship and truth. Truth is antecedent to, concomitant 
with, and a consequence of, friendship. Finally, I argued that the requirements of truth 
and friendship are compatible by describing the virtue of friendly interpretation. 
 We are now entitled to claim that truth is an OGP, and, by principle (OGP), that 
truth is a value. The final question concerns the interpretation of (VN): If x is a value, 
then x is normative (is a norm) for the human person. I have already indicated some of 
the problems that lie in this area of the inquiry. What is at issue is the right way to 
characterize the relationship not only between norms and values, but also between values 
and persons. It is to this relationship that I turn in the next—and final—chapter.  
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Chapter V: The Normativity of Values for the Human Person 
1 Introduction 
 In chapter IV, I argued that being endowed with truth is an objective good for the 
human person.437 The conclusion of chapter IV serves as the first premise of the master 
argument of this dissertation: 
 (1) Being endowed with truth is an objective good for the human person. 
 (2) If being endowed with x is an OGP, then either: (a) x is a value  directly, in 
 virtue of x’s participating some value(s) V0, V1, … Vn, or (b) x is a value indirectly, 
 in virtue of x’s pro-character for the human person and the value of human 
 personhood. 
 (3) Therefore, truth is either a value directly, in virtue of participating some 
 value(s) V0, V1, … Vn, or (b) x is a value indirectly, in virtue of x’s pro-character 
 for the human person and the value of human personhood. 
 (4) Values are normative for the human person. 
 (5) Therefore, truth is normative for the human person. 
Premise (1) was defended in chapter IV. Premise (2) was introduced in chapter III, 
section 7 as principle (OGP). (OGP) states that if being endowed with x is an OGP, then x 
is a value in one of two ways.438 The need for a disjunctive consequent in (OGP) is that, 
as von Hildebrand observes, there exist “things,” endowment with which is objectively 
                                                        
437 Although, recall that for ease of exposition, I spoke simply of “truth” as the objective good in question. 
Now that it is time to assemble the final version of the master argument, we need to reintroduce this 
locution or else sacrifice the requisite precision and subtlety.  
438 Actually, it seems that there is nothing preventing x from being a value in both ways. 
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good for the human person, that are not values in their own right. Rather, they are values 
“indirectly” in light of the value of human personhood. That is, even if that x, endowment 
with which is objectively good for the person, is not important-in-itself, it is still the case 
that the x is indirectly important-in-itself in virtue of the (direct) value of human 
personhood and the pro-character that x has for the value of human personhood. 
According to von Hildebrand, anything that has a pro-character for the value of human 
personhood is thereby non-neutral from the point of view of value ([1953] 1972, 91). As 
such, one or both of the disjuncts in the consequent of (OGP) must be satisfied if being 
endowed with x is an OGP. Either x is a value in its own right, through participating 
certain values, or x is an indirect value in virtue of its pro-character for the human person 
and the value of human personhood.  
 The reader may recall from chapter III, section 7, that there is an ambiguity in von 
Hildebrand’s use of the word “value” at this juncture. It is well to clear this up in order to 
forestall any charges of equivocation. To be more precise, “value” has one sense for von 
Hildebrand: “important-in-itself.” But there are two basic kinds of values for von 
Hildebrand.439 The first kind of values are those, participation in which makes something 
a value (important-in-itself). We can think of values of this kind roughly on analogy with 
Platonic forms (indeed, as Kinneging (2017) argues, von Hildebrand is a Platonist about 
moral ontology). For example, the value justice is that, participation in which, makes 
                                                        
439 Actually, von Hildebrand draws various distinction among kinds of values. Among his most 
fundamental distinctions is the distinction between ontological and qualitative values, the distinction 
between morally-relevant and non-morally-relevant values, and the distinction among various “families” or 
“themes” of values, e.g., aesthetic values, intellectual values. 
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concrete acts of justice themselves values, “things” that are important-in-themselves. This 
supplies the second kind of values in von Hildebrand. Values of this kind are concrete 
“things” that are endowed with, or participate, certain values of the first kind. (As I noted 
in chapter III, von Hildebrand also refers to these simply as “goods” (2009, 79).) 
Utilizing a pair of terms that von Hildebrand uses throughout his corpus, I will refer to 
the first kind of values as principium-values and the second kind of values as 
principiatum-values. Both principium-values and principiatum-values are included in 
what von Hildebrand calls “direct values.” What von Hildebrand calls “indirect values” 
are those “things” which have a pro-character for the human person. Their having a pro-
character is dependent upon the value of human personhood. Hence, we might think of 
their value as derivative upon the value of human personhood. They “borrow,” to employ 
a metaphor, their value from the value of human personhood, as the moon borrows its 
light from the sun.  
 It might seem as though this implies that indirect values and the corresponding 
OGPs are merely means to the end of realizing the value of human personhood. To 
understand that this is not so, we need to bear in mind that there is a distinction to be 
made between the categories of importance, as von Hildebrand draws them (the 
subjectively-satisfying, the OGP, and the important-in-itself (value)), and the distinction 
between ends and means.440 The categorial distinction drawn by von Hildebrand, and the 
means/ends distinction are orthogonal to one another. Means and ends can be found in all 
                                                        
440 It doesn’t help that von Hildebrand, as I noted in chapter III, also uses (in another place) “indirect” or 
“secondary” as a label for the value of something that is a means to something else.  
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three of von Hildebrand’s categories. We can seek something that is merely subjectively-
satisfying for its own sake, just as much as we can seek an OGP or a value for its own 
sake.441 Likewise, the means that we take to some end can also be taken from any of these 
categories.442 That von Hildebrand’s distinction among categories of importance is 
orthogonal to the distinction between means and ends is an important point to emphasize, 
since I reject reducing the normativity of truth to merely instrumental normativity. In this, 
I am in complete agreement with von Hildebrand: the normativity of values is not a 
matter of values being the means to some end, even if the end in question is something as 
significant as the realization of one’s personhood. Values are normative neither simply 
because we take them as our ends, nor simply because they serve as the means to 
whatever other ends we may have adopted for ourselves.  
 The question, then, is that of the kind of values at issue in premise (4). To answer 
this question, recall one of the central contentions of chapter III—indeed one of the 
central contentions of this dissertation as whole—that norms necessarily exhibit a “for”-
structure. Norms are norms for something; more specifically, for certain kind(s) of 
beings. Discovering what makes something normative requires uncovering the “for”-
structure that obtains between the target norm-giving class (here: values) and the target 
norm-given class (here: human persons). In satisfaction of this requirement I shall 
                                                        
441 For example, someone might seek out the flattery of others (something merely subjectively-satisfying) 
as an end, e.g., by always acting so as to “fish for compliments.” Another person seeks out health (an OGP) 
as an end, as in the case of the “health-nut.” 
442 For example, someone might take causal sex (subjectively-satisfying) as the means to relieving a slight 
headache, or the restoration of health (an OGP) as a means to preparing oneself for a long hiking trip. 
Particularly apropos to the present investigation is the way in which truth (an OGP and a value) can serve 
both as a means and as an end. Finally, we can use the performance of a piece of classical music as a means 
to healing someone (music therapy) or perhaps (in more vulgar fashion) as a means to seducing someone. 
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illustrate several relationships between values and the human person that together 
(partially) constitute the “for”-structure that obtains between values and human persons. 
This serves for a defense of premise (4) and thus completes the defense of my master 
argument. In response to the question which began this paragraph, the answer is that both 
kinds of values (direct and indirect) are normative for the human person in light of the 
common “for”-structure that obtain between values of both kinds and the human person. 
Indirect values just happen to “wear” the “for”-structure “on their sleeves” given their 
pro-character for the human person. But the “for”-structure to be uncovered in the present 
chapter applies to both direct and indirect values.  
 After elucidating this “for”-structure, I conclude the chapter, and the dissertation, 
with a reckoning of my account against the desiderata enumerated in chapter III, section 
6. By way of anticipation and introduction, however, let me briefly situate the content of 
this chapter vis-à-vis those desiderata. Recall that what we seek (following a suggestion 
of Bernard Williams) is an account of the normativity of truth that is neither sui generis 
and mysterious, nor merely instrumental. In the latter respect, I am in complete 
agreement with the personalist philosophers whose work I have here sought to “creatively 
retrieve.” In the former respect, however, the account that follows may appear to differ in 
spirit from those philosophers.443 Although I rely on these philosophers’ metaethical 
claims that norms are grounded in values, I think that without uncovering the “for”-
structure of values, the task is incomplete. What is required is an understanding of what it 
                                                        
443 This is something that I already acknowledged at the outset of chapter IV. It is also for this reason that 
the subtitle of this dissertation is not “A Personalist Account” but rather a “Person-Centric” Account. 
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is about values and persons, such that the former are normative for the latter, and such 
that we could come to discover and accept this normativity. So, rather as Norris Clarke 
saw his “creative retrieval” of Aquinas as being, at the same time, a “creative 
completion” of Aquinas in various respects (1993, 1), I humbly submit the remainder of 
this work as the beginning of an attempted creative completion of the personalist 
philosophers whose work has animated my own. 
 The account given in this chapter is neither instrumental (since the relationship 
between values and persons is not that of means-to-ends), nor will it be left mysterious 
why values are norm-giving for the human person. The account of the “for”-structure 
thus situates itself in a way that meets the basic desiderata previously enumerated. The 
method of this chapter is therefore similar to that of chapter IV. If the question of chapter 
IV was why is truth an objective good for the human person, the question of chapter V is 
why should this fact make a normative difference to the person. If the method of chapter 
IV was to describe the relationships between truth and the human person, such that being 
endowed with truth is an OGP, the method of chapter V is to describe the relationships 
between values and the human person, such that values are normative for the human 
person. 
 In response, this chapter will maintain the existence of two broad types of 
dependence-relations between persons and values that together constitute the “for”-
structure. On the one hand, persons are dependent upon values insofar it is in, and 
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through, value-grasping and value-realizing acts that human personhood is realized.444  
On the other hand, values are dependent upon persons not least because the existence of 
values in the actual world is dependent upon the value-realizing acts of persons, and the 
ability of persons to grasp values. I now proceed to illustrating these relationships. 
2 The Relationships Between Persons and Values 
2.1 Person-on-Value Dependency-Relations 
 In this section, I will discuss two ways in which the realization of personhood is 
dependent upon values. I begin with value-grasping acts before proceeding to value-
realizing acts. First, though, let me make two preliminary points. 
 The first point is that “performing” value-grasping and value-realizing acts does 
not require a complex theoretical understanding of the nature of these acts. This would be 
to place such acts beyond the abilities of the many human persons who have never 
explicitly considered the nature of these acts, let alone possessed a correct theory of their 
nature. What is required for value-grasping acts, however, is that the person in question 
actual grasp something (if only implicitly) as important-in-itself.445 Even if the person 
struggles to explain himself, it should somehow be clear that he has “latched onto” the 
“world of values.” Similarly, for value-realizing acts, it is required that the person in 
question actually act for the sake of that which is important-in-itself, i.e., for the 
                                                        
444 As noted in chapter IV, this is shorthand for a realization that is both axiological (realizing one’s value 
as a person) and metaphysical (the actualization of potentialities constitutive of being a person). It should 
be recalled, however, that the realization in question does not imply that persons are originally without 
value. Rather, all persons are endowed with ontological value (cf. von Hildebrand [1953] 1972, 131ff), 
which is then unfolded and realized in the exemplification of other values which the human person can 
participate (e.g., moral and intellectual values) (cf. Crosby 1996, 240).   
445 What is required is a pretheoretical awareness of values. See Wenisch (2017, section V) for discussion 
of von Hildebrand on the distinction between theoretical and pretheoretical awareness. 
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realization of values in, and through, his action (cf. von Hildebrand ([1953] 1972, 280-
281). If this seems like too high a bar, recall that such acts are founded in value-grasping 
acts, and that one can grasp values without any explicit theoretical structure. In fact, far 
from being necessary, von Hildebrand actually suggests that possessing such a structure 
(especially if it is in error) hinders the ability to grasp values (ibid., 2-3).446 Stein, 
likewise, reminds us—in an insight that we will return to below—that the natural 
orientation of the person is toward values (Stein [1922] 2000, 227). A theoretical 
structure comes later, and is the task of philosophy to produce, but the possession of such 
a structure is not necessary for value-grasping and value-realizing acts.  
 In what sort of concrete situations or forms of life does this implicit grasp of 
values manifest itself?447 Ordinary life reveals several examples, although grasping values 
is pervasive. The first is that of the pious simpleton. The pious simpleton has no complex 
theoretical grasp of the nature of value and other metaethical notions. But in his own 
simple way— what he does and how he “sees” the world—he reveals a grasp of values 
that is, we might say, “earthy,” in the way that a farmer’s appreciation of certain values is 
earthy. The pious simpleton possesses a sense of the response that is owed values. This 
sense is played out in his pious practices, which are the “offerings” he gives in response 
to various domains of values. In response to the sacred values which are made manifest to 
                                                        
446 Although von Hildebrand says this, it seems that his understanding of value-grasping acts is such that 
they must be fully explicit (cf. ibid., ch. 19). Certainly, his understanding of morally good acts, as those 
which realize some value, does imply such an explicit, conscious awareness (ibid., 280-281).  
447 It may be that the grasp in question is indeed explicit, even if it is not theoretically articulated or 
articulable. This is just to say that perhaps the implicit/explicit distinction is too blunt an instrument for the 
point I am trying to make—in which case bearing in mind von Hildebrand’s distinction between 
pretheoretical and theoretical awareness should hopefully suffice to make my point clear.  
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him in the sacred liturgy, he offers worship and adoration to God. In response to the 
workaday values present in the “blessings” bestowed upon him, he offers the response of 
prayerful thanksgiving.448 In response to his own failings (the disvalues he exemplifies)—
the confession of sins and the doing of penance. In response to the value and dignity of 
others and their needs—as equally small, but also equally valuable in the eyes of God—
charity and succor. In his appreciation of all these values as existing beyond, and not 
merely in, their relationship toward him—the sense of smallness before the mysterium 
tremendum et fascinans, whose significance is overawing and in no way dependent upon 
him, or his own small offering in response.449  
 A second manifestation of an earthy grasp of values on the part of ordinary 
persons comes from the experience of having children. Contingently existing beings 
participate in the eternal and divine, Aristotle observes, by generating new members of 
the species (cf. Generation of Animals, II, 1, 731b24ff). Whether or not Aristotle is right 
to say that individuals whose existence is contingent cannot directly participate in 
eternity, it does seem true to say that, in the experience of generation, persons are put into 
contact with values in at least two powerful ways. 
 First, having children has the potential to extend the temporal range of parents 
(biological or spiritual) in at least two ways.450 The first is that it orients the parents 
                                                        
448 The response which is so beautifully depicted in Millet’s The Angelus. 
449 I have described this character in terms of Christianity because of my own experience, but I believe that 
one of the virtues of religion qua religion is, more generally, that it puts ordinary human persons in contact 
with a world of transcendent values, above all with what Scheler thought of as the highest series of 
values—the holy, or the sacred (Scheler 1973, 554). Of course, religion is also fraught with peril, insofar as 
false religions, peddling false values, can be a source of great evil. 
450 In referring to spiritual parentage, I have in mind, e.g., the priest who baptizes children, thus “giving 
birth” to them in the life of grace.  
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beyond the duration of their own lives. This considerably extends the horizon of their 
own solicitous concern and enables them to see certain values that they were previously 
unable to see. In disposing over their lives, they must now take into account not only their 
personhood, but another human being’s potential for realizing personhood. 
 Second, in grasping the (in principle) infinity of the propagation of new life (one 
generation of humans after another after another…), one is oriented beyond the temporal 
to the eternal. This contact with a sense of eternity facilitates a person’s grasping of 
values which are eternal. Marcel puts it well, if not uncharacteristically cryptically, when 
he says that we cannot divorce being from the exigence of being, i.e., the deeply felt 
need451 for being that makes the ultimate separability of being and value impossible. 
Furthermore, this exigence of being is inseparable from the exigence of “perennialness” 
(Marcel [1950] 2001b, 61). We might say that in grasping the potential infinitude of 
human generations, we grasp the value of being, and the value(s) of beings.452 
 In addition to this temporal reorientation of the person in the experience of 
generating new life, there is also (perhaps for the first time) a concrete other for whom 
one would gladly lay down one’s life. Since it is nonsensical to speak of laying down 
one’s life for the merely subjectively-satisfying (how could laying down one’s life be 
satisfying in that way?) or for the OGP (how could terminating one’s existence be good 
for the person in that way),453 it must be the case that we are in touch here with something 
                                                        
451 As a translation of exigence, “deeply-felt need” is perhaps best, but nevertheless comes up short. Marcel 
retains the use of exigence in giving his Gifford Lectures (The Mystery of Being) in English. 
452 This is, of course, one of the major ways in which Marcel is distinguished from his atheistic counterparts 
in French existentialism, above all Sartre. 
453 We can only see that laying down one’s life is good for the person when we have moved beyond the 
point of view of the objectively good for the person, to the point of view of values. Sacrificing oneself 
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(someone) important-in-itself (herself). We realize—perhaps for the first time—that even 
in laying down my life for the beloved child, I would not thereby be annihilating my 
being, but rather that my being would be at its “summit” or “culminating peak” (Marcel 
[1950] 2001a, 167).454  
 Finally, there is the experiencing of nearing the end of one’s life, or of being so 
gravely ill at a young age that death is likely, or of even just entering deeply into the 
mystery of one’s mortality. One common factor in all these experiences is the sense that 
there are some things or, better, some incarnated values that remain even when 
everything else has been taken away. Indeed, another way to think about this experience 
more generally is in terms of situations in which you have been stripped of all that you 
have. What is left to a person, when all that he owns has been taken away?455 When 
everything that satisfies one’s desires, and everything objectively to one’s good is taken 
away, what remains are the values that one embodies,456 constituting, in a way, one’s very 
being. Yet again, what drives the insight here is a sense of eternity, comparable to that 
which comes into play at the beginning of life. When one’s body is entering the final 
stages of dying, one confronts the question of what one might “take into eternity,” and 
                                                        
solely for one’s objective good is not such that it is at all conducive to one’s own good. I discuss both of 
these themes below. 
454 We realize, if only to a limited degree, the wisdom of Christ in the Gospel, “For he that will save his life, 
shall lose it: and he that shall lose his life for my sake, shall find it” (Matthew 16:25, cf. Matthew 10:39, 
John 12:25). 
455 What, for example, was Christ left with on the Cross, when, having been stripped of his garments, He 
had nothing left to His name? Meditating on the tenth Station of the Cross is salutary in considering the 
awareness of values. 
456 This is not to claim that this is all that is left.  
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the awareness of that which is seen as “transferrable into eternity”457 is an awareness of 
that which is truly important-in-itself.458  
 In general, we might say that the implicit awareness of values on the part of non-
theoretically inclined persons is due to moments of human life in which such persons are 
brought into contact with the significance and possibilities of eternity, the radical 
dependence of others on them (for their very existence, survival, and prospects of 
flourishing), and their own radical dependence on others.459 In fact, it may even be 
necessary for the awareness of certain values that one have a lively sense of eternity and 
otherness, and a theoretically-sophisticated person who lacked this sense would be unable 
to truly grasp values, no matter how well-versed he was in ethical theory. 
 My second general point is that the relationship between value-grasping and 
value-realizing acts may be understood roughly on the model of what, in Aristotelian and 
Thomistic philosophy, is referred to as first and second actuality. Value-grasping acts 
first-actualize the person in such a way as to activate a potential for performing value-
                                                        
457 Lest the reader be misled, let me state here that being-eternal is not a necessary condition on something’s 
being important-in-itself. A beautiful landscape is important-in-itself, despite its being ephemeral. 
Furthermore, as Scheler notes, the “duration” of something important-in-itself functions as a rough criterion 
of its value-rank: higher values tend to be those which are endure (1973, 90). 
458 The sort of experience described in this paragraph might also be considered from the point of view of the 
dying person’s loved ones, who attend his sickbed and begin considering, as Marcel puts, just what it is 
about the other person, and the loving bond that exists between him and you, that will persist through death 
(cf. [1950] 2001b, 61ff, 153ff). As Marcel notes, in such moments, we are confronted with the fact that 
love does not terminate at the moment of death, and so we are led to consider what it is about the beloved 
that allows us to say, to him, “thou shalt not die.” 
459 These moments are, furthermore, ordinary, though in them the extraordinariness of personal being and 
values are made manifest. Mounier writes, “we must avoid thinking of the highest personal life as that of 
the exceptional person, attaining an inaccessible height solely by his own exertion...but if personality is 
fulfilled in pursuit of values that extend into the infinite it [i.e., personhood] is none the less called upon to 
discern and achieve the extraordinary in everyday life. But this is a super-ordinariness, by which a person is 
not set apart, for every other person is also called to it. In the words of Kierkegaard, “The really 
‘exceptional’ man is the truly ordinary man”” (1952, 46).  
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realizing acts.460 Value-realizing acts in turn represent the crowning moment and 
consummation of value-grasping acts. Both together are necessary for the full 
actualization (realization) of personhood and both depend, for their own intrinsic 
completeness, on one another. This is why a complete account of the “for”-structure of 
values for persons requires a discussion of both acts. 
2.1.1 Value-Grasping Acts 
 In this section, I discuss the nature of value-grasping acts primarily according to 
the account defended by Edith Stein, supplementing her account, where adventitious, by 
observations of von Hildebrand.461 I focus on Stein because of the relative simplicity and 
straightforwardness of her account. Since this is not a dissertation on the phenomenology 
of value-grasping acts, it would pose too much of a distraction to work from von 
Hildebrand’s account, which is considerably more nuanced (see fn 477, below). Since all 
                                                        
460 Value-grasping and value-responding acts exhibit a similar structure according to von Hildebrand, 
namely, what he calls a “super-actual” attitude ([1953] 1972, 243, 265, 361). This attitude is akin to the 
notion of second potentiality/first actuality, whereby one possesses a habit of acting in certain ways, even if 
one is not constantly acting in those ways. 
461 Although I cite Scheler in the following discussion, it is unclear whether his account of value-grasping 
acts (or what he calls “value-ception”) essentially involves affectivity in the way about to be unpacked. 
Although Scheler argues that values are given in acts of feeling, these acts of feeling are to be distinguished 
from any physical or visceral feeling-states (Kelly 2011, 29, cf. 105). In this way, Stein seems to go beyond 
Scheler in making being-affected and (a normatively demanded) affective response central to the acts in 
which values are given to us. However, the extent of this apparent disagreement might be mitigated since 
Stein does not reduce values to the feeling-states that constitute our affective responses to values. The case 
of von Hildebrand is more complicated. Seifert charges Scheler with the “emotionalization of 
consciousness” by construing “cognitive acts of the intellect to be affective and emotional acts” (2017, 
740). Von Hildebrand, by contrast, avoids this problem, “insisting on the cognitive nature of value 
cognition as distinct from feeling, and distinguishing value cognition (Wertsehen) from the being touched 
by values affectively (the being affected/ Affiziertwerden), which he does not identify with the cognitive act 
in which values are given to cognition” (ibid., fn 10). The origin of the objection that Scheler 
“emotionalizes” consciousness is Wojtyla (1979a, 52-56). Clearly there is disagreement between Kelly and 
Seifert on the interpretation of Scheler’s account of value perception.  
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that is required in order to discuss the dependency of personhood upon value-grasping 
acts is a working account of such acts, my decision poses no problems here. 
 What makes Stein’s accounts stand out is its characterization of value-grasping 
acts either as affective acts, or else as essentially involving or requiring affectivity. 
Although, as I argue in a note below, value-grasping acts are not exclusively affective 
acts, it is a key personalist insight that their affectivity has often been ignored. 
Accordingly, I discuss value-grasping acts primarily insofar as they are affective acts.462 
This should not, however, be taken to imply that value-grasping acts are essentially 
passive, as we shall see.   
 I would like to begin by calling attention to how an understanding of the nature of 
value-grasping acts is related to an understanding of the human person. It is a central 
contention of this work, after all, that understanding normativity requires understanding 
that entity for whom norms are given. One manifestation of this contention is that our 
understanding of how it is that values (and norms) are given to us is restricted (we might 
even say, restricted a priori) by our understanding of the basic “powers” of the person for 
coming into cognitive contact with the world. That understanding has had implications 
(historically) for how affectivity (or the emotions, I will use these terms more-or-less 
interchangeably here) relates to our ability to grasp values. As Scheler notes, ethical 
theories have historically either (1) taken the emotions seriously, but with the result of 
being relativistic and empirical, or (2) dismissed the emotions, where this is seen as 
                                                        
462 To be clear, I endorse what follows as capturing some part of our experience of grasping values. I leave 
it to future work to examine in full the metaethical implications of the account, especially for moral 
epistemology and ontology of values. 
 442 
 
preserving the absolutist, a priori, and rational character of ethics. “That ethics can and 
must be both absolute and emotional,” Scheler writes, “has rarely ever been considered” 
(1973, 254).463  
 What is the genealogy of this predilection of ethical theory? Scheler suggests time 
and again that it lies in a mistaken understanding of the human person that limits the 
human person to reason and sensibility (see, e.g., ibid., 68, 166, 254).464 To get a sense of 
how the understanding of the human person can limit our ethical theorizing, examine the 
following argument (1973, 166): 
 (1) Spirit is divided into reason and sensibility.465 
 (2) If (1), then moral facts must belong either to the sphere of contents of 
 sensation or to the sphere of contents of reason.  
 (3) Therefore, moral facts must belong either to the sphere of contents of 
 sensation or to the sphere of contents of reason.  
 (4) Moral facts do not belong to the sphere of contents of sensation (sphere of 
 contents of reason).  
                                                        
463 In staking out this metaethical turf, what the personalist wants, in a pithy slogan, is “emotions without 
emotivism.” In fact, Scheler goes on to anticipate and respond to the emotivist position of A.J. Ayer under 
the heading of “ethical nominalism” about moral facts. See Scheler (1973, 168-177). 
464 This is an ambiguous claim. As it stands, all that Scheler can mean here is that the person qua 
intellectual being is divided into reason and sensibility. But even those to whom the error identified by 
Scheler is attributable may still also ascribe will (and, indeed, a free will) to the person. Von Hildebrand is 
astute to this and clarifies that the traditional division of the person is rather into intellect and will, and that 
what this traditional division misses is affectivity (the heart), as existing alongside intellect and will as a 
basic “center” of the person. For this reason, von Hildebrand’s theory of value-responses includes not only 
theoretical and volitional responses, but also affective responses ([1953] 1972, 202-203). This 
notwithstanding, I follow Scheler’s exposition of the argument above. 
465 Sometimes Scheler speaks instead of an exhaustive division into thinking and perceiving, instead of 
reason and sensibility. See the passage quoted below. 
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 (5) Therefore, moral facts belong to the sphere of contents of reason (sphere of 
 contents of sensation). 
Premise (4) and the conclusion (5) can be modified according to whether one wishes to 
prove that moral facts belong to the sphere of contents of reason, or to the sphere of 
contents of sensation. What Scheler has given us here is a diagnostic argument for the 
division of ethics (historically) into rationalist and empiricist varieties. What he rejects 
(along with von Hildebrand and Stein, among others) is the first premise. Spirit (the 
human person, in this context) is not merely divided into reason and sensibility. Or, to put 
the point more generously, the intellectual (or truth-oriented) powers of the human person 
are not exhausted in reason and sensibility (sensation). There is also the heart, affectivity, 
emotions, and it is this third possibility that falsifies premise (1).466 Scheler writes: 
 It is not only in “inner perception” or observation…but also in the felt and lived affair 
 with world…in preferring and rejecting, in loving and hating, i.e., in the course of 
 performing such intentional functions and acts, that values and their order flash before 
 us!…A spirit limited to perception and thinking would be absolutely blind to values. 
 (ibid., 68) 
 
 To avail myself of a reference to popular culture and science-fiction, the Vulcans 
of Star Trek (epitomized by the Mr. Spock character of the original television series), 
who entirely suppress their emotions, would be unable to experience what Scheler calls 
(variously) “value-cognition,” “value-intuition,” or “value-perception” (ibid.). In fact, it 
is clear from the history of the fictitious Vulcans that they do in fact grasp the value of at 
least one “thing”: what they refer to as “logic,” but what we would probably better 
                                                        
466 Price (1969, 452) also mentions the philosophical neglect of affectivity, in his discussion of the affective 
aspect of some belief as a warm, trusting, pro-attitude toward their object. 
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understand as a whole body of values embodied in the moral philosophy of the ancient 
Stoics. But it is equally clear upon reflection that the Vulcans’ grasp of this value is 
historically parasitic. If it weren’t for their violent collective past, in which, living 
exclusively from their most violent passions, they nearly destroyed their civilization, they 
would never have grasped the value of “logic.” That is, an original revolution in their 
affectivity is itself responsible for their coming to grasp the value of logic.  
 Scheler’s claim is that whenever it appears that we have a species of persons who 
both grasp values and exhibit no affectivity, that there must always be some explanation 
(perhaps historical) that leads us back to affectivity. A purely “logical” race of beings 
would be no more in a position to grasp values than a calculator. To put the point in terms 
of the age-old dichotomy between reason and the passions, reason is neither a slave to 
passion (pace Hume) nor their master. In this respect, Aquinas comes nearest the mark, 
when he observes the mutual interpenetration of intellect and will, i.e., of knowledge and 
love, and observes the ways in which they mutually condition each other.467  
 Scheler’s argument shows that an impoverished understanding of the human 
person constrains the understanding of value-grasping acts. With this in mind, the 
question is now that of the nature of the affective acts by which we grasp values, or of the 
“affective moments” of such acts. To understand these acts, I turn to Edith Stein’s 
account of affective acts ([1922] 2000, I, § 2(c)), supplementing her account with the 
insights of others where adventitious.  
                                                        
467 Cf. ST Ia, q. 82, aa. 3-4, ad 1. Reason, of course, still governs the passions, according to Aquinas, but its 
task is not to dispense with them (cf. ST IaIIae, q. 24, a. 3, resp.). 
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 To begin, Stein draws two important contrasts concerning affective acts. First, 
affective acts, unlike what she calls categorial acts, have a sensory quality of their own.468 
What this means is that internal to affective acts, there is a certain experience of what von 
Hildebrand calls “being affected,” ([1953] 1972, 208-210). Unlike categorial acts, which 
involve no experience of being-affected, but are merely founded on (sensible) acts that do 
have such a component,469 affective acts themselves essentially involve being-affected. 
To see the contrast, consider the act by which we grasp the meaning of the word “tree.” 
The act by which we grasp the meaning of “tree” does not involve being-affected. In 
other words, we feel nothing in the act of grasping the meaning of “tree.”470  
 In the case of affective acts, however, such acts involve (as part of their “matter” 
and not merely as part of some presupposed founding act), my being-affected. Stein gives 
the example of beholding a beautiful landscape. This act, unlike a categorial act, is not 
merely one that presupposes some substrate of sensible intuition (a presupposed act of 
seeing the landscape in question), but itself involves being-affected in the guise of 
feelings of “enjoyment, comfortableness, and the like” (ibid., 159). Basically stated, 
affective acts (and, hence, value-grasping acts), involve feelings, and do not merely 
                                                        
468 For the discussion of categorial acts, see ibid., I, § 2(b). Basically, categorial acts are “acts of thought,” 
which include judging, inferring, comparing, contrasting, collecting, counting, and grasping the common 
meanings (core senses) of words (cf. ibid., 152-153). 
469 To be clear, the being-affected of sensible acts is not, strictly speaking, the same as the being-affected of 
affective acts. The “being-affected” of sensible acts refers, more formally, to the fact that these experiences 
essentially involve the experience of receiving something “from the outside.” 
470 There is, however, a certain sensory-feel that is presupposed by this act, namely the sensory quality of 
sensory intuition—in this case, the sensory intuitions of trees and what it is like to see trees (see [1922] 
2000, I, § 2(a)). But this sensory-feel belongs, properly speaking, to the act of sensory intuition of the tree, 
and not to the act of grasping the meaning of “tree.” 
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presuppose them. Value-grasping acts are intrinsically affective in a way that categorial 
acts are not. 
 The second preliminary point that Stein makes is that these feelings exhibit 
intentionality. They intend the values in question and so serve as the basis for manifesting 
the world of values to the person (ibid.). She also takes up the need to clarify the meaning 
of “feeling,” which is ambiguous between: 
 (F1) the acts in which we are confronted with values  
 (F2) the attitudes that values evoke in us.471 
Although she doesn’t say so, F1 seems just to refer to value-grasping (affective) acts 
themselves, acts whose intentional objects are values. “Feeling,” used in accordance with 
(F1), is just a broad way to designate the acts by which we grasp values. Often, though, 
and in a more colloquial vein, “feelings” refers narrowly to the feelings that values evoke 
in us (F2).472 It is on the basis of this distinction that Stein illustrates the following 
preliminary model of value-grasping acts, which serves as a useful foil to her own 
account. According to this model, value-grasping proceeds according to the following 
series of acts (using Stein’s case of the beautiful landscape for an example): 
 (1) We have an object-perception of x. 
  We perceive the landscape. 
 (2) We feel f in the presence of x. 
  We feel gladness in the presence of the landscape. 
                                                        
471 There is a similar distinction to be found in von Hildebrand, whose account distinguishes “being-
affected” from “affective responses” ([1953] 1972, 208). 
472 We might add: whether or not we would call that which evokes these feelings “values.” 
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 (3) We have affective attitude r toward x. 
  We take joy in the landscape. 
 It isn’t clear though, notes Stein, how (1)-(3) relate to each in terms of what is the 
foundation for what. It also isn’t clear what sort of relation obtains among the acts in this 
“series.” What Stein thinks is clear is that the feeling in (2) is the motive for the affective 
attitude in (3).473 In a phrase reminiscent of von Hildebrand, (2) “requires” (3): grasping 
the value requires the response (cf. von Hildebrand ([1953] 1972, 38-39). (3) is the 
response to (2). But the question is what entitles us to call the grasp of the value (in this 
case, the beauty of the landscape) itself an affective act. Another, schematic, way to 
formulate this question is to ask where to insert the word “beauty” in the above schema 
(1)-(3). That is, why is the full series (1)-(3) required? Why not “insert” the apprehension 
of beauty into (1). Couldn’t we, for example, just simplify the account as follows? 
 (4) We have an object-perception of the beautiful landscape. 
 (5) We have a feeling in response to the beautiful landscape. 
In support of such a simplification, Stein considers the case of the person who beholds a 
beautiful landscape but is left cold by it ([1922] 2000, 159). Such cases seem to illustrate 
that we can receive, as “fact-information” (Stein’s word) the beauty of the landscape, 
without having any feeling whatsoever. It is then a separate matter of whether we respond 
to this “fact-information” with the appropriate affective attitude. The simplification in 
                                                        
473 One sort of case in which (2) and (3) come apart can be illustrated by appeal to von Hildebrand’s idea of 
cooperative freedom, discussed below. We can have certain feelings when taking in a landscape that are 
entirely unbidden without this constituting an affective response. It is all the difference between a vague 
feeling of uplifting in the presence of a mountain vista, and actually rejoicing in the beauty before one’s 
eyes. 
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question cuts out the role of feeling in perceiving the object as endowed with value. 
Indeed, it actually cuts out the very idea of value-perception altogether. The “beauty” is 
given as “fact-information,” and either gives rise to (i.e., causes) certain feelings in 
observers, or does not give rise to certain feelings. Insofar then, as we still want to hold 
onto the claims that (a) beauty is a value, and (b) we are given the beauty of the 
landscape in (4), then we must pursue a Lockean analysis of value as a secondary quality, 
i.e., as a causal power of objects to evoke certain feelings in observers.474 Spelled out 
more explicitly, we arrive at the following naturalistic model of value-grasping acts: 
 (6) We have a sensation of the landscape. 
 (7) The sensation of the landscape causes us to feel a certain way. 
 (8) This feeling causes us to affectively respond to the landscape in a certain way. 
This pushes the notion of value into our minds,475 with the result being that values are 
merely feelings, in the way originally denounced by Stein, as well as Scheler.476  
 Nevertheless, the case of the person left cold by the beautiful landscape that he 
beholds is not without its plausibility and, as such, requires a response.477 Stein’s response 
                                                        
474 For an example of such a view, see McDowell (1985) and Wiggins (1987). 
475 In the same way that a Lockean secondary quality analysis of color pushes color into our minds. 
476 Scheler does pursue, however, the idea of an analogy between values and colors, in terms of their 
respective ontological statuses (for discussion, see Kelly (2011, 10, 27-28) and Frings (1997, 23-25)). He 
does not, though, take up Locke’s view of colors as secondary qualities.  
477 This is as good a place as any to note some complications in von Hildebrand’s account of value-grasping 
acts that are not present in Stein’s account. Stein makes value-grasping acts out to be a species of affective 
acts. In von Hildebrand’s work, the relationship between value-grasping and affectivity is much more 
complex. To begin with, von Hildebrand, who does not talk about value-grasping acts per se (the term 
“value-grasping act” is my own), distinguishes among abstract knowledge of a value, perceiving a value 
and participating in a value (2009, 154). A difficult exegetical question is whether von Hildebrand’s notion 
of value response (including affective value responses) falls under the perception of value or participation 
in value. Answering this question depends, in turn, upon deciding whether von Hildebrand thinks that the 
responses of being gladdened by or rejoicing in some good are constitutive of perceiving a value or 
participating a value. Although he sometimes seems to think of value perception as requiring such 
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is that the cold person has not really perceived the value (here: beauty) at all ([1922] 
2000, 159). The case confuses the affective act by which the person grasps the value of 
beauty with the sensory acts by which the person grasps those features of the landscape 
“to which beauty adheres” (ibid.). Speaking loosely, the cold person has a grasp of that 
on which beauty supervenes, without grasping the supervening beauty itself.478 What 
allows for this possibility is that the sensible features in question “place no claim upon 
me” whereas beauty “insists that I inwardly open myself up to it and let my inner self be 
determined by it…as long as this inner contact is not effected, for as long as I withhold 
the response which beauty requires, beauty doesn’t entirely divulge itself to me” (ibid.). 
A completely fulfilled value-grasping act is one in which the value-intention (being-
affected) and response-reaction (affective response) are united (ibid.).479  
                                                        
responses (e.g., when he says that perceiving a value naturally leads to our being gladdened by it, or to our 
rejoicing in it (2009, 115), he is clear that they are instances of the second mode of participating a value 
(2009, 113; cf. 1961). The problem, then, is what to make of affective value response. Sometimes it seems 
that affective value responses are mode of participating in a value (as in the case of being gladdened by, or 
rejoicing in, a value). But sometimes it seems as though any instance of the second mode of participating a 
value requires an antecedent perception of the value, where this involves making the required response. 
The importance of this question for Stein’s case of the cold person lies is it is not obvious, by von 
Hildebrand’s lights, whether this person has perceived the value, but failed to participate (by being 
gladdened by it) or whether the person’s failure to participate entails a failure to perceive the value as 
well. The question is further muddied by (a) von Hildebrand’s discussion of being-affected both with value 
response and with the superabundant happiness that follows from perceiving a value (b) his claim that the 
ontological category of a good (e.g., object, state of affairs, event, person) itself constrains the possibilities 
for being-affected and affective response and (c) the role of “cooperative freedom” and the sanctioning of 
being-affected and affective response. The (provisional) bottom line is that not all values require an 
affective response and not all values are able to affect us. Where such a response is required, and where 
such affectation is possible, then (I think) they serve as criteria by which we can check whether a person 
really has grasped a given value. Where such a response is not required, or where the value cannot affect 
us, then such affectation and response cannot be used as criteria for value-grasping acts (according to von 
Hildebrand).  
478 The supervenience in question is non-reductive (i.e., weak). Beauty is not (e.g.) nothing but the “pixels” 
of a painting. Nevertheless, if you were to superimpose splashes of paint, à la Jackson Pollock, on Ary 
Scheffer’s Dante and Beatrice, this would not be without effect on the beauty of the piece. 
479 In this way, the response to beauty is akin to the response of love. Just as the beauty of a work of art 
doesn’t entirely divulge itself to someone standing before it coldly, the values (the “overall beauty” in von 
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 What this means is that a value-grasping act, for its completeness, is not merely a 
matter of (6) or even (1) (understood in isolation from (2)-(3)), but also requires (7)-(8) or 
(2)-(3). Grasping the values incarnated by an object is not equivalent with grasping the 
color of an object. Grasping the beauty of a landscape is not the same sort of grasping as 
grasping the redness of an apple. 
  What differentiates the sensible features of the landscape (e.g., the redness of the 
apples on its trees) from the beauty of the landscape, is that the former can be totally 
grasped apart from any response made by the person. In the case of sensory acts and 
sensible contents, we are in the realm of the axiologically inert or neutral (for all intents 
and purposes, anyway).480 In the realm of affective acts and values, however, the acts in 
question require a contribution on the part of the person, namely the feelings in question. 
We do not have to feel any particular way, or respond feelingly in any particular way, in 
order to grasp the redness of the apple, whereas we do have to feel a certain way, and 
respond feelingly a certain way, to grasp the beauty of the landscape.481  
                                                        
Hildebrand’s phrase) of a person does not divulge itself to someone beholding her coldly. The Pharisees 
never grasped the overall beauty of Christ.  
480 I add this qualification because, as von Hildebrand and others argue, there is a value to being as such, 
such that there is nothing that is purely inert, axiologically speaking (see von Hildebrand ([1953] 1972, 
146ff)). This is akin to the “ontological goodness” or “transcendental goodness” of the medieval 
philosophers. 
481 This talk of “feeing” and “response,” should not, however, be taken to imply that value-grasping acts are 
purely passive. To see this, we can return to Marcel’s insistence that receptivity is not passive, insofar as 
receiving another presupposes an active disposing over ourselves, in the ways in which we prepare 
ourselves to welcome another. If we set out hiking, or go to an art museum, with an attitude of complete 
indifference, or even hostility toward the proceedings (thing, e.g., of a teenager dragged against his will to 
the Museum of Fine Arts), then we have not disposed over ourselves adequately to be-affected in value-
disclosing ways. For this reason, values are perhaps best grasped in the extension of a moment of 
recollection, or the “ingathering” of which Marcel speaks ([1950] 2001a, 126).   
 451 
 
 But still, why think that these feelings are required for the act, itself, of grasping 
the value as opposed to just being required for the response-reaction? In other words, 
why push affectivity down into the perception of the value in question? Here is where the 
case of the person left cold plays a positive role in Stein’s argument. What such cases 
illustrate is that two persons can perceive the same object, without perceiving the same 
values, or without both perceiving the object in question as incarnating any values at all. 
One person can perceive the beauty of the landscape, while the other person is left cold. 
In cases where the sensory contents of (1) and (6) are the whole story, there is no basis 
for distinguishing between these obviously different cases. Even more strongly, there are 
cases in which we can grasp values without any sensible content at all. Such cases 
include, suggests Stein, grasping the elegance of a proof, or the harmony of a well-
crafted theory, the value of a joyful pardon, and the disvalue of a grudge ([1922] 2000, 
160).482  
 So we have two possible cases. In one case, the cold person perceives the 
landscape (6). What this establishes is that we can have (6) without (7) and, hence, 
without (8). This undermines the causal account of (1)-(3) given by (6)-(8). In the other 
case (the elegant proof), we have (8) without (6) and (7). What this establishes is that (7) 
and (8) need not be the effect of (6). Taken together, these two cases pull apart sensible 
contents and value-perception, such that it is no longer supportable to claim that values 
are nothing but the effects of certain sensible contents on observers. This rules out the 
Lockean naturalistic model of (6)-(8) as an interpretation of (1)-(3). Thus, the 
                                                        
482 The last two examples are of value-grasping acts. 
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relationships among (1)-(3) is not that of strict efficient causality, with (1) temporally 
prior to (2), and (2) temporally prior to (3). In place of this interpretation of (1)-(3), Stein 
offers the following bold replacement, holding that what she calls “extra-egoic data,” 
(i.e., the sensory information given in (1)): 
 never emerge[s] unaccompanied by egoic-data. A value-constitution goes hand-in-hand 
 with every object-constitution.483 Every fully-constituted object is simultaneously a value-
 object. Basically, the value-free world of mere things is an abstraction that's suggested to 
 us by the fact that we aren't equally persuaded by all the intentions that can arise on the 
 basis of available material, but rather alternate between different “orientations.”484 When 
 axiologically oriented we see values, and in particular, aesthetic, ethical, religious values, 
 and so forth. (Stein [1922] 2000, 160) 
 
What this implies, for the original series of acts (1)-(3) is that even (1) is not entirely free 
of the involvement of the affectivity of the human person. In order to properly understand 
(1)-(3), we have to realize that the acts in this series of acts do not exhibit temporal and 
(efficient) causal priority with respect to each other.485 The response is not given after we 
grasp the value, and the value is not grasped after we grasp the object. Furthermore, the 
perception of an object does not cause (efficiently) our grasping the values incarnated in 
                                                        
483 Scheler seems to advocate an even stronger position when he writes, “the value-qualities of objects are 
already given in advance at a level where their imaged and conceptual features are not yet vouchsafed to 
us, and hence that the apprehension of values is the basis of our subsequent apprehension of objects” (1954, 
57). 
484 Von Hildebrand speaks in a similar vein of the “ontological” versus the “axiological” “rhythm” ([1953] 
1972, 251). Incidentally, when he speaks this way, it seems that any disagreement between him and Stein 
(see fn 477) is not as strong. Although von Hildebrand does reiterate that we can speak of a merely 
intellectual act of perceiving values, he does grant that in “understanding a value” we “simultaneously 
surpass the theme of a mere knowledge of being” (ibid.). The extent to which the apparent disagreement is 
verbal as opposed to substantive would seem to turn (a) on how robust a distinction von Hildebrand wants 
to draw between “perceiving” a value versus “understanding” a value, and (b) whether Stein would endorse 
the distinction in question. 
485 Here again, it is unclear whether von Hildebrand would agree. In places, he seems to think that there is a 
temporal priority of value-perception, e.g., when he speaks of being-affected and affective responses as 
“surpassing” mere value-perception (see, e.g., [1953] 1972, 233). But then he also speaks of a 
“simultaneous surpassing” (ibid., 251). It is hard to interpret this phrase, since surpassing something seems 
to imply a temporal priority of the surpassing over the surpassed.  
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the object, and this value-grasping does not cause the response-reaction. This is not a 
causal-temporal series of events, but one act of engagement with the world, in which we 
have distinguished different elements. Not only, then, does grasping a value require the 
value-intention, response-reaction, and object-perception, but object-perception itself 
requires the value-intention and response-reaction.486 
                                                        
486 While Stein speaks only of affective responses, von Hildebrand also includes volitional value response. 
In a volitional response, there is a reference to a not-yet-real value-endowed state of affairs which is to 
come into being as the result of my activity (ibid., 201). Affective responses, by contrast, do not necessarily 
contain a reference to something not-yet-real (ibid., 202). For example, we can respond affectively to a 
living hero, e.g., by feeling admiration toward the heroic person who saves someone at great personal cost. 
I should also clarify that for von Hildebrand (and probably for Stein) not every affective-response to 
something is necessarily a value-response (ibid., 211). That is, we can respond affectively to things falling 
under other categories of importance (e.g., the merely subjectively-satisfying).  
 For my part, I think that value-grasping acts can—even should—also involve a “theoretical 
response” to more general moral truths and the facts of a given situation. (In at least one place, von 
Hildebrand seems to acknowledge this—in his claim that value judgments are theoretical affirmations 
(2009, 66).) For example, sometimes our affective responses to, or being-affected by, someone can be 
influenced by mere sentimentalism. We might have what are sometimes called “bleeding heart” feelings, 
where these are due, not so much to any authentic value-grasping act, but are rather to a false dichotomy 
between “warm feelings” and “cold reason.” In The Return of the King, Gandalf says to Pippin, “generous 
deed should not be checked by cold counsel.” This much is true, but not all counsel is cold. We may, for 
example, be moved with pity at the sight of a beggar. But we might also know that this particular beggar 
attempts to steal from those who approach him with aid, and that he in fact has a home but plays the part of 
a beggar out of indolence. In encountering this beggar, even if we have seen him before and “know his 
story,” we might still find our hearts moved. Given what we know, however, we should reason that one 
ought not to place oneself in danger without a sufficiently good reason, and that aiding a notorious false-
beggar is not such a reason. This involves a theoretical response to the “major premises” (general moral 
truths) of one’s deliberation. This is not a case of “cold counsel.” It is a matter of not ignoring the truth. 
 On the other hand, consider a case in which you are dealing with a different beggar, but one who 
bears a superficial resemblance to the original crooked beggar. In this case, you begin to look on him as on 
the crooked beggar, talking yourself out of doing him a good turn on account of the superficial similarities. 
This is a case of “cold counsel.” Your coldness to the crooked beggar and his indolent and unjust behavior 
has allowed you to talk yourself out of doing good for the indigent in general. Or consider, more generally, 
cases in which you allow your narrow self-interest to talk you out of a generous deed. For example, your 
pastor appeals for a greater sacrifice at offertory time. But, although you are moved by his appeal and 
initially will to give more, you stay your hand, rehearsing arguments about your finances that bear no 
proportion to the call of the appeal (and perhaps to the actual condition of your finances). In short, cold 
counsel is just that—a distorted, but nevertheless affective response, to the call of some value-laden moral 
situation. But counsel is not cold as such, and there is nothing automatically cold about sanctioning or 
disavowing (to use von Hildebrand’s terms) our affective responses in light of reason.  
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 The contribution of feelings to value-grasping acts is therefore twofold. One the 
one hand, feelings provide the basis for our apprehending a value. Without feelings, or 
without being-affected, we would never be able to grasp values in the first place. 
Furthermore, feelings are necessary for the completion of value-grasping acts (through 
being constitutive of affective responses).487 Feelings are, as it were, both the 
“messengers” of values, as well as part of our response to the message. We might say that 
it is through our affectivity that we are embedded in a world of values and able to “reach 
out” into the world and retrieve, or discover, values. Our feelings are the means of our 
receptivity to values, as well as our active response to values that crowns the acts by 
                                                        
487 A complication arises here, which must be pointed out. Although he does not draw this distinction 
explicitly, von Hildebrand (for one) effectively distinguishes between affective response in a narrow sense, 
and affective response in a broad sense (the closest he comes to this distinction is his discussion of the 
coexistence of good and evil in a person’s soul in (ibid., ch. 32). To get the narrow sense, we need to pull a 
few claims together. Von Hildebrand speaks of the “cooperative freedom” of the human person in 
sanctioning or disavowing the affective response that we make to values (ibid., 316-318, 320-321, 324). 
However, sanction, properly speaking, can only be given “toward a value response and especially toward a 
morally positive attitude” (ibid., 327). Sanction is always sanction-of a morally positive attitude 
constitutive of an affective value response. Third, “our sanction and our affective response interpenetrate 
each other in such a way that we can no longer speak of two realities. They merge into one attitude” (ibid., 
324). Put together, we get the notion of affective response narrowly-construed, in which that response is 
“one” with a sanctioning of the response and, as such, morally positive. The upshot is that a narrow-
affective-response is one that is adequate to its object. It is a “concerting” with the value, as von 
Hildebrand puts it (ibid., 327). However, von Hildebrand also speaks of affective responses that “contradict 
the call of morally relevant values” (ibid., 332). (For example, taking joy in another’s misfortune.) The 
question is which sense of affective response is at issue here, and it seems clear enough that, since our task 
is here to elucidate the nature of value-grasping acts, that the answer must be affective response in the 
narrow sense. Not any old affective response to a value suffices for our grasping the value in question. We 
do not grasp the beauty of a painting if we are filled with loathing. The question thus arises: how do we 
know that we have responded in the right way? Although I cannot answer this question in full, this seems to 
be an application of my point (see fn 486) that affective response must go together with the exercise of 
reason in a more traditional sense of the word. We can also distinguish phenomenologically between the 
case in which someone rationally intuits that admiration is the due response to beauty and the case in 
which someone is filled with loathing in the presence of the beauty. The latter sort of case isn’t a case in 
which someone is grasping the essential interconnectedness of value and response, but is rather (e.g.) a 
slave to his hatred of the beautiful. As von Hildebrand notes, some degree of rectitude is necessary to grasp 
the due response. Additionally, we might bear in mind Stein’s observation that value-response is 
interpersonal (see below). Other persons can therefore serve as a check against aberrant affective responses.  
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which we grasp them.488 Without affectivity of the former sort, we would be utterly blind 
to values. Without affectivity of the latter sort, we would not be blind to values, but 
values would not be graspable consciously.489 As such, value-grasping acts would be 
doomed to a sort of vague subconscious presentiment.  
 What remains to be discussed are the different sorts of feelings that enter into 
value-grasping acts, and how they bear upon value-grasping acts. One way that we can 
mark off the categories that Stein has in mind here is by distinguishing between feelings 
that bear some “intentional freight” and those that do not and are rather “experienced 
purely inwardly” ([1922] 2000, 163). Examples of the former include gratitude, trust, and 
admiration (ibid.). These attitudes are directed upon some intentional object, specifically 
persons or values embodied by persons. For example, we can be grateful to another for 
his generosity to us, trust that he will provide care for us, and admire his charity. We 
cannot feel gratitude, trust, or admiration, in the absence of some person and the values 
which he embodies. How does this relate to the schema for value-grasping acts? Such 
feelings seem to be those which satisfy both (2) and (3). That is, in the case of feelings 
                                                        
488 According to von Hildebrand, “the response is our position toward the good. We are, as it were, 
speaking to the object, whereas in being affected we are only receiving the “word” of the object” (ibid., 
209). 
489 Another way to make this point is by appeal to Aquinas’s distinction among three kinds of passivity. The 
third kind of passivity is that wherein whatever passes from potentiality to actuality is passive. In this 
respect, the intellect is a passive power (ST Ia, q. 77, a. 2, resp.). However, the intellect is not only passive, 
but active. Although the intellect is in potentiality with regard to the intelligibility of things, the intellect 
must also act so as to reduce the potentiality intelligibility of things to actual intelligibility. In other words, 
the intellect must make something this is intrinsically intelligible to be intellected by itself. Similarly, with 
values and value-grasping acts. The power to grasp values is, for philosophers such as Scheler, Stein, and 
von Hildebrand, a basic power of the human person alongside the intellect and the senses. Its passivity 
consists in its being-affected by values, which being-affected actualizes the potential for a complete value-
grasping act. The value-grasping act is completed in the active response-reaction to a value, wherein we 
bring the intrinsic intelligibility of the value to actual intelligibility in us.  
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which cannot be experienced apart from some intentional (personal) object, both (2) and 
(3) are “satisfied” by the same type of feeling. For example, the gratitude that we feel 
toward a benefactor and his favor is the same feeling as the feeling of gratitude that we 
give in response to the value of his benefaction.490 
 Examples of feelings that can be experienced without exhibiting intentionality 
include anxiety, elation, and relief (ibid.). These feelings can serve as the basis of 
intentional experiences, in which case we speak of fear, hope, and confidence (ibid.). In 
these cases, we can distinguish the type of feeling that “satisfies” (2) from that which 
“satisfies” (3). For example, the value-intention might be anxiety, but the response-
reaction is fear. For example, we might experience some vague dread or presentiment 
without its being directed upon anything in particular. By itself, this is not enough for us 
to grasp whatever disvalue is before us. What is also required is an intentional 
experience, constituted by the response-reaction, in which this vague anxiety or dread is 
solidified around a particular dangerous object, in which we grasp the disvalue of this 
object.  
 Finally, what can we say about feelings that never have an intentional object? 
Moreover, are there any such feelings? It isn’t obvious, but we might assign pleasure and 
pain to this category. How would such feelings relate to the grasping of values? Here, we 
can apply a distinction drawn by Stein in another context between the experiential 
coloring or coloration of an experience, and the content of the experience (ibid., 135). 
                                                        
490 Whether this means that, in such cases, (2) and (3) collapse into each other, or whether we want to 
maintain a distinction (whether among tokens of the same feeling, or “differently colored” tokens of the 
same feeling-type) between (2) and (3), is a further question. 
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With this in mind, we might say that pleasure and pain influence the coloration of our 
experience (or, more directly, color our experience), against which the manifestation of 
certain values or disvalues is either enhanced or diminished.  
 An example should suffice to make my meaning clear. If you are wracked with a 
horrible, chronic pain, it is very difficult to grasp the values embodied in your situation 
or, indeed, in your projects, your very life, maybe even the world itself. To use Stein’s 
words about pain and pleasure, “they seize possession of [us] so exclusively that nothing 
else has room besides” ([1922] 2000, 163).  This is not to say that there are no values 
embodied in this painful situation (e.g., a disease or some tremendous grief), but it is to 
say that the coloration of your experience, due to the pain in question, severely 
diminishes your capacity for grasping these values. Consider, e.g., a devout Catholic, 
who has been admonished to “offer up” his suffering for the intentions of the Sacred 
Heart. In cases of lesser pains, he is able to see their (salvific) value and “offer them up” 
accordingly. But when the pain is too severe, he becomes like the person (described by 
Stein) whose grasp of values remains unfulfilled—he “catches a glimpse,” at best, of the 
value of his situation “without being inwardly filled up with it” (ibid., 162). We might 
say that such a person has a “merely intellectual” grasp of the value in question—at best. 
It is empty, almost no better than if he had no grasp at all and was merely told (by his 
spiritual director, say) that his situation did embody certain values. His pain thus 
diminishes his prospects for a personally fulfilled grasp of certain values. However, to be 
clear, this is not a necessary connection. For it might be the case that a more spiritually 
advanced person would actually find such severe suffering rather an enhancement of his 
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ability to grasp certain values—e.g., as extending the range of his empathy for the 
suffering.491 This is another way of emphasizing that value-grasping acts are not causal 
effects, but are sensitive to the play of meaning, or sense.492 
 The resulting picture (which may differ from the letter of Stein’s account, and for 
which I assume responsibility) is that of three “levels” of feelings, with the following 
roles that they play in the internal structure of value-grasping acts: 
 (A) Non-intentional feelings: experience-colorers 
 (B) “Sub”-intentional bases of intentional feelings: value-receptors 
 (C) Intentional feelings: value-responders 
In keeping with the earlier discussion of (1)-(3), it should be clear that (A)-(C) are not to 
be understood as completely independent of each other, or as existing in certain necessary 
causal-temporal relationships. The case of the suffering Catholic already demonstrates 
that (A) is influenced by (C), i.e., that the coloration provided by a severe pain is 
influenced (sometimes) by the intentional feelings directed upon that pain and other 
intentional experiences and meanings constitutive of his being a Catholic.493 This 
                                                        
491 Similarly, pleasure may either enhance or diminish one’s ability to grasp certain values. In some cases, 
pleasure may serve to dull our appreciation of certain values, but in others enhance it. I suspect, however, 
that pleasure is more-or-less beside the point when we are talking about values specifically (see the next 
subsection), and that the salient experience here is pain, with the absence of pain and the presence of pain 
being such as to enhance or diminish our ability to grasp values. 
492 As noted in chapter IV, this is one of Scheler’s benchmarks for how we ought to treat others as persons, 
i.e., understanding their acts in terms of bands of sense, and not merely bands of causes. 
493 A related phenomenon, noted by von Hildebrand, is the way in which what he calls “superactual” acts 
and responses color our experience. Such acts and responses—of which the ongoing love for another 
person is the highest example—have both a material and a formal role in our experience. Materially, they 
influence and enliven us, enabling us to actualize ourselves in certain ways (e.g., the superactual love of my 
spouse motivates me to seek her out). Formally, they structure our consciousness in a certain way (e.g., the 
superactual trust of a child in his mother structures the child’s relationship and possible experiences with 
his mother in certain ways) (2009, 45-47). 
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example also displays the active side of value-grasping acts. The suffering Catholic is not 
merely the prey of his pain and other feelings. Indeed, how he suffers his pain, and how 
he responds feelingly to it, are also shaped by his volitional response to Catholicism, his 
will to live in light of the truths of his religion, e.g., his will to imitate Christ’s Passion.  
 Let us consider another example of (A)-(C), with an eye to their interpenetration, 
as well as to the active aspect of value-grasping acts. Suppose that you are feeling 
pleasure (A). Sub-intentionally, you are also feeling a certain quickening in your lived 
body, a stirring of undifferentiated sensual desire beginning to surge (B). This feeling of 
quickening, while not itself directed (as yet) to anyone in particular (or to any activity in 
particular) is nevertheless receptive of (to use Scheler’s terminology) the rank of vital 
values, specifically (say) the value of sexual activity. The presence of pleasure heightens 
this receptivity but is by no means necessary for it. Consider, e.g., how this quickening 
might be felt even in those who are otherwise struggling with ill health and even with 
pain. In the midst of such experience, there can still be flashes or surges of vitality—
eddies among the generally depressed health of the person—that are receptive of the 
values of vitality even amidst a situation that otherwise depresses such receptivity. The 
value-receptor that I have called the feeling of vital quickening is not reducible to 
pleasure but is merely colored by the experience of pleasure (or pain).  
 But this value-receptor is still not enough to grasp the value of sexual activity. 
Perhaps, as a result of this quickening, you dissipate yourself into all manner of casual 
sexual encounters characterized entirely by lust. That is, in the concrete encounter with 
another, in which this undifferentiated quickening is now accompanied by a particular 
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response-reaction, it is still open whether the response-reaction discloses the value of 
sexual activity or not. If the other person is one’s beloved spouse, then the response of 
loving enjoyment discloses the value of sexual activity. On the other hands, if the other 
person is a stranger you met in a bar, or if there is no other person at all (merely an image 
on a computer screen, say), then the response-reaction of lust does not disclose the vital 
(as well as spiritual) value of sexual activity. Rather, it reduces such activity to Scheler’s 
rank of useful values, or even to mere sensible values. Sexual activity is seen as merely 
fulfilling a function—it discharges the pent-up sensation of quickening, and it is a 
convenient and potent source of sensual pleasure.494 Even this might be too charitable. As 
we will see below, von Hildebrand would interpret this not as a case of perceiving sexual 
activity on a lower value-rank, but of abandoning the point of view of values altogether—
of perceiving sexual activity is something merely at the service of our own subjective 
satisfaction.495 
 What this example also shows us is that the direction and contents of one’s own 
striving shapes our ability to grasp certain values. Although values can be given 
(according to Scheler) apart from striving, it is while striving that we often grasp certain 
                                                        
494 This is the sort of attitude that is displayed in some recent articles in The Economist on the problem of 
sex-selective abortion of females in certain East Asian countries. The resulting imbalanced sex-ratios are 
described as having negative social effects, with instability resulting from the male population’s lack of 
access to sexual (and marital) partners of the opposite sex. 
495 Another complication is that the feeling of vital-quickening is not necessary to having some response or 
another to the value of sexual activity. Consider, e.g., a case in which one merely has sex with their spouse 
out of a sense of duty—feeling neither much (if any) pleasure and no quickening. In such a case, however, 
the value of sexual activity is partially obscured and sexual activity is seen again in a pragmatic vein—as 
being merely a means to discharging one’s marital duty. So while the value-receptive feeling of quickening 
is not necessary to having some response or other (e.g., a feeling of contentment at having done one’s 
duty), it is necessary to grasp the true value of sexual activity, which cannot be adequately grasped apart 
from the particular vital-spiritual loving enjoyment that characterized sexual activity performed not merely 
not out of a sense of duty, but also as an expression of the vitality of the lived body. 
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values—indeed, sometimes we might not have grasped certain values had we not been 
striving in certain directions (1973, 38). In keeping with the present example, we might 
say that fully grasping the value of sexual activity is not possible apart from striving to 
fulfill one’s vocation to the married life. There are, however, two Schelerian caveats that 
must be mentioned here in passing.496 The first is the striving can be the source of value-
deception, so that we come to respond to something as important-in-itself (which is not 
important-in-itself) simply on account of our striving for it (ibid., 37). Although Scheler 
does not say so, this phenomenon seems to be related to that whereby we savor some 
things more in the act of desiring them, than we do when we have come to attain them. 
Indeed, the experience of finally attaining something we have long sought can often be 
highly instructive in the actual value or disvalue of the thing in question. Stripped of the 
romance of pursuit, we come to see a thing (or a person) for what (or who) it (she) is. The 
second is that we tend to falsely devalue something that we strive for but cannot attain 
(ibid.).497 In keeping with the current example, this is the attitude of those toward the 
value of sexual activity who are unable to attain it in a healthy and love-expressing way. 
Such an attitude might even amount to the view of marriage whereby it is nothing but a 
legalization of man’s lusts.498  
                                                        
496 For discussion of these caveats, see Kelly (2011, 92-93, 95-97). Further developments of the interplay 
between active and passive in the person’s orientation to values can also be found in Scheler. See Kelly 
(2011, 44-50) for discussion of the ways in which one’s subjective ordo amoris, basic moral tenor, acts of 
sympathy, and social milieu structure this orientation to values. 
497 This is a case of ressentiment as a source of value-deception. Ressentiment is the source of value-
deception most worked out in detail by Scheler. See Scheler (1998). 
498 We might also cite, as a further sign of the active aspect of value-grasping acts, Hartmann’s insight that 
it is through moral conflicts that we widen our capacity for value-grasping acts ([1932] 2003, 209; cf. Kelly 
(2011, 148)). It is not only through striving for certain goods that we come to grasp values, but also through 
struggling to reconcile the competing demands of certain goods that we come to grasp values. This is 
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 Now, it might be that the above example falters in certain respects. This is not a 
dissertation on the value of sexual activity, marriage, the lived body, or sexual feelings. 499 
What should be clear (hopefully) is the way in which the three types of feelings (A)-(C) 
come together (or come apart) in ways that constitute value-perception or else value-
deception. Uncovering all the relationships among (A)-(C), and how these interact with 
(1)-(3) and their interrelations is a project worthy of further research, but one which I 
cannot here undertake.  
 In sum, value-grasping acts are complexes of non-intentional, sub-intentional, and 
fully-intentional feelings, that require, for their consummation, not only a feeling of the 
value, but a response to the value in question. The next, and, for our purposes, more 
important question to consider is that of how our personhood is realized in value-grasping 
acts. It is to this question that I now turn.500 
                                                        
especially powerful in cases of discerning one’s vocation. As one wrestles with the choice between doctor 
or lawyer, priest or husband, painter or poet, one comes to perceive more clearly—and poignantly—the 
values embodied in each. 
499 Still other examples, pertaining to other value-ranks, might be given. For example, one might consider 
how a sub-intentional feeling of gratitude (initially undifferentiated) is required to respond adequately to an 
encounter with God and thereby to perceive adequately the supreme goodness of God.  
500 Another way of cashing out the nature of value-grasping acts, that I cannot explore here but hope to take 
up in future work, is in terms of Newman’s distinction between real and notional apprehension (and real 
and notional assent) in the Grammar of Assent. Such an approach presents two advantages. The first is that 
it would allow us to speak in the idiom of propositions now dominant in analytic philosophy. We could 
discuss the apprehension and assent to value as a matter of apprehending and assent to propositions about 
values. The second concerns a point that will be raised obliquely in footnotes throughout the next 
subsection. The point is this. It seems that some persons are able to “grasp” values, albeit in such a way that 
they are left cold (as in Stein’s case) or are driven to destroy the value in question (von Hildebrand’s 
satanically proud man—see below). We might say, using Newman’s idiom, that these persons apprehend, 
but fail to assent, to the value in question. This enables us to capture the sense in which they grasp the 
value, but fail to respond to the value affectively in the appropriate way (and thus why their grasp of the 
value is not a full grasp). We can also say that, even in cases where they assent to a given value-
proposition, their assent is merely notional, not real. That is, their assent is merely abstract and conceptual, 
and not a lively assent attached to the values themselves. A quick example from earlier in the dissertation 
may suffice to motivate the distinction: there are those for whom assent to the value of the human 
personhood is “merely intellectual.” They accept the notion that persons are valuable, but their assent 
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2.1.2  How Value-Grasping Acts Reveal the Dependency of Personhood on Values 
 Speaking schematically, the realization of one’s personhood requires that one be 
in contact with the world of values. Being in contact with the world of values requires 
value-grasping acts. So, the realization of one’s personhood requires value-grasping acts. 
This requirement is better understood when we consider what von Hildebrand calls the 
categories of importance, construed as categories of motivation ([1953] 1972, ch. 3), 
attending to the way in which personhood is realized in living from the point of view of 
values, but not realized—even countered—in living from the point of view of the merely 
subjectively-satisfying. The first part of this subsection considers the categories of 
motivation and, more importantly, the transitions that one is able to make among them, to 
discern how it is that personhood is realized in the value-grasping activity characteristic 
of the category of the important-in-itself (values). 
 With this general answer to our question on the table, I then outline three specific 
ways in which the realization of personhood is dependent upon value-grasping acts. 
These are: (1) value-grasping acts enable the person to consecrate himself to certain 
persons and values, (2) value-grasping acts delimit the field of the person’s agential 
possibilities (her agential field), and (3) the intrinsic relationality of the person is realized 
in value-grasping acts. These specific modes of dependency point the way forward to 
value-realizing acts, indicating the ways in which value-grasping and value-realizing acts 
                                                        
seems to miss the reality of this value. Certainly, such persons do not consummate their assent to this value 
in responses of heart and will. For discussion of Newman on real and notional assent, see Newman [1874] 
2010, ch. IV), Price (1969, series 2, lecture 5), and Crosby (2014, ch. 2). 
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form an organic unity. They also correspond to three major dimensions of personhood: 
(1) the interior life; (2) the agential life; (3) the interpersonal life. 
2.1.2.1 The General Answer 
 By way of contrast, consider how, according to Stein, “the value-response is the 
‘most natural’ behavior for the person” ([1922] 2000, 227). Is this right? Is the value-
response really the most natural behavior for the person? The answer to these questions 
requires that we return to a perennial philosophical insight (mentioned in chapter IV) that 
we must distinguish between the question of whether S is a person, and whether S is 
living as a person, or whether S lives “out of,” or “from” her personhood.  
 If we are speaking about personhood in the abstract, then Stein’s point holds 
water. But if we are talking about the conduct of actual, flesh-and-blood, human persons, 
then we must bear in mind the point just made, that human beings are capable of living as 
non-persons just as much as they capable of living as persons. Or, to speak in the 
language of “levels” or “strata,” if personhood forms the deepest stratum of a person’s 
being, then it is possible for the person either to live from her personhood, i.e., out of this 
deepest level of her being, or to live from some other, more-or-less peripheral, 
superficial, or shallow level of her being.501 We might put it this way: even if personhood 
is our “birthright,” living as persons is something that is more-or-less within our power 
either to take up or cast aside. Like hereditary monarchs, we can either take the throne, or 
                                                        
501 Stein ([1922] 2000, 227, 234, 237-239) and von Hildebrand ([1953] 1972, 85, 238) both speak of 
different “levels,” “strata,” or “centers” of a person’s being in this respect.  
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abdicate. Kingship might be our birthright, but we are free to renounce it. Personhood is 
like kingship. We can either live as persons or abdicate and renounce our personhood. 
 It is this possibility which von Hildebrand’s categories of importance, understood 
as categories of motivation, can help us to understand. Recall from chapter III, section 7, 
that von Hildebrand distinguishes among the merely subjectively-satisfying (SS), the 
objectively good for the person (OGP), and the important-in-itself, or values (V).502 These 
are categories of importance, where importance is that character of a being which 
grounds its axiological profile as a bonum or a malum (von Hildebrand [1953] 1972, 23-
24). Following the occasional usage of von Hildebrand (cf. ibid., 83-84), I will speak of 
these categories (when understood as categories of motivation), as different points of 
view from which (or out of which) a human person may live.503 What we will see is that, 
for the most part, living from the point of view of the subjectively-satisfying (hereafter, 
the SSP) is a non-personal—even, at times, depersonalizing—mode of being. On the 
other hand, living from the points of view of the objective good for the person (OGPP) 
and values (VP) are eminently personal modes of being. To enter into, and live from, 
these latter two points of view is thus necessary for the realization of one’s personhood. 
                                                        
502 For a thorough review of these categories, see Crosby (2017, 687-691). 
503 These are not “points of view” in the same way that the “epistemic point of view” (and its variants) are 
points of view (see chapter III). It is not the case that values are only valuable from within the point of view 
of values, or that objective goods are only objectively good within the points of view of the OGP, or that 
things are only subjectively-satisfying from within the point of view of the SS. Indeed, these are not even 
three points of view that we toggle between, the way in which it is imagined that we toggle between (say) 
the epistemic points of view and the practical point of view. For example, to live from the point of view of 
values is to approach the subjectively-satisfying in light of that which is important-in-itself, not to be able 
suddenly to stop thinking in terms of values and pivot to thinking in terms of satisfaction.  
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To understand why, let us now examine these different points of view, and the transitions 
that one can make from one to the other.504  
 First, let us take the SSP. Unlike the VP, the SSP is essentially indexical with 
respect to oneself. Something is subjectively-satisfying for me, or to me (ibid., 35). The 
satisfaction of a nice glass of Scotch, a flirtatious conversation, or a vigorous hike all 
exhibit this essential indexicality. They are satisfying for me, or to me. There is no such 
thing as the subjectively-satisfying in itself. As such, being-subjectively-satisfying is not 
an intrinsic property of any real being (ibid., 80-82). 
  As we shall see, some goods that are subjectively-satisfying are also objective 
goods for the person. In discussing the subjectively-satisfying, then, we want to focus 
upon the merely subjectively-satisfying. I understand this qualification to entail that the 
merely subjectively-satisfying, unlike an OGP, contains an essential reference to me, but 
not an essential reference to my personhood. Put into the language of levels or strata, this 
is to say that the merely subjectively-satisfying only reaches me at a relatively superficial 
or shallow level—perhaps even the most superficial or shallow level. 
                                                        
504 There is thus a hierarchical structure that characterizes these points of view, albeit one in which 
whatever is legitimate in the level below is taken up in the level above. It is in discussing these transitions 
that I seek to extend the insights of von Hildebrand on the characteristics of these points of view. Von 
Hildebrand does not explicitly consider these transitions, although he does discuss the ways in a person can 
live from what I call an impure point of view (see ibid., ch. 32). This is not, to reiterate the point of the 
previous note, to suggest that persons can toggle between points of view, but rather that persons often do 
not live from one or the other of these points of view purely, but often live from an impure, or mixed, point 
of view. This is due, according to von Hildebrand, to the conflict between the two basic centers of the 
human person—a prideful, concupiscent center that is at best blind to values and, at worst, hostile to them, 
and a loving, reverent value-responding center. Spencer gives an admirable elucidation of the notion of a 
center in von Hildebrand, defining it as a “broad way of engaging with the world according to a single 
“theme” of family of formal objects” (2017, 728). Finally, the notion of a transition here is not the same as 
that of toggling among points of view. Rather, the transitions in question are momentous events in the life 
of a person, heralding either a conversion of sorts in one’s way of engaging the world (according to a 
different theme, as noted by Spencer), or else a fall from grace. 
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 Thus construed, the SSP is a point of view in which we are, as von Hildebrand 
says, imprisoned within ourselves (ibid.). Living from the SSP makes for a very narrow 
horizon. Our engagement with the world is mediated through the categories of 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction. We approach other things in the world through these 
categories, reaching out to seize at that which satisfies us and recoiling from that which 
dissatisfies us. That which is neither satisfying, nor dissatisfying, is—at best—something 
that we merely step around (more or less carefully). Von Hildebrand even goes so far as 
to identify the complete absorption in this point of view with one of the roots of moral 
evil, namely concupiscence.505  
 Furthermore, that which we find subjectively-satisfying does not issue any kind of 
call or challenge to us (ibid., 39). Instead, writes von Hildebrand: 
 The attraction of the subjectively satisfying…lulls us into a state where we yield to 
 instinct; it tends to dethrone our free spiritual center. Its appeal is insistent, ofttimes 
 assuming the character of a temptation, trying to sway and silence our conscience, taking 
 hold of us in an obtrusive manner. (ibid., 38) 
 
In this passage, we should not interpret the use of “the attraction of the subjectively 
satisfying” as a grammatical subject as imputing any kind of agency to things that we 
find to be subjectively-satisfying. Rather, this passage describes the SSP, from which the 
attractiveness of things is given in this manner. According to von Hildebrand, what I am 
calling the SSP is an egocentric outgrowth of our pride and concupiscence. It is 
fundamentally a falsification of the world, born of the person’s blindness to values while 
                                                        
505 The man of concupiscence is one for whom the approach to the world is that of extracting satisfaction 
from it, much as I just described the SSP. Such a man is blind to values and deaf to their call. However, he 
does not yet go so far as to bear an active hostility toward values. For this, he must also be prideful. At best, 
the hostility of the man living from the SSP is not directed upon values as such, but merely upon how they 
rankle him, not leaving him in peace to extract satisfaction as he will (cf. ibid., 431-433). 
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living from the SSP (ibid., 83). When we live from the SSP, certain things appeal to us as 
appeasing our desires or massaging our pride.506 We allow ourselves to be “lulled” into a 
merely reactive condition, where instinctual dispositions reign unchecked, and we give 
way to the temptations that assail us. Things, qua sources of satisfaction “take hold of us 
in an obtrusive manner” (ibid., 38). We are seized by things that impinge themselves 
upon us as sources of satisfaction. 
 This is not to say that we are necessarily passive in the face of the subjectively-
satisfying. The SSP is also a state of bad faith, wherein we allow (nay, even seek out) the 
quashing of the voice of conscience. Sometimes we immerse ourselves in the 
subjectively-satisfying in order to achieve an “emancipated” subjectivity, wherein we 
allow our desires to take free rein, untroubled by the gentle call of values and the 
challenge it poses for our behavior (cf. ibid., 433). Alternately, it might be the case that 
we are lazy and seek to block out values (e.g., someone who deliberately shuns being in 
company where he might be called upon to provide some service—fair-weather “friends” 
who always seem to disappear when one’s need is dire). This sort of person is considered, 
in a different context, by Scheler, who notes how we can harness the possibility of 
                                                        
506 Pride is more complicated than concupiscence, however, and seems to dwell in a deeper stratum of the 
person than does concupiscence. Even von Hildebrand seems to acknowledge this in referring to 
concupiscence in terms of “having” and pride in terms of “being” (reminiscent of Marcel’s being/having 
distinction) (von Hildebrand [1953] 1972, 441). I think, then, that von Hildebrand’s point is better 
understood by qualifying it in terms of his distinction among various types of pride. Von Hildebrand 
distinguishes among (1) satanic pride, (2) the pride of self-glorification, (3) the pride of vanity, and (4) the 
pride of haughtiness (ibid., 442-451). As he describes these four types of pride, it becomes clear that some 
of them do indeed belong to the SSP, e.g., (2) and (3) both involve an acquisitive, craving, possessive 
attitude toward values. On the other hand, satanic pride presents an interesting case, which will be returned 
to below. For now, it suffices to acknowledge that satanic pride might require some contact with the point 
of view of values, if only to occasion the rejection of that world and the desire to overthrow it. 
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emotional “contagion” to our advantage, inducing a pleasant mood by surrounding 
ourselves only with cheerful faces, or shunning the suffering lest we become 
“contaminated” with an unpleasant feeling (1954, 15-17).507 Or, it might be that we desire 
an escape from the world (cf. von Hildebrand [1953] 1972, 434-435). In this vein, 
consider the person for whom the pursuit of satisfaction is not a pursuit of satisfaction per 
se, but only under the guise of its providing a diversion or distraction.  
 Furthermore, because (within the SSP) things always refer us back to the (most) 
shallow stratum of ourselves, we are never able to transcend ourselves. In living from the 
SSP, things never take on a character which would enable the transcendence that is one of 
the hallmarks of personhood.508 Finally, from within the SSP, nothing “moves” or 
“touches” (von Hildebrand [1953] 1972, 227). It is as if the manner in which things are 
related to us is restricted to a narrowly causal sense of relatedness. Things impinge upon 
us in an obtrusive manner, appealing to our urges, appetites, desires, habits, and cravings 
and we react by reaching out and attempt to seize the thing in question, thereby satisfying 
                                                        
507 Indeed, as Scheler describes this phenomenon, it is one of emotional infection, a completely involuntary 
transference of feelings without truly participating in the other’s experience. As such it is of a piece with 
the self-imprisonment of the SSP (see next paragraph), insofar as emotional infection isn’t genuine 
sympathy with the other, but merely the reproduction of a type-identical feeling state in oneself, whose 
cause typically remains unknown (cf. ibid.). 
508 The nature of this imprisonment differs depending on whether the person is primarily marked by 
concupiscence or pride (ibid., 441). The concupiscent man so throws himself into the subjectively-
satisfying as to disperse himself across these goods. A lack of “coherence” is, in this case, what prevents 
self-transcendence: one cannot transcend herself if there is nothing “there” to transcend. In a related vein, 
Crosby speaks of dispersion when he describes a lack of self-presence and recollection necessary for living 
as persons (1996, 128-131). Marcel also speaks of the need for what he calls “ingathering” to truly enter 
into oneself contemplatively, and transcend oneself ([1950] 2001a, 131-132). With respect to the prideful 
man, self-imprisonment is rather the result of his “reflexive gazing at himself” (von Hildebrand [1953] 
1972, 441). This is an Augustinian notion of pride, which Dahlstrom (2017, 95-96) articulates as a 
challenge to being true-to-oneself. In this respect, pride thwarts transcendence by likewise undermining 
that which is transcended, albeit in a manner different from that of concupiscence. 
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ourselves. We are moved and “touched” by value-endowed objects (when we grasp them) 
in a way that we cannot be touched by what we approach as merely subjectively-
satisfying. You cannot be touched by the Top-40 pop-song you play in order to get out of 
a bad mood, or even by a sublime work of Beethoven if listened to in the same way. Only 
in the grasping of such works from within the VP can they truly touch you.509 
 Now, it is worth asking whether anybody ever really lives from the SSP. Von 
Hildebrand answers in the affirmative, giving, as examples, Cain, Iago, Richard III, and 
Don Giovanni ([1953] 1972, 49).510 I shall not dispute von Hildebrand’s examples. Given 
the assumption that one can live from the SSP, the question is how one is able to move 
from the SSP to the point of view of the objective good for the person (the OGPP). This 
transition is absolutely crucial for the realization of our personhood, for the following 
reason. There is an ever-present temptation to renounce one’s personhood and live from 
the SSP.511 Furthermore, not only is this an ever-present temptation, but it is also a 
temptation to which many frequently succumb and hence a condition in which many 
persons find themselves (or, rather, do not find themselves, given an absence of 
recollection) at different points in their lives. Barring the operation of divine grace, what 
can be said about the journey back to living an authentically personal existence? As we 
                                                        
509 Although it is also true to say that the encounter with such works can be the occasion for coming into 
contact with the point of view of values.  
510 Even more plausibly, von Hildebrand argues that the morally positive and negative “centers” can coexist 
in a manner, even going so far as to articulate the basic types of coexistence possible ([1953] 1972, ch. 32). 
In the language of the present discussion, this is to say that a person need not live “purely” from one or 
another of these points of view but can exist in a state of tension among them (“impurely”), in addition to 
transitioning among them.  
511 I have alluded to this perennial philosophical theme in chapter IV. We find it on full display, with all of 
its characteristic pathos in the works of Pascal and Kierkegaard, among others. 
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shall see, the point of view of values (VP) is so radically different from the SSP that we 
might say (without exaggeration) that there exists a chasm between them.512 What is 
required, then, is a point of view that mediates between that of the merely subjectively-
satisfying and that of the important-in-itself, and which shares features of each. In a 
word, what we need is a bridge, and it is my contention that the point of view of the 
objectively good for the person is this bridge.513 
 What, then, is the character of the OGPP? First, we should note that, from the 
OGPP, goods still take on an essentially indexical character. Something is objectively 
good for me, or to me (ibid., 50). But, I would hasten to add, this indexicality is not 
equivalent with that of the SSP. Here the talk of different levels or strata within the 
person finds broader application. In the OGPP, we approach goods as reaching down into 
our personhood. We ask of things whether they are in our “true interest” and whether 
they are able to bestow “true happiness” (ibid.). Calling to mind the discussion of 
Wojtyla in chapter IV, we might say that in the OGPP we have our “moment of truth 
about the good.” In this moment of truth, we surmount the determination of ourselves by 
the play of appearances before us, specifically, the play of appearances of satisfaction and 
                                                        
512 This is a potential source of disagreement between my account, and von Hildebrand’s understanding of 
these categories. As already noted, von Hildebrand thinks that these points of view can coexist in a single 
person, although not in their pure states. Although I accept that this is a possible (and actual) phenomenon, 
it is nevertheless important to consider these points of view in their pure states, insofar as (a) von 
Hildebrand does hold that there are men who live from these points of view “purely,” and (b) we want 
some understanding of how these men (who retain all the potentialities of personhood) might somehow 
make the move to the point of view of values.  
513 It is important to point out that, in this respect, I differ markedly from von Hildebrand, who does not 
place this “burden” on the OGPP. My account is more similar to Crosby (1996, 86), who argues that a 
recollected subjectivity is necessary for self-transcendence. Even so, there are seemingly deep differences, 
stemming from my insistence on the role of grasping objective goods in coming to enter the VP.  
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dissatisfaction. We put, as it were, some distance between ourselves and that which 
entices us. We resist the “obtrusive” manner in which things impinge upon us, and 
subject them to the scrutiny of reason.  
 To see how this works, we can return to the earlier examples of the subjectively-
satisfying: a glass of scotch, a flirtatious conversation, a vigorous hike. From within the 
SSP, these things present themselves as satisfying at a peripheral level—to slake our 
thirst for alcohol or the thrill of coquetry, to feel pride at having conquered a mountain, 
the self-adulation at having summited another 5000-footer. From within the OGPP, 
however, these same goods are taken up in a way that does not bypass our personhood. 
We come to see them—to use von Hildebrand’s word—as either legitimate or illegitimate 
sources of satisfaction. The scotch and the mountaineering may be taken up into the 
OGPP, where they will be governed in accordance with prudent care of one’s 
personhood. The flirtatious conversation may (or may not) have to be given up, 
depending on the circumstances. There are, of course, still other goods that are OGPs 
properly speaking, and which cannot be truly appreciated from within the SSP. 
Friendship, truth, moral goodness, justice, vigorous health, mercy, fairness, and equity—
we can only begin to understand them from within the OGPP.514 
 In this way, the OGPP sees the actualization of the person’s capacity for truth. 
The question of truth is here raised for the first time, and the issue of truth is interposed 
between the satisfaction that entices us (the apparent good) and what is in our true 
                                                        
514 And even then, we only begin to understand them, insofar as most of these examples are also values in 
their own right (apart from the value of human personhood). 
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interest as persons (the real, or objective, good). Living from the OGPP actualizes the 
capacity of persons to simultaneously rise above the superficial and descend more deeply 
into themselves. In the simultaneous moment of transcendence and ingathering, there 
arises (as we shall see in the next subsection) the question of being a true person, and of 
being true-to-oneself, of seeing one’s own present condition in light of a more-or-less 
dimly apprehended exemplar of the true person, and of seeking to live in accordance with 
the exemplary truth of personhood. We grasp the objective goodness of truth as it relates 
to our prospects for a genuinely flourishing personhood.515 With these moments of truth 
comes the kindling of an interior life, whereby we live from the depths of our 
personhood. 
 In having the moments of truth that comes with entering the OGPP, we also 
respond to our personhood as something important and significant in its own right—a 
value properly so-called. Our primary response is one of gratitude for our personhood 
(ibid., 395-396). Gratitude is directed toward gifts, and so in responding as grateful, we 
are responding to our personhood as a gift. This response of gratitude is free in the sense 
that we can always refuse a gift, leave it unopened, open it and never use it, or open it and 
use it. In entering the OGPP we appreciate, however dimly, that our personhood is not 
something that we have an absolute right over, to dispose over in whatever manner we 
see fit. It is to be treasured in the way a precious gift is treasured. In this way, entering 
upon the OGPP affects us interiorly, awakening us to the value of our personhood.  
                                                        
515 From the first “moment of truth about the good” to one’s firm establishment within the OGPP, there is, it 
much be noted, a lot of backsliding and bad faith.  
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 In addition to impressing upon us the value of our personhood and making 
possible an interior life wherein the truth of personhood and its objective goods becomes 
an issue for us, living from the OGPP also awakens our intrinsic relationality to other 
persons. It is in the OGPP that the potentiality for interpersonal relationships is first 
actualized. To see how, consider von Hildebrand’s example of the act of forgiveness 
(ibid., 60). Von Hildebrand uses this example to illustrate the distinction between the 
subjectively-satisfying and the objective good (or, in the case of forgiveness, objective 
evil) for the person. What he says is that we cannot forgive the merely subjectively-
dissatisfying. If someone dissatisfies us in some way (i.e., does something, broadly 
speaking, that we experience as dissatisfying), this does not yet rise to the level of an evil 
perpetrated against our person, to which we can then respond by making an act of 
forgiveness and mercy. We have not yet, within the SSP, asked the question of harm or 
being-wronged for we have not asked the question of what is in our true interest as 
persons. We are dissatisfied, rankled, maybe even annoyed, but not wronged, and we 
cannot bestow an act of loving mercy upon someone for merely rankling us. This sort of 
high-mindedness requires responding to the other as a person, and not merely as a source 
of dissatisfaction, like a mosquito or gnat.  
 What von Hildebrand’s analysis of forgiveness suggests is that from within the 
SSP, there can be no interpersonal acts. The targets of our activity from within the SSP 
are not others qua person. Accordingly, our acts are not interpersonal acts and our 
relationships not interpersonal relationships. One’s thoughts, words, and deeds do not yet 
rise to the level of the other person. They do not yet “address” the other qua person. We 
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seek satisfaction from others or flee from others as sources of dissatisfaction, and in turn 
impinge upon others as sources of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. We become the very 
agents that von Hildebrand describes in the block-quote, above. We obtrusively put 
ourselves before others, seeking to trade in satisfactions, or seeking to actively impose, or 
else thwart, the satisfactions of others. We seek to lull people to sleep, to bring them 
“down to our level,” to silence their consciences and unman them as persons. In the realm 
of pseudo-loves, this is the “love” (discussed in chapter IV) described by Kierkegaard as 
merely transactional: the desire to deceive and not be deceived.  
 Moreover, the awakening of our potential for interpersonal relationships also has 
the effect of modifying the indexicality of objective goods that we encounter. Once we 
have entered into various relationships with others—friendships, marriages, coworkers, 
fellow citizens—we can approach goods not only as good-for-me, but as good-for-us. 
This brings us back to the previous point made about the interposition of truth and the 
resulting interior life. Now, the questions raised pertain not only to my own flourishing as 
an individual, but also explicitly to the flourishing of those to whom I am related, and to 
the flourishing of the relationships themselves. They relate to myself not as an isolated 
monad, but precisely as a person, i.e., as an entity intrinsically ordered to relations with 
other persons. This “modified indexicality” makes possible the sense of a shared 
“interior” life of the related persons.516 
                                                        
516 In this regard, it is worth reminding ourselves that the SSP is not some Hobbesian state of nature. The 
state of nature, if such there be, is more likely one of the impure points of view mentioned above. Certainly, 
in the setting of the family, there is always already this modified indexicality. Indeed, the nitty-gritty details 
of family life provide a microcosm of the impure point of view, in which there may coexist not only a sense 
of the good-for-us, but also an egocentric extension of oneself in one’s family, so that the good-for-us is 
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 In sum, in entering the OGPP we enter a point of view within which (if only 
dimly) we begin to actualize (1) an interposition of the truth between ourselves and that 
which appeals to us in a subrational (and hence subpersonal way), (2) a response of 
gratitude to our personhood, and (3) a potentiality for authentically interpersonal acts and 
relationships. In these three ways, the essential indexicality of the OGPP is revealed as 
referring to the person as person, insofar as it reaches down to the deepest strata of 
personhood as (1) capable of sustaining a robust interior life, (2) important-in-itself 
(intrinsically valuable), and (3) capable of sustaining interpersonal relationships. 
 At this point, the reader might be worried that I have thus made the transition to 
the OGPP from the SSP nearly as difficult (for all intents and purposes) as the move from 
the SSP all the way to the VP. But this is not so. To see why, consider the following. 
With von Hildebrand, I think that we can distinguish the SSP and VP in the following 
manner. Among the subjectively-satisfying, there are relations of more-and-less. That is, 
some things are more satisfying than others, and less satisfying than still others. Among 
values, there are rather hierarchical relationships of higher and lower (ibid., 40-41). To 
speak, then, of “higher pleasures” (as, e.g., Mill does) is already to begin abandoning the 
SSP, for we are already evaluating our sources of satisfaction with respect either to our 
objective good, or to some value(s).517 Thus, the beginning of this transition to the OGPP 
can be quite modest, taking the form of merely differentiating among one’s sources of 
                                                        
merely the good-for-me in disguise. Von Hildebrand discusses precisely this sort of case when he 
denounces self-love (especially if understood as the extension of one’s ego) as the basis of love (2009, 8). 
517 According to the account here defended, talk of higher and lower pleasures qua pleasures is nonsense. In 
qualitatively assessing pleasures in this way (to follow Mill as opposed to Bentham) is already to have in 
mind (if only implicitly) a standard external to mere satisfaction or pleasure against which we measure the 
qualitative “height” of a pleasure. 
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satisfaction—recognizing, to use Mill’s example, that it is always better to be a miserable 
Socrates than a happy pig.  
 This is just another way of reminding ourselves that the bridgehead of the OGPP 
on the side of the SSP consists in its essential indexicality, albeit with an indexicality 
which is modified in a way that enables the initial actualization of the three potentialities 
mentioned above. But as a bridge, the OGPP also has a bridgehead on the side of the VP. 
In certain ways, then, in entering upon the OGPP we are already directed upon, or 
preparing ourselves for, the world of values. How is this so? First, the very notion of an 
OGP presupposes the notion of at least one value, the value of our personhood, which I 
have mentioned above (cf. ibid., 56, 77). Furthermore, in actualizing our potential for 
authentically interpersonal relationships, we also come to grasp the value of personhood 
as such, as we come to understand others as persons, and as important-in-themselves on 
that account. Finally, in responding gratefully to our own personhood, we come into 
contact with the basic structure of value and value-response. In responding to our own 
personhood as a value, as something to which various responses are due, we dispose 
ourselves to grasping things as value-endowed, i.e., endowed with an intrinsic 
importance, to which we owe an adequate response.518   
 Moreover, the ability to perceive values is contingent upon moral rectitude 
according to von Hildebrand (ibid., 45-47, 228). As we saw above, the SSP is the 
                                                        
518 Here, I differ from von Hildebrand, who says that we must first grasp moral values before we grasp that 
the nature of the person is ordered to transcendence through contact with the world of values (ibid., 186). 
My argument against him is implicit in the above discussion: there is too much of a chasm between the SSP 
and the VP to make sense of our coming to grasp values prior to our coming to grasp our own personhood, 
and what is objectively good for it. The latter readies the way for the former, and not the other way around.  
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outgrowth of egocentric tendencies to seeing the world through the lens of possible 
satisfactions of our pride and concupiscence.519 We can be blind to values, and hence 
blinded to the VP, without at least a certain degree of moral rectitude.520 This requirement 
is another indication, to my mind, of the absolute necessity of the OGPP as mediating 
between the SSP and the VP. Though von Hildebrand would deny that we can be fully 
morally conscious in the OGPP (cf. [1953] 1972, 265), it seems that taking the step out of 
the SSP clears the scales from our eyes sufficiently to prepare the way for perceiving and 
responding to values. Again, this begins with the value of our own personhood and the 
resulting care that we take with respect to our personhood. Adapting von Hildebrand’s 
language, we might say that the awakening of our moral consciousness requires a 
preceding (or at least simultaneous) awakening of ourselves as persons. Our coming to 
                                                        
519 Echoing a point made above, it might be that allowances have to made for the extraordinary character of 
satanic pride, in which some kind of value perception has occurred against which the satanically proud man 
carries out his self-destructive mission to destroy values. It is worth considering, though I cannot do justice 
to the question here, whether we should modify von Hildebrand (in a way that allows him to explain satanic 
pride) so that moral rectitude is required for the cultivation of a habitus of value-perception, even while 
allowing for the possibility of one-off acts of grasping particular values. One way to consider this 
possibility is by turning the tables and focusing on the holy person. A holy person might, in a flash of 
intuition or even a mystical vision, perceive some great evil (disvalue), even though he has not been 
habituated by moral corruption to see all the vast possibilities of evil. That is, the holy person could surely 
identify an obvious evil (e.g., the Holocaust) even if unable to identify the full range possible and actual 
evils. Similarly, those who are satanically proud can identify obvious values, even if blind to the full range 
of values. Indeed, it might be precisely on account of such an unlooked-for encounter with a high-ranking 
value that the satanically proud man (also morally corrupt in other ways) set outs to destroy the values 
whose truth is so obvious. In a related vein, we might appeal to a facet of Scheler’s account of ressentiment 
as a fundamental source of value-deception. Scheler says that even in cases of ressentiemnt, the true order 
of values shines (translucently) through one’s own distorted ordo amoris (cf. Frings 1997, 68). Perhaps this 
translucency explains how, in certain circumstances, the proud man does grasp certain values in their 
proper ranks (if only briefly) before setting out to expunge those values, the memory of whose sovereignty 
burns him. 
520 In addition to this blindness by our lack of rectitude, von Hildebrand also acknowledges that our 
interests can also corrupt our perceptions of values (cf. ibid., 228). Scheler, who also discusses this 
phenomenon in more depth, refers to it not as a form of value-blindness but, more accurately, as a form of 
value-deception (1973, 37). 
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grasp certain things as non-instrumental goods answering to the deepest strata of our 
being is a precondition for our coming to see the very same goods as endowed with a 
significance and value all their own. 
 Another way of making the same point is to say that in the OGPP we respond to 
goods as good-for-me or good-for-us, but we respond to our personhood as something 
important-in-itself, i.e., as endowed with value. So, we have in the OGPP both essential 
indexicality, on the one hand, and a grasp of the important-in-itself, on the other. Tracing 
the transition among categories schematically, we begin with a pure indexicality (goods 
are referred to ourselves, but not to our personhood as such), move to a mixed 
indexicality (things are good for us, in the sense of serving that which is important-in-
itself), and finally end by grasping these selfsame goods as also important-in-themselves, 
and not merely insofar as they resonate deeply with our personhood.521  
 What, then, is the VP and how does living from it constitute the realization of our 
personhood? In addition to its eminently interpersonal character (something discussed 
                                                        
521 We can see these schematic transitions by means of examples in which we are approaching one and the 
same good through all three stages. Imagine someone with artistic abilities. At first, this person might 
doodle in an idle manner, because it merely pleases him, serves as a useful distraction, or attracts flattery 
and the attention of others. Later on, his artistic talent is seen as objectively good, for the development of 
these talents contributes to the realization of his personhood, something important-in-itself. Still later, he 
comes to see his artistic works and talents—indeed, art in general—as endowed with their own importance, 
apart from serving the realization of the value of his personhood. In keeping with the theme of this 
dissertation, we might also offer a parallel example involving the case of truth. Within the SSP, truth (so far 
as we can speak of its being grasped within the SSP) is approached as one more potential source of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction. We are pleased to hear of a foe’s downfall, displeased to learn that we are not 
found attractive by someone we are attempting to seduce. Truth is reduced to fact, and we take satisfaction 
in the acquiring, consuming, and trading facts, or else uses them as means to satisfy ourselves in other 
ways. Within the OGPP, however, truth is grasped as the objective good that it is. We grasp its intimate 
relationships with all manner of other OGPs and also grasp its place in the structure of transcendence and 
ingathering mentioned above. Finally, we come to grasp the importance-in-itself of truth, the value of the 
intrinsic intelligibility of being and the actual and potential relationships between being and intellect.  
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above, and which will be discussed again below), the VP also has the following 
characteristics, which contrast it sharply with the SSP. In the VP, things are given as 
endowed with values, as important-in-themselves. As such, the encounter with values is 
experienced in a radically different way from the encounter with something merely 
subjectively-satisfying. Instead of slaking our lusts, values inspire in us a feeling of 
bliss.522 They “elevate us” and liberate us from our own self-centeredness (von 
Hildebrand [1953] 1972, 36). In the experience of values, we are transported to an order 
that transcends ourselves, where the value of things is not restricted to how they satisfy 
and appease us (ibid.). Unlike the merely subjectively-satisfying, values address a call or 
challenge to us, wherein we grasp that we owe an adequate response to the value in 
question. This call or challenge does not undermine our personhood, as we saw was the 
case with the subjectively-satisfying, but appeals to us in a sovereign or kingly way 
(ibid., 38-39).523 Values appeal to a deeper level of our being and, correlatively, living 
from the “deeps” of our personhood disposes us to grasping the world of values.  
 Furthermore, whereas the response to the subjectively-satisfying is fundamentally 
that of appropriation, consumption, and use, i.e., taking for oneself, the response to 
values is characterized by a non-consumptive self-donation and enjoyment or delight in 
the value (ibid., 216-217, 220). In this, we can detect connections with both Scheler and 
Wojtyla. Scheler ingeniously observes that some goods are divisible and, as such, can be 
                                                        
522 Von Hildebrand uses bliss in a wider sense than Scheler, for whom this emotion is essentially the feeling 
of one’s own self-value. Its negative correlate is despair (Scheler 1973, 344). 
523 Metaphorically, we might add that values address themselves to us as one sovereign to another, whereas 
the subjectively-satisfying addresses us as a master to his slave. 
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appropriated only by a limited number of persons, and only to a greater-or-lesser extent, 
whereas other goods are inexhaustibly communicable to all persons (1973, 93).524 An 
example of the former might be something like fine food and drink, which is in finite 
supply, while an example of the former might be something like a work of art, a piece of 
music, or a liturgical celebration. The former are those that we appropriate for ourselves, 
whereas the latter are those that, by participating in them, the person transcends herself 
(von Hildebrand [1953] 1972, 218). This is demonstrated, above all, in the case of other 
persons, to whom the proper response is not one of use, but of love (Wojtyla 1981, 23). In 
the realization that our personhood is not primarily to be taken as a mere instrument at 
our disposal, but something to be loved, we also come to realize that this is also the due 
response to other persons.525 In this way, the OGPP helps to mediate the insight that 
personhood is oriented to self-donation. 
 Recall, also according to Wojtyla, that the ability for self-donation flows naturally 
from the very structure of the person as self-possessing and hence both self-governing 
and self-determining ([1981] 1993c, 194). In all of this, the very highest capacities of the 
human person are actualized (cf. von Hildebrand [1953] 1972, 217). This again points to 
how the OGPP readies the way for the VP. In taking ourselves “in hand,” we make it 
                                                        
524 Marcel also makes this distinction. See, e.g., ([1950a] 2001, 114) where Marcel talks about lower sense 
of participation using the image of a cake, which can be sliced into individual “shares.” 
525 In keeping with my remarks about the family (see fn 516, above), we should not lose sight of the fact 
that the love of others directed to us is just as much part of the process by which we learn that the proper 
response to our own person is love. Although it would take us too far afield to consider the matter here, a 
related personalist theme (in Scheler, von Hildebrand, and Macmurray, to name a few) is to reject theories 
of love that are grounded in self-love, noting to the contrary that self-love (and the very notion of a self) is 
itself distilled from an original experience of being-loved that does not ontologically distinguish “I” and 
“thou,” as in the case of the earliest relationship between mother and child. Only later, does one grasp one’s 
“self” as an object of love. For discussion of this theme in Scheler, see Frings (1997, chapter 2, section 2). 
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possible to transcend ourselves in loving relations with others, and in responding to 
values more generally. Without the self-presence (to use Crosby’s term) that is the fruit 
of entering the OGPP, we can neither govern, nor determine ourselves, and without the 
actualization of these capacities, we cannot go on to give ourselves to others and, in so 
doing, transcend ourselves.526 We find, then, that, in the course of moving from the OGPP 
to the VP, we more fully enter into a mode of living as persons through self-donation, 
self-transcendence, and interpersonal relationships which, as we saw in earlier 
discussions of Marcel, Mounier, and Wojtyla, are essential to the human person. In 
making the transition to the VP, we enter fully into participation in the world of values, 
the “natural home” of the human person qua person (Stein)—that world in which our 
personhood as such is realizable.527  
 In conclusion, lest we come to think (naïvely) that the story of the human person 
is the story of uninterrupted progress to his true home in the world of values, we would 
do well to ponder the following words of Marcel: 
 [T]he love of truth may be a sort of mysterious joy in moving against this intelligible 
 background, within this intelligible setting. Though the joy certainly is a precarious and 
 threatened one. For it is the case that we have access to this region only under rather 
 difficult conditions…this intelligible region is not our natal soil. ([1950] 2001a, 76).  
 
                                                        
526 Cf. Scheler (1954, 44). 
527 It should also be noted that, in this natural home of the point of view of values, we do not leave concern 
for our own subjectivity and happiness behind. The operative von Hildebrandian notion here is that of a 
“super value-response.” This notion, which he introduces in his philosophy of love (see 2009, ch. 7), 
captures how, in responding to values (in his discussion, specifically the values of one’s beloved), one does 
not set aside one’s own subjectivity and prospects for happiness (one’s own objective good). Rather, in the 
very attitude of lovingly responding to values, we implicate our own prospects for happiness, hoping for a 
return of love (or, more generally, for some return to our objective good as a result of responding to 
values). For discussion of this later development of von Hildebrand’s thought, see Crosby (2017, 695-699). 
Although I cannot argue for it here, it seems that the notion of a super-value-response and the idea of a 
“deeper self-love” (mentioned in passing in The Nature of Love, but never developed in his subsequent 
corpus), is key to uniting the OGPP and VP as over-against the SSP. 
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The love of truth is the joy that we take in being in contact with the transcendental truth 
of being, in moving against the intelligible background. Generalizing, we might say that 
there is an analogous love and joy in living in the world of values. Our access to this 
world, though, is difficult—it is not our “natal soil.” We are not born to it but are rather 
born into a broken world (le monde cassé) in which conditions are not at all conducive to 
our entering the world of values and which even undermine and tempt those who do. As 
von Hildebrand keenly observes, there are many in whom pride, concupiscence, and the 
awareness of values coexist, if only impurely so.  
 Interpreted in terms of truth, as this passage of Marcel suggests, the joy that we 
feel in moving in the world of values, and the precariousness of that joy, is due precisely 
to the fact that the world of values only shows up against the intelligible background, i.e., 
against the transcendental truth of values in their being. There is always the temptation to 
turn away from the truth, or, stronger still, to fashion “one’s own truth.” The former is 
concupiscence; the latter is pride. The former is a dispersion of oneself that is 
submissively passive; the latter an exaltation of oneself that is maniacally active. The 
former hides from the truth in all manner of distractions and lusts. The latter seeks to lord 
over and dominate the truth.  
 It is only “in the truth,” in moving against Marcel’s intelligible background, then, 
that the world of values, against which we realize our personhood, is fully disclosed. 
Truth, as such, is the “narrow gate” we must enter. We enter through this gate, in the first 
instance, with respect to our own personhood. Marcel says that the person is the active 
negation of the impersonal, the “One.” It is in confronting our situation, of which we are 
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a part, that we negate the impersonal (non-personal) manner in which we are living. The 
confrontation in question is a confrontation with the truth of our situation. It is thus 
through a confrontation with the truth that we are raised to a personal manner of life and 
its possibilities. Truth, and our relationship to truth, is the indispensable condition on our 
coming to live from the point of view of values, for it is the indispensable condition on 
our coming to confront our own personhood.528 
2.1.2.1 Specific Dependencies of Personhood on Value-Grasping Acts 
 It remains in this section to discuss three specific ways in which value-grasping 
acts relate to the realization of one’s personhood, which serves well as a transition to the 
coming discussion of value-realizing acts. These are (1) the relationship between value-
grasping acts and personhood-constituting value-consecrations,529 (2) the relationship 
between value-grasping acts and the field of possible agential activity, and (3) the 
relationship between value-grasping acts and the intrinsic relationality of the person. 
(a) Value-Grasping Acts and Value-Consecration 
 The first way in which value-grasping acts are particularly related to the 
realization of personhood is through being an enabling condition on value-consecrating 
acts. By value-consecrating act, I mean an act whereby one dedicates, commits, devotes, 
or otherwise gives oneself to some value or values. This consecration is a special source 
of inspiration for the value-realizing acts that I will discuss in the next section. In 
                                                        
528 The reader should be advised that although some of the language of this section is evocative of 
Heidegger’s Being and Time (e.g., the One, fallenness, conscience, and situation), the primary inspiration 
here is Marcel. Although Marcel bears some similarities to Heidegger, his interpretations of these 
phenomena are not straightforwardly Heideggerian.  
529 The term “value-consecration” is inspired by Marcel’s use of consecration in this context. We might also 
talk of “value-commitments.”  
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consecrating ourselves to a value, we put ourselves at the disposal of that value, i.e., we 
dispose ourselves to act in ways that realize the value in question.530 
 The notion of a value-consecration is one that I take from the work of Gabriel 
Marcel (cf. [1952] 2010, 119; [1950] 2001a, 162ff).531 Marcel invokes the notion of 
consecrating oneself in an attempt to answer the question, “who am I…I who interrogate 
myself about my own being” (ibid., 148). This very question—who am I—is one that can 
only be asked by a person (ibid., 152). We might reasonably take it to be one of the 
hallmarks of personal being, that it makes its being and identity an issue for itself, and 
subjects itself to this kind of questioning.532 In keeping with the results of the previous 
section, we must bear in mind that this act of interrogation is itself something that only 
begins in the “moment of truth” that partially constitutes the OGPP. Someone still living 
from the SSP does not yet engage in this sort of interrogation, for they have yet to acquire 
a sufficiently deep appreciation of their personhood. Conversely, one might say that it is 
in the very act of self-interrogation that one makes the transition from the SSP to the 
OGPP. The act of self-interrogation therefore curiously straddles the categories of value-
grasping and value-realizing acts. For it is, on the one hand, part of the series of acts by 
which we come to grasp our own personhood and its value, and, on the other hand, itself 
part of the realization of the value of one’s personhood. This is because we cannot realize 
                                                        
530 There is thus a connection to be drawn here with Marcel’s notion of disponibilité. 
531 In turn, Marcel seems to have been inspired in this claim by his reading of the American philosopher 
Josiah Royce. See, e.g., Royce (1908, 352). 
532 In this way, Marcel’s characterization of the person is (at least superficially) similar to Heidegger’s 
characterization of Dasein as “ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an 
issue for it” ([1962] 2008, ¶4). 
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the value of our personhood without some such moment of calling it into question, or 
“making it an issue” for ourselves.533  
 The act of self-interrogation is therefore partially definitive of entering upon the 
“bridge” of the OGPP. Its culmination, therefore, is to be found in the VP. It begins in the 
OGPP, with an active confrontation of ourselves and our current situation. But it can only 
be answered definitively from the VP. Value-consecrating acts, as part of the definitive 
response that we make to our own self-interrogation, are consummated in the VP. For it 
is from this point of view that we are able to consecrate ourselves to values in such a way 
that furnishes us with the sense of our “life” or “identity” as persons.   
 Two further points need to be made. The first is that the consecration to values is 
(at the very least) a manifestation of what Marcel calls (throughout his corpus) “creative 
fidelity,” i.e., an act of faithfulness that is creative of ourselves. As such, for Marcel, the 
“objects” of our consecrations are primarily other persons, or supra-personal realities (cf. 
1964, 135). We consecrate ourselves to other persons qua persons, which is an act that 
can only be carried out against the background of grasping the other as important-in-
herself, and indeed as embodying a whole host of other particular values.534 Value-
consecrating acts, as the answers to our act of self-interrogation, therefore often take the 
form (perhaps always take the form, ultimately) of a dedication to specific other persons 
as value-endowed beings and as precious in our eyes.  
                                                        
533 Here again, I would have my reader bear in mind that these acts do not require possession and 
deployment of a robust philosophical theory of these acts and, moreover, we can detect the nature of these 
acts as implicit in certain everyday ordinary—but significant—moments of people’s lives. 
534 This should hopefully put the reader in mind of the discussion of love in chapter IV, where, following 
von Hildebrand, I endorsed the claim that love is a value-response (though not only a value-response). 
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 Second, we should attend to the temporality of personal identity in Marcel’s 
account. Prior to introducing the notion of consecration, Marcel discusses (and rejects) a 
number of other accounts of what makes us the persons that we are ([1950] 2001a, 148-
161). All of them share in common the following feature: they are oriented upon the past. 
In other words, our commonplace, “go-to,” understandings of identity are too often 
backward-looking. Consider, e.g., theories of personal identity on which mere continuity 
of some sort (bodily, psychological) is what constitutes identity.535 As should be clear 
from the discussion of Marcel in chapter IV, mere continuity or constancy is fraught with 
the potential to “go rancid.” One’s identity as a distinct person risks being lost in mere 
continuity. What is required, and what occurs, in the act of self-interrogation, is that we 
rise ourselves above mere continuity and, in a moment that we might poetically describe 
as suspended time, survey our situation including where we have come from, and reach 
forward into the future. This act of reaching forward is given concrete expression in 
asking ourselves for what, or for whom, would I die? For what or for whom would I lay 
down my life? These are the questions that crown the act of self-interrogation, in which 
(according to Marcel) we are able to give a definitive answer to the question, “who am 
I?” We may find, in our self-interrogation, that the answers to these latter questions are to 
be found in our current situation, e.g., in our embeddedness in a tradition for which we 
                                                        
535 To be clear, I primarily have in mind here Schetchman’s (1996) characterization question of personal 
identity, i.e., what makes me who I am, as opposed to the reidentification question (what makes me the 
same person across time). However, insofar as many analytic theories of personal identity do not attend to 
Schetchman’s distinction, it remains the case that our go-to understandings of personal identity in the 
analytic tradition remains understandings grounded solely in some form of continuity (what makes me the 
same person). What these considerations drawn from Marcel are supposed to show is that identity is 
constituted not only out of continuity with a past and a tradition, but also out of the possibility for 
conversion and consecration.  
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would give our lives as a martyr dies for the Church. Although the content of the answer 
won’t be new, its being an answer will be new. We will come to realize, perhaps for the 
first time, just who we are.536  
 In addition to being unable to account for the role of consecration in determining 
who we are, mere continuity or constancy is also unable to make sense of the role of 
conversions, in all their various forms.537 Both consecration and conversion imply the 
possibility (though not the necessity) of a radical break with one’s “past life.” Baptism is 
a “rebirth,” or being “born again.” In receiving absolution, the penitent’s sins are “blotted 
out.” In a way that is not sufficiently appreciated, the person exiting the confessional is 
not the “same person” as the one who goes in. Members of consecrated religious orders 
take new names upon professing vows, as do candidates for the Sacrament of 
Confirmation, popes, and newlywed women. Who we are as persons is shaped in a 
powerful way by these acts of conversion.  
 Conversion leads us back to consecration, for in making a conversion, we 
consecrate ourselves, at the very least, to the values at issue in the conversion. A moral 
conversion is a consecration to the domain of moral values. The conversion of the 
confessional is a consecration to God and holiness. The dynamism of conversion and 
                                                        
536 There are other potential questions that might be of service in acts of self-interrogation. My thanks to 
Professor Hopp for the following suggestions: (1) to what do I dedicate most of my voluntary time and 
attention, (2) before what losses do I fear and tremble the most, (3) what would I wish for given a fixed 
number of wishes. I am also indebted to Professor Hopp for calling to mind the fact that answers to these 
existential questions can precede any occurrent consideration of them—or, at least, that upon occurent 
consideration of these questions, we might find that certain answers have been “brewing” (my word) in us 
for some time. In Hopp’s example, this is illustrated by the memory of a past action as monstrous, revealing 
the sort of person I used to be, even though at the time the action barely had an impact on my life.  
537 For discussion of the related phenomenon of repentance, see Scheler (1987b). Scheler calls repentance a 
“vehicle of truth against oneself” (1987b, 99). 
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consecration is a source of evidence for the necessity of the OGPP for entering the VP. It 
is in confronting oneself and the truth of one’s situation that one begins the process of 
conversion. Opening this process thrusts us forward into asking the questions: who am I, 
for whom would I lay down my life? These questions draw our attention to the future and 
to the possibility for sources of intrinsic significance, for which it would make sense to 
sacrifice oneself. As I have noted, it is nonsensical to speak of sacrificing oneself (dying) 
for the subjectively-satisfying or one’s objective good. In confronting myself and asking 
these questions, then, I am led to consider the existence of the very category of the 
important-in-itself, of ultimate values or value-endowed beings for whom it would make 
sense to sacrifice myself in such a way that the sacrifice (actual or possible) would 
furnish a sufficiently ultimate or fundamental answer to who I am.538 
 This is not, again, to deny that our pasts influence us in many ways, both subtle 
and gross, conscious and unconscious. It is, however, to point out (what should be 
obvious) that the person, as conscious of his existence playing itself out temporally, is 
both a backward-looking and forward-looking being. Accordingly, the realization of 
personhood is as much shaped by events in one’s past as it is by one’s attitudes and acts 
that are directed to one’s future. In fact, the realization of our personhood, playing itself 
out against a temporal background, requires the existence of acts that are both rooted in 
                                                        
538 Mounier, writing in a similar vein, says, “we have no authentic existence until we have an interior 
stronghold of values or of devotion, against which we do not believe that the fear of death could prevail” 
(1952, 71). It is worth pointing out, however, that the focus on sacrifice and conversion here is not merely a 
(potentially question-begging) way of obtaining the result that values are necessary for the realization of 
personhood. For Marcel (and Royce), the emphasis upon sacrifice and commitment is established apart 
from any consideration of values per se. Royce, e.g., argues for the necessity of what he calls “loyalty” 
prior to taking up the question of worthy causes for loyalty (i.e., values).  
 490 
 
our histories (backward-looking), but also anchored in the future (forward-looking). 
These forward-looking acts, by which we somehow stake out commitments to a 
distinctive future for ourselves are precisely value-consecrating acts of the sort just 
described.  
(b) Value-Grasping Acts and the Field of Possible Agential Activity  
 The second special connection between the realization of personhood and value-
grasping acts is another way in which value-grasping acts enable value-realizing acts. 
Simply put, in grasping values we alter the terrain or landscape of what it is possible for 
us to do. We alter the field of our possible operation as agents.  
 One way in which we do this has to do with the sorts of objects that we are able to 
take as goods. Scheler writes, “any formation of a world of goods…is guided by an order 
of ranks of values…this order of ranks of values…delineates the field of the possible, 
beyond which a formation of goods cannot proceed” (1973, 22). Our ability to respond to 
goods, to “take note” of them, and even to introduce goods into the world is dependent 
upon the values that we have grasped. Our value-grasping acts determine our possibilities 
as recognizers and creators of goods.  
 However, it would not be right to interpret this as the claim that we need to have 
already grasped values in order to recognize goods. For goods just are, according to 
Scheler, things of value (even if values are not equivalent with goods) (ibid., 9). Values, 
however: 
 have their own distinct relations and correlations, and, as value qualities, can be, for 
 example, higher or lower. This being the case, there can be among these value-qualities 
 an order and an order of ranks, both of which are independent of the presence of a realm 
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 of goods in which they appear, entirely independent of the movement and changes of 
 these goods in history, and ‘a priori’ to the experience of this realm of goods. (ibid., 15) 
 
The structure of values, both in their individual value-essences (e.g., the essences of 
sanctity, beauty, and humility) and their interrelations among each other (e.g., the 
hierarchy of values in Scheler and von Hildebrand, and the structuring of values around 
certain unifying “themes” in von Hildebrand ([1953] 1972, 129-130)), delineate the 
structure of a possible world of goods. Although Scheler does not (here, at least) make 
the leap, I would include our actions within the structure of possible goods, insofar as our 
actions can themselves be “things of value,” or value-endowed.  
 Our value-grasping acts might, therefore, be said to import into our intellects 
some portion of the total structure of the world of values.539 This in turn structures our 
agential field. One such type of structure is described in the last paragraph. Our agential 
field is structured in terms of higher and lower.540 For example, our value-grasping acts 
enable us to adjudicate conflicts between the pursuit of two goods, both of which cannot 
be simultaneously attained. Additionally, if we are seeking to exemplify or embody 
certain values in ourselves (e.g., by cultivating a virtue), or to realize some value in our 
communities (e.g., bringing about a more just society), then our value-grasping acts 
themselves will also structure how we settle conflicts among the values that we seek to 
realize. For example, my history of value-grasping acts might be such that my agential 
field is delineated in such a way that I come to pursue the cultivation of musical-aesthetic 
                                                        
539 It is worth reminding ourselves here that, as Scheler observes, the acts by which we perceive values 
involve acts of “preferring” and “placing after,” i.e., in grasping values we are always also situating them 
within the hierarchy of values (1973, 88-89). In an insight related to the present discussion, he also goes on 
to say that these acts themselves help to circumscribe the values that we can go on to grasp (ibid.). 
540 This is essentially the (subjective) ordo amoris of Scheler’s ethics. 
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values to the exclusion of all else. Perhaps I have yet to come into contact with, and 
grasp, values which are of a higher order than the musical-aesthetical.  
 Our agential fields are also structured by the phenomenon of what von Hildebrand 
calls “value polarity.” Among certain values there exists an exclusiveness. Value-polarity 
is a form of value-exclusiveness in which the exclusivity in question “is not the result of 
an antithetical character in their [the values] very qualities, but rather of the mere 
incapacity of one and the same being to be endowed simultaneously with those different 
values” ([1953] 1972, 141). Von Hildebrand gives, as an example, the inability of one 
and the same person to be endowed with both an “overwhelmingly powerful vitality” and 
an “ethereal delicacy” (ibid.). Scheler also discusses this phenomenon, under the heading 
of what he calls “the essential tragic of all finite moral being.” Finite moral beings are 
essentially imperfect insofar as they (we) cannot come to represent simultaneously the 
different exemplars of various series of values. For example, we cannot simultaneously 
be (to use Scheler’s categories) a saint, a hero, and a genius (1973, 590).541  
 It would seem that a further corollary of value-polarity, or the essential tragic of 
finite moral being, is that in coming to grasp certain (series of) values, we not only 
expand our agential fields, but also limit them. For once, partially on the basis of our 
value-grasping acts, we come to embody the values in question, we close off the 
possibility of coming to embody polar values, or to emulate exemplars of values that are 
                                                        
541 Related phenomena include the various value-antimonies drawn by Hartmann ([1932] 2003, § 2). Cf. 
Kelly (2011, 175ff) for discussion. 
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polar with those we currently embody.542 Polarity and our own moral finitude thus 
structure the field of our agential activity by ruling certain possibilities out or, at least, by 
making certain possibilities not readily actualizable without substantial modification to 
our agential field. 
 The modification of our agential fields by value-grasping acts also occurs insofar 
as the values that we have grasped interact with the ends that we can set for ourselves (cf. 
Scheler 1973, 42). This interaction can occur in at least two ways. The first is that 
realizing values can itself come to be an end that we adopt, and we can only set such ends 
if we have grasped the value in question. For example, we cannot set ourselves the end of 
realizing justice in the world if we have never grasped the value of justice, or the end of 
realizing humility in ourselves if we have never grasped the value of humility.543 The 
second is that we can evaluate our ends in light of the values that we have come to grasp. 
For example, Jones used to have the end of experimenting with every possible source of 
sensory pleasure, e.g., by engaging in all manner of drug-taking. Now, in light of Jones’s 
grasp of certain values, he rejects that end, or at least sees it in a different light. 
 Value-grasping acts provide structure to our agential fields by delimiting the 
possible shapes that field can take. This occurs primarily through introducing a 
hierarchical structure to our agential fields that corresponds to our grasping certain values 
                                                        
542 I do not wish to rule out the possibility, implicit in the above discussion of conversion, of changing in 
such a way that one comes to embody different values than those one currently embodies. However, this in 
no way touches the phenomena of value-polarity and the essential tragic of finite moral being. For in such 
cases we would have to leave something behind. For example, the Frankish warrior who embodied a 
powerful vital and martial spirit, and the associated values, would have to leave (at least some of) that 
behind to truly come to embody the values communicated to him by a Christian missionary. 
543 Hearkening back to the earlier points about the satanically proud man, this also seems to apply to his 
ability to set for his ends the destruction of said values. 
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as higher-than or lower-than others. It also occurs through the polarity that exists among 
values which, in conjunction with our status as finite moral beings, means that our value-
grasping acts (and the subsequent values that we come to embody) rule-in, or rule-out, 
our coming to realize certain other values. Finally, it occurs through playing a role in the 
setting of ends, and the evaluation (and possible rejection) of preexisting ends. 
(c) The Interpersonal Nature of Value-Grasping Acts 
 For the last specific way in which value-grasping acts are related to the realization 
of personhood, we need to switch gears. The past two ways were united by the fact that 
they both play the role of enabling conditions in the realization of values and, a fortiori, 
our personhood, as well as being more concerned with the interiority of the human 
person. This last way returns to the nature of value-grasping acts as such, and discerns in 
the nature of these acts an interpersonal dimension by which the intrinsic relationality of 
the human person is realized. For this insight, we must return to Stein’s account of 
affective acts. 
 As Stein observes, though there are different “private experiential colorings” in 
value-grasping acts, there is also an “identical core” or “core sense” that enables one and 
the same value-content to be given to multiple persons (indeed, to any person who grasps 
it) ([1922] 2000, 164-165). In this way, value-grasping acts (affective acts for Stein) are 
akin to the aforementioned categorial acts, by which we grasp the core meaning of a 
word.  
 The idea of a core applies, however, not only to the value as such, but also to the 
“value-intention” (Stein) or the “being-affected” (von Hildebrand) on the basis of which a 
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value is given to us. We are affected in the same core way by the same values. This is 
what enables us together to grasp one and the same value (ibid.).  
 However, recall that a value-grasping act requires not only a value-intention or 
being-affected, i.e., a feeling whose intentional object is the value in question, but also a 
response-reaction (the affective or volitional response, in von Hildebrand) that we “owe” 
to the value in question. It is here that the interpersonal nature of value-grasping acts is 
made even clearer. Stein writes:  
 Suppose I’m standing in front of a work of art in admiration. Then on one hand, this 
 admiration lays a claim that the artwork be given its due; and this claim is either empty or 
 more or less experientially filled, depending upon the depth, liveliness, and so forth, with 
 which the admiration is felt. On the other hand, in this admiration I feel myself as a 
 member of the community of art experts or art lovers; and insofar as I do that, my  
 experience calls for the experience of the community to be engaged and reproduced in 
 itself. (ibid., 165) 
 
Value-grasping acts, therefore, are consummated not only in an individual response-
reaction to the felt value at issue (note that in this case admiration is both the value-
intention and the response-reaction) but also in an interpersonal response-reaction. When 
we are affected by something endowed with a value we feel ourselves bound together in 
the community of persons who are likewise affected by this value, the community of 
those who have been “touched” in a certain way. We experience this communal bond as 
itself norm-giving for us. That is, as a member of this community it is right, and we 
ought, to grasp and respond to the value in question. Furthermore, because what I grasp is 
a common value, and on the basis of the same types of feelings and affective responses, 
this enables me to form bonds with other persons, and to situate myself within a network 
of persons bound together by a common type of value-grasping act. Since value-grasping 
 496 
 
acts, qua affective acts, “fill the subject inwardly” they have a “great significance for the 
constitution of the community” (ibid.). We are united by a single intentional object (the 
value in question), a single core feeling-type that we experience as our receptivity to that 
value, and a single type of affective-response that is felt as normatively required of us, 
and which we “return” to the value (value-endowed object) in question as its due. The 
experience of value-grasping acts is therefore suited by its very nature to binding persons 
together into communities centered on common values and a common experience of the 
normativity of those values. 
 The interpersonal character of value-grasping acts is also to be met in the related 
phenomenon of exemplars, already mentioned above in passing.544 In fact, Stein’s 
observations dovetail nicely with this phenomenon. It is often the case that the 
communities of which she speaks have exemplars as their common “intentional object.” 
The classic cases here are religious communities, whose “founders” are exemplars for the 
followers, e.g., Christ, or Buddha. Sometimes, the community even has multiple 
exemplars, e.g., the saints of the Catholic Church.  
 Regardless of the type of community, the relationship between the exemplar and 
other persons is, in part, a value-grasping relationship. Scheler even goes so far as to say 
                                                        
544 Although I simplify matters by speaking simply of exemplars, Scheler distinguishes among value-
persons, exemplars, and model persons. Value-persons do not actually exist, merely being the ideal 
correlates of the ranks of values. For example, the value-person of the saint corresponds to the value-rank 
of the holy/sacred. Exemplars, as ideals, have more meat on their bones, being shaped by concrete 
historical and cultural conditions. For example, the value-person of the hero is given a particular coloration 
by the ancient Greeks of Homer’s time. Finally, there are model persons. Model persons actual exist and 
approximate the exemplars. In my usage, “exemplar” comes nearest to what Scheler means by a model 
person. For a breakdown of this distinction, see Kelly (2011, 211ff). For a contemporary account of ethics 
as resting on exemplars, see Zagzebski (2017). For more detail on Scheler’s different value-persons, see 
Scheler (1987a). 
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that posited norms545 are valuable or disvaluable in accordance with the exemplariness of 
the person who posits the norm, where this exemplariness is in turn dependent upon the 
value-essence of the person in question. He also suggests that exemplars are historically 
prior to norms in any historical system of norms.546 That is, the grasping of norms is 
something that is mediated through a relationship to some exemplar. Indeed, Scheler 
suggests that nothing is capable of moving a person to becoming morally good quite like 
“the evidential and adequate intuition of a good person in his goodness” (1973, 574).547 
However, because the relationship to the exemplar is such that we grasp his value-
essence, we are not here in the presence of mere emulation or habituation (see below). 
Rather, the relationship is such that, far from blindly imitating the exemplar’s behavior, 
our wills remain autonomous insofar as they grasp the values embodied by the exemplar 
and his activity (ibid., 575). 
 We can press even further and inquire into the nature of the relationship between 
the exemplar and others. According to Scheler, it is only in love that we ascend to a full 
understanding of the value-essence of another person (ibid., 491). We can put this 
together with von Hildebrand’s claim that love is, in part, a value-response in its own 
right. What emerges from the conjunction of these claims is that love plays a twofold role 
in the relationship with exemplars (and other beloved persons). Love is first a response to 
                                                        
545 Since Scheler speaks of persons positing the norms in question, I have here referred to such norms as 
“posited norms” to avoid any confusion. Norms that follow straightaway from values themselves depend 
upon the value directly.  
546 Hartmann takes a similar line in his discussion of exemplars ([1932] 2002, 197-198). 
547 Lest the reader think that the basic structure of this intuition is radically different from the basic nature 
of value-grasping acts, Scheler reminds us that there still exists the possibility of value-blindness and value-
deception when it comes to grasping the exemplariness of model-person (ibid., 578-579). 
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some value of the exemplar disclosed by another value-grasping act (i.e., on the basis of a 
different being-affected and affective-response, such as admiration, esteem, or 
veneration).548 Then, with this first “stage” in place, love becomes itself the basis for 
further disclosure of the “value-essence” of the exemplar (or other beloved person).549 
Often enough, the relationship that becomes love is engendered (at least in part) by other 
value-responses to a person, and then, on the basis of the ensuing love discovers the full 
value-essence of the beloved.550 
 Since this ground has already been trodden, however, we might consider how this 
applies specifically to the case of an exemplar. Consider the moment in the Farewell 
Discourses when Christ says, “I will not now call you servants: for the servant knoweth 
not what his lord doth. But I have called you friends: because all things whatsoever I 
have heard of my Father, I have made known to you” (John 15:15). We can use this verse 
to capture a general transition that is made with respect to exemplars, from the esteem, 
admiration, and/or veneration paid to the master, to the moment of being drawn into the 
master’s heart, and the love that grows between the exemplar and the disciple. Calling the 
disciple by the name of “friend” signifies in words what was cemented in the loving 
attitude which grew up on the basis of, and provided the soil for, complete disclosure of 
the “truth” of the exemplar (in this case, his value-essence) to the beloved disciple. 
                                                        
548 I say “first” here, but it is not obvious to me that both “stages” of love could not just happen “in a flash.” 
This depends upon whether one wishes to countenance “love at first sight” and the extent to which such 
love (if it is not merely analogous) is truly disclosive of the beloved person’s value-essence. 
549 This should remind the reader of the discussion of Kierkegaard in chapter IV. Love is disclosive in this 
manner not least through the ways in which it “loves forth” the values of the beloved and “upbuilds” the 
beloved. We will pick up this theme below. 
550 For discussion, see chapter IV. 
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Indeed, as Scheler says, the experienced relation between oneself and the exemplar just is 
fidelity (1973, 574). What the foregoing does is to underscore, with Marcel, that true 
fidelity is essentially a creative fidelity.551  
 A discussion of exemplars is especially apropos in an investigation of the 
normativity of truth, where truth is given a Thomistic treatment (see introduction). As 
Ramos notes, in her study of Aquinas on measure, just as there are two measures in the 
order of being (form and exemplar), so in the order of activity there are two measures 
(reason and law) (2012a, 42). As we saw in the introduction, measure is, in Aquinas, 
bound up with the notion of truth. Truth is the measure of things (ontologically, in 
themselves, and logically, in our intellects). In measuring up to being, then, our intellects 
are measuring up not only to the forms of things (which is often what we focus on, given 
Aquinas’s discussion of the forms of things coming to exist in our intellects), but also 
with the exemplars of things.552 The measure of exemplarity is no less important, for it 
furnishes us with the notion of law as one of the measures of human activity. This is 
especially the case when it comes to the exemplarity of the human person, which Pope St. 
John Paul II often referred to evocatively as, “the truth about man.” 
 Indeed, Wojtyla, in a comparative study of Scheler and Aquinas, asserts that, for 
Aquinas, exemplarity is what underpins the entire normative (norm-giving) order ([1959] 
1993b, 77). In a passage which nicely ties these moments together, Wojtyla writes: 
                                                        
551 Scheler is attuned to the moral dimension of this creativity, when he discusses the way in which we 
become like the exemplar, without merely imitating him. We determine our goals in accordance with those 
of the exemplar, we come to love and hate as he does, and we come to alter our basic moral tenor through 
our relationship with him (1973, 578, 580-581). 
552 For discussion on the relationship between truth and exemplar in Aquinas’s theory of the 
transcendentals, see Aertsen (1996, 255, 274). 
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 Because the will is a rational appetite, reason, which is so naturally connected with the 
 will, must also seek the truth in whatever the will aims at, in every action of the will. 
 Action, in turn, is an act of existence. Thus our whole existence is continually being 
 actualized in conjunction with truth. And this is inevitable and necessary because it flows 
 from our nature as human beings. The function of truth in human action and existence 
 constitutes the very essence of the moral norm, which St. Thomas conceives existentially 
 and not merely formally, just as he also conceives the good existentially. (ibid., 81) 
 
Note how a close analysis of the nature of the human person is what uncovers the special 
role of truth in the normative order. Wojtyla, following Aquinas, places truth at the 
foundation of normativity. It is in that “moment of truth about the good,” in the lived 
experience of this moment, that we come to grasp norms (ibid., 91). These moments of 
truth are not merely exercises in reason conceived formally, but are also the result of our 
human activity—the result, that is, not only of our capacity for interior speculative 
activity, but interpersonal practical activity. As human persons, we are concerned not 
merely with the “form” of the good, but also with the “matter” of the good (for Aquinas, 
beatitude), and the exemplars of the good (for Aquinas, God Himself).  
 Recall from the mention of Anselm in the introduction, that truth in action is 
rectitude. That “our whole existence is continually being actualized in conjunction with 
truth” means, in part, that from the beginning of human activity, there is a seeking after 
rectitude. Such seeking strives to encounter those who model such rectitude for us, to find 
a teacher who establishes the rule of right reason for us.553 It is in this way that Christ’s 
conjunctive response to Thomas (“I am the way and the truth and the life) makes sense. 
Aquinas’s existential notion of truth provides the underpinnings for the phenomenology 
of exemplars here discussed.554 It is the inherent dynamism of the human person, 
                                                        
553 In an ideal situation, one finds this first with one’s parents. 
554 Indeed, it is precisely such a foundation that Wojtyla argues is lacking in Scheler (ibid., 84-86, 91-93). 
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governed by the interpenetration of reason and will, and hence ordered to the true in the 
good, that drives the search for exemplars, as concrete measures of rectitude. We seek 
exemplars to show us how we ought to be—to show us not only a way, or a life, but the 
right (i.e., true) way and true life. To show us—in the domains of both doxa and praxis—
what is orthos doxa and orthos praxis.    
 Whether through the specific case of the relationship with an exemplar, or in 
cases of love more generally, value-grasping acts are interwoven with our intrinsic 
relationality as persons, above all with our ability to enter into relationships of faithful 
love toward others. Such relationships are not only the responses that we make to values, 
and so the consummation of value-grasping acts, but also the basis for the disclosure of 
values, and so the receptivity to still further value-grasping acts. The realization of our 
personhood is thus dependent upon such acts for the special manner in which they 
actualize, but also depend upon, our ability (indeed, our exigence) to love others. If value-
grasping acts are necessary to engender loving relationships with others, it is no less the 
case that our intrinsic orientation to other persons is necessary for such acts even to 
occur.  
 This concludes the discussion of value-grasping acts. Let us now briefly review 
how the realization of personhood is dependent upon such acts. First, in a general way, 
we saw how the VP is that plane whereon personhood is most fully realized. We saw this 
by contrasting von Hildebrand’s three categories of motivation, and carefully attending 
the transitions from one category to another. I have argued that the OGPP bears a special 
relationship to the notion of truth. It is in living from this point of view that we have our 
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“moment of truth,” in which (1) the question of truth interposes itself between us and 
whatever goods we find enticing us by their appearances, and (2) the question of the truth 
about ourselves (“who am I?”—“what is my life?”) interposes itself between my life as it 
currently stands (and its history) and my life as I seek to consecrate it going forward. 
These acts of interrogation open the door to the world of values in which I can fully 
realize my personhood. The act whereby we grasp the value of truth is, like the act 
whereby we grasp the value of our personhood, preeminent for subsequent value-
grasping (and value-realizing) acts. In terms of value-grasping acts, this is played out 
against the recognition of that which is important-in-itself and the challenges that this 
category of importance addresses to me. We also saw how value-grasping acts structure 
of my own agential field, by making certain acts possible, and others (in a sense) 
impossible. Finally, we saw how value-grasping acts are interwoven with our intrinsic 
relationality as persons. Value-grasping acts are themselves interpersonal, as we feel 
ourselves part of a community of persons who have grasped a given value and have a 
shared sense of its normative upshot. Additionally, relationships such as love (e.g., of an 
exemplar) both consummate and inaugurate whole series of value-grasping acts.  
2.1.3 Value-Realizing Acts 
 We must now consider the second way in which the realization of personhood is 
dependent upon values, namely, through value-realizing acts. By value-realizing acts, I 
mean acts that brings into existence states of affairs endowed with one or more values. 
More specifically, the act in question should be constitutive of what von Hildebrand calls 
a “volitional response” to values. Our acting to bring into existence a value-endowed 
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state of affairs must be undertaken consciously for the sake of bringing the state of affairs 
into existence through our agency (cf. von Hildebrand [1953] 1972, 201). In other words, 
there are no accidentally value-realizing acts as such. There might be an act of man 
(actus hominis) that accidentally bring into existence a value-endowed state of affairs. 
For example, perhaps you absentmindedly flip a switch that dispenses pain-relieving 
medication to hospital patients who desperately need it. But this is not, properly speaking, 
a human act (actus humanus) whereby you act in light of an end and on the basis of 
reasons. Although values are not reducible to ends, all value-realizing acts, as a species of 
human acts, take (if not values per se), state of affairs as value-endowed and therefore 
something which ought-to-be as their ends.555  
 There is one important qualification that must be made here. According to both 
Scheler (1973, 27) and von Hildebrand ([1953] 1972, 260-261), one ought not to set their 
own moral value as such as the ends of their value-realizing acts.556 At first glance, it 
might seem odd that the values which can be taken as the ends of value-realizing acts are 
restricted in this way. But, in fact, this restriction is demanded by the very nature of value 
as the important-in-itself and the VP as oriented upon the important-in-itself. For, as von 
                                                        
555 Though a full discussion would require too lengthy a digression, we might note that in addition to 
functioning as ends, or that in light of which we set and evaluate ends, values can also serve as reasons for 
acting. 
556 Both philosophers refer to this sort of behavior as “pharisaical” (ibid.). Von Hildebrand does, however, 
claim that a morally good act (and hence moral goodness in the person) requires, for one of its elements, 
the actualization of a “general will to be good” (ibid., 281). But since he understands the general will to be 
good as itself a value-response—specifically a volitional response to the value of being morally good, this 
is not at odds with his rejection of being-pharisaical. The general will to be good is the will to be good for 
the sake of the value of goodness (ibid., 258), and not merely because “being good is good for me” 
(compare: being good is good for business). Blosser (2005) and Crosby (2017) question Scheler and von 
Hildebrand, respectively, on this claim.  
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Hildebrand notes, what the pharisaical point of view does is to treat all values as means to 
the one supreme value of one’s own moral value (i.e., one’s goodness) (ibid.). But to take 
values in this way betrays that one has not really grasped them as values at all and so, a 
fortiori, is not living from the VP. We must remember that value-realizing acts are 
essentially the consummation of value-grasping acts. As such, value-realizing acts cannot 
“contradict” value-grasping acts, for the former is the natural completion of the latter. If 
we do not count as grasping values so long as we grasp only some X that is a means to 
our moral improvement, then we do not count as acting to realize values if we interpret 
our acts as being mere means for our moral improvement.557 At best, we might say that 
persons who “grasp” values in this way have entered upon the OGPP, but have yet to 
make the leap from only grasping the value of personhood, to grasping other values.558  
 Our own moral value is only ever, as Scheler puts it, on the “backside” of our acts 
(1973, 27).559 It is never something that we bring (or ought to bring) explicitly into view 
                                                        
557 To clarify, as does von Hildebrand, there are certain “neutral” things, axiologically speaking, which it is 
licit to take merely as a means for our moral improvement. Von Hildebrand’s example is that of fasting.  
558 That is, they have confronted their own personhood, and they realize that part of the call of their 
personhood is moral goodness, but they have not yet carried their act of self-interrogation out to its 
conclusion in the question of self-sacrifice. For it does not make sense to “die for one’s moral goodness.” 
True sacrifice must be an act of self-donation, not taken as a mere means to one’s improvement. In truly 
answering Marcel’s question, we move beyond taking the call of moral goodness in a pharisaical way (as 
our supreme end), and see it as the “backside” (Scheler) of our acting to realize values for their own sake. 
559 Although von Hildebrand agrees with Scheler on this score, he also maintains the need for a “general 
will to be good,” which is a volitional value-response to the value of moral goodness as such, whereby we 
grasp that moral goodness is an OGP. He also makes the actualization of this general will to be good out to 
be a necessary condition on a human act’s being morally good, and inveighs against those who set aside the 
morality of an action in favor of more direct considerations. The latter is the person who says, “I do not 
care whether it is morally good or bad to act so. I do not even care whether it is obligatory, the most 
important thing is the other man, that he does not suffer, and so forth” (von Hildebrand [1953] 1972, 269). 
It is worth asking whether these claims are at odds with the claim that we ought not to set our own moral 
goodness as an end, with values serving as the means thereto. It is also worth considering these claims in 
conjunction with issues raised by other moral philosophers, e.g., the applicability of Bernard Williams’s 
infamous “one thought too many” argument or contemporary work on moral fetishism and the distinction 
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before us, yet nevertheless acting to realize values has the direct effort of “increasing” 
our own moral value (goodness), as well as the particular moral values that we exemplify 
(e.g., humility, fortitude, generosity).560  
2.1.4 The Dependency of Personhood on Value-Realizing Acts 
2.1.4.1 The General Answer 
 This brings us to the general way in which the realization of personhood is 
dependent upon value-realizing acts. At least part of the realization of one’s personhood 
is one’s becoming a good person. Moreover, at least part of becoming a good person is 
becoming a morally good person. Becoming a morally good person requires performing 
value-realizing acts. Therefore, the realization of one’s personhood requires, at least in 
part, the performance of value-realizing acts.561  
 I include, “at least part,” throughout the preceding argument because I do not 
wish to assume (because I cannot here defend) the claim that a good person just is a 
morally good person, i.e., that the realization of personhood is exhausted in becoming 
morally good. Crosby endorses such a claim when he writes, “it is one of the most 
elementary moral truths that in being morally good, human persons become good as 
human persons; they become good, not in some particular ‘regional’ respect, not good as 
                                                        
between de re and de dicto desires to do the “right thing.” For an example of the latter, see Carbonell 
(2013). 
560 This is a philosophical treatment of the wisdom of Christ in the Gospels: “But when thou dost alms, let 
not thy left hand know what thy right hand doth” (Matthew 6:3). 
561 Again, I would remind my reader of the discussion which preceded my treatment of value-grasping acts. 
Although persons, to count as performing value-grasping and value-realizing acts, must grasp the intrinsic 
importance of certain values, this need not be a theoretically sophisticated grasp. 
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carpenter, as surgeon, as musician, but good as human persons” (1997, 231).562 For our 
purposes, though, what we can take from Crosby is the more modest claim that moral 
goodness is a fundamental part of realizing our personhood, and that grasping this 
fundamentality requires value-grasping acts.563 In terms of the earlier discussion, it 
requires living from the VP.   
 There is a further point to be made here about the general connection between the 
realization of personhood, and the performance of value-realizing acts. Value-realizing 
acts flow from value-grasping acts, so tightly in fact, that we might think of them as one 
extended act of the person. What, however, should we say about acts in which one person 
merely emulates another who exemplifies a certain value? Does emulating the just man 
make someone just, if it proceeds apart from any value-grasping act of justice as such? In 
response to these questions, Scheler, for one, would answer in the negative. This sort of 
habituation (commonly, if not entirely fairly) pinned on Aristotelian virtue ethics is not 
sufficient, according to Scheler, for becoming morally good or for coming to exemplify 
particular moral values (1973, 537). 
 This is not the place to discuss these details of Scheler’s account. What we should 
take from this point, however, is that mere emulation and the ensuing habituation are not 
                                                        
562 Blosser (2005) also questions the view that the normativity at issue for the person is merely only moral 
normativity. On his view, the moral is but one species of what he calls the “simply normative.” 
563 Perhaps we can also admit, as uncontroversial, that being morally good is also sufficient for being a 
good person. It just turns out that there are plenty of other non-morally-relevant values (to use von 
Hildebrand’s word) adornment with which makes one an even better person. There is at least one problem 
with this claim, though, in that we might think that of a morally good person, and an equally morally good 
person who is also (say) very intelligent, the latter is not better qua person, than the former. If one has this 
intuition, it might be that one wants an even stronger claim than Crosby’s, namely that moral goodness is 
such that you cannot add anything to it (outside of moral goodness) to make someone a better person. 
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sufficient for value-realizing acts insofar as the imitating person does not “co-grasp” the 
values realized by the exemplar.564 If you observe someone who is always giving alms to 
the poor, e.g., money to beggars on the street, then, in order to come to exemplify the 
value of generosity to the needy,565 you would need to grasp that this is the value being 
realized in the alms-deeds. If, when you give to the beggar, you do so simply because so-
and-so did so, you do not count as realizing a value, save accidentally. You must give 
either because you grasp the value in the exemplar’s deed and can see how to realize the 
value in your own circumstances or, at the least, because you have otherwise come to 
grasp the goodness of the exemplar, and so “catch a first glimpse” of the value of 
relieving the needs of the poor. Someone who gives a quarter to every beggar because 
Bob does, just because Bob is lucky with the ladies, and maybe the show of generosity 
will pay off romantically, is neither performing a value-grasping act, nor is he even 
engaging in the sort of emulation and habituation that could possibly contribute to his 
own moral improvement.566 
 With these qualifications in place, we have an account of how value-realizing 
acts, in a general way, relate to our realization as persons. Such acts bear an essential 
relation to the nature of value-grasping acts. As such, they cannot be blind acts of 
emulation and habituation, merely accidentally value-realizing, or pharisaical. These are 
                                                        
564 To apply a distinction of von Hildebrand, we might say that the resulting “habits” will be what he calls 
merely “dispositional virtues,” and not “spiritual virtues.” The former are the virtues of the morally 
unconscious man, who does not grasp the relevance of moral values in his situation, whereas the latter 
belong to the morally conscious man who does (von Hildebrand [1953, 1972, 366). 
565 To say nothing of coming to realize the value and dignity of the poor, even in their indigence.  
566 All the more if the emulator, unlike Bob, is fabulously wealthy, and doesn’t grasp the ill-fitting response 
of a fabulously wealthy man responding to the needs of the poor by contributing mere pocket change. 
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not mere conditions on value-realizing acts, but specify the essence of such acts as the 
consummation of value-grasping acts.567  
 Two points remain to be discussed. The first concerns the possibility of value-
realizing acts as inherently individualized. The second concerns the interpersonal nature 
of value-realizing acts. Taken together, these points will round out the contention that the 
realization of personhood is dependent upon value-realizing acts, understood as 
essentially related to value-grasping acts.  
2.1.4.2 Specific Dependencies of Personhood on Value-Realizing Acts 
(a) Value-Grasping and Value-Realizing Acts and Incommunicability 
 Scheler chides Kant (and ethical formalists in general) for reducing the human 
person to a mere “X of rational activity” (1973, 371). It is no less important, however, to 
ensure that in the current discussion of the human person, we do not reduce the person to 
the mere “X of value-grasping and value-realizing activity.” Persons are not merely 
value-grasping and value-realizing agents, even if a significant part of our distinctiveness 
as persons comes down to these activities (cf. von Hildebrand 1961, 80).  
 Again, we circle back to a point made time and again in this investigation: what is 
required is a complete understanding of human person. As already noted, personalism is 
committed (rightly) to the claim that individual human persons are not merely specimens 
that instantiate the species “human person.” Human persons are, to a certain extent, 
                                                        
567 Incidentally, the reverse also holds, a value-grasping act that nowhere eventuated in action, or at least, 
the disposition-to-act in certain ways, would not be a true value-grasping act. 
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incommunicable. We see both aspects of personhood on display in the two foundational 
Medieval definitions of persons: 
Boethius: A person is an individual substance of a rational nature.568 
Richard of St. Victor: A person is an individual and incommunicable 
existence.569  
We have already effectively plumbed the first definition of personhood in relation to the 
“rational nature” of the human person as involving (speaking broadly) the capacities of 
value-grasping and value-realizing acts. We now need to plumb the second definition in 
relation to these acts. But first, we should say more about the incommunicability in 
question. 
 Part of what is meant by incommunicability is just the earlier claim that human 
persons are not mere specimens of a species. Another, more positive elucidation of 
incommunicability involves emphasizing the “unrepeatability” of individual human 
persons (Crosby 1996, 48). One way to understand the unrepeatability of the human 
person is to consider how, qua person, one is not subject to the laws of numerical 
quantity (ibid., 49-50).570 Crosby puts this point strikingly when he writes: 
                                                        
568 See Boethius, A Treatise against Eutyches and Nestorius, section III. 
569 See Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, Book IV, chapter 23. 
570 The law in question is that an individual x, in comparison to a great many x’s, is reduced in significance, 
“made smaller,” or “relativized” in the midst of the many. Crosby writes, “if a large quantity [of some kind 
of being] gets reduced by one, or enlarged by one, nothing much seems to have happened to the quantity; 
the change is negligible. In relation to millions or billions, one is very small” (ibid., 49). Crosby’s 
discussion here bears a striking similarity to Sokolowski’s argument that “person” is not a sortal term, and 
that the person qua person is not a mere individual, but what he calls a “singularity” (2006a, 165-166). Or 
consider Pascal’s equally striking passage in the Pensées: “For, in the end, what is man in nature? A 
nothing compared to the infinite, an everything compared to the nothing, a midpoint between nothing and 
everything” (2004, 59; S230/L199). 
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 According to one estimate, there have existed until now some 77 billion human beings.  
 But no one person becomes small in the presence of all these other persons, or is 
 relativized in their presence; no one comes to represent an inconsiderable quantity in the 
 realm of personal being, and to be overwhelmed by the many other persons. (ibid., 50). 
 
Individual persons, whatever else we are, are not just one more thing among others. We 
can count persons, and enumerate them, but this does not in any way diminish the person. 
The contribution of a person to reality is not just in being 1/nth of the total number of 
persons, such that the ontological novelty and uniqueness of the person is diminished in 
accordance with the total number of other persons. Nor, indeed, is a person’s ontological 
uniqueness merely a matter of her being an addition to the number of human persons. 
Take a single human person away, and then replace her with another, and you have not 
thereby “preserved” the state of affairs. Rather, you have radically altered it, by 
eliminating an incommunicable, i.e., unrepeatable being from the world, only to replace 
her with someone equally unrepeatable and incommunicable. Persons are 
incommunicable, unrepeatable, and, hence, irreplaceable.571  
 An interesting, non-personalist, argument for these claims may be found in a more 
general metaphysical thesis, namely Kripke’s claim that the origin of x is a necessary 
property of x, or, in a slogan, “origins are necessary” (see Kripke 1981, 110-115). For any 
given person, there will be a unique origin (at a minimum, a particular moment in time 
                                                        
571 Although incommunicability is one of the hallmarks of the personal, Crosby does not claim that it is the 
exclusive provenance of the personal. Incommunicability, on his account, comes in degrees—from the 
incommunicability of the matter that makes up a book to the incommunicability of angelic essences. The 
question, already alluded to in passing in chapter IV, is where exactly to situate human persons with respect 
to incommunicability. This is related to the medieval disputes on the principle of individuation, specifically 
between the Thomistic insistence on matter as the principle of individuation, and the Scotistic postulation 
of haecceity. In the personalist literature, this issue is taken up by Scheler (cf. 1954, 121), Stein (2002), and 
Crosby (1996). While Crosby is content to raise the question as to whether human incommunicability is the 
same as (the Thomistic notion of) angelic incommunicability—namely an incommunicability of essence, 
Stein, and especially Scheler come down in favor of incommunicability of essence for the human person.  
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and space, but also a particular genetic origin in her biological parents). Since origins are 
necessary, if you “change” the origin, you thereby “destroy” one person and replace her 
with another. An implication of the necessity of origins, when we focus upon its temporal 
application, is that human persons have unique, unrepeatable “starting times” for their 
lives. Changing the starting time would have an effect upon the entire course of a 
person’s life. It seems, then, that in recognizing the necessity of temporal origin, we also 
recognize the role that a particular lifetime plays in giving sense to the incommunicability 
of the human person. Part of what makes a person incommunicable (unrepeatable, 
irreplaceable) is the particular course she runs through time and space. 
 Additionally, the incommunicability of the person is manifested in how persons 
have, in addition to an outwardly-oriented relational pole, an inwardly-oriented interior 
pole, signified, e.g., in Mounier’s description of the “intimate conversion” and Scheler’s 
notion of the “intimate person” in contrast to the “social person” (1973, ch. 6, B, 4, ad 5). 
The intimate person is a “sphere” of intimacy, in which the person is able to enjoy 
solitude even as she also stands in a whole host of relationships with other persons (ibid., 
562-563). This sphere has epistemic consequences insofar as it is a sphere of “absolute 
personal privacy, which can never be given to us” (Scheler 1954, 10).572 
 A corollary to this epistemic application of incommunicability is that certain 
truths are only known to, or by, oneself because they are given in, or disclosed to, our 
                                                        
572 Although as Scheler hastens to point out, that there is experience in this sphere is given in expression, 
i.e., in the body as a field of expression (though not, contrary to his contemporaries) through any kind of 
inference or analogy (ibid.). 
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incommunicable person, or sphere of absolute intimacy with ourselves.573 One of the 
kinds of truths that are only known in this way may be identified with what Scheler calls 
“the good-in-itself-for-me.”574 He writes: 
 If, however, an ought becomes a moral and genuine ought whenever it is  based on an 
 insight into objective values—there is also the possibility of an evidential insight into a 
 good whose objective essence and value-content contain a reference to an individual 
 person, and whose ought therefore comes to this person, and to him alone as a “call,” no 
 matter if this call is addressed to others or not. (1973, 490) 
 
Although I am not certain how the argument here (if there is one) is supposed to work, 
Scheler’s phenomenology seems sound.575 We intuit certain goods as containing an 
essential reference to ourselves. I understand “goods” here to include broadly any value-
endowed “thing,” e.g., a good state of affairs, a good deed, a good object. The essential 
reference to me—the “call” addressed to me—consists in my grasping the good in 
question as something that I, and I alone, can realize, and that I, and I alone, am called to 
realize.576 
                                                        
573 It also appears that this is a corollary of the necessity of temporal origins, insofar as certain truths are 
disclosed to us at particular moments in time, and these moments would be altered (and thus the encounters 
destroyed) by a difference in temporal origins. Another way of putting the incommunicability of persons is 
to say that persons cannot be replaced because, to each person, there is the possibility of meeting with 
certain truths at certain moments of time, moments of time which prove definitive for the person coming to 
understand who she is. 
574 For discussion of the good-in-itself-for-me, also referred to by Scheler as the “call of the hour” [Kairos] 
see Frings (1997, 68ff).  
575 A somewhat related phenomenon is discussed by Hartmann. There are innumerable “special antimonies” 
that arise between universal values and the values of personality (Hartmann [1932] 2003, 421). What he 
means is that there is a tension between the demands of universal values (to act the same way as anyone 
else would in a given situation and acting in a way that has a mark of one’s own distinctiveness, where such 
a mark could not (and should not) be found in just anyone’s conduct. Indeed, for Hartmann, this is one 
dimension of what we might call his “two-dimensional normativity of the person.” On the own hand, we 
must act so as to realize our own ideal personhood; on the other, we must achieve a distance from the 
“average person.” It is precisely in working through such special antimonies between the universal 
demands of values, and one’s own personhood, that we satisfy these norms. For discussion of these two 
norms of personhood, see Kelly (2011, 222-223). 
576 Realizing the good-in-itself-for-me thus manifests entering the OGPP, which contains the notion of the 
important-in-itself, while retaining an essential reference to me qua individual person. 
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 This does not mean that the good in question depends upon me for its goodness. 
As Scheler says, it is still good-in-itself, i.e., good independently of any relation that I 
may bear it. Nevertheless, it is a good-in-itself-for-me. Scheler writes: 
 [The] essential reference to me…is contained…in the special non-formal content of this 
 good-in-itself, something that comes from this content and points to “me,” something that 
 whispers, “For you.” And precisely this content places me in a unique position in the  
 moral cosmos and obliges me with respect to actions, deeds, and works, etc., which, 
 when I represent them, all call, “I am for you and you are for me.” (ibid.)577 
 
It is difficult to say more than this. One might, in fact, say that in this passage we have 
the apotheosis of the mutual interdependence of persons and values. There are some 
instances of values, as given embodiment in particular, concrete acts, that are given to us 
specifically, and to whom we ourselves are given specifically. Or, rather, to which we are 
called to give ourselves—a call which we are quite free to refuse.578  
 Indeed, it seems that a certain fortitude is required to listen for, and make a free 
response to, the call of values addressed to one as an individual person. Too often, the 
response to hearing the first whisperings of this call is to stop up one’s ears in fear. Fear 
of what? Fear of at least two things: (1) we are afraid of being bound in such a way that 
we cannot—even would not—shake off our bonds. We are afraid of the irrevocability of 
the call, of something that once heard, cannot be unheard, and which will rob us of a 
lesser, though more comforting and less demanding, form of freedom.579 It is fear of 
                                                        
577 Wojtyla, as Pope John Paul II, says something similar: “The experience of a vocation is unique and 
indescribable, and is only perceived as a gentle breeze of the clarifying touch of grace. The vocation is a 
breathing of the Holy Spirit, who, at the same time as He genuinely shapes our fragile human reality, shines 
a new light into our hearts. He instills an extraordinary power that merges our existence into the divine 
enterprise.” What John Paul II refers to as vocation, and Scheler refers to as a “unique position in the moral 
cosmos” is precisely the experience of one’s incommunicability in the cosmos and the order of providence. 
578 Scheler saw this refusal of, or resistance to, one’s callings, as the root of tragedy (see Kelly (2011, 46). 
579 See Dahlstrom’s (2008) account of the development of human freedom, whereupon each level 
subordinates the one below. The fear I am trying to illustrate here may be depicted in terms of a fear of 
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being bound by values.580 But it is more than that. For here, we are running not just from 
“general” values—justice as such, beauty as such, love as such. We can always “grasp”581 
such values, and walk away “unscathed,” comforting ourselves with a curious mixture of 
cynicism (convincing ourselves that we are irredeemably unworthy to serve the values in 
question) and hedonism (drowning out any doubts with respect to this cynical attitude in 
a stream of diversions). Rather, what we are running from are values that reach right 
down into us, seizing our hearts, addressing themselves directly to us. It is perhaps, at 
bottom, nothing more nor less than fear of the fiercest sort of love and fidelity possible 
for the human person.582  
 Second, we are afraid of the voice itself, the whispering. Who is doing this 
whispering? Where is the voice coming from? Even more terrifying, still, is the fact that 
the voice is given in such a way that it does not even seem localizable. If it isn’t 
localizable, then it is neither far, nor near. This means that we cannot run from it. We can 
only stop up our ears.583 But when we surmount this fear (or perhaps, despite this fear), 
                                                        
subordinating lesser levels of freedom, and so fleeing back to those levels in fear of a higher level of 
freedom. Compare also the mysterious “necessity” that Frankfurt says attends that which we care about. 
580 In response, we can take refuge in the SSP. This is the response of concupiscence as von Hildebrand 
describes it. There is, however, another response, one that opens up in virtue of the possible development of 
this fear into out-and-out hatred of that which would bind us. This is the response of pride, especially what 
von Hildebrand calls “satanic” pride, i.e., the (ultimately impotent) attempt to overthrow the reign of values 
and destroy anything endowed with value. 
581 “Grasp” appears here in scare-quotes, insofar as it problematic to speak of grasping values apart from 
responding to their call—an aspect of value-grasping acts emphasized by Stein and von Hildebrand. 
Although it remains to elucidate such experiences, it does seem possible—even ubiquitous—that we 
somehow hear such calls “at a distance” and in such a way that we are not yet fully involved and can still 
turn away. Perhaps this is why the image of whispering (see fn 577) is so evocative here. Whispering is at 
once far away, and very close—we can sometimes barely hear a whisper, and yet whispers directed to 
someone are often spoken directly into that person’s ear. 
582 If so, then it is also a fear of being wounded and immolated in this fiercest of loves. 
583 This description comes from the experience of the author; it does, however, bear a curious (although 
perhaps superficial) resemblance to Heidegger’s discussion of conscience in Being and Time (¶¶54-60). 
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we are confronted with an insight into values addressed directly to ourselves. 
Colloquially, we might describe this as the sense that there is something that it is given 
me to do, and this is it.584  
 What this intuition shows us is how our incommunicability cuts across our being 
value-graspers and value-realizers. As an individual person, there are some values that 
only I can grasp and, a fortiori, that only I can realize. My existence makes a difference 
in part because, without me, there are certain valuable states of affairs that would not be 
raised to knowledge in the human world or brought into real existence in that world. Who 
can say, in the end, how the arc of one’s life, and one’s appreciation (or failure to 
appreciate) this truth and live in its light shape the course of history? Of what good has 
gone undone by the one who wallows in concupiscence? Of one who, having begun the 
journey to the point of view of values, turns away in fear? Of the one who, having made 
it almost all the way, failed at the last step? Or of those who, upon perceiving values, 
utter, like Milton’s Lucifer, non serviam. And, on the other side, how, by acting in the 
light of values, even the most seemingly insignificant minutiae of our lives have worked 
together to create a web of significance, endowing those caught up in it with the 
resplendence of the values it embodied?585  
                                                        
584 This sense remains lodged in the popular conscious, derivative upon those who have truly experienced 
it, in the form of such sayings as: “God has a plan for everyone,” or, “everyone has a special purpose.” 
These, of course, express trite and pale imitations of the phenomenon that Scheler has his finger on, but 
they provide evidence that traces of this intuition linger even in the most anodyne of persons. 
585 Edith Stein, in her later life as a Discalced Carmelite nun, put it thus: “What did not lie in my plan, lay in 
God’s plan. And the more such things happen to me the more lively becomes in me the conviction of my 
faith that—from God’s point of view—nothing is accidental, that my entire life, even in the most minute 
details, was pre-designed in the plans of divine providence and is thus for the all-seeing eye of God a 
perfect coherence of meaning” (2002, 113). 
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 For those with the eyes to see and ears to listen, Scheler’s intuition of the good-in-
itself-for-me permeates an entire life and bathes everything else, every detail, in its light. 
One’s entire life becomes, as it were, an offering or a response to the call that was given, 
that was, as Scheler says, for me. In closing, we should note that there is at least one such 
good-in-itself-for-me which is addressed to every individual person, and that is one’s own 
ontological value as a person. In the moment of truth about my personhood, and the 
good, which contains both the elements of importance-in-itself, and an indexical 
reference to me, we first make contact with the structure of the good-in-itself-for-me in 
the guise of our own incommunicable personhood. This is the first value to which we 
must respond, or flee, and in this relationship to ourselves, we make possible, or close 
off, the disclosure of still further calls addressed to us as “individual and incommunicable 
existences.”586 Here again, we see the objective goodness of truth for the person as 
enabling the relationship with these “incommunicable callings,” first in the moment of 
truth in which we interrogate ourselves and seek the meaning of our lives as persons 
(Marcel), and second in those moments of clarity when we receive the intelligible content 
of a calling addressed directly—and only—to us (Scheler).   
(b) Values-Realizing Acts and the Intrinsic Relationality of Persons 
 Finally, we come to the way in which value-grasping and value-realizing acts are 
related to our intrinsic relationality as persons. Recall that Stein classifies value-grasping 
acts as affective acts. Here, we will take up the completion of Stein’s account by turning 
                                                        
586 Scheler says that this is the fundamental experience that founds the experiences of vocation, mission, 
and election (1973, 490, note). 
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to her discussion of social acts. Anticipating our results, we can say that value-grasping 
and value-realizing acts, as forming an organic unity, are affective-social acts. Together 
with the role of theoretical and volitional responses, it turns out that value-grasping and 
value-realizing acts correspond to the entirety of the human person in a unique way. That 
is, such acts contain elements that answer to all the major dimensions of the human 
person: (1) interiority (involving intellectual, volitional, and affective centers) and (2) 
intrinsic relationality (with analogues of these centers). What remains is to specify the 
intrinsic relationality of value-realizing acts (just as we specified the relationality of 
value-grasping acts above).  
 First, I am going to introduce a modification of language. Whereas Stein speaks 
primarily of community, I will speak of friendship.587 Next, we must note the following 
principle governing the foundation of friendships (and communities in general). The 
“possibility of community formation reaches just as far as the zone of reciprocal 
understanding by individuals” (ibid., 206). This should remind the reader of the claim, in 
chapter IV, that truth is necessary for friendship insofar as friendship requires the 
following structure between persons: (1) communicable truth; (2) communicated truth; 
(3) receivable truth; (4) received truth. Indeed, Stein evokes a similar structure when she 
speaks of content that is not only pronounced and heard, but also imparted and received. 
Whereas the first two point to the physical, or merely sensible, acts at issue for 
                                                        
587 This is not unfair to Stein’s text, as she often has recourse to examples from friendship. Furthermore, 
friendship seems to fall under her understanding of community as (minimally) relationships in which 
subjects (i.e., persons) live together with each other as subjects ([1922] 2000, 130). In light of the focus on 
friendship in chapter IV, this modification is appropriate.  
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understanding (verbalizing and hearing), the latter two point to the interpersonal 
dimension. What makes such relationships possible are utterances with meanings, whose 
meanings are primarily that which is imparted or given to the other. In uttering something 
with meaning, I am imparting some meaning to another person, which is to say that I am 
targeting my discourse to the other as someone endowed with understanding (ibid., 211). 
I am not targeting the other as a “private personality” (in Stein’s words). That is, in 
seeking to convey something meaningful to others, I appeal to them as beings with an 
understanding common to my own, and thus to their personhood as endowed with 
rational nature (Boethius) as opposed to being incommunicable (Richard of St. Victor). 
 Stein then proceeds to treat of social attitudes and acts which, unlike those which 
seek to reach the other purely as an understanding person, are such that they “matter 
directly to another person in her individual quality and affect her to the core” (ibid.). We 
can interpret how these acts matter in friendships by reminding ourselves of the 
consequential relationship that obtains between truth and friendship. Truth is a 
consequence of friendship, for through friendship we come to create and discover the 
truth about ourselves, as unique human persons. The social attitudes and acts of Stein’s 
account are at the service of the creation and discovery of this truth in friendships and are 
therefore foundational for friendships and communities more broadly. 
 The importance and role of truth for friendship and communities can be brought 
out by contrasting friendship and community with other forms of interpersonal 
“relationships.” Let us consider one representative example, namely, what Stein refers to 
as association, wherein one treats others as objects, interacting with them in a narrowly 
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rational and mechanical way, for the sake of eliciting particular responses from them 
(ibid., 130).588 How does truth manifest itself in such association? In such cases, truth 
enters into the scene as a mere means. We use what knowledge we have of the other 
individual—the truth about her—to manipulate her in certain ways, so as to achieve a 
desired response. We figure out how we can use the truth about her as a stimulus. Instead 
of seeking an understanding of the other which will found deeper acts of creating and 
disclosing still further truths, we seek only to bend the individual to the will of the 
association. If the association’s job is to get a certain politician into office, it uses the 
truth about others (the voting class) to elicit the desired reactions (voting, campaigning). 
If, e.g., the association knows the following truths—that the voter has been laid off, is 
without marketable skills, is addicted to a substance, but unable to acknowledge that it is 
not his fault, that he is resentful of, and anxious over, changing economic 
circumstances—then it can craft stimuli (e.g., linguistic cues in stump speeches, images 
and catchphrases on social media), that elicit a response. In the case under consideration, 
the responses must include the affective responses of further anger and resentment, but 
also hope or a sense of resurgence, together with a volitional response (go vote), and a 
theoretical response (adopting the opinions589 of the association as your own).  
                                                        
588 Below the level of the association is that of the mere “mass” (see ibid., 241ff). 
589 This is a topic for future research in its own right. For example, Stein ([1922] 2000, 247ff) worries about 
convictions that we obtain from others, specifically whether such convictions are always the result of mere 
suggestion, or whether they can be grounded in their own right. Several of her observations are salient here. 
The first is that the formation of convictions is as much due to motives as it is to reasons. Stein also 
observes that certain persons are just naturally credulous, just begging to be filled with convictions from 
some external source. Finally, Stein discusses cases of what we might call doxastic contagion, whereby we 
become infected with the opinions of those around us. (This is essentially a variant on the emotional 
infection identified by Scheler (1954, ch. 2).) In cases of doxastic infection, our propinquity with others and 
the resulting overstimulation draws down on our mental energy, necessitating a shut-down of our higher 
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 Thus far, then, we have two elements in place: (1) a zone of reciprocal 
understanding among persons (rational nature), and (2) an orientation toward others as 
unique individuals (incommunicable). We must now focus our attention upon the social 
attitudes and acts themselves. The first characteristic that we notice, according to Stein, is 
that social acts have a basic character as either positive and affirming, negative and 
rejecting, or indifferent. Examples of the first include trust, gratitude, and, most 
importantly, love.  Examples of the second include distrust, aversion, and hatred (ibid., 
211). Implicitly, Stein makes love and hatred the fundamental social attitudes, by 
describing the indifferent stance as one that is neither loving nor hating (ibid.).  
 The positive and negative social attitudes bring to bear a peculiar causal efficacy, 
or power, upon the person who is the “object” of such an attitude.590 This efficacy is 
                                                        
mental functions. My point (above) may thus be interpreted, à la Stein, in the following manner. 
Associations are good at discovering how to motivate others (the “target”) to adopt certain opinions. Being 
so motivated leaves the target in a position of conviction-readiness, malleable in the hands of others who 
seek to implant opinions. Associations are also adept at discovering the precise opinions that certain 
persons are predisposed to adopt, and so incorporate them into their messaging, or else at discovering 
vague formulations that allow the target to conclude that the association has his opinions (rather than the 
other way around). Finally, associations are skilled at using doxastic infection. Consider, e.g., the following 
series of acts. (1) Bombard the target with opinions that they are predisposed to accept. (2) Isolate targets 
according to shared opinions. (3) Confuse the target by calling contrary opinions into question (discredit 
their content and the people who hold them, attack their groundlessness, associate the content with 
“undesirable” persons). (4) Induce confusion in the target between the strength with which a conviction is 
held, and its groundedness. (5) Sit back and watch as doxastic control functions (e.g., the negative doxastic 
voluntarism discussed in chapter I) power down further. (6) Repeat the cycle, this time with greater 
saturation of convictions in the target. We might also consider interactions among persons where those 
using the truth as a stimulus-means, are not united around one particular goal. Rather, they are the 
dispassionate functionaries of large corporations or governmental entities (think of Silicon Valley and the 
NSA). No one in particular (save, perhaps, the people at the top) has an end in mind (beyond doing their 
job), yet all this data-gathering is deployed to make me respond in certain ways (e.g., by buying or using 
certain products). Even more sharply is how these forms of interaction come together. Witness political 
campaigns that tap into the networks and technology of firms such as Facebook and Twitter, using an 
“association” of the unwitting to further the ends of an association of the witting, i.e., of using the 
functionaries of Twitter to further the end of their candidate. 
590 “Object” is used here in a formal and non-pejorative sense. Our social attitudes toward others have 
objects (namely, the other person) even though we do not treat the other person merely as an object.  
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twofold. (1) Social attitudes are motivationally powerful insofar as they motivate their 
object to respond to the attitudes in question. (2) Social attitudes are causally591 powerful 
insofar as they provide their object (the other person) with a certain vim and vigor for the 
performance of still further acts (social or otherwise). Here is how Stein puts it: 
 The contents as such—the love, the hatred, the trust, and so forth—deploy a specific 
 efficacy within the human beings whom they befall. The love which I meet with 
 strengthens and invigorates me and grants me the power for unexpected achievements.  
 The distrust that I run into disables my creative power. Other people’s attitudes encroach 
 directly upon my inner life and control its course—unless I “lock myself up” against 
 them. (ibid., 212). 
 
In a related discussion, she writes: 
 Besides the attraction or revulsion that emanates from the personal distinctiveness of an 
 individual, contact with her exercises yet another influence upon the experiencing of 
 other persons: a distinctive modification of whatever they do or let be done. The presence 
 of another person prevents certain stirrings from coming over me that would just go 
 ahead and run their course if I were left on my own, while other stirrings are induced in 
 me which I wouldn’t be capable of all on my own. (ibid., 266) 
 
In short, she says, we are dealing with “the impact of one person upon the other person” 
and “the influence that the development of a person undergoes thanks to another person” 
(ibid.). In so modifying the condition of other persons, we contribute directly to the 
formation of their character as well (ibid.). 
 It is worth pausing here to tease out of these passages the various suggestions for 
how social attitudes are motivationally and causally powerful, and to illustrate each with 
a brief example. There are at least four suggestions:  
                                                        
591 This is not, perhaps, the best word to describe the efficacy in question. Wanting for a clear alternative, I 
can only advise my reader to interpret it generously, in accordance with the subsequent discussion. For 
instance, it would seem that the power of social attitudes lies not merely in the transmission of power 
(Stein) but also in providing reasons to act (or believe) in certain ways. 
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 (1) Social acts strength and invigorate. (Think of the energy which is imparted to 
the lover from her beloved, the vim and vigor with which persons act in the first 
flowering of some love, and of the steady and secure source of strength that comes from a 
long-established love—the ability, e.g., to persevere through an illness or tragedy.) 
 (2) Social acts enable unexpected achievements. (Think of the tired medical 
researcher, desperately trying to find the cure for an illness and on the verge of burning 
out. The trust and gratitude of the patients he serves enable him to continue carrying out 
his work, holding off collapse for another day. For a more parochial example, witness 
how the respect and regard of one’s colleagues, family, and friends, enables an academic 
to persevere in completing a major project.) 
 (3) More generally, social acts modify the structure of the other person’s agential 
field. Love makes possible, as Kierkegaard so keenly saw. (Consider someone for whom 
the prospect of having and raising children is terrifying, but who is enabled to make this 
leap in light of the love he receives from his spouse.) 
 (4) Social acts prevent, and induce, certain “stirrings.” (Perhaps I have a musical 
talent, but I am uncertain of developing it, fearful of failure or wary of the time 
commitment. The joy that another person takes in listening to me sing, in the beauty of 
my voice, stirs me to action, to taking this talent seriously and investing the time and 
resources necessary to cultivating it. Or consider someone whom a sinful habit is 
rankling, whose lustfulness is regularly on the verge of stirring. The presence of a calm 
and steady love can settle down or even prevent these stirrings from gaining steam.) 
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 Although I will not discuss the parallel effects of hatred and other negative social 
acts, it is worth noting an importing distinction between acts of love and acts of hatred. 
Adapting Stein’s words, we can formulate laws of non-conservation of love and hatred. 
When one person loves another, both the beloved and the lover reap the reward just 
identified. The lover does not lose out to the extent that he loves; rather “love operates 
within the one who loves as an invigorating force that might even develop more powers 
within him than experiencing it costs him” (ibid., 212).592 In other words, love is also 
reflexive in its causal and motivational efficacy. Not only does love that we receive have 
an effect on us, but also the love that we give. A similar law holds of hatred, but with an 
important difference. When one person hates another, both the hater and the hated suffer 
the consequences (where these are understood as the negative counterparts of (1)-(4) 
(above)). Moreover, hating is far more depleting than being hated (cf. ibid.). Though in 
hating another we deplete the other person in certain ways, we deplete ourselves far 
more. Hatred, too, is reflexive, with the hater suffering for his hate.593 
 What remains to be seen is how value-grasping and value-realizing acts and 
hence, values themselves, are related to these social acts. There are two basic answers. 
The first is that values “enkindle” these acts, specifically the values “that are inseparably 
                                                        
592 Stein formulates her views here with reference to her concept of “lifepower.” For the sake of avoiding a 
lengthy digression on this notion, and endorsing the idea of lifepower, my formulations of these laws are 
neutral on the existence of Stein’s lifepower. 
593 This is manifested with the greatest drama in the case of von Hildebrand’s satanically proud man, who 
seeks, in his hatred of values and God, to destroy them. But though such a man might derive some 
demoniac, maniacally frenzied energy from such a project, it is ultimately a display of impotence. The 
satanically proud man wastes himself in his pursuit of destruction, and though he may burn with the 
passion of his hatred, this is not at all the sensation of burning that comes with love. Speaking poetically, 
one might contrast the non-consumptive flame of love (think of the Burning Bush of Exodus) and the 
consumptive flame of hatred.  
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bound up with the being of the person” (ibid.). This relationship (of enkindling) between 
values and social acts is isomorphic with the relationship between values and affective 
acts. The second way in which values and social acts are related is that social acts 
themselves enkindle values in the other. Pulling both threads together, Stein writes: 
 The relationship of value-perception and taking a stance on value [i.e., in the case of love 
 she is here describing] is therefore the same that we set out earlier. The apprehending of 
 value and the attitude appropriate to it mutually require one another, and while the 
 required attitude is not being experienced, the value isn’t being apprehended completely 
 vividly. So in a certain way it’s correct to say that love is based upon the apprehended 
 value of the beloved person, but on the other hand, the worth of a person is fully and 
 completely accessible only to the lover. (ibid., 213) 
 
Thus, in loving another person, we perform both value-grasping and value-realizing acts. 
In loving another person, we apprehend her ontological value as a person, and at least 
some of the qualitative values that she embodies. But in loving her, we also gain access 
(in the only way possible) to her full value-essence.594 We grasp more than the occurent 
values that are “on the surface,” there for all to see. We also grasp her latent values (those 
that are undeveloped, dormant, in potentia, lying in wait), and are able to “trace the line” 
of these values in such a way as to “love forth,” in Kierkegaard’s phrase, the full 
flowering of the beloved.595 
 To review, the realization of personhood is dependent upon value-realizing acts in 
at least three ways. The first of these is the general dependence of the realization of 
                                                        
594 Stein’s phenomenology of social acts bears, in this regard and others mentioned above, a strong 
resemblance to Scheler’s phenomenology of love in The Nature of Sympathy. For the similarities in 
question, see Scheler (1954, Part II, chapter 1). Several of the major claims discussed in this chapter of The 
Nature of Sympathy are incorporated into the discussion of the consequential relationship between truth and 
friendship, and the virtue of friendly interpretation, in chapter IV of this dissertation.  
595 Moreover, there are even certain properties that can only be actualized in forms of community, e.g., 
humility and pride, servility and defiance, power lust and affability, team spirit and helplessness (ibid., 266-
267).595 This list encompasses what Stein calls the “social virtues.” 
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personhood upon becoming a morally good person, where this in turn requires acting 
with the end of realizing value-endowed states of affairs. The second relates to the 
incommunicability of personhood. The human person is not merely a specimen endowed 
with value-realizing nature. The person is also incommunicable, unrepeatable, and 
irreplaceable. As such, its relationship to value is not only universal, but also individual. 
The person is that being capable of discerning the good-in-itself-for-me. This good-in-
itself-for-me is, ontologically, my ontological value as a person. As such, our act of 
discerning this value, and the value itself, exhibit both importance-in-itself, and what we 
called “essential indexicality”: the for-me, or to-me. But, as we saw in the discussion of 
value-grasping acts, this is precisely the structure of the OGPP. Thus, it is in entering this 
point of view that we are able to grasp our ontological value and the good-in-itself-for-
me. Entering this point of view is constituted in the moment of truth about oneself and 
about the good. Thus, in the same moment of truth that we come to grasp our own 
personhood, its value, and the called-for response, we also dispose ourselves to 
discerning other calls addressed to us by values. Because these values are not our own 
personhood, we come to grasp the category of the important-in-itself. In realizing values 
in the particular way “addressed to me,” the incommunicable side of our personhood is 
realized in a way that makes manifest the underlying unity of the human person as both 
incommunicable and instantiating a rational (value-grasping and value-realizing) nature. 
Lastly, the realization of personhood as intrinsically relational is also dependent upon 
value-realizing acts. While it is though our relationships with other persons that we come 
to grasp values, it is no less true that values themselves come to be realized through our 
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relationships with others. This is true in a “technical” sense, for the very relationships at 
issue are themselves endowed with high value. But, in a more profound and mysterious 
sense, the relationships themselves realize values both in the lover, and in the beloved, 
adorning both to the detriment of neither.  
 We have thus come to learn how the realization of personhood is dependent upon 
both value-grasping and value-realizing acts. We have also learned how these acts are 
related to each other, and how they come together in the realization of personhood in its 
several basic dimensions. Finally, we have also seen, time and again, the special role that 
truth plays with respect to value-grasping and value-realizing acts. Both acts play out 
against the intelligible background and are only made possible in explicit moments of 
truth—encountering our own personhood, the act of self-interrogation, grasping 
exemplars and the values that underpin the normative structuring of our agential fields, 
grasping the good-in-itself-for-me, and discerning and building up the truth of others. 
2.2 Value-on-Persons Dependency 
 We now turn to the dependence of values on persons. Since this discussion 
represents the outer limit of the present investigation, it is brief, contenting itself mostly 
with offering observations and indicating future lines of research. Additionally, since 
values are normative for the person, and not persons normative for values, we need only 
establish the for-structure as it runs from values to persons, and not persons to values. 
Nevertheless, the following discussion speculates on the ways in which persons are for 
values, i.e., ways in which values are themselves dependent upon persons. 
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 Values are dependent upon persons in at least three related ways. First, values are 
objectively related to persons. We might also call this a “logical” dependence. Second, 
values come to exist in the actual world through the agency of persons. We might call 
this an “ontological” dependence. Third, values are dependent upon persons as beings 
endowed with freedom. We might call this a “dependence on freedom.” 
 (1) Logical dependence. Both Hartmann ([1932] 2002, 207-209) and von 
Hildebrand (2016, 33; 1960, ch. 5) distinguish between (to use Hartmann’s terminology) 
relationality and relativity. One thing (x) can be objectively related to another thing (y), 
without this implying that x is somehow “made up” by y, a mere product of y’s 
consciousness or the consciousness of y’s community.596 Objective relationality is a 
ubiquitous phenomenon, running from the profound (the Creator and His creatures) to the 
everyday (fathers and sons). Values are relational, but not relative. As such, in 
elucidating the dependence of values upon persons, the reader ought not to begin thinking 
of values as merely “in” consciousness or “made by” consciousness—no more than he 
should begin thinking about sons as merely in the consciousness of their fathers. 
 Values are logically dependent upon persons in that they contain an intrinsic 
reference to the person. This logical dependence is one that Hartmann says is 
“interwoven with so many categorical structures.” For example, geometrical laws hold 
for spatial bodies, mechanical laws for real bodied, physiological laws for organisms, and 
psychological laws for psychic beings. In general, these sorts of laws are those to which 
                                                        
596 What we wish to rule out, in distinguishing relationality from relativity, in the dependence of values on 
persons are all the connotations of moral relativism. 
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the target class of entities is subjected (Hartmann [1932] 2002, 208). Since, as we have 
seen, values are norm-giving, they contain an intrinsic reference to those entities for 
whom they are normative (the norm-given). We cannot sanction the existence of a norm-
giving class without its corresponding norm-given class. The very fact that values give 
norms, then, is logically dependent upon our identifying a kind of being for whom values 
could give norms, i.e., to whom the norm-giving of values is addressed in the actual 
world. We have identified the norm-given being in question as the human person. 
 (2) Ontological dependence. The second way in which values are dependent upon 
persons expands upon the merely “logical” dependence of (1). Values597 are dependent 
upon persons in more than the merely formal sense of depending upon them as the object 
of their norm-givingness. They are dependent upon persons for their coming to be in the 
actual world, for the adornment of the actual world with values.598  
                                                        
597 To be clear, this discussion refers to what von Hildebrand calls “qualitative values” and not to 
ontological values. Values are not dependent upon persons for the coming-to-be of the ontological value of 
beings. For brevity’s sake, I will omit “qualitative” in the remainder of this subsection. 
598 (Though, to be clear, being itself a value.) The issue of ontological dependence raises the thorny 
question of the ontology of values. Here, I can only gesture toward the possible alternatives, leaving a 
complete investigation of the ontology of values to another day. Two possibilities map directly onto the 
debate between Platonists and Aristotelians on the ontological status of universals. As Kinneging (2017) 
sums up these possibilities for moral ontology, this is the debate between those who conceive of values (the 
moral eidê) as ante rem and those who conceive of values as in re. Applying von Hildebrand’s categories, 
Kinneging contrasts these positions as follows: whereas for the Aristotelian, justice is a moral value 
because it is an objective good for man, for the Platonist, justice is an objective good for man because it is a 
moral value. For the Aristotelian, values are ultimately grounded in anthropology (human nature), whereas 
for the Platonist values “exist per se, and are hence outside, and independent, of human nature and human 
existence” (ibid., 627). Hartmann and, argues Kinneging, von Hildebrand are Platonists about the ontology 
of values. We have seen how von Hildebrand embraces the Platonist position in his denial that values are 
for anyone. This claim encapsulates a running debate, within this dissertation, between its Thomistic and 
personalist influences. As I discuss below, I think that there is a way to thread the needle between these 
positions, involving the analysis of value through the lens of the Thomistic transcendental properties of 
being. Another position entirely is that of Scheler, according to values are neither things, properties of 
things, nor logical abstractions from things (cf. Frings 1997, 23). Rather, they have what Scheler calls a 
“functional existence” whose being is analogous to that of colors. Values, like colors, must enter into a 
function without something in order for them to be. I leave to future work the task of articulating this 
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 Explaining this ontological dependence of qualitative values on persons requires 
elaborating on the peculiar metaphysical situation of the person, such that values are 
dependent upon the person. Hartmann describes this situation strikingly when he writes: 
 In the stream of real existence, in fluctuating reality itself, there must be a point of 
 support, upon which the Ought-to-Be impinges…In short, there must be a real self-
 existent which can serve as the originating point of a real tendency in the stream of 
 Being; there must be a form capable of intent in the midst of blind events, itself brought 
 forth and borne along by them and yet, amidst them, powerful in self-activity…The 
 subject is such a pole of the positive Ought-to-Be in the realm of the real…not as a 
 metaphysical subject in general, but as empirical, actual, just as we know it in man. (ibid., 
 256) 
 
The human person is this “point of support” in the “stream of real existence.”599 The 
positive-ought-to-be, which is a unique feature of Hartmann’s metaphysic of values, is 
the situation that occurs when the ideal being of some value finds itself in opposition to 
the actual world or, more specifically, with a particular state of affairs. The positive-
ought-to-be is disclosed in cases of disparateness between a state of affairs, and some 
value(s) (cf. ibid., 249-250).600 Perhaps the clearest and most striking cases of this 
disparateness concern the values of justice, fairness, and equality. For example, when we 
                                                        
ontology of values alongside the Platonist, Aristotelians, and transcendental varieties just discussed. It 
should be noted, however, that the reader should not not to read Locke’s secondary quality analysis of color 
into Scheler’s value/color analogy.  
599 For the Platonic origins of this claim, see Kinneging (2017). 
600 More generally, for Hartmann, the idea of oughtness arises in the person’s discerning this disparity, 
which discernment requires the discernment of values (see Kelly 2011, 109-113 for discussion). For 
discussion of similar points in Scheler, see Blosser (2005, 130). Scheler, who lacks the concept of the 
positive-ought-to-be, conveys a related insight in his discussion of the ideal ought. The ideal ought is 
grasped in the disparity between the real world and the ideal, and “is always directed at the removal of 
negative values” (ibid.). A similar insight might be at work in Scheler’s account of how we can arrive at 
knowledge of God and the Fall of Man (apart from positive revelation) through the operation of repentance 
(Scheler 1987b, 120-123). The disparity between real and ideal is here given as the disparity “between a 
world created by the absolute perfection of God and the world as it known to me in reality” with the Fall 
being the sole explanation of this disparity (ibid., 121). For a related point in terms of conscience (of which 
repentance is one of the “stirrings”), see Frings (1997, 62-63). Hartmann likewise links the positive-ought-
to-be and conscience (see Kelly 2011, 110). 
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grasp the injustice of detaining an innocent person in a fit of “mob justice,” we are 
grasping a tension between this state of affairs and the value of justice, and a sense of 
resistance of the state of affairs to some ideal world of values. Specifically, this is the 
resistance embodied by the agents responsible for the unjust state of affairs, as well as a 
sense in which the world itself undermines the reign of values. This more mysterious 
sense of resistance is, I think, to be identified with the brokenness of the world to which 
Marcel refers, and the tragedy that dogs the steps of the realization of values.601  
 The person is required as the addressee (pole) of the positive-ought-to-be of 
values. The very fact that there exists a graspable disparateness and disharmony between 
things as they are and things as they ought-to-be only makes sense given the 
presupposition of an entity whose situation is such that it can grasp the disparateness in 
question. Imagine, if you will, that there exist no persons, but there do exist two worlds. 
One is a world of values (for present purposes, let it be Hartmann’s Platonic realm). The 
other is our universe (the “natural” world), denuded of persons. These are the only two 
worlds. There is no other world, no supernatural realm, no divine being. My question is 
this: in what sense could there be a disparateness of the “natural” world with the world of 
values? Would it not just be the case that there exist two worlds, utterly unrelated to, and 
perfectly parallel with, each other? It seems that a necessary condition on the two worlds 
                                                        
601 Addressing this very issue, Mounier, in a moving passage, writes, “even before it meets with opposition, 
the urge to achieve values flags from a kind of internal weakness…man’s highest mission is dogged by 
disappointments at every turn, and often cut short by death. Values conflict with one another instead of 
combining in a harmonious whole. Of a life dedicated to values one may say…that it alternates between a 
lyrical extreme where value reigns in triumph over a world of progress and ultimate reconciliation, and a 
dramatic extreme where value is everlastingly subject to defeat. Joy is inseparable from the pursuit of 
values, but no less so is suffering—suffering which is intensified as the progress of culture deepens man’s 
sensitivity to it, and is increased to the extent that personal existence is amplified” (1952, 81). 
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relating to each other is a being, of such a kind and existing in such a situation, that is 
able to “hold them together.” In a related vein, Hartmann continues: 
 The metaphysic of the Ought is exactly this, that in its unfoldement in real existence, in 
 its actuality, it is necessarily directed to a real subject…In so far as the Ought enters into 
 Being, and in so far as the positive Ought-to-Be becomes an existent, it can be this only 
 as it at the same time seizes hold of something already existent, and points it to that to 
 which its own direction points. It seizes upon the subject. For this alone permits of being 
 grasped hold by the ideal power of values. The rest of existence is dull and dead to the 
 call of the ideal. It does not “hear” it, it lack intuitive rationality. (ibid., 257) 
 
There has to be something in this, the actual world, “our” world, to which the call of 
values is addressed, to whom the disparate condition of this world with respect to how 
things ought-to-be is graspable.602 The rest of existence is “dull and dead” to this call and 
unable to “hear” it.603  
 We might recapitulate Hartmann’s point here in terms of the transcendental 
properties of being, especially given the role that Aquinas’s account of truth as a 
transcendental has played in our investigation. Values are. They “have” being. As such, 
they are true, i.e., intelligible. Accordingly, we cannot endorse the existence of a state of 
                                                        
602 To those who question that the “world of values” is a world, I would say that nothing hangs on the 
formulation of my argument in terms of worlds. My main contention, adapting Hartmann, is that the ought-
to-be of values (i.e., the normativity of values) requires an entity that is able to grasp the disparateness 
between the world as it actually is, and the world as it ought to be—e.g., by grasping ways in which it falls 
short of exemplifying certain values or ways in which it exemplifies disvalues. This is not even necessarily 
to claim that values, insofar as they are values, require the existence of persons. Rather, the claim is that the 
normativity of values (or values qua norms) require the existence of persons. As such, we can endorse (with 
von Hildebrand) the claim that anything that is a necessary condition for some value is itself a value. But 
this does not entail, on my view, that such necessary conditions are themselves normative in the absence of 
persons.  
603 We can relate these claims back to Scheler’s insistence on the singular importance of exemplars for the 
moral improvement of persons by saying that persons serve values in this way (lending their “real power” 
to the merely “ideal power” of values) through being exemplars to others (whether they intend to or not). In 
a related vein, White (2005, 65) writes, “Value is effective in history when persons love that value and are 
moved and changed by virtue of it. Exemplary persons, by manifesting values, effect change in history by 
inspiring others to love the same values that they embody and to live accordingly: it is their value-being 
which is effective in history, by awakening love and admiration in others.” 
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affairs in which there are values, but they are wholly and utterly unintelligible. If there 
are values, then they must be at least potentially intelligible. This potential intelligibility 
required a potential intellection (or, more broadly, reception) of the values in question. 
This potential intellection/reception contrasts with the dull, dead, and deaf character of an 
utterly non-personal world. Accordingly, values require beings with the potentiality to 
grasp them, just as truth (in general) requires the existence of intellectual beings.604  
 In addition to the transcendentality of truth playing a role here, there is also 
implicit in Hartmann’s argument the transcendentality of activity. This transcendental—
not on the classic Scholastic lists—is one that Clarke (1994a) has argued, convincingly, 
belongs on those lists. Since the hour is late, we shall have to make do with a brief gloss 
of Clarke’s argument, which turns on the Medieval adage operari sequitur esse (to 
operate follows upon being). It is through this characteristic operation that we come to 
know the agent in his being. Accordingly, activity is the self-revelation of being. Now, 
consider an entity that did not manifest itself to other entities at all, that never revealed 
itself through its activity. Such a being would make no difference at all to the world, and 
thus might just as well not be. Thus, activity is a transcendental property of being.605  
                                                        
604 Lest this claim be interpreted extravagantly, let me reminder the reader of Aquinas’s meaning. Truth is a 
transcendental property of being. One way in which this has been expressed in modern parlance is by 
saying that truth supervenes on being. But all that is, is ultimately ontologically dependent upon God, Who 
exists necessarily. Hence truth depends ontologically upon God, Who creates all things as they are, fixing 
the measure of their truth. Although the question (seemingly) never arose for Aquinas, it would be 
interesting to ask whether he would accept the dependence of truth upon persons on the assumption of 
atheism. That is, (1) could he countenance a world in which there is no God, but there is truth, and (2) in 
such a world, would truth be dependent on non-divine persons, or would the dependence of truth on 
persons breaks down? I cannot answer these questions here. Indeed, they are, qua questions to pose of 
Aquinas, so exotic that I do not have any firm intuitions. The idea of bracketing the existence of God the 
Creator who establishes the measure of all things isn’t part of Aquinas’s modus operandi as a theologian. 
605 For an overview of Clarke’s argument, on which the preceding summary is based, see (1994a, 45-46). 
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 The “power” of values, which Hartmann speaks of, would be a completely inert 
force (and, hence, not a power at all) if there was nothing to receive its “impulse,” and 
furthermore, no being that could be empowered by his coming to know the values in 
question.606 There must therefore not only be entities able to grasp values, but entities 
able to realize values. For it is characteristic of the activity or operation of values that 
they do not, of themselves, set about creating and fashioning value-laden states of affairs. 
They are utterly dependent, for their activity, upon the cooperating human person. As 
such, in satisfying the transcendental property of activity, they reveal their ontological 
dependence upon persons. 
 In closing, although values are not dependent upon persons in satisfying the 
transcendental property of being things [res] (i.e., they have their essence quite apart 
from any dependence upon persons), they are dependent upon persons for their being-true 
(intelligible) and being-active (activity). In a word, while their “valueness” is not 
ontologically dependent upon persons, the intelligibility and power of that valueness, 
without which it would be unknown and totally inert in our world, is ontologically 
dependent upon persons. In this way, applying Aquinas’s doctrine of the transcendentals 
is the key to understanding the way in which values are, and are not, dependent on 
persons, the better to grasping how, in their objective relationship with persons, they are 
not merely relative to person.607 
                                                        
606 For example, the empowerment that Stein attributes to grasping values and the exchange of social 
attitudes and acts. 
607 For the sake of completeness, I should note two further, mundane senses of ontological dependence that 
can be found in von Hildebrand’s Ethics: (1) moral values depend upon the person insofar as the person is 
the bearer of moral values ([1953] 1972, 169); (2) the value of value-responses depends on the existence of 
the human person who makes the response (ibid., 353). 
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 (3) Dependence on freedom. Building upon the observation (just made) that 
values are impotent in themselves and depend upon the person for their agency and 
power, we can also say that values are metaphysically dependent upon persons qua 
beings endowed with freedom. Recall von Hildebrand’s description of values as 
appealing in a “sovereign” way to our “free spiritual centers.” The call of values heard in 
our grasping them is not at all an obtrusive call that seeks to undermine our freedom and 
reduce us to the level of a slave. As such, this character of the call of values is dependent 
upon the freedom of persons, without which their appeal would not be possible.  
 In addition to being dependent upon us for our free activity (what von Hildebrand 
calls our direct freedom in the sphere of the will), values also depend upon what von 
Hildebrand calls our “cooperative freedom,” by which we sanction the movement of 
values within ourselves (namely, being-affected and affectively responding). This 
personally-sanctioned value-response is what, throughout his work, von Hildebrand 
refers to as the gift of one’s “inner word” to some value (see, e.g., ibid., 239, 287). These 
sanctioned gifts are, in turn, are “only possible as a ‘concerting’ with the world of values, 
in the last analysis with God [and] can only take place when sustained by the logos of the 
world of values” (ibid., 327, cf. 337). This harmony of the actual world and the world of 
values is therefore something that occurs in the hearts of persons and is, therefore, 
metaphysically dependent upon the person and her freedom. 
3 Recap: How the Person-Value Relationships Give Us Normativity 
 How, then, does the dependency of persons upon values give us the normativity 
of values and, with it, the normativity of truth in particular? There are two answers to this 
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question that track, respectively, the resting-points of chapter IV and the present chapter. 
The resting-point of chapter IV was with what, deploying the terminology of the present 
chapter, we can call the point of view of the objectively good for the person. In accepting 
the conclusions of chapter IV, one effectively enters upon the “bridge” of the OGPP. One 
sees that there is a certain good (friendship) that answers to his being-a-person, grasps 
that truth stands in certain relationships to that good (and his person), and so comes to 
understand (and, moreover, accept) that truth is a norm. Such a person grasps the 
normativity of truth and sanctions it. But, crucially, he grasps and sanctions it only 
insofar as he sees it in reference to his own personhood, and the realization of that 
personhood. What gives us normativity, then, at this first resting-point, is the response 
that one has made to one’s own value as an individual person, and the care that one takes 
in that personhood.608 In this respect, the first answer bears a certain affinity with 
Zagzebski’s account of the truth-norm in terms of care, which we discussed in chapter III. 
 The deeper answer, though, is the one that is obtained and realized once you have 
crossed over to the point of view of values in a decisive way. When you come to see how 
values are for the person, and persons are for values, you come to grasp the normativity 
of values. If, as I have been maintaining throughout this investigation, norms are 
disclosed as norms-for, then we understand the normativity of the norm-giving class once 
we uncover how the norm-giving class is for the norm-given class. It is this 
                                                        
608 This is the “normativity of personhood” that Kelly (2011, 197-198) argues is a feature of ethical 
personalism.  
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understanding that furnishes an answer to the normative question in general, and the 
doxastic normative question in particular. 
 However, as discussed both in this chapter, and at the outset of chapter IV, this 
method of answering the normative question in terms of values (a) through considering 
them as objective goods for the person, and (b) through considering the for-structure of 
values and persons is neither von Hildebrand’s method, nor is it clearly the method of any 
other personalist considered in this investigation. It might be argued that I am simply 
uncovering the structure of the relationship between persons and values, such that value-
perception, as described by Scheler, von Hildebrand, and Stein, is possible. Normativity, 
on such a tentative view, would find its source in that which makes possible the division 
between the norm-giving and the norm-given, namely the “for”-structure that obtains 
between persons and values. It is through uncovering this structure that the present 
investigation hopes to constitute not only a creative retrieval of the personalists, but also 
a step toward a creative completion. 
 It is also to be hoped that what we have here is an “explanation without 
reduction” that remains faithful to the deep insights of personalism while still seeking to 
address the (doxastic) normative question on its terms, and in a way that avoids the 
problems of the normativist and teleological accounts. If the foregoing account rings true, 
then we should have before us an answer that is neither a story about the brute 
normativity of values (an account that would be all-too-akin to normativism) nor a brutal 
reduction of values to the merely instrumental (an account that would be no different than 
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the teleologist’s position). In short, my answer to the doxastic normative question has 
striven to be neither brute nor brutal.  
4 Conclusion: Revisiting the Desiderata of Chapter III 
 It is now time to conclude this investigation by returning to the desiderata 
articulated in chapter III, to see how the account that has developed since the end of 
chapter III measures up to them. Some of the elements of this assessment have already 
been touched upon in the last section, and in the introduction of this chapter. It remains to 
bring these threads together, complete them, and bring this work to a close. 
 (1) It must make intelligible the fact that we care about belief, as I have presented 
it, and that we therefore care about the norms of belief. There are two ways in which the 
account satisfies this desideratum. The first is found in chapter IV. Truth is related to 
friendship in three intimate ways. It is necessary for friendship, concomitant with 
friendship, and a consequence of friendship. In making intelligible the fact that we care 
about truth, the account makes intelligible the fact that we care about belief, which is 
itself a commitment to some truth.609  
 The gist of this first answer is that it makes sense of caring about belief by 
showing how truth is an OGP and how belief, as presented in chapter I, section 6, is 
related to that OGP. The second, more general answer (presented in this chapter) is to 
                                                        
609 It may be wondered whether what we care about in this context is actually belief, as opposed to, say, 
knowledge. My response takes the former of a dilemma. If you accept a broadly JTB account of 
knowledge, whereupon knowing that p entails believing that p, then caring about knowledge seems to entail 
caring about believing. But if you accept a more robust distinction between belief and knowledge, 
whereupon believing involves the will, commitment, and a disposition to deeper understanding and the 
upbuilding of others, then the worry about knowledge is a non-starter.  
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make sense of caring about belief by showing how truth, qua value, is related to the 
realization of human personhood. From within the OGPP, we come to care about belief 
insofar as it is related to the value of our personhood. Later on, from within the VP, 
caring about truth is explained as the result of coming to grasp its intrinsic importance, as 
something that we could not fail (at least, from within the VP) to care about. 
  (2) It must not make the mistake of invoking the epistemic point of view, or some 
sui generis category of epistemic value. It should be clear from the foregoing that I do not 
invoke the “epistemic point of view” or the notion of a category of “epistemic values.” 
Truth is a value, alongside others, and an explanation is provided of the relationship 
between values and the human person. Indeed, the account of the normativity of truth that 
has been developed here is not merely “epistemic” normativity. Rather, the normativity 
that attaches to items of interest to the epistemology (preeminently, in this investigation, 
belief) has been incorporated into a more general (and generous) normative framework. 
 (3) It must relate, in a meaningful way, to the subject of the normativity of truth—
the human person. My account relates meaningfully to the human person. This is 
exemplified both in chapter IV, with the focus on truth as an objective good for the 
person, and the elucidation of truth as related to the structure of personal being as 
intrinsically relational. It is also exemplified in this chapter, through the elucidation of the 
“for”-structure, that obtains between persons and values.  
 (4) It must do so in a way that gets the relation to the person right. A purely 
instrumental understanding is not adequate. In the last section, we saw that the account 
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provided does not reduce the normativity of truth to instrumental normativity, or to 
bearing a merely instrumental relationship to the human person. 
 (4a) It must do so in a way that gets the scope of doxastic normativity right, i.e., it 
must secure the applicability of norms of belief in a way that is stronger than what is 
secured by TI (the teleological/instrumentalist account), though not so strong as to entail 
universalism in the second sense of the word. The foregoing account does not have the 
result that one’s evidence (as that word is roughly understood in analytic epistemology) 
automatically gives rise to a reason to believe any given proposition p. By situating the 
normativity of truth within the hierarchy of objective goods for the person, and values, 
we see that, in the concrete circumstances of life, evidence all by itself is not going to 
entail an obligation to believe in cases where a higher good or value is at stake. For 
example, there might be cases in which we shouldn’t believe that p, even if p is true and 
we would be justified in believing p, because our moral goodness would be imperiled. 
We already got a taste of this in reviewing Aquinas’s discussion of curiosity. By and 
large and for the most part, one ought to believe the truth. Truth is an objective good and 
a value. It is intimately related to many other such goods and values. As such, having true 
beliefs is intimately related to many other goods and values. But this doesn’t mean that an 
obligation to believe arises simply in virtue of having certain evidence in one’s hands. 
 On a final note, let me say that I consider a large part of the “evidence” for the 
conclusions arrived at throughout the course of this investigation to be that they “ring 
true” to our experience as human persons. That is, these truths are such that—by and 
large, and for the most part—we already implicitly know or understand them in virtue of 
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being persons. It is one of the tasks of philosophy to make this understanding explicit and 
to bring to light the truth of the human person. Such philosophy hopes to be not merely 
informative, in elucidating a theoretical understanding of something implicitly known, 
but also edifying, in highlighting the truth about what we can and ought to be, and calling 
attention to the ways in which our current forms of life (what we call “friendship,” 
“belief”) are pale imitations of the genuine article. Like G.K. Chesterton, I set out, 
alongside the dominant accounts of the normativity of truth, to “found a heresy of my 
own.” Like Chesterton, “when I had put the last touches to it, I discovered that it was 
orthodoxy.” And the orthodoxy in question is that truth is orthos doxa and we can 
understand why. 
 The radical orthodoxy and heretical commonsense of the foregoing proposal, 
however, is fraught with a deadly peril. In a milieu that, among other things, makes the 
account seem “revisionary” and “radical,” there is the risk that the very experience of 
ourselves and the world in which we live is so fallen that the conclusions drawn in this 
investigation will not ring true, and will thus fall on deaf ears. If this is so, then it should 
only reinforce the necessity of laboring to remind humanity of these truths, to surmount 
the familiarity with personhood that (as the proverb goes) breeds contempt. We can only 
believe (or is it hope?) that “the natural law can in no way be blotted out from the hearts 
of men.” 610 We can only believe (or is it keep faith?) that “man’s true vocation, even if 
throttled, will inevitably manifest itself.”611 
                                                        
610 ST IaIIae, q. 94, a. 6, resp. 
611 Sciacca (1960, 111). 
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Appendix I: Truth as an Issue for the Human Person 
 In this appendix, I continue the discussion that began in the introduction (§ 0.3). 
To remind the reader, in that section I considered the challenge, thrown down by Marcel, 
to account for truth as a value—as something “at stake” for us and for which we might 
lay down our lives (as other have in the past). Marcel thinks that we cannot make sense of 
this aspect of truth by considering a definition of truth such as Aquinas’s adaequatio 
formulation and, as such, argues that there exists a fundamental ambiguity in the notion 
of truth. In this appendix, I briefly continue the development of three ways in which we 
can respond on Aquinas’s behalf—three ways, that is, in which Aquinas implicitly draws 
out the existential significance of truth as the adaequatio intellectus et rei. These 
responses should also, if successful, mitigate Marcel’s alleged ambiguity of truth, and 
provide a blueprint for how we can capture what I called the “existential pathos” of truth 
without surrendering a robustly “objective” account of truth—without, that is, embracing 
a Kiekegaardian account of truth as subjectivity.  
1 Truth and communication 
 It is a general principle of Thomistic metaphysics that everything communicates 
itself insofar as it is “in act.”612 This natural communication of being is a central theme in 
the work of Norris Clarke, who worked to bring this principle—which can be found 
throughout the Thomistic corpus, but which is never explicitly thematized by Aquinas—
to the forefront. As both Clarke (1993, 90-92) and (1994a), and Aertsen (1996, 264) 
                                                        
612 For an explicit formulation of this point, see Aquinas’s Questiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei, q. 2, a. 1, 
resp.; cf. ST, Ia, q. 19, a. 2, resp. 
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illustrate, this communication-in-act is what makes possible the knowledge of things. To 
put this into the language of Aquinas’s theory of truth, this natural communication of 
being is part of what makes logical truth possible in the first place.  Actuality, as Aertsen 
(1996, 264) says, is the ground of both knowability and being in Thomistic philosophy.  
 What is disclosed in the natural communication of being? Clarke, citing Aquinas, 
says that what is thus disclosed is the essence, or what-it-is, of the thing that is doing the 
“communicating” (1994a, 54-55). Since operation follows upon the being of a thing, a 
thing’s action points to its essence, disclosing the sort of thing that it is. This 
metaphysical-epistemological principle is summed up in the terse Medieval formula: 
operari sequitur esse. What is called the “second act” of a thing (its characteristic 
operation (operatio)) follows upon its “first act” (the act of existence (esse) of that thing).  
 In a more general way, what it disclosed is not only the essences of things, but the 
truth of things. It is the act of being, as Aertsen (1996, 264) says, that underlies that truth 
of all things. Without this natural communication-in-act, we could not speak of 
transcendental truth as the ordination of things to the intellect. For this reason, Clarke 
(1994a) even goes so far as to argue that activity ought to be given a place with the other 
transcendentals. If all that is, is true only insofar as it is in act, and if activity expresses a 
mode of being that is not captured by the word “being,” then activity is a transcendental.  
 There are interesting questions here relating to the exact details of how action 
reveals the essence of a thing, and how this is to be reconciled with Aquinas’s own less-
than-sanguine assessment of the human intellect’s ability to know completely the 
essences of things (cf. In symbolum apostolorum, Prologue). Since these are not of 
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concern for the present discussion, I set them aside. What I am interested in is rather how 
this natural communication of being is enacted at the personal level. At the subpersonal 
level, the communication of things through activity is more or less determined by the 
essence of the thing in question. Characteristic action follows from the essence of the 
thing in question and indicates to us the sort of thing that it is. We learn what things are 
through what they do. 
 But, as has been often observed, persons are not merely specimens of a given 
species, who are known simply by knowing that they are specimens of homo sapiens. 
Persons are not merely “whats,” but “whos.” Their communication is self-communication 
and has the ability to disclose not only what they are (human beings) but also who they 
are (as individual human persons).613 In other words, such self-communication takes on 
the characteristic of any other personal act (the actus humanus of Aquinas). Unlike the 
mere act of a man (actus hominis), a human act is the manifestation of the person as a 
rational being, one who is not determined to act in such-and-such a way, but who chooses 
to do so on the basis of reason. In fact, since it is the very essence of human beings to be 
rational, it would appear that only in such free, rational activity, can a human being reveal 
himself as human to others. But since these same free, rational acts also reveal who he is, 
the human person is an entity who is able simultaneously to reveal the sort of entity that 
he is and the individual person that he is.  
                                                        
613 There is a controversy here surrounding the supposed incommunicability of the person, and what exactly 
this means. But however we interpret this metaphysically, I think that, epistemologically, it is false to 
assume that it means that persons cannot disclose who they are, as unique unrepeatable persons to others, 
especially to those whom they love. 
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 The self-communication of the truth of oneself is thus an activity that can be taken 
up by the person in his capacity as dominus sui. The human person is not determined to 
reveal himself, nor is he determined to reveal himself as he really is. Here, Aquinas’s 
discussion of the falsity of things is apropos (De Ver. q. 1, a. 10; ST Ia, q. 17, a. 1). 
Aquinas says that there is no falsity in things insofar as they are related to the divine 
intellect. But insofar as they are related to other, non-divine (specifically human) 
intellects, there can be falsity in things. Falsity is “accidentally” in a thing when that 
thing is such as to tend, by the manifestation of certain sensible qualities, to cause us to 
have a false opinion of it. Aquinas gives the example of fool’s gold. By the manifestation 
of sensible qualities that typically indicate the presence of gold, fool’s gold tends to cause 
us to have a false opinion: namely, that the sample of fool’s gold is real gold (gold “in 
truth”).  
 If falsity can thus be said to be in things (such as fool’s gold), a fortiori it can be 
said to be in persons. In fact, in the case of persons, it seems to be even more appropriate 
to speak of falsity, insofar as persons cause false opinions in others not merely 
accidentally, but also deliberately. Human persons do not merely tend to cause false 
opinion in others by the presence of certain accidental sensible qualities, as, e.g., the 
woman who dyes her hair blond tends to cause a false opinion in others that she is a 
natural blonde. They also cause false opinions to the extent that they communicate 
themselves falsely to others, and so act to bring about such errors. 
 Human persons are thus not only beings for whom the reception of truth from 
things is possible, but also those beings for whom the communication of truth 
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(understood as an actus humanus) is possible. Furthermore, as with reception, the human 
person is that being for whom reception and communication are not merely natural, 
deterministic acts. We can undermine and thwart, as well as enhance and enable, our 
potential for receiving and communicating the truth. We can also go a step further and act 
so as to falsify what we receive and communicate. 
 We can also see this by keeping in mind how we, qua beings endowed with 
ontological truth, serve as the measures of the intellects of others. The ability of others to 
relate to us by logical truth is, in part, a matter of our allowing it. By being-false, we 
uproot the possibility that others can relate to us by logical truth and, in turn, uproot the 
possibility of any other relationships (e.g., relationships of love) that depend upon a 
relationship of logical truth. In other words, human persons have the capacity to serve as 
spoilers of the truth. In a sense, then, while it seems that we have no choice about 
revealing ourselves where this taken to be content-independent, we are not doomed to 
reveal ourselves as who we really are. Dissimulation is always a possibility, as are lying, 
boasting, hypocrisy, and irony.614 Furthermore, it may be the case that we even have the 
ability to falsify the communication of what we are. We are able, that is, to live in such a 
way as to depersonalize ourselves and reduce persons to mere things (in the pejorative 
sense of “thing”). Whether this is ultimately possible or not, I cannot say here.615 We may 
not be able ever to completely shed the revelation of ourselves as persons, but we can 
                                                        
614 The aforementioned vices contrary to truthfulness (see ST IIaIIae, qq. 110-113). 
615 Marcel thought so, since we live in a world where “techniques of degradation” are able to bring about a 
state of affairs in which a material view of the person comes to be the “truth” (see Marcel [1952] 2008, 13-
14). 
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sure bring into being a world in which it is harder and harder to tell the difference 
between persons and non-persons. 
2 Truth and passion 
 In addition to being an existential issue for the human person through the capacity 
of the person for being-true and being-false in matters of the reception and 
communication of the truth, truth is also an issue for the human person insofar as it can 
be an object of passion.616 Aquinas specifically discusses how particular truths can be an 
object of hatred (ST IaIIae, q. 29, a. 6, resp.).  
 It is interesting that Aquinas uses his threefold distinction among ways of defining 
the nature of truth from the De Veritate to articulate, in the Summa theologiae, three ways 
in which particular truths can be hated by human persons. I discussed the three ways of 
defining truth in the introduction (§ 0.2). According to the first, truth refers to the 
foundation or basis of truth in things. To hate truths in this sense is to hate that things are 
the way they are. As Aquinas has it, we hate such truths because they are “repugnant or 
hurtful” to some good that we love. We might hate that North Korea has nuclear 
weapons, that Trump is president, that Clinton was the Democrat’s nominee, on account 
                                                        
616 According to Aquinas, a passion is a receptivity. Receptivity can either be said in a general sense (in 
which case it might even be perfective of the being in question) or in two particular senses. The first of 
these is when the patient receives something suitable to it (e.g., health) and loses something unsuitable to it 
(e.g., sickness). The second particular sense is the reverse: the patient receives something unsuitable to it, 
and loses something suitable (ST IaIIae, q. 22, a. 1, resp.). More specifically, a passion is a movement of 
the (sensitive) appetitive power of the soul (ibid., aa. 2-3). Passion is thus not entirely akin to “emotion,” 
“affect,” or “affectivity” as used by personalist philosophers. Von Hildebrand, for one, argues against the 
attempt to squeeze all affectivity into the narrower notion of the passiones (2017, 542). Such a reduction of 
affectivity to passion rinses out the active character of affectivity, as disposing or preparing oneself to 
receive someone or something (cf. Marcel [1950] 2001a, 117-118). As we shall see below, however, 
Aquinas’s description of the passion of hatred (specifically, hatred of truths) lends itself to being developed 
into a more active, affective notion.   
 547 
 
of the repugnance or hurtfulness of these truths to some good that we love—namely our 
country.  
 According to the second type of definition, we consider truth in its formally 
complete nature, i.e., in relation to that which in which it primarily resides: the intellect. 
Hatred of truths in this sense occurs when someone hates some truth as known by him. 
Aquinas’s example of this sort of case is that of a person who wishes to commit some 
morally sinful action, and hates the truth (known by him) that doing so is sinful. In such 
cases, the hatred of the truths in question comes down to their “getting in the way” of 
what we want to do. We want to be able to sin in peace, but we cannot do so, so long as 
we know that what we are doing is wrong.  
 Finally, the third type of definition concerns truth as the manifestation of what is. 
Hatred of truths as manifestations of what is occurs when someone hates some truth as 
known by another. This is especially the case when the truth in question is about oneself. 
Aquinas’s example of this hatred is of a man who hates that some sin of his is known by 
another, so that he cannot remain hidden in his sinfulness. This is a particularly 
significant example in light of the discussion of falsity above. The hatred of truths in this 
third sense is related to the human capacity for falsity in their self-communication to 
others. We can keep things back about ourselves, and even pass ourselves off as 
someone, or something, that we aren’t. But we aren’t necessarily successful at this. As a 
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result, sometimes certain truths about ourselves are “outed” to others, and we hate these 
truths as the manifestations, or proclamations, that we are such-and-such.617  
 Of course, there may be other senses in which particular truths are hated, and it 
may be that truth is also the object of other passions, e.g., love. It certainly seems that we 
can love truths in the same way in which we hate truths. We can love that things are the 
way they are. We can love some truth as “residing” in our intellect. We can love some 
truth as manifesting the way things are. In fact, since Aquinas thinks that hatred, as a 
passion, is somehow parasitic upon the passion of love, it might even be necessary that 
the hatred of truths presupposes the love of truths (ST IaIIae, q. 29, a. 3, resp.). 
 We can apply these insights of Aquinas regarding the hatred (and therefore, also, 
the love) of particular truths to see how one might hate truth qua truth (and, therefore, 
love truth qua truth). First, we might hate that there is truth or, in other words, we might 
hate that there is a way that things are. More specifically, we might hate that truth 
measures our intellects, and that we are not ourselves the measure of truth. Correlatively, 
we might speak of a love that there is truth, or a love that things are intelligible. As 
Marcel puts it, what we call the love of truth “may be a sort of mysterious joy in moving 
against this intelligible background, within this intelligible setting” ([1950] 2001a, 76). It 
is through the notions of intelligibility, measure, and (to use Stein’s word) ordination of 
intellect-to-thing that truth qua truth can become for us an object of love or hatred. We 
                                                        
617 Aquinas’s discussion of the hatred of truth seems to fit nicely with Scheler’s treatment of ressentiment 
(Scheler 1998).  
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can love that there is a truth of things and a truth of intellects, just as much as we can hate 
that there is a truth of things (that measures) the truth of our intellects.  
 Second, we might hate truth in general as residing in our intellects. This is akin to 
the hatred of truth as a measure of our intellects mentioned in the last paragraph. This 
hatred seems to have for its object the relationship of accidental logical truth, which runs 
from the truth of things to the truth of the human intellect. It is a hatred that the intellect 
is subservient to the truth, that it must be humble and silent before the truth, and that truth 
is not something of its own devising and original activity. This sort of hatred is related to 
what von Hildebrand calls “satanic pride” ([1953] 1972, 442-44; [1948] 2011, 151-55). 
The satanically proud person abhors any kind of submission or obedience, which 
submissive obedience is (or ought to be) precisely the attitude of the human intellect 
before the truth of things.618 The person who hates truth in this sense hates, to use 
Aquinas’s terminology, that he relates to things by accidental logical truth and not 
essential logical truth. His perfection as an intellectual being is utterly dependent on 
something entirely outside of his control—namely that things exist (esse) and have a 
determinate essence (essentia) that he did not bestow. 
 Thirdly, we can hate the truth qua truth insofar as truth is, in the words of Hilary, 
the manifestation, or proclamation, of what is. Aligning this more closely with the third 
type of hatred of particular truths identified by Aquinas, we might also describe this third 
                                                        
618 This submission before the truth is most dramatically captured in the words of St. Paul: “And every 
height that exhalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every understanding 
unto the obedience of Christ” (2 Cor. 10:5). Bearing in mind the words of Christ: “I am the Way, and the 
Truth, and the Life” (John 14:6). 
 550 
 
type of hatred of truth qua truth as the hatred of truth as being able to reside in the 
intellects of others. That is, one might be jealous of the truth as residing in others, as 
known by others. While, of course, the differing conditions of persons mean that some 
things are intelligible to some persons, but not intelligible to others, nevertheless truth 
itself—the ontological truth of things, and the ordination of the human intellect to that 
truth—is open to all persons in principle. Correlatively, we might love truth precisely 
because of this—because truth does not discriminate, but is open and accessible to all, in 
principle. This hatred, too, seems to be related to pride. Specifically, it seems related to 
the kind of pride that manifests itself in a disregard for anything that is common and open 
to all. This is, for a mundane example, the sort of pride had by those who will not join 
certain clubs or societies unless their membership is exclusive and entitles the person to 
some esoteric “knowledge.” It is the sort of pride that confuses the common with the 
vulgar, from which it holds itself aloof.619  
 Truth as an object of the passions of love and hate relates, in all three of its 
dimensions, to the pride or humility of the person in question. In general, pride (of one 
sort or another) is aligned with one or more of the ways in which truth in general can be 
an object of hatred, just as humility is aligned with one or more ways in which the truth 
in general can be an object of love.  
 Beyond this, we might also bear in mind the wider notion of truth at issue in 
Aquinas, including, as it does, not only the truth of doctrine, but also the truth of life. In 
                                                        
619 I suspect that this sort of pride might be exhibited by certain academics who cannot bear being proven 
wrong by the “unlearned” or “common” man. 
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this sense, also, truth may be said to be an object of hatred and love. A person may love 
the truth of life, as expressing the measure of what she ought to be. In this connection, we 
might call to mind a phrase of Pope St. John Paul II, who often spoke of the truth about 
man. We might love, or hate, that there is such a truth. Again, the notion of truth as a 
measure is operative. What we hate, or love, is the fact that there is an intelligible rule by 
which we ought to live our lives as human persons, or, alternately, that there is an 
intelligible exemplar of personhood. The notion of an exemplar, or exemplary cause, is 
one that Aertsen (1996, 44-47, 255, 274) links up with truth in his examination of the 
transcendentals. With the transcendental of truth, there is a relation to the exemplary 
form, according to Aquinas (ibid., 274). The truth of the intellect has, for its “cause,” the 
ontological truth, as exemplar and foundation of logical truth (ibid., 255). Ultimately, this 
is referred to the divine intellect, which is the exemplar and foundation of all that is. For a 
Christian such as Aquinas, the ultimate exemplar will be the person of Jesus Christ—
recall again the words of the Gospel: I am the Way, and the Truth, and the Life. 
 What we might also love, or hate, in the truth of life (or the truth about man) is the 
sense that our deepest beatitude as persons requires that we surrender to this truth—to 
that to which we are called. (This notion of a calling, or vocation, was mentioned in the 
introduction as an extension of the truth of life to the individual human person, as well as 
in chapter V.) To recall another Gospel passage, “The truth shall make you free” (John 
8:32). Freedom not in the sense to do whatsoever you would, but freedom for the deepest 
realization of your value as a human person, and the actualization of all the potential of 
that personhood. To love this truth is the life of the saints. To hate it is to hate that one’s 
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happiness, realization, and actualization depend upon receiving and living according to a 
truth that is not of one’s own fashioning.  
 These reflections upon the thought of Aquinas indicate just some of the ways in 
which particular truths, and truth qua truth, can be an object of hatred and love. Much 
more could be said, of course, but these observations hopefully suffice as a down-
payment on the full existential value of Aquinas’s theory of truth as an object of human 
passion. 
3 Truth and justice 
 Finally, I wish briefly to draw attention to the relationship between truth and 
justice in Aquinas. Truth (or truthfulness) is a special virtue according to Aquinas, one 
that falls under the cardinal virtue of justice. Truth in this sense is a debt that we owe our 
fellow persons. Aquinas says that, “one man owes another a manifestation of the truth” 
(ST IIaIIae, q. 109, a. 3, resp.). Referring specifically to the “truth of life,” Aquinas more 
explicitly describes truth as that “whereby a man, both in life and in speech, shows 
himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern him, not other, and neither greater 
nor less, than they are” (ibid., ad 3). This in turn hearkens back to the discussion of truth 
in the Prima Pars, where Aquinas acknowledges that truth is that “according to which 
man shows himself in deed and word as he really is” (ST Ia, q. 16, a. 4, ad 3).620  
                                                        
620 This aspect of truth is also related to pride and humility. The truthful person does not exhibit pride, for 
this would be to distort his manifestation of himself. However, humility itself must also be governed by the 
truth, lest the person wrongfully (and erroneously) denigrate himself. Aquinas gives the example of 
someone who “not understanding his honor, compares himself to senseless beasts” (ST IIaIIae, q. 161, a. 1, 
ad 1, quoting Ps 48:13). Rephrased positively, we might say that this is the case of someone who, not 
understanding the honor of personhood, treats himself as a non-person. This would a false, and harmful, 
pseudo-humility. I should also note that here, and above, I was inspired to think about truth in connection 
with pride and humility through close readings of Dahlstrom (2017). 
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 This is not an equivocation on Aquinas’s part. While the virtue of truth (or 
truthfulness) is not the same as truth per se, what it owed by all persons, and what is 
given by the virtuous (and therefore truthful) man is the truth per se. This is another 
example of the third type of definition of truth: truth as manifestation. Because persons 
are those entities capable of deliberately communicating to others, we are also those 
entities capable of doing so virtuously (truthfully) or viciously (falsely). Furthermore, 
since we are capable of such communication, we are also what Sokolowski calls “agents 
of the truth” (2006a, 170-73; 2006b, 205; 2007, 43ff). According to Sokolowski, we are 
agents of truth through our ability to reveal and express the truth (2007, 43). Furthermore, 
when we use declarative sentences to reveal and express the way things are, we express a 
certain kind of responsibility and indicate to others that we can be counted on as agents of 
the truth (2007, 47-48).621 
 This designation of the person as an agent of truth dovetails nicely with Aquinas’s 
account of truth as a manifestation that is morally owed to other persons. In acting as 
agents of truth in interpersonal communication, we take upon ourselves a responsibility 
to communicate in a just manner, to properly relate to other persons as also being agents 
of truth in their own right. The responsibility that Sokolowski identifies as being 
expressed by the use of declarative sentences can be identified with the debt of truth that 
is incurred (and paid) by the just man according to Aquinas. Truth is thus not only an 
                                                        
621 In Sokolowski’s analysis, this expression of responsibility indicates that the agent of truth in question 
has exercised a fourfold freedom: (1) freedom to tell the truth, (2) a freedom from the excessive love of 
one’s own opinions and the freedom to learn from others (docility), (3) a freedom to pay attention, and (4) a 
willingness to face and accept the truth (ibid., 48). 
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issue in the internal life of the person, as an object of his (more-or-less well-governed) 
passions, but also an issue in his interpersonal relationships, the perfection of which is the 
work of the virtue of justice.622 Summing up, we can say that truth is an issue for the 
person both as an individual with an interior life (truth as an object of passion), but also 
insofar as persons exist in communion with other persons (truth and communication, 
truth and justice). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
622 See ST IIaIIae, q. 58, a. 2, resp., where Aquinas argues that justice is essentially a virtue that regards 
another being capable of action. 
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Appendix II: The Formulation Problem 
1 Some Observations, New and Old 
 In the main text, I noted that my positive suggestions regarding the formulation of 
the content of the truth-norm were not quite so straightforward, as I had not taken account 
of what I said in the discussion of Gibbons’s puzzle, in chapter II. In this appendix, I will 
expand upon this. 
 First, however, I wish to make (or reiterate the spirit of) a few comments 
regarding Gibbons’s puzzle, and the separation of truth and reason that it presupposes.  
 The first is that the norm of reason is bound up with the norm of truth, on pain of 
losing the ability to criticize, as bad, and sometimes even as evil, certain ostensibly 
reasonable beliefs.  
 The second point is that reason (broadly speaking to include all three of Aquinas’s 
acts of the mind: abstraction, judgment, and inference) just is how we are able to come to 
the truth. This kind of discursive reason (ratio) is how specifically human persons come 
to know the truth. I cannot here rehearse all the arguments for this claim. It shows up 
against a wider philosophical panorama. Primarily, there is the claim that truth is a 
transcendental property of being, that all that is, is true, which is to say that all being is 
intelligible: essentially and actually so to the Divine Intellect, accidentally and potentially 
so to all other intellects. Secondarily, there is the insistence that we come to understand 
the act of knowledge by reflecting upon the mode of being of the knower. For the human 
person as a “composite” being, as both intellectual and embodied, discursive reason 
according to the three acts of the mind is the corresponding mode of knowing. By way of 
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contrast, God knows all things through His essence, and the angelic persons know all 
things by way of intuition.623 Which intuition, it bears pointing out, we persons 
sometimes participate (see Pieper [1963] 2009a, 28-9). This intuitive mode of knowledge, 
which the medieval called intellectus as opposed to ratio, is “that simple vision to which 
truth offers itself like a landscape to the eye” (ibid.).  
 Thirdly, such a picture does not entail that we are infallible. Aquinas is not at all 
sanguine in this regard, especially when it comes to the knowledge of God. Recall his 
remark that we do not even completely understand the essence of a little fly.  
 Finally, to make a point not properly emphasized above, I think that it is mistaken 
to think of propositions as something “out there” in the world, over which formulations 
of the truth-norm quantify. Consider, e.g., one popular objection to a simple version of 
the truth, viz.: 
 (Simple) "p (You ought to believe that p « p is true) 
 It is suggested by many that this cannot be right—after all, it is not as though you 
have an obligation to every single proposition that exists, to believe each and every one 
of them, and not only the “atomic” propositions, but the molecular ones (i.e., those 
formed by the operation of logical connectives) as well.624  
 The force of this problem is diminished, when you realize that “p” refers to those 
propositions that you have “formed,” or else to those that have been presented to you, 
formed by others (or else, as below, when you quantify over beliefs instead of 
                                                        
623 See, for God’s knowledge according to Aquinas, ST Ia, q. 14; SCG l. 1, cc. 46-71; De Ver. q. 2. See, for 
the knowledge of angels according to Aquinas, ST Ia, qq. 54-58; De Ver. q. 8. 
624 For but one influential exponent of this claim, see Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007).  
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propositions). Incidentally, with this provision in place, one can maintain that the simple 
formulation of the truth-norm is coextensive with Wedgwood’s (2002) formulation of the 
truth-norm, whereon the class of propositions at issue is restricted to those that one is 
actually considering.  
 Of course, such an understanding as I have just presented, or such as Wedgwood 
has argued for, has been attacked on the grounds that it does not actually command us to 
“pursue the truth,” and surely this is something that we want the truth-norm to tell us to 
do.625 Again, I think that this is a mistaken demand. Citing Aquinas, I have pressed the 
point (above) that truth is but one good that the human person apprehends in the 
landscape of “good things” for the human person. It is a mistake to think that an explicit 
logical formulation of the truth-norm needs to be designed to tell us to pursue the truth. 
In general, we do not pursue goods because explicit, logically formulated norms bid us do 
so. We pursue goods because we grasp their goodness for us, or else their intrinsic value. 
This hearkens back to the point of Scheler (and also Marcel), cited above and adapted 
thus: it is only in a time where grasp of values has weakened or vanished, that explicit 
norms loom so large. On a historical note, it is worth wondering whether the need to 
formulate the truth-norm could ever have arisen in a time when respect for the truth was 
much higher than it is today. In a philosophical (and popular) age of widespread 
disregard for, or minimization of, the (value of) truth, trying to formulate such a norm is 
like trying to close the stable door after the horse has bolted.  
                                                        
625 See, e.g., Dodd (2013, 142). 
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 Attempting a logical formulation does serve a useful purpose, however, and that is 
to make clear our thoughts regarding the norms of belief—“making explicit,” to adapt 
Brandom’s (1994) language, what is present implicitly, e.g., in the intuitions of T and J 
emphasized by Gibbons (2013). Or, on a more pessimistic note, what is no longer as 
implicit as it once was. 
 Finally, I wish to make a point, one that is no less significant for having been 
made many times before, that a justified belief, that one comes to see his false, forces the 
believer’s hand.626 In terms of my two species of belief-as-commitment, this situation 
forces the believer either to abandon his belief, or to write-off and ignore the reasons that 
tell against its truth. The crucial point is that truth is what is latched onto in either event: 
either we are genuinely committed to the truth, and so abandon the false belief, or else we 
are committed to the truth of our own beliefs, whatever they may be, in which case we 
say, “the evidence be damned.” Truth is the relevant value, and even those who are not 
open to it, still want it, still want their beliefs to be true, for whatever (perhaps even 
nefarious) reasons. 
2 Attempting to Crack the Formulation Problem 
 Bearing in mind these observations and the points made about the asymmetry of 
goodness and evil in Aquinas and Whiting, let us see whether we cannot make a 
provisional attempt at solving the formulation problem. To begin, let us recall the two 
principles that I endorsed above: 
                                                        
626 This is implicit and, in some cases very explicit, in the work of those theorists canvassed by David 
(2001) and Berker (2013) (mentioned above) whereon justification is valued only instrumentally as a 
means to truth, or as truth-conducive. 
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 (1) "p(£Bp ® p) 
 (4) "p(¯Bp ® p) 
 The next thing to bring before our minds is the problem posed by integrating the 
remarks I made on conscience. I imagine that someone wishing to derive an objection 
from this would invoke the following principle: 
 (UJ) "p (Rp ® £Bp)627  
 The problem comes when we look at UJ together with (1), and consider the cases 
that motivated Gibbons, i.e., cases in which p is false, but reason apprehends it as true. 
Applying Aquinas, I have said that a false conscience binds all of the time. However, 
what I deny, also following Aquinas, is that a false conscience always excuses. Bearing 
this in mind, and bearing in mind also that my subsequent points were made, following 
Aquinas and Whiting, in terms of the goodness of believing, we might move to replace 
(1) and (4) with principles about the goodness (GB) and evil (EB) of given beliefs that p: 
 (GB) "b(p) (G[b(p)] « Tp & … )628  
 (EB) "b(p) (E[b(p)] « ~G[b(p)]) 
 One of the circumstances to be inserted into GB is that the belief in question does 
not violate what I have called your intellectual conscience. As we saw, to believe against 
your conscience is always bad, though believing in accordance with your conscience is 
not necessarily good.  
                                                        
627 Read: if p is what reason presents to you as true, then you ought to believe that p. 
628 Where “…” stands in for a formulation of the other elements cited by Aquinas, e.g. circumstances. 
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 (GBC) "b(p) (G[b(p)] « Tp & ~V[b(p)] & …)629 
 Taking on board UJ for purposes of argument, the assumption that needs to be 
made to reconcile this difficulty is thus: 
 (OG) ~"b(p)(£Bp ® G[b(p)])  
 OG says that it is not the case that, for every belief of yours that p, that if you 
were bound to believe that p, then the belief that p is good. To use Aquinas’s example, it 
might be that the unbeliever is bound to believe that Christ is not the Messias. 
Nevertheless, this is surely not a good thing.  
 As I pointed out in passing in the discussion of solutions to the puzzle that 
Gibbons rejects, there are those who would interpret this sort of claim in terms of 
subjective and objective “oughts.” Subjectively, you ought to believe that p, but 
objectively you ought not believe that p. As Gibbons argues, this does not really solve the 
underlying problem. What I have presented here is not a version of that strategy, but a 
distinction in terms of one principle involving “ought” and one involving “good.” Truth 
is part of what makes a given belief good. The next question is whether goodness suffices 
for “ought.” From what has been said, it should be clear that if we have GBC in mind, 
then the answer is “yes,” but if we have GB in mind, without the appropriate 
modification, then the answer is “no.” Goodness entails “ought” only if we include in the 
relevant understanding of goodness a condition that you have not violated your 
conscience in the act. Keeping this together, we get: 
                                                        
629 In these formulation, “G[b(p)]” means “the belief that p is good,” “Tp” means “p is true,” “E[b(p)]” 
means “the belief that p is evil” and “V[b(p)]” means “the belief that p violates your intellectual 
conscience.” 
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 (Final) "b(p) (G[b(p)] ® £Bp)  
 There will be those who object to this formulation, on the grounds that it entails 
that we ought to believe every proposition that it would be good for us to believe, and 
surely that would be unreasonable. In effect, we come back to the opening move of the 
formulation problem. But notice that the formulation quantifies over beliefs. Although I 
have not made this assumption explicit, I think that once again we must restrict our 
attention to actual beliefs, and not “possible beliefs.” If a belief of yours is good, then you 
ought to (go on) believing it, as well as go on “using” it, e.g., as a premise of theoretical 
or practical reasoning, or “being” it, as a constituent of your identity (who you are). If a 
proposition that you are considering (contemplating, inquiring/reasoning about) is such 
that a belief in it would be good, then you should believe it.  
 However, this would not actually tell you to go out and pursue such good beliefs, 
and so once again it seems that we fall on the other horn of the formulation problem: that 
the proposed formulation does not command you to go out and pursue the truth. Since I 
have already made my thoughts clear on this score, I will not reiterate them here, except 
to note, once again, that the pursuit of any good, and a fortiori, of truth, is something that 
is governed by the totality of virtue. Perhaps explicit norms for the pursuit of goods may 
also be logically formulated. Perhaps instead, in grasping the goodness of things, we 
always also grasp them as existing in certain hierarchical relations, on the basis of which 
we impose order on our pursuit of the good.630 Mercifully, such a task is not part of the 
present investigation.  
                                                        
630 For example, the ordo amoris in Scheler and Augustine, and the ordo caritatis in Aquinas. 
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